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Preface 
 
 
This study was commissioned and 
coordinated by the Middle East Project 
(MEP) of the Democracy and Governance 
Programme, a research programme of the 
Human Sciences Research Council of South 
Africa.  
The genesis of this study was the suggestion 
made in January 2007 by Professor John 
Dugard, in his capacity as UN Special 
Rapporteur on the human rights situation in 
the occupied Palestinian territories, that 
Israel’s military occupation displays 
elements of colonialism and apartheid.  The 
Human Sciences Research Council 
commissioned this study to scrutinise 
Professor Dugard’s hypothesis from the 
perspective of international law.   
Over a period of 15 months, the team of 
scholars engaged in extensive research, 
discussion, and rounds of lively debate 
through seven drafts.  The result is the 
consensus represented in this report, offered 
here for public discussion.  Constructive 
criticism is welcomed, in order that 
shortcomings in this document may be 
addressed in a future edition.  Although this 
study is essentially a legal document, 
observations from other disciplines are 
encouraged.  
The Executive Summary was presented for 
public discussion on 16 May 2009 at the 
School for Oriental and African Studies 
(London), at a public seminar co-hosted by 
the HSRC and the Sir Joseph Hotung Project 
in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in 
the Middle East, based at the Law School of  
the School of Oriental and African Studies,  
University of London.  
 
The MIDDLE EAST PROJECT is an independent two-year project of the HSRC, conducted from June 
2007 through June 2009, to conduct analysis of Middle East politics relevant to South African foreign 
policy. Its funding was provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Government of South 
Africa. The analysis in this report is entirely independent of the views or foreign policy of the 
Government of South Africa and does not represent an official position of the HSRC, nor should it be 
taken to represent the views of contributors listed here under ‘Consultation’. It is intended purely as a 
scholarly resource for the Department of Foreign Affairs and the concerned international community.  
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Executive Summary 
A. Introduction 
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the 
hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights 
Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in 
the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (namely, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and 
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: 
Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation 
constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What 
are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism 
and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States? 
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of 
Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, and, if so, do elements of its 
occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious 
interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of self-
determination to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of 
apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices 
must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South 
Africa and Namibia have suffered. 
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was 
to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in 
political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of 
intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively 
argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in 
the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which 
implements a system of apartheid.  
Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of 
armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international 
humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law 
prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use 
of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In 
contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered 
to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to 
core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination, 
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of 
contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. 
Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the 
International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973, 
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and 
systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime. 
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory 
opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory 
opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal 
consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall 
advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international 
community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are 
appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.  
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The scope of this study was determined by the question it poses: whether Israel’s practises in the OPT 
amount to colonialism or apartheid under international law. Hence Israel’s practices inside the Green 
Line (1949 Armistice Line) are not examined, except where they illuminate Israeli policies in the 
OPT. The history of the conflict before Israel’s occupation began in June 1967 as a result of the Six-
Day War is also not addressed, except where this is necessary to clarify the application of 
international law to the OPT. Questions of individual criminal responsibility or culpability for the 
commission of acts which constitute apartheid are also beyond the scope of this study, which focuses 
instead on the question of the responsibility of States as a result of internationally wrongful acts. 
 
B. Legal Framework for this Study 
This study is based on fundamental concepts and principles of international law and draws on diverse 
branches of substantive international law, in particular the law regulating belligerent occupation 
which forms part of the law of armed conflict. Israel remains the belligerent occupant of the OPT as 
they are territories over which Israel does not possess sovereignty but only a temporary right of 
administration. Consequently, Israel must abide by the relevant rules of the law of armed conflict—
principally the provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949—in its administration of the territories. The law of armed conflict is supplemented by 
international human rights law which also applies in occupied territory. The prohibitions on 
colonialism and apartheid are rooted principally in the field of international human rights law. 
Colonialism and apartheid both constitute serious violations of fundamental human rights. 
Colonialism has been consistently condemned by the international community because it prevents, 
and aims to prevent, a people from exercising freely its right to determine its own future through its 
own political institutions and in pursuit of its own economic policy. Although theoretical aspects of 
colonialism have increasingly been addressed in recent years in post-colonial and third world 
approaches to international law, the substantive aspects of colonialism have receded from 
international attention in recent decades following decolonisation in Africa and Asia over the course 
of the twentieth century. The main instrument of international law regarding colonialism, the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960, hereafter ‘the 
Declaration on Colonialism), condemns ‘colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’, which 
includes ‘settler colonialism’ such as was practiced, for example, in South Africa. Other laws and UN 
resolutions contribute to an understanding of colonialism, its threat to the enjoyment of human rights 
and the obligation of all states to ensure its abolition. This body of law and commentary establishes 
the basis for and the standard against which the review of Israel’s practices is undertaken in this study. 
Apartheid is an aggravated form of racial discrimination because it is a State-sanctioned regime of law 
and institutions that have ‘the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group 
of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. This definition 
is employed in the Apartheid Convention, which builds on the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965, hereafter ‘ICERD’). The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (1998, hereafter ‘Rome Statute’) includes apartheid as a crime falling 
within the Court’s jurisdiction and, while this study does not consider the criminal responsibility of 
individuals, the provisions of these three treaties were employed to develop a working definition of 
apartheid for the purpose of considering Israel’s State responsibility for practices that offend against 
the norm prohibiting apartheid. 
The rules of international law prohibiting colonialism and apartheid are peremptory: that is, they are 
rules ‘accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as [rules] from 
which no derogation is permitted’. Every State owes a legal duty to the international community as a 
whole not to engage in practices of colonialism or apartheid. Conversely, all States have an interest in 
ensuring that these rules are respected because they enshrine fundamental values of international 
public order. Faced with a violation of the prohibitions of colonialism and apartheid, all States have 
three duties: to co-operate to end the violation; not to recognise the illegal situation arising from it; 
and not to render aid or assistance to the State committing it.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 15 
 
C. Legal Framework in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
To examine Israeli practices for qualities of colonialism and apartheid one must first consider the 
wider framework of law in the OPT, including applicable international law and Israeli law. This 
framework is structured by three basic legal facts.  
First, the Palestinian people has the right to self-determination, with all the attendant consequences 
this entails under the relevant principles and instruments of international law.  
Second, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip remain under belligerent 
occupation. Israel’s arguments that the Palestinian territories are not ‘occupied’ in the sense of 
international law have been rejected by the international community. Israel does not possess 
sovereignty in these territories but only a temporary right of administration. As a consequence, 
Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem has been dismissed as unlawful and is not recognised by the 
international community. The occupied status of the West Bank was confirmed by the ICJ in the Wall 
advisory opinion. Israel’s ‘disengagement’ from the Gaza Strip did not constitute the end of 
occupation because, despite the redeployment of its military ground forces from Gaza, it retains and 
exercises effective control over the territory. In all of the occupied Palestinian territories, Palestinians 
are therefore ‘protected persons’ under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention--namely, they are 
persons who ‘find themselves, in the case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the 
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’. 
Third, the prolonged length of Israel’s occupation has not altered Israel’s obligations as an Occupying 
Power as set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations. Israel must therefore 
abide by the relevant rules of the law of armed conflict in its administration of the territories, as these 
are supplemented by international human rights law. 
In the light of this normative framework, Israel’s administration of the OPT systematically breaches 
the law of armed conflict, both by disregarding the prohibition imposed on an Occupying Power not 
to alter the laws in force in occupied territory and by enforcing a dual and discriminatory legal regime 
on Jewish and Palestinian residents of the OPT. Israel grants to Jewish residents of the settlements in 
the OPT the protections of Israeli domestic law and subjects them to the jurisdiction of Israeli civil 
courts, while Palestinians living in the same territory are ruled under military law and subjected to the 
jurisdiction of military courts whose procedures violate international standards for the prosecution of 
justice. As a consequence of this bifurcated system, Jewish residents of the OPT enjoy freedom of 
movement, civil protections, and services denied to Palestinians. Palestinians are simultaneously 
denied the protections accorded to protected persons by international humanitarian law. This dual 
system has gained the imprimatur of Israel’s High Court and constitutes a policy by the State of Israel 
to sustain two parallel societies in the OPT, one Jewish and the other Palestinian, and discriminate 
between these two groups by according very different rights, protections, and life chances in the same 
territory. 
This system has entailed serious violations of the law of armed conflict, but, as this study shows, also 
involves violations of the international legal prohibitions of colonialism and apartheid.  
 
D. Findings on Colonialism 
Although international law provides no single decisive definition of colonialism, the terms of the 
Declaration on Colonialism indicate that a situation may be classified as colonial when the acts of a 
State have the cumulative outcome that it annexes or otherwise unlawfully retains control over 
territory and thus aims permanently to deny its indigenous population the exercise of its right to self-
determination. Five issues, which are unlawful in themselves, taken together make it evident that 
Israel’s rule in the OPT has assumed such a colonial character: namely, violations of the territorial 
integrity of occupied territory; depriving the population of occupied territory of the capacity for self-
governance; integrating the economy of occupied territory into that of the occupant; breaching the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in relation to the occupied territory; and 
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denying the population of occupied territory the right freely to express, develop and practice its 
culture.  
Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem is manifestly an act based on colonial intent. It is 
unlawful in itself, as annexation breaches the principle underpinning the law of occupation: that 
occupation is only a temporary situation that does not vest sovereignty in the Occupying Power. 
Annexation also breaches the legal prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the threat or use 
of force. This prohibition has peremptory status, as it is a corollary of the prohibition on the use of 
force in international relations enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Israel’s acquisition of 
territory in the West Bank also starkly illustrates this intent: the construction of Jewish-only 
settlements within contiguous blocs of land that Palestinians cannot enter; a connecting road system 
between the settlements and the settlements and cities within the Green Line, the use of which is 
denied to Palestinians; and a Wall that separates Jewish and Palestinian populations, as well as 
dividing Palestinian communities from each other, with passage between Palestinian areas controlled 
by Israel. By thus partitioning contiguous blocs of Palestinian areas into cantons, Israel has violated 
the territorial integrity of the OPT in violation of the Declaration on Colonialism. 
The physical control exercised over these areas is complemented by the administration that 
Israel exercises over the OPT, which prevents its protected population from freely exercising political 
authority over that territory. This determination is unaffected by the conclusion of the Oslo Accords 
and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority and Legislative Council. The devolution of 
power to these institutions has been only partial, and Israel retains ultimate control. By preventing the 
free expression of the Palestinian population’s political will, Israel has violated that population’s right 
to self-determination. 
The law of self-determination further requires a State in belligerent occupation of foreign 
territory to keep that territory separate from its own in order to prevent its annexation and also to keep 
their economies separate. Israel has subordinated the economy of the OPT to its own, depriving the 
population under occupation of the capacity to govern its economic affairs. In particular, the creation 
of a customs union between Israel and the OPT is a measure of prohibited annexation. By virtue of the 
structural economic measures it has imposed on the OPT, Israel has violated the Palestinian 
population’s right of economic self-determination and its duties as an Occupying Power. 
The economic dimension of self-determination is also expressed in the right of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, which entitles a people to dispose freely of the natural wealth and 
resources found within the limits of its national jurisdiction. Israel’s settlement policy and the 
construction of the bypass road network and the Wall have deprived the Palestinian population of the 
control and development of an estimated 38 percent of West Bank land. It has also implemented a 
water management and allocation system that favours Israel and Jewish settlers in the OPT to the 
detriment of the Palestinian population. Not only is this practice contrary to the lawful use of natural 
resources in time of occupation, which is limited to the needs of the occupying army, but it is also 
contrary to international water law as the allocation employed is both unjust and inequitable. 
Moreover, it is significant that the route of the Wall is similar to the ‘red line’ that delineates those 
areas of the West Bank from which Israel can withdraw without relinquishing its control over key 
water resources that are used to supply Israel and the settlements. Thus, by its treatment of the natural 
resources of the OPT, Israel has further breached the economic dimension of self-determination, as 
expressed in the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Finally, self-determination also has a cultural component: a people entitled to exercise the right 
of self-determination has the right freely to develop and practice its culture. Israeli practices privilege 
the language and cultural referents of the occupier, while materially hampering the cultural 
development and expression of the Palestinian population. This last issue renders Israel’s denial of the 
right to self-determination in the OPT comprehensive. 
In his report, Professor Dugard suggested that elements of the occupation resembled 
colonialism. This study demonstrates that the implementation of a colonial policy by Israel has not 
been piecemeal but is systematic and comprehensive, as the exercise of the Palestinian population’s 
right to self-determination has been frustrated in all of its principal modes of expression. 
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E. Findings on Apartheid 
The analysis of apartheid in this study encompasses three distinct issues: (1) the definition of 
apartheid; (2) the status of the prohibition of apartheid in international law; and (3) whether Israel’s 
practices in the OPT amount to a breach of that prohibition. 
Article 3 of ICERD prohibits the practice of apartheid as a particularly egregious form of 
discrimination, but it does not define the practice with precision. The Apartheid Convention and the 
Rome Statute have developed the prohibition of apartheid in two ways: they criminalise certain 
apartheid-related acts and further elaborate the definition of apartheid. The Apartheid Convention 
criminalises ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by 
one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing 
them’. The Rome Statute criminalises inhumane acts committed in the context of, and to maintain, ‘an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other 
racial group.’ Both focus on the systematic, institutionalised, and oppressive character of the 
discrimination involved and the purpose of domination that is entailed. This distinguishes the practice 
of apartheid from other forms of prohibited discrimination and from other contexts in which the listed 
crimes arise. The prohibition of apartheid has also assumed the status of customary international law 
and, further, is established as a peremptory rule of international law (a jus cogens norm) which entails 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes). 
In drafting this study, it was necessary to develop a methodology to determine whether an instance of 
apartheid has developed outside southern Africa. This aspect of the study was organised according to 
the definition of apartheid contained in Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention, which cites six 
categories of ‘inhuman acts’ as comprising the ‘crime of apartheid’. This list is intended to be 
illustrative and inclusive, rather than exhaustive or exclusive. Accordingly, a determination that 
apartheid exists does not require that all the listed acts are practiced: for example, Article 2(b) 
regarding the intended ‘physical destruction’ of a group did not apply generally to apartheid policy in 
South Africa. Practices not expressly enumerated may also be relevant, as Article 2 mentions ‘similar 
policies and practices … as practiced in southern Africa’. For the purposes of this study, it was 
therefore assumed that a positive finding of apartheid need not establish that all practices cited in 
Article 2 are present, or that those precise practices are present, but rather that ‘policies and practices 
of racial segregation and discrimination’ combine to form an institutionalised system of racial 
discrimination that has not only the effect but the purpose of maintaining racial domination by one 
racial group over the other.  
Fundamental to the question of apartheid is determining whether the groups involved can be 
understood as ‘racial groups’. This required first examining how racial discrimination is defined in 
ICERD and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia, which concluded that no scientific or impartial method exists for determining whether 
any group is a racial group and that the question rests primarily on local perceptions. In the OPT, this 
study finds that ‘Jewish’ and ‘Palestinian’ identities are socially constructed as groups distinguished 
by ancestry or descent as well as nationality, ethnicity, and religion. On this basis, the study concludes 
that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs can be considered ‘racial groups’ for the purposes of the 
definition of apartheid in international law.  
In examining Israel’s practices under the prism of the Apartheid Convention, this study also recalls 
the system of apartheid as it was practiced in South Africa because those practices illustrate the 
concerns and intentions of the drafters of the Apartheid Convention. It must be clear, however, that 
practices in South Africa are not the test or benchmark for a finding of apartheid elsewhere, as the 
principal instrument which provides this test lies in the terms of the Apartheid Convention itself.  
By examining Israel’s practices in the light of Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention, this study 
concludes that Israel has introduced a system of apartheid in the OPT. In regard to each ‘inhuman act’ 
listed in Article 2, the study has found the following: 
o Article 2(a) regarding the denial of the right to life and liberty of person is satisfied by Israeli 
measures to repress Palestinian dissent against the occupation and its system of domination. 
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Israel's policies and practices include murder, in the form of extrajudicial killings; torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees; a military court system 
that falls far short of international standards for fair trial; and arbitrary arrest and detention of 
Palestinians, including administrative detention imposed without charge or trial and lacking 
adequate judicial review. All of these practices are discriminatory in that Palestinians are subject 
to legal systems and courts which apply standards of evidence and procedure that are different 
from those applied to Jewish settlers living the OPT and that result in harsher penalties for 
Palestinians. 
o Article 2(b) regarding ‘the deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions 
calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part’ is not satisfied, as the 
Israel’s policies and practices in the OPT are not found to have the intent of causing the physical 
destruction of the Palestinian people. Policies of collective punishment that entail grave 
consequences for life and health, such as closures imposed on the Gaza Strip that limit or 
eliminate Palestinian access to essential health care and medicine, fuel, and adequate nutrition, 
and Israeli military attacks that inflict high civilian casualties, are serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights law but do not meet the threshold required by this provision 
regarding the OPT as a whole. 
o Article 2(c) regarding measures calculated to prevent a racial group from participation in the 
political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and to prevent the full development of a 
group through the denial of basic human rights and freedoms is satisfied on several counts:  
(i) Restrictions on the Palestinian right to freedom of movement are endemic in the West 
Bank, stemming from Israel's control of checkpoints and crossings, impediments created 
by the Wall and its crossing points, a matrix of separate roads, and obstructive and all-
encompassing permit and ID systems that apply solely to Palestinians. Palestinians living 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not allowed to visit the other territory and are not 
allowed to enter East Jerusalem with a pass. 
(ii) The right of Palestinians to choose their own place of residence within their territory is 
severely curtailed by systematic administrative restrictions on Palestinian residency and 
building in East Jerusalem, by discriminatory legislation that operates to prevent 
Palestinian spouses from living together on the basis of which part of the OPT they 
originate from, and by the strictures of the permit and ID systems.  
(iii) Palestinians are denied their right to leave and return to their country. Palestinian refugees 
displaced in 1948 from the territory now inside Israel who are living in the OPT 
(approximately 1.8 million people including descendents) are not allowed to return to 
their former places of residence. Similarly, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
displaced to surrounding states from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 have been 
prevented from returning to the OPT. Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 to 
surrounding states (approximately 4.5 million) are not allowed to return to either Israel or 
the OPT. Palestinian residents of the OPT must obtain Israeli permission to leave the 
territory. In the Gaza Strip, especially since 2006, this permission is almost completely 
denied, even for educational or medical purposes. Political activists and human rights 
defenders are often subject to arbitrary and undefined 'travel bans', while many 
Palestinians who travelled and lived abroad for business or personal reasons have had 
their residence IDs revoked and been prohibited from returning.  
(iv) Israel denies Palestinians in the OPT their right to a nationality by denying Palestinian 
refugees from inside the Green Line their right of return, residence, and citizenship in the 
State (Israel) governing the land of their birth. Israel’s policies in the OPT also effectively 
deny Palestinians their right to a nationality by obstructing the exercise of the Palestinian 
right to self-determination through the formation of a Palestinian State in the West Bank 
(including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  
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(v) Palestinians are restricted in their right to work, through Israeli policies that severely 
curtail Palestinian agriculture and industry in the OPT, restrict exports and imports, and 
impose pervasive obstacles to internal movement that impair access to agricultural land 
and travel for employment and business. Although formerly significant, Palestinian 
access to work inside Israel has been almost completely cut off in recent years by 
prevailing closure policies and is now negligible. Palestinian unemployment in the OPT 
as a whole has reached almost 50 percent. 
(vi) Palestinian trade unions exist but are not recognised by the Israeli government or by the 
Histadrut (the main Israeli trade union) and cannot effectively represent Palestinians 
working for Israeli employers and businesses. Although these workers are required to pay 
dues to the Histadrut, it does not represent their interests and concerns, and Palestinians 
have no voice in formulating Histadrut policies. Palestinian unions are also prohibited 
from functioning in Israeli settlements in the OPT where Palestinians work in 
construction and other sectors. 
(vii) The right of Palestinians to education is not impacted directly by Israeli policy, as Israel 
does not operate the school system in the OPT, but education is severely impeded by 
military rule. Israeli military actions have included extensive school closures, direct 
attacks on schools, severe restrictions on movement, and arrests and detention of teachers 
and students. Israel’s denial of exit permits has prevented hundreds of students in the 
Gaza Strip from continuing their education abroad. Discrimination in relation to 
education is striking in East Jerusalem. A segregated school system operates in the West 
Bank as Palestinians are not allowed to attend government-funded schools in Jewish 
settlements.  
(viii) The right of Palestinians to freedom of opinion and expression is greatly restricted 
through censorship laws enforced by the military authorities and endorsed by the High 
Court of Justice. Since 2001, the Israeli Government Press Office has greatly limited 
Palestinian press accreditation. Journalists are regularly restricted from entering the Gaza 
Strip and Palestinian journalists suffer from patterns of harassment, detention, 
confiscation of materials, and even killing.  
(ix) Palestinians’ right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association is impeded through 
military orders. Military legislation bans public gatherings of ten or more persons without 
a permit from the Israeli military commander. Non-violent demonstrations are regularly 
suppressed by the Israeli army with live ammunition, rubber-coated steel bullets, tear gas, 
improper use of projectiles such as tear gas canisters, and participants are arrested. Most 
Palestinian political parties have been declared illegal and institutions associated with 
those parties, such as charities and cultural organisations, are regularly subjected to 
closure and attack. 
(x) The prevention of full development in the OPT and participation of Palestinians in 
political, economic, social and cultural life is most starkly demonstrated by the effects of 
Israel's ongoing siege and regular large-scale military attacks on the Gaza Strip. Although 
denied by Israel, the population of the Gaza Strip is experiencing an on-going severe 
humanitarian crisis.  
o Article 2(d), which relates to division of the population along racial lines, has three elements, two 
of which are satisfied: 
(i) Israel has divided the West Bank into reserves or cantons in which residence and entry is 
determined by each individual’s group identity. Entry by one group into the zone of the 
other group is prohibited without a permit. The Wall and its infrastructure of gates and 
permanent checkpoints suggest a policy permanently to divide the West Bank into racial 
cantons. Israeli government ministries, the World Zionist Organisation and other Jewish-
national institutions operating as authorised agencies of the State plan, fund and 
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implement construction of the West Bank settlements and their infrastructure for 
exclusively Jewish use. 
(ii) Article 2(d) is not satisfied regarding a prohibition on mixed marriages between Jews and 
Palestinians. The proscription of civil marriage in Israeli law and the authority of 
religious courts in matters of marriage and divorce, coupled with restrictions on where 
Jews and Palestinians can live in the OPT, present major practical obstacles to any 
potential mixed marriage but do not constitute a formal prohibition. 
(iii) Israel has extensively appropriated Palestinian land in the OPT for exclusively Jewish 
use. Private Palestinian land comprises about 30 percent of the land unlawfully 
appropriated for Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Presently, 38 percent of the West 
Bank is completely closed to Palestinian use, with significant restrictions on access to 
much of the rest of it.  
o Article 2(e) relating to the exploitation of labour is today not significantly satisfied, as Israel has 
raised barriers to Palestinian employment inside Israel since the 1990s and Palestinian labour is 
now used extensively only in the construction and services sectors of Jewish-Israeli settlements in 
the OPT. Otherwise, exploitation of labour has been replaced by practices that fall under Article 
2(c) regarding the denial of the right to work. 
o Arrest, imprisonment, travel bans and the targeting of Palestinian parliamentarians, national 
political leaders and human rights defenders, as well as the closing down of related organisations 
by Israel, represent persecution for opposition to the system of Israeli domination in the OPT, 
within the meaning of Article 2(f). 
In sum, Israel appears clearly to be implementing and sustaining policies intended to maintain its 
domination over Palestinians in the OPT and to suppress opposition of any form to those policies. 
The comparative analyses of South African apartheid practices threaded throughout the analysis of 
apartheid in Chapter 5 is there to illuminate, rather than define, the meaning of apartheid, and there 
are certainly differences between apartheid as it was applied in South Africa and Israel’s policies and 
practices in the OPT. Nonetheless, it is significant that the two systems can be defined by similar 
dominant features.  
A troika of key laws underpinned the South African apartheid regime—the Population Registration 
Act 1950, the Group Areas Act 1950, and the Pass Laws—and established its three principal features 
or pillars. The first pillar was formally to demarcate the population of South Africa into racial groups 
through the Population Registration Act (1950)and to accord superior rights, privileges and services to 
the white racial group: for example, through the Bantu Building Workers Act of 1951, the Bantu 
Education Act of 1953 and the Separate Amenities Act of 1953. This pillar consolidated earlier 
discriminatory laws into a pervasive system of institutionalised racial discrimination, which prevented 
the enjoyment of basic human rights by non-white South Africans based on their racial identity as 
established by the Population Registration Act. 
The second pillar was to segregate the population into different geographic areas, which were 
allocated by law to different racial groups, and restrict passage by members of any group into the area 
allocated to other groups, thus preventing any contact between groups that might ultimately 
compromise white supremacy. This strategy was defined by the Group Areas Act of 1950 and the 
Pass Laws—which included the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 and the Natives (Abolition of 
Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act of 1952—as well as the Natives (Urban Areas) 
Amendment Act 1955, the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 1945 and the Coloured Persons 
Communal Reserves Act 1961.  
This separation constituted the basis for the policy labelled ‘grand apartheid’ by its South African 
architects, which provided for the establishment of ‘Homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’ into which 
denationalised black South Africans were transferred and forced to reside, in order to allow the white 
minority to deny them the enjoyment of any political rights in, and preserve white supremacy over, 
the majority of the territory of South Africa. Although the Homelands were represented by the South 
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African government as offering black South Africans the promise of complete independence in 
distinct nation-States, and thus satisfying their right to self-determination, the Homelands were not 
recognised by either the African National Congress or the international community and were 
condemned by UN resolutions as violations of both South Africa’s territorial integrity and of the right 
of the African people of South Africa as a whole to self-determination. Having divided the population 
into distinct racial groups, and dictated which groups could live and move where, South Africa’s 
apartheid policies were buttressed by a third pillar: a matrix of draconian ‘security’ laws and policies 
that were employed to suppress any opposition to the regime and to reinforce the system of racial 
domination, by providing for administrative detention, torture, censorship, banning, and assassination. 
Israel’s practices in the OPT can be defined by the same three ‘pillars’ of apartheid. The first pillar 
derives from Israeli laws and policies that establish Jewish identity for purposes of law and afford a 
preferential legal status and material benefits to Jews over non-Jews. The product of this in the OPT is 
an institutionalised system that privileges Jewish settlers and discriminates against Palestinians on the 
basis of the inferior status afforded to non-Jews by Israel. At the root of this system are Israel’s 
citizenship laws, whereby group identity is the primary factor in determining questions involving the 
acquisition of Israeli citizenship. The 1950 Law of Return defines who is a Jew for purposes of the 
law and allows every Jew to immigrate to Israel or the OPT. The 1952 Citizenship Law then grants 
automatic citizenship to people who immigrate under the Law of Return, while erecting 
insurmountable obstacles to citizenship for Palestinian refugees. Israeli law conveying special 
standing to Jewish identity is then applied extra-territorially to extend preferential legal status and 
material privileges to Jewish settlers in the OPT and thus discriminate against Palestinians. The 
review of Israel’s practices under Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention provides abundant evidence 
of discrimination against Palestinians that flows from that inferior status, in realms such as the right to 
leave and return to one’s country, freedom of movement and residence, and access to land. The 2003 
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law banning Palestinian family unification is a further example of 
legislation that confers benefits to Jews over Palestinians and illustrates the adverse impact of having 
the status of Palestinian Arab. The disparity in how the two groups are treated by Israel is highlighted 
through the application of a harsher set of laws and different courts for Palestinians in the OPT than 
for Jewish settlers, as well as through the restrictions imposed by the permit and ID systems.  
The second pillar is reflected in Israel’s grand policy to fragment the OPT for the purposes of 
segregation and domination. This policy is evidenced by: Israel’s extensive appropriation of 
Palestinian land, which continues to shrink the territorial space available to Palestinians; the hermetic 
closure and isolation of the Gaza Strip from the rest of the OPT; the deliberate severing of East 
Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank; and the appropriation and construction policies serving to 
carve up the West Bank into an intricate and well-serviced network of connected settlements for 
Jewish-Israelis and an archipelago of besieged and non-contiguous enclaves for Palestinians. That 
these measures are intended to segregate the population along racial lines in violation of Article 2(d) 
of the Apartheid Convention is clear from the visible web of walls, separate roads, and checkpoints, 
and the invisible web of permit and ID systems, that combine to ensure that Palestinians remain 
confined to the reserves designated for them while Israeli Jews are prohibited from entering those 
reserves but enjoy freedom of movement throughout the rest of the Palestinian territory.  
Whether the confinement of Palestinians to certain reserves or enclaves within the OPT is analogous 
to South African ‘grand apartheid’ in the further sense that Israel intends Palestinian rights ultimately 
to be met by the creation of a State in parts of the OPT whose rationale is based on racial segregation 
engages political questions beyond the scope and method of this study. Within the scope of this study 
is that, much as the same restrictions functioned in apartheid South Africa, the policy of geographic 
fragmentation has the effect of crushing Palestinian socio-economic life, securing Palestinian 
vulnerability to Israeli economic dominance, and of enforcing a rigid segregation of Palestinian and 
Jewish populations. The fragmentation of the territorial integrity of a self-determination unit for the 
purposes of racial segregation and domination is prohibited by international law.  
The third pillar upon which Israel’s system of apartheid in the OPT rests is its ‘security’ laws and 
policies. The extrajudicial killing, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment of Palestinians, as described under the rubric of Article 2(a) of the Apartheid 
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Convention, are all justified by Israel on the pretext of security. These policies are State-sanctioned, 
and often approved by the Israeli judicial system, and supported by an oppressive code of military 
laws and a system of improperly constituted military courts. Additionally, this study finds that Israel's 
invocation of 'security' to validate sweeping restrictions on Palestinian freedom of opinion, 
expression, assembly, association and movement also often purports to mask a true underlying intent 
to suppress dissent to its system of domination, and thereby maintain control over Palestinians as a 
group. This study does not contend that Israel’s claims about security are by definition lacking in 
merit; however, Israel's invocation of 'security' to validate severe policies and disproportionate 
practices toward the Palestinians often masks the intent to suppress Palestinian opposition to a system 
of domination by one racial group over another.  
Thus, while the individual practices listed in the Apartheid Convention do not in themselves define 
apartheid, these practices do not occur in the OPT in a vacuum, but are integrated and complementary 
elements of an institutionalised and oppressive system of Israeli domination and oppression over 
Palestinians as a group; that is, a system of apartheid.  
In summary, this study finds that Jewish and Palestinian identities function as racial identities in the 
sense provided by ICERD, the Apartheid Convention, and the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Israel’s status as a ‘Jewish State’ is 
inscribed in its Basic Law and it has developed legal and institutional mechanisms by which the State 
seeks to ensure its enduring Jewish character. These laws and institutions are channelled into the OPT 
to convey privileges to Jewish settlers and disadvantage Palestinians on the basis of their respective 
group identities. This domination is associated principally with transferring control over land in the 
OPT to exclusively Jewish use, thus also altering the demographic status of the territory. This 
discriminatory treatment cannot be explained or excused on grounds of citizenship, both because it 
goes beyond what is permitted by ICERD and because certain provisions in Israeli civil and military 
law provide that Jews present in the OPT who are not citizens of Israel also enjoy privileges conferred 
on Jewish-Israeli citizens in the OPT by virtue of being Jews. Consequently, this study finds that the 
State of Israel exercises control in the OPT with the purpose of maintaining a system of domination 
by Jews over Palestinians and that this system constitutes a breach of the prohibition of apartheid. 
 
F. Implications and Recommendations  
International law is inherently biased towards the protection of State interests. Although the 
Palestinian people has some international status because of its entitlement to self-determination, the 
remedies available to it on the international sphere are limited, and principally lie in recourse to 
human rights bodies in attempts to ensure that Palestinian rights are respected. This relative absence 
of remedies available to the right-bearer does not, however, have the consequence that Israel’s 
obligations are lessened or extinguished. The conclusion that Israel has breached the international 
legal prohibitions of apartheid and colonialism in the OPT suggests that the occupation itself is illegal 
on these grounds. The legal consequences of these findings are grave and entail obligations not 
merely for Israel but also for the international community as a whole.  
Israel bears the primary responsibility for remedying the illegal situation it has created. In the first 
place, it has the duty to cease its unlawful activity and dismantle the structures and institutions of 
colonialism and apartheid that it has created. Israel is additionally required by international law to 
implement duties of reparation, compensation and satisfaction in order to wipe out the consequences 
of its unlawful acts. But above all, in common with all States, whether acting singly or through the 
agency of inter-governmental organisations, Israel has the duty to promote the Palestinian people’s 
exercise of its right of self-determination in order that it might freely determine its political status 
freely pursue its own economic policy and social and cultural development. 
The realisation of self-determination and the prohibition on apartheid are peremptory norms of 
international law from which no derogation is permitted. Both express core values of international 
public policy and generate obligations for the international community as a whole. These obligations 
adhere to individual States and the intergovernmental organisations through which they act 
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collectively. Breaches of peremptory norms, which involve a gross or systematic failure by the 
responsible State to fulfil the obligations they impose, generate derivative obligations for States and 
intergovernmental organisations of cooperation and abstention.  
States, and intergovernmental organisations, must cooperate to end any and all serious breaches of 
peremptory norms. The obligation of cooperation imposed upon States may be pursued through 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the United Nations, should States decide that this is 
appropriate, but must also be pursued outside these organisations by way of inter-State diplomatic 
measures. One possible mechanism is that States may invoke the international responsibility of Israel 
to call it to account for its violations of the peremptory prohibitions of colonialism and apartheid. All 
States have a legal interest in ensuring that no State breaches these norms, and accordingly all States 
have the legal capacity to invoke Israel’s responsibility. Above all, however, all States and 
intergovernmental organisations have the duty to promote the Palestinian people’s exercise of its right 
of self-determination in order that it might freely determine its political status and economic policy. 
The duty of abstention has two elements: States must not recognise as lawful situations created by 
serious breaches of peremptory norms nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. In 
particular, States must not recognise Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem or its attempt to acquire 
territory in the West Bank through the consolidation of settlements, nor may they bolster the latter’s 
economic viability. Should any State fail to fulfil its duty of abstention then it risks becoming 
complicit in Israel’s internationally wrongful acts, and thus independently engaging its own 
responsibility, with all the legal consequences of reparation that this entails. 
In short, for States the legal consequences of Israel’s breach of the peremptory norms prohibiting 
colonialism and apartheid are clear. When faced with a serious breach of an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm, all States have the duty not to recognise this situation as lawful and have the duty 
not to aid or assist the maintenance of this situation. Further, all States must co-operate to bring this 
situation to an end. If a State fails to fulfil these duties, axiomatically it commits an internationally 
wrongful act. If a State aids or assists another State in maintaining that unlawful situation, knowing it 
to be unlawful, then it becomes complicit in its commission and itself commits an internationally 
wrongful act. 
States cannot evade these obligations through the act of combination. They cannot claim that the 
proper route for the discharge of these obligations is combined action through an intergovernmental 
organisation and that if it fails to act then their individual obligations of cooperation and abstention 
are extinguished. That is, States cannot evade their international obligations by hiding behind the 
independent personality of an international organisation of which they are members.  
Moreover, like States, intergovernmental organisations themselves bear responsibility for their actions 
under international law. Obligations erga omnes generated by a breach of a peremptory norm of 
international law are imposed on the international community as a whole and are thus imposed 
equally on intergovernmental organisations as well as States. As the International Court of Justice 
stated in the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in occupied Palestinian territory 
advisory opinion, the United Nations bears a special responsibility for the resolution of the Israel-
Palestine conflict. 
While both States and intergovernmental organisations have a degree of discretion in determining 
how they may implement their duties of cooperation and abstention, the authors of this study agree 
with Professor Dugard’s suggestion that the parameters of these duties might best be delineated by 
seeking advice from the International Court of Justice. Accordingly we respectfully suggest that, in 
accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations and pursuant to Article 65 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, an advisory opinion be urgently requested on the 
following question: 
Do the policies and practices of Israel within the Occupied Palestinian Territories violate the 
norms prohibiting apartheid and colonialism; and, if so, what are the legal consequences arising 
from Israel’s policies and practices, considering the rules and principles of international law, 
including the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
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Discrimination, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960), the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, and other relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?  □
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Chapter I 
The Question and Its Framework: 
Sources of Law and Key Concepts 
 
A. Framing the Question under International Law 
In his 29 January 2007 report as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (hereafter ‘OPT’) since 1967, John Dugard raised a 
fundamental question for the United Nations General Assembly: 
The international community has identified three regimes as inimical to human rights - 
colonialism, apartheid and foreign occupation. Israel is clearly in military occupation of the 
OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of 
apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a 
regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied 
people, the occupying Power and third States? It is suggested that this question might 
appropriately be put to the International Court of Justice for a further advisory opinion.1 
This report considers whether that the UN General Assembly has grounds for requesting the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue such an advisory opinion. It further considers what 
implications a finding of colonialism or apartheid may have for the international community.  
The ICJ has, in the past, ruled on the question of a regime’s legality: notably, regarding South 
Africa’s occupation of Namibia. In the last of four advisory opinions issued between 1950 and 1971,2 
the Court addressed the legality of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia (in violation of a UN 
Security Council resolution calling for its withdrawal) and was effectively charged with adjudicating 
on the overall nature of the South African regime in Namibia. Having considered South Africa’s 
policy of establishing and enforcing apartheid in Namibia—that is, ‘distinctions, exclusions, 
restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic 
origin [in] denial of fundamental human rights [and in] flagrant violation of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter’3 —the Court concluded that, 
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under 
obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its 
occupation of the Territory.4 
The Court recently dealt with some aspects of Israel’s practices as an Occupying Power in its 2004 
advisory opinion, Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.5  In this case, however, the Court was asked to rule on one particular action undertaken 
within Israel's regime in the OPT, rather than the nature of the regime itself. A request from the 
                                               
1 A/HRC/4/17, 29 January 2007, 3. 
2  International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 11 July 1950; Voting Procedure on Questions 
relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 7 June 1955; 
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1 July 1956; 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971. 
3 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971, at para. 131. 
4 Ibid, at para. 133. 
5 Legality of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 
2004, 136.  All documents of the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice 
cited in this report are available online at www.icj-cij.org.  
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General Assembly to the Court for a further advisory opinion as to whether Israel’s prolonged 
occupation of the OPT has assumed characteristics that breach the international legal prohibitions on 
colonialism and apartheid would require the Court to opine on the legality and legal implications of 
Israel’s continuing occupation of the OPT. 
Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation. It is acknowledged and accepted as a 
possible consequence of armed conflict. However, international humanitarian law—especially as set 
forth in the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(henceforth ‘the Hague Regulations’) and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (henceforth ‘Fourth Geneva Convention’)—
presupposed that occupation is a temporary state of affairs that will naturally draw to a close after the 
cessation of hostilities or at the latest upon the conclusion of a peace agreement. Any other outcome is 
precluded by the norms of international law that prohibit the annexation or acquisition of territory as a 
result of the use of force. The legal nature of a belligerent occupation that has lasted four decades 
therefore must come into question and call for a review of the intentions of the Occupying Power. 
Such a review must move beyond previous analyses of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian 
territories that have tended toward a ‘habitual focus on specific actions undertaken within the 
occupation, as distinct from the nature of the occupation as a normative regime’.6 The Special 
Rapporteur’s comments impel a more holistic legal approach to assess the cumulative effect of four 
decades of belligerent occupation by Israel.  In particular, this situation is examined through the lenses 
of two elements of international law—the prohibitions of colonialism and apartheid—to ascertain 
whether the occupation is unlawful on these grounds.   
 
B. Scope of the Study 
This report considers whether Israel’s belligerent occupation of the OPT since June 1967 contains 
elements of colonialism and apartheid and is accordingly illegal on those grounds.7  This approach 
guides the report’s scope in two ways: (1) it does not address questions of individual criminal 
responsibility or culpability for the practices of apartheid; and (2) evidence is confined to Israeli 
practices within the OPT and to the period after the 1967 war during which those territories came 
under military occupation. Engaging in colonial practice is not a crime attracting individual criminal 
responsibility under international law but is exclusively a matter concerning the responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts. This study’s findings of colonialism and apartheid do not 
affect claims that Israel’s occupation is unlawful on other grounds. 
 
 
1. State versus Individual Responsibility 
This study makes no attempt to discover factual evidence that would tie specific individuals to 
criminal offences that arise under the rubric of apartheid.  This would require demonstrating that 
specific facts are present that constitute the conduct of a criminal offence (the actus reus) and also, 
crucially, that the accused acted with the requisite mental state (the mens rea) which renders that 
conduct criminal.  The mens rea is an element beyond the simple demonstration that, as a matter of 
fact, a breach of the law has occurred,8 and must be proved in relation to every individual act alleged 
                                               
6 Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M Gross & Keren Michaeli, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory’ (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law. 551 at 552. 
7Although this report is concerned with the legality of Israel’s practices in the OPT, the obligation of an 
Occupying Power to withdraw from occupied territory is not dependent on a finding of illegality. The UN 
Security Council has called on Occupying Powers to withdraw from the OPT without declaring their presence 
illegal: for example, regarding Israel’s occupation of the OPT (SC Res. 242 of 22 November 1967 and SC Res. 
338 of 22 October 1973), Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait (SC Res. 660 of 2 August 1990) and Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor (SC Res. 384 of 22 December 1975). 
8 For a discussion of the mens rea required under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in order 
that an accused may be convicted of the crime of apartheid see, for example, R. S. Lee (ed.), The International 
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to be criminal. That project would require more than demonstrating that Israel’s practices in its 
administration of the OPT constitute the crime of apartheid.  There is a fundamental difference 
between establishing that a rule of international law has been breached,—which may, in certain 
circumstances, render an individual liable to prosecution—and establishing that an international crime 
has been committed.   
Rather, those practices that are identified as constituting the crime of apartheid in the Apartheid 
Convention are used here to structure an assessment of whether Israel’s acts, policies and practices in 
the OPT constitute a breach of the peremptory norm prohibiting apartheid, which as a result gives rise 
to State responsibility.  State responsibility is neither criminal nor civil as these are conceived in 
domestic legal systems.  At its core, a finding of State responsibility simply records that the 
delinquent State has committed a breach of general international law that binds all States or of a 
specific legal obligation which binds two or more States.  If it were found that Israel’s practices 
amount to apartheid, then individual criminal responsibility could arise consequentially.  This is 
consonant with the approach adopted by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
regarding the imposition of criminal responsibility imposed on individuals for acts which amounted to 
the crime against humanity of apartheid. 
It is generally recognised that the prohibitions of apartheid and racial discrimination have peremptory 
status.  A peremptory norm of general international law, or ius cogens rule, is defined in Article 53 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a rule which is ‘accepted and recognised by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character’.  Obligations imposed on States by peremptory norms necessarily affect the vital interests 
of the international community as a whole.  An international wrongful act which amounts to a serious 
breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm imposes on all States remedial duties which 
do not arise in relation to other internationally wrongful acts. Thus the International Law Commission 
in its commentary regarding its 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts,9 which codified the rules of international law on State responsibility,10 referred 
expressly to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and noted that 
                                                                                                                                                  
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, NY|: Transnational 
Publishers, 2001), pp.105-106.  It should be recalled that Israel is not a party to the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, and that its practice is therefore only illustrative of the need for mens rea in the commission of 
the crime of apartheid. 
9 2001 International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Article 40: ‘This Chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach 
by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of international law.  A breach of such an obligation 
is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.’ 
10 The 2001 Articles were approved, without vote, by the General Assembly in resolution 56/83 (12 December 
2001), operative paragraph 3 of which provided: ‘Takes note of the articles on the responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts, presented by the International Law Commission, the text of which is annexed to 
the present resolution, and commends them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of 
their future adoption or other appropriate action.’ This followed the recommendation of the International Law 
Commission that the General Assembly take note of the Articles and subsequently decide whether to convene a 
diplomatic conference with a view to conclude a convention on State responsibility—see International Law 
Commission, Report on the work of its Fifty-Third session, UN Doc.A/56/10 (2001), , 38-41 and 42, paras.61-67 
and 72-73; and also James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, (Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, 2002), pp. 58-60. In 2004, the 
General Assembly reconsidered this matter, and decided to defer its decision—see J. Crawford and S. Olleson, 
‘The continuing debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 959. The General Assembly has since adopted resolution 62/61 (8 January 2008), UN 
Doc.A/RES/62/61, in which it, once again, commended the Articles to the attention of States ‘without prejudice 
to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action’ (operative paragraph 1), and included on the 
provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session consideration of whether a convention should be adopted, or other 
appropriate action be taken, on the basis of the Articles (operative paragraph 4). See also D. Caron, ‘The ILC 
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there also seems to be widespread agreement with other examples listed in the Commission’s 
commentary to Article 53, viz, prohibitions against slavery and the slave trade, genocide, and 
racial discrimination and apartheid.  These practices have been prohibited in widely ratified 
international treaties and conventions admitting of no exception.  There was general 
agreement among governments as to the peremptory character of these prohibitions at the 
Vienna Conference.  
The remedies available to all States for the breach of a peremptory norm of international law under 
the law of State responsibility include: immediate cessation of the unlawful act if it is continuing; 
making assurances and guarantees of non-repetition if circumstances so require; satisfaction; and full 
reparation for material and moral damage caused by the internationally wrongful act.11  Further, 
Article 41 of the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
imposes additional duties on all States when they are faced with a serious breach of an obligation 
arising under a peremptory norm of international law.  The legal consequences for third States faced 
with such a situation are considered in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
2. Scope of Empirical Evidence 
 
The scope of Israeli practices considered in this report was confined from the outset in two ways. 
First, reflecting the present concern with the legality of Israel’s occupation, it was confined to 
reviewing Israeli law and practices in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, territories 
that Israel occupied in June 1967 and that lie beyond the ceasefire lines delineated in Israel’s 1949 
Armistice Agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Israeli policy in the Golan Heights, although also 
captured and occupied by Israel in 1967, was excluded from this study because the Golan was not a 
part of Mandate Palestine and so fell outside the scope of the Special Rapporteur’s 2007 report to 
which this study responds. Israeli law and State practices inside the 1949 ceasefire lines were also 
excluded because the present concern is with the legality of Israel’s occupation and accordingly with 
Israel’s practices in territories of Mandate Palestine that are internationally recognised as being held 
under belligerent occupation.  
This study found, however, that geographical exclusions did not operate neatly. For example, it was 
found that Israeli policy is to extend Israeli Basic Law and other civil law to Jewish settlers in the 
OPT. The High Court of the State of Israel also hears cases from Palestinians living in the OPT. 
Hence Israeli Basic Law and relevant civil law, as well as High Court decisions, are discussed where 
relevant. 
Evidence is further confined to Israeli laws, policies and practices imposed after the June 1967 war 
when Israel’s military occupation of the OPT began, with references to earlier history only to the 
extent necessary to clarify essential legal questions. This is not to imply that events and policy 
statements prior to 1967 are not relevant to a test of colonialism and apartheid, but only reflects 
concern that history and its historiography not distract from consideration of Israeli policies and 
practices in light of relevant international human rights and humanitarian law.  Data and analysis 
pertaining to the post-1967 period is indeed considered here to be sufficient to test for regimes of 
colonialism and apartheid, drawing on relevant instruments of international law. 
Empirical evidence in this study is assembled from United Nations organs, human rights organisations 
and other reputable authorities that have documented and analysed Israeli practices and policies in the 
OPT from the perspective of human rights law and international humanitarian law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Articles on State responsibility: the paradoxical relationship between form and authority’ (2002) 96 American 
Journal of International Law 857. 
11 See Articles 30, 31, 34 and 41 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts: for commentary, see C. Tams, ‘Do serious breaches give rise to any specific 
obligations of the responsible State?’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 1161. 
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C.  International Law in Occupied Territory  
Determining whether Israel’s practices in the OPT breach the prohibitions of colonialism and 
apartheid is made here within the legal framework regulating situations of belligerent occupation 
provided by international humanitarian law and relevant human rights law. International laws and 
norms relevant to a situation of belligerent occupation include laws on the use of force, international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law, in addition to 
commentary and case law regarding the application of international law in occupied territories.  
The primary legal framework regulating a situation of belligerent occupation is international 
humanitarian law (known also as the laws of armed conflict or the laws of war). Especially important 
here are those laws regulating the relations of an Occupying Power with the inhabitants of occupied 
territory: especially, the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. 
Here it is useful to consider the meaning of ‘belligerent occupation’ and to outline the general 
protections provided by international humanitarian law. It is important also to clarify that the 
application of international humanitarian law to a particular context does not displace the application 
of human rights law.  
International human rights law, including prohibitions of colonialism and apartheid, is also applicable 
in situations of belligerent occupation, as discussed below. The prohibition of colonialism is 
expressed most directly in the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960). The prohibition of apartheid was introduced in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963), as 
affirmed by the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973). 
Discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, these instruments are also outlined below to clarify their 
configuration within human rights law. 
 
1. International Humanitarian Law 
The underlying normative framework of international law regulating belligerent occupation, and thus 
applicable to the OPT, is contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention 
of 1949.  The Hague Regulations are annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, to which Israel is not a party, but they are recognised as forming part of 
customary international law.12  In the Beth El case (1978), Justice Witkon of the Israeli High Court of 
Justice agreed that the Hague Regulations 1907 formed a part of customary international law and was 
therefore enforceable in the domestic courts of Israel.13   
Israel became a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 6 July 1951.  After the June 1967 War, 
Israel took the position that the Fourth Geneva Convention was not applicable as a matter of law to 
the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, employing the ‘missing reversioner’ and other arguments 
examined in Chapter II. Israel is also not a party to Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
(1977), which expanded the definition of an international armed conflict and codified a number of 
fundamental principles governing the conduct of hostilities. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council, 
the UN General Assembly and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention have consistently 
affirmed its applicability14 and in 2004, the International Court of Justice unanimously affirmed its 
                                               
12 In the Beth El case (1978): see Ayyub v. Minister of Defence (1978) 33(2) P.D. 113 (English summary in 
(1979) 9 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 337). 
see Ayyub v. Minister of Defence (1978) 33(2) P.D. 113 (English summary in (1979) 9 Israel Yearbook of 
Human Rights 337). 
13 Ayyub v. Minister of Defence (1978) 33 (2) P.D. 113 (English summary in 9 Isr YHR (1979) 337). 
14 See S.C. Resolution 237 of 14 June 1967; S.C. Resolution 271 of 15 September 1969; and S.C. Resolution 
446 of 22 March 1979.  For General Assembly resolutions, see, for example, G.A. Resolution 56/60 of 10 
December 2001 and G.A. Resolution 58/97 and 9 December 2003.  See also Conference of the High Contracting 
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention: Declaration (5 December 2001) available at: 
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applicability in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory advisory opinion. Israel is also bound by the provisions of the Protocol I of 1977 that are 
established as customary international law, as has been recognised and applied by the Israeli High 
Court of Justice. Hence the general definition and legal meaning of belligerent occupation is discussed 
here for reference.  
 
a. Defining ‘Belligerent Occupation’ 
Belligerent occupation has been described as ‘a transitional period following invasion and preceding 
the cessation of hostilities’ which ‘imposes more onerous duties on an Occupying Power than on a 
party to an international armed conflict’.15  Determining the start of an occupation is essentially a 
question of fact,16 which must be distinguished from invasion: 
Invasion is the marching or riding of troops—or the flying of military aircraft—into enemy 
country.  Occupation is invasion plus taking possession of enemy country for the purpose of 
holding it, at any rate temporarily.  The difference between mere invasion and occupation 
becomes apparent from the fact that an occupant sets up some kind of administration, whereas 
the mere invader does not.17 
This distinction flows from the Hague Regulations, which has the status of customary international 
law18 and provides a definition of occupation upon which, on the whole, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention relies: 
42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
established and can be exercised.19 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/fd807e46661e3689852570d00069e918/8fc4f064b9be5bad85256c1400722
951!OpenDocument.  
15. Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No.IT-98-34-T (2003), 73, para.214, available at: 
www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-tj030(2003), www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-
tj030331-e.pdf.  
16. See A. McNair and A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 
pp. 377-378; and G. Schwarzenberger, International law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals.  
Vol. II: The Law of Armed Conflict (London: Stevens & Sons, 1968), p. 324. 
17. L. Oppenheim, International law: a treatise. Vol. II: Disputes, war and neutrality (London: Longman, 
1952), 7th edn by H. Lauterpacht), p. 434: see also Re Lepore, 13 Annual Digest of Public International Law 
Cases 354 (Supreme Military Tribunal, Italy: 1946) at 355; Disability pension case, 90 International Law 
Reports 400 (Federal Social Court, F. R. Germany: 1985) at 403; and G. von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy 
Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 28-29.  See also below on the notion of effective control of occupied territory. 
18. See Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, available at: www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-
tj030331-e.pdf, 73, para.215.  The customary nature of the Hague Regulations was declared by the International 
Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg in the Trial of German Major War Criminals, Cmd. 6964 (1946) 65.  The 
customary status of the Regulations has since been affirmed by various other courts: see, for example, In re 
Krupp (US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg), 15 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 620, 622 (the 
Annual Digest was subsequently retitled International Law Reports, which is now the title applied to the series 
as a whole); R. v Finta (Canadian High Court of Justice), 82 International Law Reports 425 at 439; Affo v IDF 
Commander in the West Bank (Israel High Court), 83 International Law Reports 122 at 163; Polyukhovich v. 
Commonwealth of Australia  (Australian High Court), 91 International Law Reports 1 at 123.  See also T. 
Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 38-
40. 
19. The Fourth Geneva Convention comes into operation in relation to the civilian population earlier than the 
provisions of Section III of the Hague Regulations which deal with belligerent occupation.  Article 6 of Geneva 
Convention IV provides that it applies ‘from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2’.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross’ commentary to Article 6 states that this language was employed 
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43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, 
the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, 
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country. 
Thus, in 1949, the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg ruled that  
an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental authority to the exclusion of the 
established government.  This presupposes the destruction of organised resistance and the 
establishment of an administration to preserve law and order.  To the extent that the 
occupant’s control is maintained and that of the civil government eliminated, the area will be 
said to be occupied.20  
 
b. General Provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
The Fourth Geneva Convention is supplementary to Section II and III of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations21 and is predominantly geared toward ensuring the protection of civilians. While human 
rights law applies without discrimination to all people in a territory, the provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention apply only to those individuals who qualify as ‘protected persons’, specified in 
Article 6 as civilians ‘who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in the 
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which 
they are not nationals’, excluding nationals of neutral or co-belligerent States that maintain diplomatic 
relations with the Occupying Power.  
                                                                                                                                                  
to indicate that the Convention ‘became applicable as soon as the first acts of violence were committed...Mere 
frontier incidents may make the Convention applicable, for they may be the beginning of a more widespread 
conflict.  The Convention should be applied as soon as troops are in foreign territory and in contact with the 
civilian population.’  Accordingly, the term ‘occupation’ in Article 6 bears a wider meaning than in Article 42 
of the Hague regulations: ‘So far as individuals are concerned, the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
does not depend upon the existence of a state of occupation within the meaning of Article 42 ... The relations 
between the civilian population of a territory and troops advancing into that territory, whether fighting or not, 
are governed by the present Convention.  There is no intermediate period between what might be termed the 
invasion phase and the inauguration of a stable regime of occupation.  Even a patrol which penetrates into 
enemy territory without any intention of staying there must respect the Convention in its dealings with the 
civilians it meets.’ J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), pp. 59-60. See also G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the 
ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 64-71; and International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic, 74-75, paras. 219-221, available at: 
www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-tj030331-e.pdf.  
20. Trial of Wilhelm List and others (the Hostages trial), VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 34 (1949) 
at 55-56. As Benvenisti notes, however, although an occupant has the legal duty to establish an administration in 
territory it occupies, today this ‘is the rare exception rather than the rule’: see Eyal Benvenisti, The international 
law of occupation ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 4-5: also UK Ministry of Defence, The 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 276, para.11(3)(1); 
Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No.IT-94-1-T (trial judgment, 7 May 1997), 204-205, para.584, available at:  
www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf; and Prosecutor v Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T 
(trial judgment 3 March 2000), p. 51, para.149, available at: www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc1/judgement/bla-
tj000303e.pdf. Thus, in the Armed activities on the territory of the Congo case, Judge Kooijmans noted in his 
separate opinion: ‘Occupants feel more and more inclined to make use of arrangements where authority is said 
to be exercised by transitional governments or rebel movements or where the occupant simply refrains from 
establishing an administrative system’: Armed activities on the territory of the Congo case (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Uganda), ICJ Rep, 2005, 168, Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 306, p.317, 
para.41. 
21 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, p. 172, para. 89. Section III concerns ‘military authority of the 
territory of the hostile state’ and is largely concerned with provisions aimed at preserving the institutions and 
structure of the state. 
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Although this study does not comprehensively review Israel’s practices under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, it is the scale of Israel’s violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention that suggests 
different normative regimes in the OPT. In this respect, several of its protections have particular 
relevance to this report.  
Article 49(6), for example, is especially relevant as it prohibits the transfer of the occupied power’s 
population into occupied territory.22 Article 53 prohibits destruction by the Occupying Power of real 
or personal property: ‘Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to 
social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered 
absolutely necessary by military operations’.23 Both of these provisions are relevant to Israeli policies 
to establish Jewish civilian settlements in the OPT. 
Article 27 presupposes a general right of movement for the civilian population, although this may be 
subject to restrictions made necessary by circumstances of war time.24 Article 27 also ensures a range 
of rights regarding culture and family: ‘Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect 
for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their 
manners and customs’. The authoritative commentary of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross states that, ‘the obligation to respect family rights, already expressed in Article 46 of the Hague 
Regulations, is intended to safeguard marriage ties and that community of parents and children with 
constitutes a family, ‘the natural and fundamental group unit of society’.25  This protection implies the 
right of family members to reside together in the same household or location.   
Article 27 also addresses the issue of discrimination, stipulating that ‘all protected persons shall be 
treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any 
adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion’.  The same article 
provides guarantees for humane treatment and protection against acts or threats of violence, including 
torture.  Article 33 prohibits collective punishments and all measures of intimidation or terrorism.  
Other protections require that the Occupying Power ensure adequate sustenance to protected persons, 
including water, and access to health care. Articles 55-56, 59 and 60 stipulate the obligation of the 
Occupying Power to ensure the adequate provision of these necessities including allowing in relief 
supplies.  Articles 65-68 and Articles 71-78 provide for due process, penal standards and protections 
in cases of assigned residence or internment (i.e., administrative detention). 
 
 
                                               
22  Article 49(6) states, ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies.’   
23  The ICRC commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention observes that the extension of protection  to 
public property and to goods owned collectively reinforces the rules already stipulated in the Hague 
Regulations, Article 46 and 56, according to which private property and that of municipalities and of institutions 
dedicated to charity, religion or education, the arts and sciences, must be respected; see J. Pictet (ed.), 
Commentary to 1949 Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva: ICRC, 1958), Commentary to Article 53, p. 301. 
24 The authoritative commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross notes that: ‘So far as the local population is concerned, the freedom of movement of civilians of enemy 
nationality may certainly be restricted, or even temporarily suppressed, if circumstances so require.  That right is 
not, therefore, included among the other absolute rights laid down in the Convention, but that in no way means 
that it is suspended in a general manner.  Quite the contrary: the regulations concerning occupation and those 
concerning civilian aliens in the territory of a Party to the conflict are based on the idea of personal freedom of 
civilians remaining in general unimpaired. The right is therefore a relative one which the Party to the conflict or 
the Occupying Power may restrict or even suspend within the limits laid down by the Convention.’ Commentary 
to Article 27, pp. 201-202. 
25  Pictet, Commentary to Convention IV, Commentary to Article 27, pp. 202-203. 
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2. Human Rights Law  
While relations of the Occupying Power with the inhabitants of occupied territory are regulated by 
international humanitarian law, in recent years it has become increasingly recognised that additionally 
an Occupying Power must also afford human rights guarantees to the population of territories under 
its control. This study accordingly cites human rights law extensively. As successive Israeli 
governments have rejected the application of human rights law to the OPT (although the High Court 
has sometimes acknowledged it),26 this approach requires some substantiation. 
Some States, such as the United States and Israel, still adhere to the traditional view that human rights 
law and international humanitarian law are mutually exclusive because of their conditions for 
application and the sphere of protection they afford.27  For instance, in 1998 the UN Human Rights 
Committee noted that Israel’s representative had made the argument that,  
Humanitarian law in armed conflicts had to be distinguished from human rights law.  Under 
human rights regimes, the purpose was to protect the individual from loss of life and liberty 
and from cruel treatment or oppression by the State, inflicted on him either as a citizen or as a 
person temporally subject to the jurisdiction of the State in question. Humanitarian law in 
armed conflicts, on the other hand, was designed to balance the needs of humanity against the 
nature of warfare. His Government believed that the latter situation was much more pertinent 
to the case of the occupied territories.28 
Very simply, the traditional argument was that while human rights law applies during peace time, 
international humanitarian law alone applies once an armed conflict exists.  Human rights law was 
also seen as applying within the national territory of a given State, whereas international humanitarian 
law was seen as applying extra-territorially as it regulated what States could do outside their own 
territory in wartime.  Moreover, human rights law was seen as comprising a body of obligations that 
citizens could claim from their own government, whereas international humanitarian law was seen as 
principally imposing obligations on governments in their treatment of non-nationals—that is, 
concerning a different destination of obligation. 
In recent decades, this traditional view has become inaccurate and inadequate. This is because human 
rights were recognised to be owed to non-nationals who are within a State’s territory and therefore 
subject to its jurisdiction, while international humanitarian law also regulates the conduct of hostilities 
in a non-international armed conflict (as common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and 1977 Additional Protocol II attest).  Moreover, as the International Committee of the Red Cross’ 
study of customary international humanitarian law demonstrates, regulation of different types of 
conflict has converged, as many of the customary rules applicable in international armed conflicts are 
equally applicable in non-international conflicts.29 
                                               
26 Israel’s Supreme Court acting as the High Court of Justice has also recognised this, although in equivocal 
terms. See HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, 21 June 2005, translated from the original 
Hebrew in (2006) 45 International Legal Materials 202, 215, para. 27. (‘…we shall assume – without deciding 
the matter – that the international conventions on human rights apply in the area.’) 
27. See F. Hampson and I. Salama, Working paper on the relationship between human rights law and 
international humanitarian law (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14  of 21 June 2005), 17, paras. 69-70.  For the United 
States’ position, see also Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted under Article 40 of the 
Covenant.  Concluding observations: United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (18 December 
2006), pp. 2-3, para.10, and U.S. Department of Defense, Working Group Report on detainee interrogations in 
the global war on terrorism: assessment of legal, historical, policy and operational considerations (6 March 
2003), p. 6, available at, www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf.  For a statement of the 
Israeli position see, for example, Human Rights Committee, Summary record of the 1675th meeting 
(CCPR/C/SR.1675 of 21 July 1998), statement of Mr. Schoffmann (Israel), para. 23. 
28. Human Rights Committee, Summary record, statement of Mr. Schoffmann (Israel), para.23. 
29. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols. 
( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  For commentaries on the use of human rights law in this 
study, see F. Hampson, ‘Other areas of customary law in relation to the Study’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and 
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Hence international humanitarian law is neither an autonomous nor a comprehensive legal regime.30  
As early as the late 1960s, United Nations bodies affirmed that some substantive human rights 
remained relevant during an international armed conflict.31  In Resolution 237 (14 June 1967) on the 
situation in the Middle East, the Security Council noted that ‘essential and inalienable human rights 
should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war’. In Resolution 2675 of 9 December 1970, 
entitled ‘Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts’, the General 
Assembly affirmed that ‘Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in 
international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict’.32 
By the mid-1990s, it was generally accepted that both human rights instruments and international 
humanitarian law were relevant in the regulation of non-international armed conflict. Still, the 
doctrine that both could also be applicable during an international armed conflict was only 
emerging.33  The first authoritative ruling on this question was in 1996, when the ICJ considered 
whether the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was applicable during an 
international armed conflict. In the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons advisory opinion, 
the Court ruled: 
the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in 
times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions 
may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.  Respect for the right to life is not, 
however, such a provision.  In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life 
applies also in hostilities.  The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
                                                                                                                                                  
Susan Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law ( 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 58 et seq; and also H. Krieger, ‘A conflict of norms: the 
relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law in the ICRC customary law study’ (2006) 11 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 265.  See also Noam Lubell, ‘Challenges in applying human rights law to 
armed conflict’ (2005) 860 International Review of the Red Cross 737 at 747. 
30. For a partial enumeration of lacunae in the legal régime of occupation, see G. von Glahn, ‘The protection of 
human rights in time of armed conflicts’ (1971) 1 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 208 at 212-213. 
31. For contemporary commentary see, for instance, GIAD Draper, ‘The relationship between the human rights 
regime and the law of armed conflicts’ (1971) 1 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 191, and von Glahn, Human 
rights. 
32 GA Resolution 2675 (XXV) of 9 December 1970, ‘Basic principles for the protection of civilian populations 
in armed conflicts’, operative paragraph 1. 
33. See, for instance, H.S. Burgos, ‘The application of international humanitarian law as compared to human 
rights law in situations qualified as internal armed conflict, internal disturbances and tensions, or public 
emergency, with special reference to war crimes and political crimes’, in F. Kalshoven  and Y. Sandoz  (eds.), 
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law ( Doredrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), p. 1; C. M. Cerna, 
‘Human rights in armed conflict: implementation of international humanitarian norms by regional 
intergovernmental human rights bodies’, in Kalshoven and Sandoz, p. 31; Y. Dinstein, ‘Human rights in armed 
conflict: international humanitarian law’, in T. Meron (ed.), Human Rights in International Law: Legal and 
Policy Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) Vol. II, p. 345; L. Doswald-Beck and S. Vite, ‘International 
humanitarian law and human rights law’ (1993) 293 International Review of the Red Cross 94; A. Eide, ‘The 
laws of war and human rights—divergences and convergences’, in C. Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on 
International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (The Hague: ICRC, 1984) 
p. 675; F. Hampson, ‘Human rights and humanitarian law in internal conflicts’, in A. Meyer (ed.), Armed 
Conflict and the New Law ( London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989), p. 55; P.H. 
Kooijmans, ‘In the shadowland between civil war and civil strife: some reflections on the standard-setting 
process’, in A. Delissen and G. Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead.  Essays 
in Honour of Frits Kalshoven (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 225; T. Meron, Human Rights in Internal 
Strife: Their International Protection (Cambridge: Grotius, 1987); AH Robertson, ‘Humanitarian law and 
human rights’, in Swinarski, op cit, 793; and D Schindler, ‘Human rights and humanitarian law: 
interrelationship of the laws’ (1982) 31 American University Law Review 935. 
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falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.34 
This opinion legally entrenched the idea of a normative relationship between international 
humanitarian and human rights law in international armed conflict.35  It did not provide a completely 
candid or transparent account of that relationship but nevertheless contradicted the traditional idea that 
these two branches of law are mutually exclusive because of their conditions for application and the 
sphere of protection they afford.  
In the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the 
Court reaffirmed this earlier approach: 
the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in 
case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be 
found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  As regards the 
relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are three 
possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; 
others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both 
these branches of international law.  In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will 
have to take into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights 
law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.36   
This ruling was reaffirmed in the Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda) case,37 where the International Court of Justice, concluding that Uganda was 
the Occupying Power in Ituri, (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), asserted clearly that 
Uganda was therefore under an obligation according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, 
‘to secure respect for the applicable rules of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not 
                                               
34. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1996 (1), 226 at 240, para.25.  
The earlier ruling by the European Court of Human Rights which addressed aspects of the applicability of 
human rights norms in an international armed conflict, delivered in Loizidou v Turkey, preliminary objections 
judgment (23 March 1995), Series A, No.310 at 23-24, paras. 62-64, is more restricted than that of the 
International Court in the Nuclear weapons advisory opinion.  In Loizidou, the European Court addressed only 
the extra-territorial applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights where a State party exercises 
effective control over foreign territory.  It ruled (24, para.62): ‘Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the 
Convention, the responsibilities of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military 
action—whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory.  The 
obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention derives from the fact of 
such control whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.’ 
35. It could also be seen as counter-intuitive, as international humanitarian law, the law regulating armed 
conflict, is a much older branch of international law than the protection of human rights.  Robertson, however, 
observed that this apparent anomaly disappears when the issue is considered analytically.  Human rights are the 
basic rights of everyone in all places at all times, whereas humanitarian law ascribes rights to specific categories 
of persons, in essence those who fall within the categories of protected persons enumerated in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, in the specific circumstance of an armed conflict.  Accordingly, human rights provisions constitute 
the norms of general application and only in exceptional circumstances do the norms of international 
humanitarian law apply. See Robertson, ‘Humanitarian law and human rights’, pp. 797-798: see also R. Wilde, 
‘Triggering State obligations extraterritorially: the spatial test in certain human rights treaties’ (2007) 40 Israel 
Law Review 503, but compare M. J. Dennis, ‘Application of human rights treaties extraterritorially in times of 
armed conflict and military occupation’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 119, and his ‘Non-
application of civil and political rights treaties extraterritorially during times of international armed conflict’, 
(2007) 40 Israel Law Review 453. 
36. Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep, 2004, 136, 
at 178, para.106. 
37 Congo case, para 216. 
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to tolerate such violence by any third party’38 The Court further considered that the following 
instruments in the fields of international humanitarian law and international human rights law were 
applicable, as relevant, to that instance of belligerent occupation: 
• Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague 
Convention (18 October 1907). (Neither the DRC nor Uganda are parties to the Convention 
but the Court reiterates that ‘the provisions of the Hague Regulations have become part of 
customary law’39 and as such are binding on both Parties). 
• Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 
August 1949). 
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966). 
• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (12 August 1949) and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977).  
• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (27 June 1981).  
• Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989).  
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (25 May 2000).’40 
 
Some commentators have noted that the Court omitted reference to lex specialis (a legal doctrine 
which holds that law concerning a specific subject, such as the law of armed conflict, is not 
overridden by a more general law, such as general human rights law): 
[The Court] thus concluded [in the Consequences of a wall advisory opinion] that both 
branches of international law, namely international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, would have to be taken into consideration.41 
Prud’homme claims that this omission amounts not simply to ‘a jurisprudential retreat from the 
principle of lex specialis’ by the Court but rather that it has ‘completely abandoned the theory of lex 
specialis’.42 This could reflect contemporary doubt about the ability of the lex specialis doctrine to 
provide a coherent and principled solution to potential conflicts between norms and, specifically, to 
determine the relationship between human rights and international humanitarian law in an 
international armed conflict.43  As the doctrine’s application is dependent on context rather than 
axiological principle, it is arguably unable to provide clear and unequivocal solutions to potential 
norm conflicts in international law.  This is because the legal system on the whole lacks hierarchical 
structure and the relationships between both sources of law and their substantive norms remain 
undefined: 
the application of lex specialis faces difficulties when we need to determine the relationship 
between two different normative orders or rules deriving from different areas of law, such as 
                                               
38 Congo case, para 178. 
39 Wall Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports (2004), p. 172, para. 89. 
40 Congo case, para 217. 
41 Congo case, pp. 242-243, para.216, and see 242-245, paras.215-221. 
42. N Prud’homme, ‘Lex specialis: oversimplifying a more complex and multifaceted relationship?’ (2007) 40 
Israel Law Review 355 at 385. 
43. See, for instance, O. Ben-Naftali O and Y. Shany, ‘Living in denial: the application of human rights in the 
Occupied Territories’, (2003) 37 Israel Law Review 17; Hampson, Other areas, 66-68; Prud’Homme, ‘Lex 
specialis’; W. A. Schabas, ‘Lex specialis? Belt and suspenders? The parallel operation of human rights law and 
the law of armed conflict, and the conundrum of jus ad bellum’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 592; and more 
generally, J. Kammerhofer, Unearthing structural uncertainty through neo-Kelsenian consistency: conflict of 
norms in international law (2005), available at: www.esil-sedi.eu/english/pdf/Kammerhofer.pdf; and A. 
Lindroos, ‘Addressing norm conflicts in a fragmented legal system: the doctrine of lex specialis’ (2005) 74 
Nordic Journal of International Law 27. 
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environmental norms and trade norms ... If two specialised norms stand side by side, the lex 
specialis maxim cannot be applied, given its inability to establish whether environmental 
protection is more special than human rights law, the law of the sea, or trade law. 
As the maxim is a mechanic principle without a clear content it does not provide 
guidance in determining what is general and what is special.  This is the second difficulty 
faced in the application of lex specialis to different normative orders.  Giving priority to a 
special norm within the system of unclear norm relations in which a decision cannot rely on 
such relations, the decision actually relies on political or other considerations ... Basing a 
decision only on a juridical logic such as lex specialis is rarely possible in the international 
legal system... 
Thirdly, lex specialis is in some sense a contextual principle.  It is difficult to use 
when determining conflicts between two normative orders in abstracto, and is, instead, more 
suited to the determination of relations between two norms in a concrete case.44 
Moreover, contemporary doctrine has expanded the traditional denotation of the lex specialis principle 
beyond that of a mere tool to be employed to solve potential conflict between substantive norms.  As 
is apparent from the International Court’s ruling in the Threat or use of nuclear weapons advisory 
opinion, it may be used as an interpretative device, where the content of the ‘general’ rule is 
determined in the light of the implications of the more ‘specialised’ rule: 
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities.45 
As Schabas usefully notes, however, human rights and international humanitarian law norms do not 
necessarily conflict or differ in their substantive content.  Recourse to lex specialis is superfluous 
when there is no such conflict.  Schabas claims that the fundamental compatibility of both normative 
systems was demonstrated in the Consequence of a wall advisory opinion and the Armed activities 
(Congo v Uganda) case.  Human rights and international humanitarian law can be complementary as 
each can fill lacunae in the other, as some issues are more clearly regulated by one regime rather than 
the other.46 
Further, in Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, the 
Human Rights Committee did not rely on the lex specialis maxim to determine the respective 
application of human rights and international humanitarian law in international armed conflicts. 
Rather, the Committee indicated that the issue depended on convergence or parallel application: 
… the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] applies also in situations of armed conflict to 
which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain 
Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially 
relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are 
complementary, not mutually exclusive.47 
                                               
44. Lindroos, Addressing norm conflicts, pp. 41-42. 
45. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1996(1), 226 at 240, para.25.  
46.  Schabas, Belt and suspenders?, pp. 596-597: see also Hampson, Other areas, pp. 63-65; and A. Roberts, 
‘Transformative military occupation: applying the laws of war and human rights’ (2006) 100 American Journal 
of  International Law 580 at 594. 
47. Adopted 26 May 2004, UN Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13; General Comment 29, adopted 31 August 2001, 
dealt with states of emergency, UN Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. This approach is a trend evident in recent 
doctrine: for instance, see D. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted killing of suspected terrorists: extra-judicial executions or 
legitimate means of defence?’ (2004) 16 European Journal of International Law 171; Prud’Homme, Lex 
specialis; Roberts, Transformative military occupation; and Schabas, Belt or suspenders?. It reflects a renewed 
interest in doctrines of systemic interpretation derived from Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties: see C. McLachlan, ‘The principle of systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
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These considerations are apposite to mapping the relationship between human rights and international 
humanitarian law.  A more restricted view is appropriate to the issue in hand, namely the assessment 
of Israeli practices in the OPT in the light of international standards prohibiting racial discrimination, 
colonialism and apartheid. As Israel can only exercise jurisdiction within these territories in its 
capacity as a belligerent occupant, the over-arching framework of the law of occupation must 
determine the governing normative context within which other rules of international law are applied.  
Although Roberts argues that one should be cautious in asserting uncritically that human rights 
instruments should be applied in occupied territory,48 it may safely be claimed that core prohibitions 
on racial discrimination and apartheid, for example, do apply by virtue of their status as ius cogens 
norms.49 
The ICJ has considered Israel’s duty to apply concurrently human rights and international 
humanitarian law in the OPT in the Consequences of a wall advisory opinion, where it re-affirmed its 
earlier ruling in the Threat or use of nuclear weapons advisory opinion that human rights conventions 
continue to apply in time of armed conflict (subject to any derogations made by States parties using 
mechanisms such as Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).50  The ICJ 
then considered the extra-territorial application within the OPT of the principal human rights 
instruments to which Israel is a party—namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.51 In finding that the ICCPR applied extra-territorially, the 
ICJ followed the settled view of the Human Rights Committee that this principle was confirmed by 
the travaux préparatoires of Article 2.1 of the Covenant.52  Article 2.1 provides: 
Each State party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
In this ruling, the ICJ noted, but rejected, Israel’s consistent claim made before the Human Rights 
Committee that it is under no legal obligation to apply the ICCPR in the OPT.53   
In contrast, the ICJ observed that the ICESCR contains no provision regulating the scope of its 
application.  While noting that this Covenant dealt with rights that are ‘essentially territorial’, the ICJ 
continued that ‘it is not to be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a State party has 
sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction’.  Accordingly, it 
rejected Israel’s claim, made before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that it 
was under no legal obligation to apply the ICESCR in the OPT.  It further ruled that Israel ‘is under an 
                                                                                                                                                  
Convention’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279; also C. Borgen, ‘Resolving treaty 
conflicts’ (2005) 37 George Washington International Law Review 573. 
48 See Roberts, Transformative occupation, pp. 599-600: for example, although it may be accepted in principle 
that an occupant is bound to apply the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights in occupied 
territory, does this entail that the occupant has the obligation to facilitate the exercise of the right to vote by 
protected persons present in the territory? 
49 See Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘Protection of the civilian population’, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 209 at p. 255, para. 547(4). 
50.  Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 177-178, paras. 105-106. 
51.  See Consequences of a wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 177-181, paras. 102-113. Israel ratified both 
International Covenants and the Children’s Convention on 3 October 1991: see ICJ Rep, 2004, 177, para. 103. 
52.  See, for example, Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports submitted by States parties under 
Article 40 of the Covenant. Concluding observations: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (18 August 1998), para. 10. 
For a contrary interpretation of the travaux préparatoires, see Dennis, ‘Application of human rights treaties’, 
123-124 and 122-127 generally, and his Non-application of civil and political rights, pp. 474-477. 
53. Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 179-180, paras. 109-111. 
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obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has 
been transferred to Palestinian authorities’.54  
Similarly, in the case of Loizidou v Turkey, which addressed the scope of Turkey’s extraterritorial 
responsibility to implement and respect the European Convention on Human Rights in Northern 
Cyprus, the European Court of Human Rights held that: 
the responsibility of Contracting States can be involved by acts and omissions of their 
authorities which produce effects outside their own territory. Of particular significance to the 
present case the Court held, in conformity with the relevant principles of international law 
governing State responsibility, that the responsibility of a Contracting Party could also arise 
when as a consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective 
control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether it 
be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.55  
It is clear therefore that international courts have conclusively negated the position on the extra-
territorial application of human rights treaties during armed conflict that Israel had expounded before, 
as noted earlier.   
Hampson and Salama have considered whether Israel is entitled to rely on the principle of persistent 
objection to claim that the applicability of international humanitarian law precludes that of human 
rights law in armed conflict.  (This principle provides that a State may contract out of a customary 
rule as it is being formed by claiming that it is not bound by the emerging rule.56)  Hampson and 
Salama doubt whether Israel can rely on this principle because Israel’s objection does not appear to be 
sufficiently consistent: Israel has neither made reservations to this effect nor objected to general 
comments by the Committee that have dealt with the applicability of human rights law in time of 
armed conflict.57  The ICJ had ruled that Israel’s view was contrary to the preponderant interpretation 
of the extra-territoriality of the Covenants.  The question was not the existence of Israel’s obligations 
under the Covenants, but rather the extent of those obligations. 
Accordingly, international consensus is that the framework of the law of occupation cannot preclude 
the parallel application of human rights law.  It may be that the lex specialis rule determines the 
interpretation of a given rule in specific circumstances—as, for instance, when the question of what 
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of life must be assessed in the light of the lex specialis of 
international humanitarian law—but frequently human rights and humanitarian law rules do not 
conflict or differ in their content.  The prohibitions on racial discrimination and apartheid, however, 
have the status of ius cogens norms from which no derogation is allowed and so will pre-empt any 
conflicting interpretation or application of any norm of international law, including norms of 
humanitarian law.   
To conclude, Israel’s rejection of the applicability of human rights law in the OPT has been 
authoritatively rejected by the International Court of Justice and by the wider international 
                                               
54. Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 180-181, para.112: compare Dennis, 127-128. 
55 Loizidou v Turkey (App no 15318/89 of 18 December 1996), 36 International Legal Materials (1997) 440 at 
453, para. 52. 
56 On the principle of persistent objection, see Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway)case, ICJ Rep, 1951, 116 at 
131 and 138-139; International Law Association, Final report of the Committee on the formation of customary 
(general) international law (London: ILA, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, 2000) p. 712; M. Mendelson, 
‘The formation of customary international law’ (1999) 272 Receuil des Cours 158 at 227-244: and compare J. 
Charney, ‘The persistent objector rule and the development of customary international law’ (1985) 56 British 
Yearbook of International Law 1; and T. Stein, ‘The approach of a different drummer: the principle of persistent 
objector in international law’ (1985) 26 Harvard Journal of International Law 457. 
57. Hampson and Salama, p. 17, para.70; see also Hampson, Other areas, pp. 68-72. One may also wonder 
whether a claim based on persistent objection can be structural as opposed to substantive.   
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community.  Israel cannot claim that human rights law, including the prohibition of apartheid, is 
irrelevant to its administration of the OPT.  While international humanitarian law, and in particular the 
law of belligerent occupation, provides the primary legal framework to assess the legality of the 
conduct of that occupation, this does not preclude the application of other rules of international law, 
such as human rights law.  Indeed, international humanitarian law itself mandates that its application 
must consider relevant norms in other areas of international law, including the prohibitions on 
apartheid and colonialism.58   
Hence this study considers that international human rights law and humanitarian law both apply in 
situations of belligerent occupation.  International human rights law applicable to Israel’s actions as 
the Occupying Power in the OPT is set out primarily in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both of which Israel has ratified. In sum, the following instruments are 
also applicable and shall be referred to throughout the study: 
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)59 
• Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) 
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) 60 
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 61 
• Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) 62 
• Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 63 
• Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973) 
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
 
3. Prohibition of Colonialism in International Law  
Whether Israel’s belligerent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza constitutes a colonial project has 
attracted relatively little attention from the perspective of international law. This neglect may stem 
from several causes. It may reflect impressions that colonialism was a practice restricted to 
domination by white European powers of non-white, non-European territories and thus is not as 
obviously applicable in the Israeli-Palestinian context as it was to, say, French and British rule in 
Africa.64 It could reflect an assumption that colonialism has become an obsolete concern for 
                                               
58 See for example Articles 72 and 75 (c) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (1977), entered into 
force 7 December 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
59 Ratified by Israel on 9 March 1950. 
60 Ratified by Israel on 3 January 1979. 
61 Ratified by Israel on 3 October 1991. 
62 Ratified by Israel on 3 October 1991. 
63 Ratified by Israel on 3 October 1991. 
64 As noted by Berman, ‘Many contemporary disputes involving assertions of self-determination pose 
exceptionally ‘hard cases’: unusual competing claims of arguably non-European peoples (Palestine), areas 
where the indigenous people constitutes an electoral minority (New Caledonia), etc.’: Nathanial Berman, 
‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law’ (1988-1989) 7 Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 51 at 59. 
64 On contemporary discussion of ‘colonialism’ in the present day, see, for example, Nadav Carmel-Katz 
‘Colonialism to Racism’ (1981) 10 Journal of Palestine Studies 4 170-178; See John Strawson, ‘Reflections on 
Edward Said and the Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Self-Determination’ 
(2001-2002) 20 Penn State International Law Review 363. 
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international law since the decolonization of African and Asian States in the 1960s and 1970s.65 It 
may even reflect acceptance that Israel’s establishment in 1948 resulted from a struggle for Jewish 
self-determination against the British colonial power, a narrative that casts Israel as a decolonized 
rather than a colonizing State and precludes consideration of Israel as an agent of colonialism (as 
discussed later).66 
Nevertheless, as UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard noted, some elements of Israel’s occupation—
for example, the unlawful transfer of settlers into occupied territory, discriminatory policies of the 
Occupying Power on the basis of ethnicity and religion, appropriation of natural resources, ‘de-
development’ of the Palestinian economy and forced dependence on the Israeli economy, and 
especially denial of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination—prima facie suggest a 
contemporary manifestation of colonialism. The study thus seeks to appraise whether Israel’s policies 
and practices in the OPT constitute a substantive practice of colonialism. 
Typically, the term ‘colonialism’ has been used to refer to the domination of non-European peoples 
by European powers in the sixteenth through early twentieth centuries,67 expressed in de facto and de 
jure seizure of land, denial of indigenous self-governance, and the domination, subjugation and 
exploitation of such lands and their peoples for the enrichment and greater hegemony of the 
colonising State. European powers characteristically acquired territory through conquest, treaties of 
cession, and ‘protection’ or the occupation of lands deemed or claimed to be terra nullius.68 Colonial 
rule then emerged from the coloniser’s claim to be the territory’s legitimate sovereign or to hold 
exclusive trade rights relative to other European powers and ultimately control the territory’s foreign 
policy and to redirect its domestic economy to serve the coloniser’s interest.. Policies of the metropol 
sometimes included formal policies to settle their own population in the colonised territory but in 
most cases they merely implanted smaller populations of administrators to serve colonial 
bureaucracies.69 
Prohibitions on colonialism emerged gradually while much of the world was still under European 
domination in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mégret points out that nascent 
                                                                                                                                                  
, 363; Geremy Forman and Alexandre Kedar, ‘Colonialism, Colonization, and Land Law in Mandate Palestine: 
The Zor al-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya Land Disputes in Historical Perspective’ (2003) 4 Theoretical Inquiries 
491; Robert Home, ‘Colonial and Postcolonial Land  Law in Israel/Palestine’ (2003) 13 Social & Legal Studies 
3, 291; Ralph Wilde, ‘The Post-Colonial Use of International Territorial Administration and Issues of 
Legitimacy’  (2005) 99 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 38.  
65 Leonard Barnes offers another explanation of simple distance: since ‘[f]ormulations of human rights naturally 
tend to reflect the major frustrations of those who made them’, the architects of international law are at a far 
remove from the oppressed of a colony, of territories where ‘economic subordination entails political disability; 
where political disability may bring with it severe restrictions upon civil liberty and an exceptional widening of 
the legal meaning of ‘sedition’ (such restrictions being at their most severe when the metropolitan authorities 
regard the native culture as backward or inferior); and where official anxiety about sedition and allied offences 
lead to judicial and police practices which in the metropolitan country would be regarded as unusually harsh.’ 
see ‘The Rights of Dependent Peoples’ in Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (UNESCO, Paris, 25 
July 1948) UNESCO/PHS/3 (rev.) p 253. 
66 See John Strawson, ‘Reflections on Edward Said’, at 376. 
67 See J. T. Gathii, ‘Imperialism, Colonialism and International Law’ (2007) 54 Buffalo Law Review 1013 at 
1014. 
68 J. A. Andrews, ‘The Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century’ (1978) 
94 Law Quarterly Review 408 at 410.  Terra nullius refers to territory devoid of government and under no 
sovereignty: see John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective (Cape Town: Juta & Co. 2001), 
pp. 119-120. 
69 ‘One can speak of colonization when there is, and by the very fact that there is, occupation with domination; 
when there is, and by the very fact that there is, emigration with legislation’: R. Maunier, Sociologue coloniale 
(I), Introduction a l’etude du contact des races (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1932) p. 37, quoted in M. 
Rodinson, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Monad Press, 1973), p. 92: emphasis in Rodinson.  
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humanitarian norms at this time were designed exclusively for European enjoyment; their origins 
trace to the 1859 Battle of Solferino, which was ‘a very European battle’.70 Limiting the scope of 
military campaigns outside of Europe made little sense while non-European peoples and their 
territories continued to exist, for Europeans, in a ‘twilight world’ of unfixed international legal 
personality open to colonial domination.71 Regardless of these origins, norms related to armed conflict 
in Europe eventually consolidated an understanding that military occupation was a temporary regime 
qualitatively distinct from the annexation of territory. In the mid-twentieth century, facing a scale of 
indigenous resistance that exhausted European energies and funds for sustaining colonial empires, 
these norms crystallised as a sweeping prohibition against conquest and foreign domination through 
the endorsement of the right of peoples to self-determination.72  
Although self-determination in international relations lexicon first emerged in 1919 in the aftermath 
of the First World War,73 it did not mature as a legal norm in customary international law until 
decolonization, when nascent norms against colonialism expressed the principle of self-determination 
as a rejection of ‘alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’. In 1960, these norms were codified 
in the UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples74 (henceforth, the Declaration), which comprises the basis for this study and is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4.75 Although the Declaration is not binding per se, it has acquired the status 
of a customary rule of international law over time.76 It has also been described as making ‘a 
significant contribution to developing the concept of the right of self-determination, representing as it 
does the most definitive statement of condemnation of colonialism by the international community’.77  
                                               
70 F. Mégret, ‘From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Post-Colonial Look at International Humanitarian 
Law's ‘Other', in A. Orford (ed.), International Law and its ‘Others’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2006) 265 at 270. 
71 A. Anghie, Sovereignty, Imperialism and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 79. 
72 Under Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, self-determination is characterised in the English text as a ‘principle’ 
and not a right. This is also the case with the Chinese, Spanish, and Russian texts. In the French text, the term is 
droit d’auto-détermination. According to Article 111 of the UN Charter all five texts are authentic. Article 33 
(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides that the terms of the treaty are presumed to 
have the same meaning in each authentic text. It is therefore arguable that the texts must be reconciled if 
possible, to achieve a meaning that makes sense in each authentic text.  In 1945, self-determination was not a 
binding legal right but a general principle. It was only later within the context of the human rights movement 
and decolonization that self-determination was recognised as a right under customary international law. See R 
Falk, ‘Self-Determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine versus the Incoherence of 
Experience’, in W. Danspeckgruber (ed.), The Self-Determination of Peoples: Community, Nation and State in 
an Interdependent World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 31-66, 41.  
73 President Woodrow Wilson’s articulation of self-determination in his Fourteen Points speech before the 
United States Congress was in response to the Bolsheviks’ pronouncement in support of self-determination.  See 
Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (London: MacMillan, 1994), pp. 
36-37. 
74 See GA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 Dec. 1960. 
75 This resolution was adopted unopposed by all the colonial powers, which chose to abstain rather than vote 
against it: see Umozurike Oji Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (Connecticut: Archon 
Books, 1972), p. 73.   
76 See G.I. Tunkin, Droit International Public: Problèmes Théoriques (Paris: A. Pédone, 1965), p. 101. See also 
Christos Theodoropoulos, Colonialism and General International Law: The Contemporary Theory of National 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination (New Horizon, 1989). 
77 Frank Abdullah, ‘The Right to Decolonization’, in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, in association with UNESCO, Paris, 
1991), p. 1209. 
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The Declaration opens with statements affirming the ‘passionate yearning for freedom of all 
dependent peoples’ and further affirms that ‘the continued existence of colonialism prevents the 
development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic 
development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace’. 
Article 1 then holds that 
The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a 
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. 
Article 4 calls for an end to armed repression of colonized peoples and Article 5 calls for granting 
complete independence to such peoples 
Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other 
territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of 
those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely 
expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to 
enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.78 
In referring to ‘all other territories which have not yet attained independence’, Article 5 ensures that 
the Declaration’s provisions apply not only to Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories generally but 
also to any other territory that has ‘not yet attained independence’, which would include those 
territories that had previously been placed under a League of Nations mandate,79 such as Palestine 
which had ‘reached a stage of development where [its] existence as [an] independent nation 
… [was] provisionally recognized’ in the League of Nations Covenant in 1919. This was 
given expression in the British Mandate for Palestine that had been prepared by the Council 
of the League of Nations in 1922.  As Crawford notes, ‘[l]egally the reason why the 
Palestinians have the right of self-determination now was that they had it as of 1922 under the 
mandate for Palestine’. In its advisory opinion on Namibia, the ICJ declared that  
the subsequent development of international law in regard to non self-governing territories, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination 
applicable to all of them. The concept of the sacred trust was confirmed and expanded to all 
‘territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government’ (Article 
73). Thus it clearly embraced territories under a colonial régime. Obviously the sacred trust 
continued to apply to League of Nations mandated territories on which an international status 
had been conferred earlier. A further important stage in this development was the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly 
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces all peoples and territories 
which ‘have not yet attained independence’.80  
The representative of the United States clarified the goal of the Declaration as applying to all such 
territories irrespective of their geographic location or legal status when he stated that, 
The Charter [of the United Nations] declares in effect that on every nation in possession of 
foreign territories, there rests the responsibility to assist the peoples of these areas ‘in the 
progressive development of their free political institutions’ so that ultimately they can validly 
choose for themselves their permanent political status.81 
                                               
78 Emphasis added. 
79 See James Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’, in 
Philip Alston (ed.) People’s Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 14. 
80  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa), 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 31, para. 52. 
81  Majorie M. Whiteman, 5 Digest of International Law (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publication, 
1965), p. 82, emphasis added, parenthesis in original. The use of the term ‘foreign territories’ in the passage just 
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Colonialism can thus be distinguished from other forms of foreign domination (such as prolonged 
belligerent occupation) by the dominant power’s open claim to sovereignty or assuming such 
authority over a territory’s foreign and domestic policy as to allow the people of the territory only 
nominal sovereignty (such as ‘indirect rule’ by Britain in colonial Africa). The language of the 
chapeau of the Declaration, in the first paragraph regarding self-determination and in Article 5 (which 
emphasizes that ‘all power’ should be transferred to dependent peoples so that they can enjoy 
‘complete independence and freedom’) stresses the link between a dependent people and their human 
rights, self-determination and sovereignty over their territory. The same concern was reiterated by the 
General Assembly in Resolution 2649 (30 November 1970), which recognised ‘the importance of the 
universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human 
rights’. A finding of colonialism could thus be made for any territory where practices of the colonial 
power extend not just to the appropriation of land and natural resources but also to denying—and 
demonstrating an intention permanently to deny—the peoples of that territory their right to self-
determination.82  
The Preamble to the Declaration expresses a special concern with territorial integrity, to ensure that 
the self-determination of a people can be meaningfully expressed. It affirms that ‘all peoples have an 
inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their 
national territory’ and later reiterates that ‘the integrity of their national territory shall be respected’. 
Article 6 further emphasises that ‘any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations’.  
The Declaration’s broad condemnation of ‘colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’ would 
include incremental colonization of territory through civilian settlement, including in occupied 
territory. Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an Occupying Power from 
transferring its own population into the territory it occupies precisely ‘to prevent a practice adopted 
during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population 
to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order to, as they claimed, to colonize those 
territories’.83  
As discussed in Chapter III, the Israeli Foreign Ministry argues that Article 49(6) of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention is not violated by Jewish settlement in the OPT because it reflects voluntary 
population movement rather than forced transfer.84 This argument is irrelevant because Article 49(6) 
does not specify that the ‘transfer’ need to be forced.  Thus. on 18 September 1967, the then legal 
adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Theodor Meron, advised the Israeli government that: “The 
prohibition [contained in Article 49(6)]…is categorical and not conditional upon the motives for the 
transfer or its objectives.  Its purpose is to prevent settlement in occupied territory of citizens of the 
occupying state”.85 Further, the US State Department Legal Adviser similarly noted in a legal opinion 
                                                                                                                                                  
quoted is significant because it can be applied to territories that are not a part of the metropolitan State for the 
purposes of a State’s municipal law, to territories which are geographically separate, and to those which are 
contiguous to it but do not belong to it. 
82  On definitions of colonialism, see Ronald J. Hovarth, ‘A Definition of Colonialism’ (1972) 13 Current 
Anthropology 45 at 46-47; Robert E. Gorelick, ‘Apartheid and Colonialism’ (1986) 19 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 70 at 71. 
83  Jean S. Pictet, Commentary, IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), p.  283. 
84 Foreign Ministry of Israel, ‘Israeli Settlements and International Law’, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/peace%20process/guide%20to%20the%20peace%20process/israeli%20settlements%
20and%20international%20law.  
85 A scan of  the original Hebrew text of this opinion is available at: http://southjerusalem.com/settlement-and-
occupation-historical-documents/, and a complete English translation on the website of the Sir Joseph Hotung 
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prepared in 1978 on the legality of Israeli settlements in occupied territory: ‘Paragraph 6 appears to 
apply by its terms to any transfer by an occupying power of parts of its civilian population, whatever 
the objective and whether involuntary or voluntary. It seems clearly to reach such involvements of the 
occupying power as determining the location of settlements, making land available and financing of 
settlements, as well as other kinds of assistance and participation in their creation’.86 This prohibition 
therefore includes population movement that is encouraged although not forced by a government: for 
example, through State incentives designed to attract mass civilian settlement into the territory for the 
purposes of creating ‘facts on the ground’ that will facilitate annexation.  
The provision regarding ‘transfer’ in Article 49(6) does not clearly apply to cases where a civilian 
population moves into a territory without government incentives or involvement as a result of social 
pressures such as land shortages, a process sometimes called ‘settler colonialism’. Because the 
Declaration condemns ‘colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’, it is immaterial to a finding of 
colonialism whether Jewish settlements in the OPT represent population ‘transfer’ in the sense 
suggested by Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention or represents settler colonialism. . 
This category of settler colonialism87 was extensively debated by the anti-apartheid movement in 
South Africa under the label, ‘colonialism of a special type’.  That it may be distinguished from other 
kinds of colonialism was illustrated by, amongst others, the South African experience.  First, the 
settler society effectively indigenises: it makes its own claim to self-determination in the territory it 
has seized, holding that the land is its own by right of settlement.  Second, settler independence 
movements commonly assume the mantle of a decolonisation struggle, a move that concomitantly 
denies the legitimacy of any anti-colonial claim by the people it has displaced. Where this is 
successful, settler colonies are recognised as independent States, their colonial origins are expunged 
from international law and discourse. By the 1940s, Jewish-Zionist nationalism in Palestine was being 
expressed as an anti-colonial struggle against Britain, a campaign that concomitantly rejected 
Palestinian Arab rights to the land. Its success was reflected by the UN General Assembly when it 
recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State (in Resolution 181 of 
1947) and admitted Israel as a member State in 1949. 
Partly because of the history of settler-colonial State formation, the Declaration does not consider that 
a State may be practicing colonialism within its own borders. The words ‘geographically separate’ 
were used in UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 to allay the fears of States that the prohibition of 
colonialism would apply to formerly independent peoples within their borders.88 As Israel has been 
                                                                                                                                                  
Programme in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle East (School of Oriental and African 
Studies, London) at: http://www.soas.ac.uk/lawpeacemideast/resources/48485.pdf.     
86 See United States: Letter of the State Department Legal Adviser Concerning the Legality of Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 21 April 1978, in 17 International Legal Materials (1978), p. 777 at p. 
779. 
87 See, for example, Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: 
Projects, Practices, Legacies (Routledge, 2005) and Annie Combes, Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History 
and Memory in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa (Manchester University Press, 2006).   
88  This reflects the so-called ‘Belgian thesis’ which would have extended the concept of non-self-governing 
territories to include disenfranchised indigenous peoples living within the borders of independent states, 
especially if the race, language and culture of these peoples differed from those of the dominant population. See 
J. L. Kunz, ‘Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in action’ (1954) 48 American Journal of International 
Law 109 at 109; and Patrick Thornberry, ‘Self-determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of 
International Instruments’ (1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 874. The rights of such 
peoples were eventually codified in the International Labour Organisation’s Convention (No. 169) concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (adopted on 7 June 1989, entered into force on 5 
September 1991), which recognises that groups living in such states still experience enduring conditions of 
alienation, marginalisation, and discrimination. That their dilemma results from colonisation is built into the 
definition in Article 1(b): ‘Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, 
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admitted to the United Nations as an independent State (tacitly although not explicitly within its 1949 
ceasefire lines), for the purposes of this study it is assumed that the Declaration is not legally 
applicable within those lines. The 1949 ceasefire lines delineate areas beyond which Israel cannot 
claim legal title, and it is legally responsible for any Israeli settlement in the OPT.   
Settler colonialism is also distinguished by a third trait: a pattern of advancing civilian settlement 
across borders, reflecting the drive for land and resources as well as military attempts to resolve the 
insecurity that regularly emerged along settler frontiers.89 In South Africa (as in North America), 
indigenous title was extinguished not through outright conquest but through an incremental advance 
of civilian settlement.90 Thus Jewish settlement in the West Bank is more analogous to settler 
colonialism than, for example, the implantation of European colonies in Africa and south Asia.   
The Declaration might still be argued to be inapplicable to Israeli practices in the OPT on other 
grounds. First, the term ‘colonialism’ might be considered inapplicable to territory contiguous with 
the dominating State, being associated only with overseas or otherwise distant lands.91 This point has 
no substance, as the Declaration makes no reference to geographic distance.92 The phrase 
‘geographically separate’ in General Assembly resolution 1541 indicates only that a colony is beyond 
the boundaries of the administering State.93 East Timor, South-West Africa (Namibia), and Western 
Sahara were all colonised by powers territorially adjacent to them and the UN listed them all as Non-
Self-Governing territories.94 
                                                                                                                                                  
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political 
institutions’. 
89 Literature on the ‘frontier’ logic of expansion includes M. Legassick, ‘The frontier tradition in South African 
historiography,’ in S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds), Economy and society in pre-industrial South Africa (London: 
Longman, 1980). 
90 The term developed in United States federal law to explain the juridical redefinition of Native Americans 
(‘Indian nations) from foreign powers to domestic entities was ‘domestic dependent nations’: see judgment by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
91    The definition of a non-self-governing territory as being ‘geographically separate’ and ‘ethnically and/or 
culturally’ distinct from the metropolitan power has been referred to by scholars as the ‘salt-water theory’ of 
colonialism: see Rupert Emerson, ‘Colonialism’ (1969) 4 Journal of Contemporary History 3 (defining 
colonialism as the imposition of white rule on alien peoples inhabiting lands separated by salt water from the 
imperial centre); and H.K. Weeseling, Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of European 
Expansion (London: Greenwood Press, 1997), preface, pp. ix-x. The salt-water theory is principally a political 
doctrine rather than a legal concept and is a highly problematic term in international law, the result of a political 
bargain: see Lee C. Bucheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978), p. 18 (describing the theory as a valiant, misguided and unconvincing attempt to limit the scope of 
self-determination by reading into the principle an arbitrary limitation.) See also Michla Pomerance, Self-
Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine of the United Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1982), p. 15. After the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, the United States representative called the Soviet Union and its satellites, ‘the largest colonial empire 
which has ever existed in history’: see Whiteman, p. 82.   
92 The Bandung final communiqué, upon which the Declaration on Colonialism is based, does not stipulate the 
colonialism only applies to territories separated from the colonial powers by salt-water: see Section D.1(a- d) of 
the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 24 April 1955. 
93 The Bandung final communiqué, upon which the Declaration on Colonialism is based, does not stipulate the 
colonialism only applies to territories separated from the colonial powers by salt-water.  
94  Namibia and East Timor have since become independent .  The eleventh edition of The Encyclopedia 
Britannica, published at the height of British imperialism, notably did not define ‘colony’ as a territory that is 
separated by salt-water or any other geographical feature, but only as ‘a term most commonly used to denote a 
settlement of the subjects of a sovereign State in lands beyond its boundaries, owing no allegiance to any foreign 
power, and retaining a greater or less degree of dependence on the mother country’: The Encyclopedia 
Britannica (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1910), p. 716.  
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In calling for Israel to withdraw from ‘territories occupied in the recent conflict’ (namely, the 1967 
Six-Day War), Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) affirmed that Israel is not the sovereign in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.95 In reviewing the route of Israel’s Wall,96 the ICJ further confirmed that 
Israel is an Occupying Power in the OPT and is obliged to administer the OPT in accordance with the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.97 It is a cardinal principle of international humanitarian law that 
sovereignty can never be vested in an Occupying Power.  Moreover, in 1993, Israel agreed to 
maintain the territorial integrity of the OPT in signing the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, Article 4 of which confirmed that ‘[t]he two sides view the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit’. Israel’s actions in the OPT may accordingly come 
under review for violations under terms of the Declaration if, as a foreign power, Israel appears to be 
engaging in actions that dismember the territory with the aim of permanent annexation. 
Moreover, it may be argued that the conflict does not replicate the unequal relations associated with 
colonialism because it is fundamentally a conflict between ‘two peoples in one land’.  This view may 
be dismissed on the ground that the conflict is fundamentally characterised, in terms of international 
law, by a denial of the Palestinian peoples’ right to self-determination. It will be recalled that UN 
General Assembly Resolution 2649 condemned ‘those Governments that deny the right to self-
determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern 
Africa and Palestine’.98 Given this coupling of the Palestinian cause with calls for decolonisation 
(reiterated in numerous other resolutions), Alain Pellet argues that, ‘there is no doubt that the 
Palestinian people can claim the benefits of a very comprehensive legal regime applicable to colonial 
peoples’.99  
The Declaration and related instruments indicate that an Occupying Power can become a colonial 
power if it practices policies associated with colonialism; that is, (1) if it attempts to annex the 
territory that it is occupying or administers it in a way that denies its people the right of self-
                                               
95 Security Council Resolution 242 (22 November 1967).  The resolution calls for ‘the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) 
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’, ‘(ii) Termination of all 
claims or states of belligerency.’ The English version omits the definite article regarding ‘territories’, leaving 
Israel with a loophole to claim that some withdrawal is adequate. The other official language translations 
retained the phrasing that would indicate all territories must be evacuated.  The French version, for example, 
calls for ‘(i) Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit.’ International 
law prohibits the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force, and holds that any such attempted 
acquisition is legally invalid. Security Council Resolution 242 reiterates this point in the context of the OPT. On 
the interpretation of resolution 242, see O. M. Dajani, ‘Forty years without resolve: tracing the influence of 
Security Council resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process’ (2007) 37 Journal of Palestine Studies 24; 
A. J. Goldberg, ‘United Nations Security Council resolution 242 and the prospects for peace in the Middle East’ 
12 (1973) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 187; M. Lynk, ‘Conceived in law: the legal foundations of 
resolution 242’ (2007) 37 Journal of Palestine Studies 7; J. McHugo, ‘Resolution 242: a legal appraisal of the 
right-wing Israeli interpretation of the withdrawal phase with reference to the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 851; Musa Muzzawi, Palestine and the 
Law: Guidelines for the Resolution of the Arab-Israel Conflict (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997), pp. 200-1 
(reproducing the text in English as well as in French, Russian, Chinese, and Spanish); and S. Rosenne, ‘On 
multi-lingual interpretation’ (1971) 6 Israel Law Review 360. 
96  Israeli authorities sometimes refer to this construction as the ‘security fence’. The United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) calls it the ‘separation barrier’. Others have called it the 
‘annexation Wall’ or even the ‘apartheid Wall’. For part of its route, it is a concrete wall, while for the rest of 
the route it is an impassable system of fences with flanking ditches and security strips. As the ICJ called it a 
‘wall’ rather than a ‘fence’, this usage is followed here. The term is often uppercased, to distinguish it from 
other walls as a unique and controversial geographic feature, and it is treated so here. 
97 Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 173-177, paras. 90-101. 
98 UN General Assembly Resolution 2649 (XXV), 30 November 1970. 
99 Alain Pellet, ‘The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place’, in Emma Playfair (ed.), International Law and 
the Administration of Occupied Territories (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 183. 
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determination; (2) it assumes permanent sovereignty over natural resources; and (3) if it transfers its 
own population into the territory it occupies with apparent intent to colonise it. Once an Occupying 
Power does these things, the occupation itself could become unlawful on grounds of colonialism, with 
the attendant consequences under international law.100  
Whether prolonged occupation alters the obligations of an Occupying Power is a question addressed 
at length in Chapter II. Here it is relevant to note that prolonged occupation per se does not equate 
with colonialism. For instance, when South Africa refused to withdraw from South West Africa 
(today Namibia) after decades of occupation, the UN Security Council declared its presence there 
‘illegal’ but this was not on grounds of colonialism.101 Rather, a prolonged belligerent occupation 
must acquire the characteristics of colonialism—especially through an open claim to sovereignty or 
through practices that have the effect of permanently denying the people’s right to self-determination, 
as discussed earlier—in order to be unlawful on that basis.  
Concluding that an occupation has acquired the attributes of colonialism has important legal 
consequences. First, an Occupying Power found to be practicing colonialism is required to withdraw 
its administration from the territory it is holding under colonial rule. Operative paragraph 5 of the 
Declaration provides that “immediate steps shall be taken in...all other territories that have not yet 
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions 
or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to 
race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom”.  This is a 
requirement of the right to self-determination under customary international law. Given the 
Declaration’s concern with territorial integrity, the Occupying Power is also obliged not to fragment, 
divide or dismember the occupied territory prior to its withdrawal from that territory. Second, a 
finding that an occupied population is also under colonial domination lends support to the claim that 
this population has a right to resist the foreign occupation and colonial domination ‘in pursuit of the 
exercise of [its] right to self-determination.’102 This resistance must be exercised in accordance with 
the established rules and principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, and the 
people pursuing self-determination is ‘entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the [UN] Charter’.103 
 
4. The Prohibition of Apartheid in International Law  
The first international instrument expressly to prohibit apartheid was the International Convention for 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), adopted in 1965.104 ICERD is a 
multilateral human rights treaty that seeks to eliminate all forms and manifestations of racial 
discrimination and, as its chapeau states, ‘build an international community free from all forms of 
racial segregation and racial discrimination’. Its preamble affirms that parties to the Convention are 
‘[a]larmed by manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas of the world and 
by governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of apartheid, 
                                               
100 See Article 1 (4) of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I): also Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. 
Gross and Keren Michaeli, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2005) 23 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law at 551-614. 
101UN Security Council Resolution 276 of 30 January 1970. 
102 UN Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 24 October 
1970.  
103 Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations. 
104 International Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), entered into 
force 4 January 1969, 660 UNTS195.  
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segregation or separation’.105  Article 3 then specifies the obligation of States parties to the 
Convention to oppose apartheid: 
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, 
prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction. 
Including a prohibition of apartheid in ICERD was an exception to the practice of the drafters not to 
refer to specific forms of discrimination in the treaty.  This was done because apartheid differed from 
other forms of racial discrimination ‘in that it was the official policy of a State Member of the United 
Nations’.106 
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(hereafter Apartheid Convention) was adopted shortly after ICERD to provide a universal instrument 
that would make ‘it possible to take more effective measures at the international and national levels 
with a view to the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid’. 107  The Apartheid 
Convention is thus intended to complement the requirements of Article 3 of ICERD, as its chapeau 
suggests in referring to Article 3. The Apartheid Convention further declares that apartheid is a crime 
against humanity and provides a definition of that crime in Article 2. It consequently imposes 
obligations on States parties to adopt legislative measures to suppress, discourage and punish the 
crime of apartheid and makes the offence an international crime which is subject to universal 
jurisdiction.108 Thus the Apartheid Convention supplements the general prohibition of apartheid in 
ICERD by providing a detailed definition of the crime and by giving several examples of practices 
amounting to apartheid when committed ‘for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination 
by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing 
them’.109 Subsequent instruments elaborate the meaning of apartheid and define what constitute the 
crime of apartheid. The formulation used in the Apartheid Convention is very similar to that of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  The Convention defines the crime of apartheid in 
Article 2 as ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by 
one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing 
them’, while the Rome Statute codifies apartheid crimes as certain inhumane acts ‘committed in the 
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group 
over any other racial group and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime’ (Article 
7(2)(h)). Both instruments emphasise the systematic, institutionalized, and oppressive character of the 
discrimination involved in apartheid, reflecting the original reasoning for including it in ICERD as a 
distinct form of racial discrimination. The analysis in Chapter IV of this report draws primarily on the 
formulation in the Apartheid Convention and is informed also by the codification in the Rome Statute 
and by reference to the apartheid practices of South Africa, which provide some indication as to what 
the international community has sought to prohibit. 
The customary status of the prohibition of apartheid is indicated by its configuration within general 
United Nations efforts aimed at the eradication of racial discrimination more generally The practice of 
apartheid has been condemned in numerous United Nations resolutions and other international 
treaties, and reaffirmed as constituting a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998).  As a particularly pernicious manifestation of racial 
discrimination, the practice of apartheid is contrary to fundamental guiding principles of international 
law including the protection of human rights and the self-determination of all peoples. Article 55 of 
                                               
105 Emphasis added. 
106 UN Doc. A/C.3//SR.1313, cited in David Keane, Caste-based Discrimination in International Human Rights 
Law, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 190. 
107 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), entered into force 18 July 
1976 (1015 U.N.T.S. 243). 
108 See Articles 4 and 5 of the Declaration. 
109 See Article 2 of the Declaration. 
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the United Nations Charter lays the foundation, when it requires Member States to promote ‘universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion’.110 Equally important is Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) which states that ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.111  The subsequent adoption 
of ICERD was the more concerted effort under international law to address racial discrimination, 
including the particular practice of apartheid.  State parties to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women emphasise that ‘the eradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, 
racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination 
and interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of men 
and women’.112 At the time of writing,, there are 173 States parties to ICERD113 and 185 States 
parties to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,114 demonstrating 
near-universal support and legal commitment to the elimination of racial discrimination and the 
prohibition of apartheid.  
Although this report is not concerned with the question of individual criminal responsibility for the 
crime of apartheid, establishing that apartheid is considered an international offence affirms the 
seriousness with which it is viewed under international law and affirms the international community’s 
commitment to its eradication. The United Nations General Assembly first referred to apartheid as a 
crime against humanity in Resolution 2202 (1966),115 a statement that was reiterated by the 1968 
Proclamation of Tehran by the International Conference on Human Rights.116  The enunciation of 
apartheid as a crime against humanity in the Apartheid Convention supplemented the general 
prohibition in ICERD and was followed by inclusion of the crime of apartheid in Additional Protocol 
I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1977)117 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(1998).118   
Although the majority of States accept the prohibition in ICERD, fewer have ratified the Apartheid 
Convention, given the heighted political disagreement at the time it was created and due to concerns 
that the convention was seen as seeking to ‘extend international criminal jurisdiction in a broad and 
ill-defined manner’.119 Currently, 107 States are parties to the Apartheid Convention.120 A majority of 
                                               
110 Charter of the United Nations, entered into force 24 October 1945 (59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993), 3 Bevans 1153. 
111 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71. 
112 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979), entered into force 3 September 
1981 (1249 U.N.T.S. 13), Preamble.  
113 Website of the United Nations Treaty Collection: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=319&chapter=4&lang=en.   
114 Website of the United Nations Treaty Collection, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=326&chapter=4&lang=en. 
115 Resolution 2202 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, The policies of apartheid of Government of the Republic of 
South Africa, paragraph 1. 
116 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran on 13 May 
1968 (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41) at 3 (1968), paragraph 7. See also the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (1968), Article 1, which considers crimes 
against humanity to include ‘inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid’. 
117 Article 85(4)(c), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (1977), entered into force 7 December 
1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
118 Article 7(1)(j), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, entered 
into force 1 July 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
119 Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order (New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 545. 
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States (168) have ratified Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,121 and an ever-
increasing number of States, currently standing at 108, have become parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which gives the Court jurisdiction over the crime of apartheid.122 There 
is no demonstrable hostility to the apartheid provisions by non-States parties to the treaties, and 
several non-parties to the Apartheid Convention have ratified the latter instruments (for example, the 
United Kingdom and South Africa). The movement of the international crime of apartheid towards 
customary international law123 reinforces the fact that the prohibition itself is clearly a rule of 
customary law.   
The prohibition of apartheid can also be considered a norm of jus cogens which creates obligations 
erga omnes.124  The International Law Commission has viewed the prohibition of apartheid as a 
peremptory norm of general international law and contended that the practice of apartheid would 
amount to ‘a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential 
importance for safeguarding the human being’.125 The Commission noted that a general agreement is 
shared by States as to the peremptory character of the prohibition on apartheid and other norms at the 
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties and how apartheid has been prohibited by a treaty 
admitting of no exception.126 With regard to the concept of erga omnes obligations, the International 
Court of Justice identified these in the Barcelona Traction case:  
‘…an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of 
the importance of the rights concerned, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.127 
The Court has stated that such an obligation would arise, for example, ‘from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and from racial 
discrimination.’128 If the prohibition of racial discrimination is to be considered a rule of jus 
                                                                                                                                                  
120 Website of the United Nations Treaty Collection, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&id=325&chapter=4&lang=en#Part
icipants. 
121 Website of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf. 
122 Website of the International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html.  
123 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 25. 
124 Doctrine affirms that there is a conceptual connection between the two categories of obligations erga omnes 
and ius cogens norms, but does not conclusively affirm their coincidence: see, for instance, A. de Hoogh, 
Obligations erga omnes and international crimes (Kluwer: The Hague: 1996), pp. 53-56, 91; and M. Ragazzi, 
The concept of international obligations erga omnes (Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1997) Chapter Three, pp. 182 
and 190; also I. Scobbie I, ‘Unchart(er)ed waters?: consequences of the advisory opinion on the Legal 
consequences of the construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the responsibility of the UN 
for Palestine’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 941 at 949-952. De Hoogh underlines that 
obligations erga omnes are essentially connected with the remedies available to all States following a breach of 
international law, whereas the notion of ius cogens norms places emphasis on their substantive content: see de 
Hoogh, Obligations erga omnes, p. 53: compare Ragazzi, Obligations erga omnes, p. 203 et seq. 
125 See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001) Vol. II, part two, pp. 112-113. 
126 Ibid., p. 112. 
127 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited second phase, final judgment 
(Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Rep, 1970, 3 at 32, paragraphs 33-34. 
128 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited second phase, final judgment 
(Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Rep. 1970, 32, paragraphs 33-34. 
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cogens,129 then it follows that the prohibition of apartheid, which addresses a particularly severe form 
of racial discrimination, is even more so a rule of jus cogens entailing obligations erga omnes— that 
is, obligations owed to the international community as a whole. 
 
5. The legal authority of an ICJ Advisory Opinion  
The function of an advisory opinion by the ICJ is to provide legal advice to international 
organisations. States cannot request an advisory opinion: this power is reserved to United Nations 
organs and bodies which have been authorised to do so under Article 96 of the UN Charter.130  
Formally, advisory opinions of the International Court are not binding, but they nevertheless have 
normative force as they constitute an authoritative statement of international law in relation to the 
question posed.   
Lauterpacht, a distinguished judge of the International Court, observed that, ‘the fact of the absence of 
formally binding force does not exhaust the actual significance of an advisory opinion’.131  Thirlway, 
a former Principal Legal Secretary of the Court, stressed that, while an advisory opinion is advisory 
rather than determinative, a State found by the International Court to have a particular obligation 
under international law ‘would be in a weak position if it seeks to argue that the considered opinion of 
the Court does not represent a correct view of the law’.132 Similarly, Judge Gros of the International 
Court has observed that ‘when the Court gives an advisory opinion on a question of law it states the 
law’, and while ‘it is possible for the body which sought the opinion not to follow it in its action...that 
body is aware that no position adopted contrary to the Court’s pronouncement will have any 
effectiveness whatsoever in the legal sphere’.133 This view was echoed in the Wall advisory opinion 
itself, as Judge Koroma stated in his separate opinion: ‘The Court’s findings are based on the 
authoritative rules of international law and are of an erga omnes character.  … [as] States are bound 
by those rules and have an interest in their observance, all States are subject to these findings’. 134  In 
her separate opinion in Wall, Judge Higgins further held (after citing a passage from the Namibia 
advisory opinion regarding a Security Council resolution condemning South Africa’s illegal presence 
in that country) that ‘[a] binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to 
the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without consequence’.  
Two additional points regarding the Wall opinion are relevant here. First, earlier ICJ advisory 
opinions regarding South-West Africa (later Namibia) when it was occupied by South Africa, suggest 
                                               
129 See, for example, United States (Third) Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law (1986), Section 702, note 
11. 
130Article 96 provides: ‘1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of 
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question; 2.Other organs of the United Nations and specialized 
agencies, which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions 
of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.’ 
131 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Security Council and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’, in E. 
Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht.  Vol. V: Disputes, War 
and Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 224 at p. 228. 
132 HWA Thirlway, ‘The International Court of Justice’, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 582-583: see also S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 
1920-1996 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1997), pp. 1754-1759. 
133.Western Sahara advisory opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 12, declaration of Judge Gros, 69 at 73, para.6: see 
also E. Hambro, ‘The authority of the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice’ (1954) 3 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2 at17 and 5; and André Gros, ‘Concerning the Advisory Role of 
the International Court of Justice,’ in Friedman, Henkin and Lissitzyn (eds.), Transnational Law in a Changing 
Society: Essays in Honour of Philip C. Jessup (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 315.  See 
further, the opinion expressed by Blaine Sloane, a former director of the UN General Legal Division, in 
‘Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice’ (1950) 38 California Law Review 830 at 855. 
134. Wall advisory opinion, separate opinion of Judge Koroma, ICJ Rep, 2004, 204 at 205-206, para. 8. 
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the weight to be accorded to the Wall opinion.  In 1956, in his separate opinion appended to the 
Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa advisory opinion, 
Judge Lauterpacht noted that the earlier advisory opinion on the International status of South West 
Africa (1950) 135 had been accepted and approved by the General Assembly. Consequently: 
Whatever may be its binding force as part of international law---a question upon which the 
Court need not express a view---it is the law recognized by the United Nations.  It continues 
to be so although the Government of South Africa has declined to accept it as binding upon it 
and although it has acted in disregard of the international obligations as declared by the Court 
in that Opinion.136 
Similarly, on 2 August 2004 when the General Assembly formally acknowledged its receipt of the 
Wall advisory opinion, it also demanded that ‘Israel, the occupying Power, comply with its legal 
obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion’.137  Thus the will of the United Nations regarding 
the obligations incumbent upon Israel were understood as international law applicable to Israel.  
Secondly, important aspects of the Wall opinion were later re-affirmed by the ICJ in its contentious 
Armed activities on the territory of the Congo judgment—in particular, the relationship between 
human rights and humanitarian law and the extra-territorial applicability of international human rights 
instruments. 138  This judgment illustrates that, in advisory opinions, the International Court states the 
law authoritatively. Thus reliance may confidently be placed upon the findings of the Court in the 
Wall opinion, despite the fact that Israel, like South Africa, has chosen not to act in conformity with 
the opinion’s rulings. 
 
D.  Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the fundamental legal conceptions that structure this study and determine 
its principal themes.  If the OPT remain occupied by Israel—an issue examined in some detail in 
Chapter 3—then they are territories over which Israel does not possess sovereignty but only a 
temporary right of administration.  The corollary to this right is that legal obligations are imposed on 
Israel regarding the conduct of that administration.  Primarily, Israel must abide by the relevant rules 
of the law of armed conflict—principally the relevant provisions of the Hague Regulations and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention—in its administration of the territories. Secondly, these provisions are 
supplemented by international human rights law.   
This study’s findings of colonialism and apartheid do not affect claims that Israel’s occupation is 
unlawful on other grounds.139 Rather, it tests for two fundamental regimes identified by Professor 
Dugard in his January 2007 report on the human rights situation in the OPT as contrary to the 
international law of human rights, namely colonialism and apartheid.  These constitute egregious 
violations of elementary human rights, the right to self-determination and the prohibition on racial 
discrimination.  Colonialism denies the right to self-determination because it prevents, and aims to 
prevent, a people from exercising freely its right to determine its own future through its  own political 
institutions.  Apartheid is an aggravated form of racial discrimination because it manifests as an 
                                               
135 International status of South West Africa advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1950, 128. 
136 Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 
1956, 23, separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, 35 at 46-47. 
137 See UN General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, 2 August 2004, operative paragraph 2. 
138Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, ICJ Rep, 2005, 168: see the Court’s discussion of belligerent 
occupation at 227-231, paras. 167-180, especially at 229-230, para. 172.  At 231, paras. 178-180, without 
express reference to the Wall opinion, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of human rights and international 
humanitarian law to occupied territory, and in 242-243, para. 216 expressly relied on its rulings in the Wall 
opinion on the inter-relationship between human rights and humanitarian law and on the extra-territorial 
applicability of international human rights instruments. 
139 See, for example, Ben-Neftali et al.  
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institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination of one racial group over another 
racial group(s).  The rules of international law violated by colonialism and apartheid are peremptory: 
the duty not to practice either regime is an obligation owed to the international community as a whole.  
All States have an interest in ensuring that these rules are respected. Faced with their violation, all 
States have the duty to co-operate to end their violation; all States have the duty not to recognise the 
illegal situation arising from their violation; and all States have the duty not to render aid or assistance 
to the delinquent State which might maintain that illegal situation. 
The next Chapter applies the relatively abstract account of the fundamental concepts and themes 
examined in this Chapter to the OPT.  In particular, it examines whether the Palestinian people 
possess the right to self-determination, the international legal status of the OPT, and the application of 
Israeli law in the OPT.  The question of colonialism is then explored in Chapter III and of apartheid in 
Chapter IV. 
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Chapter II 
The Legal Context in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
 
A. Introduction  
‘[A]n international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation,’ noted the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in 1971.140 This chapter establishes the context—the basic legal principles, facts, policies and 
practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)—that must guide the interpretation of the 
Apartheid Convention and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (discussed in Chapter  I.C). Broadly, legal principles and facts include the legal status of the 
Palestinians and their territories, and the consequent legal obligations and authority of Israel under 
international law. Policies and practices include Israeli civil and military laws that operate in the OPT. 
The following sections address these issues in several respects. First, the meaning and significance of 
the right to self-determination in international law is clarified and the right of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination is assessed. Second, arguments about the current status of West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in international law are reviewed to assess whether all remain under 
belligerent occupation by Israel. This discussion examines the ‘missing reversioner’ argument, 
Israel’s separate treatment of East Jerusalem, and the legal implications of Israel’s ‘disengagement’ 
from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Whether the Oslo Accords have altered the status of the OPT is also 
examined, particularly in light of Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which addresses 
‘special agreements’ between local authorities and the occupying power, and Article 7, concerning 
‘special agreements’ that can adversely affect the rights of protected persons. Arguments that the 
prolonged nature of an occupation loosens legal restrictions on the occupying power are also 
considered.  
On this foundation, the study then reviews the general operation of Israeli laws in the OPT, with 
special attention to the different treatment accorded by Israeli law to Jewish settlers and Palestinians 
living in the OPT. The discrimination that this system entails is briefly noted, anticipating discussion 
of underlying regimes in Chapters III and IV.  
 
B. The Palestinian People’s Right to Self-Determination  
1. The Question of Palestinian Statehood 
 
This study does not adopt a position on the international legal status of the OPT, over which the 
Palestinian people is not yet effectively exercising sovereignty, apart from categorising these 
territories as remaining under belligerent occupation (as discussed later). The precise legal status of 
‘Palestine’ regarding statehood remains controversial. The 1945 Pact of the League of Arab States 
contained an annex on Palestine that declared: 
 
At the end of the last Great War, Palestine, together with the other Arab States, was separated 
from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent, not belonging to any other State. 
The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her fate should be decided by the parties concerned 
in Palestine. 
                                               
140 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports, 
1971, 16 at 31, para. 53. All documents of the International Court of Justice cited in this report are available at: 
www.icj-cij.org. 
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Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on the basis of the 
recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations determined a 
system of government for her. 
Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no more be questioned 
de jure than the independence of any of the other Arab States. 
Even though the outward signs of this independence have remained veiled as a result of force 
majeure, it is not fitting that this should be an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the 
work of the League. 
Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of 
Palestine's special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab 
delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual 
independence. 
Palestine formally became a member of the League of Arab States on 9 September 1976. 
Subsequently, during a 15 November 1988 meeting in Algiers, the Palestine National Council 
declared the existence of the State of Palestine.141 The General Assembly then acknowledged that it 
was ‘aware’ of this declaration and affirmed ‘the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise 
their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967’.142 In the same resolution, the General 
Assembly decided to re-designate the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) observer mission to 
the UN as ‘Palestine’ without, however, changing its status or admitting ‘Palestine’ to full UN 
membership.  
  
On the basis of the Algiers Declaration, approximately 100 States have recognised Palestinian 
statehood. Nonetheless, in the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ treated Palestine’s statehood as not yet 
established:  
 
that it has a duty to draw the attention of the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion 
is addressed, to the need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon 
as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding 
problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with Israel and its 
other neighbours, with peace and security for al1 in the region.143  
 
More recently, on 22 January 2009, the Palestinian Authority (PA)144 lodged a declaration under 
Article 12(3) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), indicating recognition by the 
‘Government of Palestine’ of the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to ‘acts committed on the territory 
of Palestine since 1 July 2002’.145 Article 12(3) refers to declarations made by States which are not 
parties to the Statute. In April 2009, when the final text of this report was established, the Office of 
the Prosecutor was considering whether this declaration meets the requirements of Article 12(3), and 
had not issued its opinion. 
  
                                               
141 See Annex III to UN Doc.A/43/827 (18 November 1988), Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the 
Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 
142 UN Doc.A/RES/43/177 (15 December 1988), operative para.2. 
143 Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in occupied Palestinian territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion of 
9 July 2004, ICJ Rep, 2004, 136 at 201, para.162. 
144 The ‘Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority’ was established in Article 1 of the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed by the PLO and the Government of Israeli on 13 
September 1993.  
145 Letter submitted by the Minister of Justice of Palestinian National Authority to the Registrar of the 
International Criminal Court, Declaration recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 22 
January 2009. 
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Thus international legal practice and doctrine remains divided over the legal consequences of the 
Algiers Declaration and whether Palestine fulfils the requirements of statehood.146 Examination of this 
topic is tangential to this study, however, because it is clear that the Palestinian territories are 
occupied and consequently that the Palestinian population is not effectively exercising sovereign 
rights or its right to self-determination, as established in the next two sections. If Israel is engaged in 
colonial or apartheid practices in the OPT, this would amount to a systematic denial of the right of the 
Palestinian population to self-determination, irrespective of the controversial issue of Palestinian 
statehood. 
 
2. The Right to Self-Determination in International Law 
The ICJ has declared that self-determination is ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law’.147 In the Wall advisory opinion, 148 the ICJ affirmed that self-determination is a 
right erga omnes, whose realisation all UN member States, as well as all States parties to the 
International Covenants on human rights, have the duty to promote.149 The International Law 
Commission has concluded that self-determination also has jus cogens status and is peremptory—
States cannot derogate from its exigencies in their international relations.150  
Like many legal concepts, the right to self-determination designates a core content and an associated, 
yet integral, bundle of rights and duties. The core content is clear: it entitles peoples to ‘determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.151 Otherwise, 
                                               
146See, for instance, F.A. Boyle, ‘Creation of the State of Palestine’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International 
Law 301; J. Crawford, ‘The creation of the State of Palestine: too much too soon?’ (1990) 1 European Journal 
of International Law 307; J. Crawford, The creation of States in international law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006, 2nd Ed.), pp. 435-442 and R.E. Lapidoth and N.K. Calvo-Goller, ‘Les éléments constitutives de l’État et 
la déclaration du Conseil National Palestinien du 15 novembre 1988’ (1992) 96 Revue générale du droit 
international public 777. 
147 East Timor case (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Rep, 1995, 90 at 102, para. 29. 
148 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 171-172, para.88; see also 199, paras. 155-156. 
149 By virtue of General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970). In the Nicaragua case, the 
International Court ruled that resolution 2625 expressed rules of customary international law – see Military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua case: merits judgment (Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ Rep, 
1986, 14 at 99-100, para. 188, see also Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 171, para. 87. 
150 International Law Commission, Report of the work of its 53rd session, UN Doc.A/56/10, Commentary to 
Article 40 of its 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ibid 282 at 284, 
para. 5, available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/english/chp4.pdf.; and also J. Crawford, The 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State responsibility: introduction, text and commentaries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 246-247. Doctrine affirms that there is a conceptual 
connection between the two categories of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms, but does not 
conclusively affirm their coincidence. See, for instance, A. de Hoogh, Obligations erga omnes and international 
crimes (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 53-56, 91; and M. Ragazzi, The concept of international obligations 
erga omnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Chapter Three, pp. 182 and 190.  See also I. Scobbie, 
‘Unchart(er)ed waters?: consequences of the advisory opinion on the Legal consequences of the construction of 
a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the responsibility of the UN for Palestine’ (2005) 16 European 
Journal of International Law 941, 949-952. De Hoogh underlines that obligations erga omnes are essentially 
connected with the remedies available to all States following a breach of international law, whereas the notion 
of ius cogens norms places emphasis on their substantive content. See de Hoogh, Obligations erga omnes,  p. 
53; compare Ragazzi, Concept of international obligations erga omnes,  p. 203 et seq. 
151 This formulation was employed in operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) (15 
December 1960), the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which 
consolidated the references to self-determination contained in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the United Nations 
Charter.  For an overview of this principle, and its development, see K. Doehring, Self-determination, in B. 
Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: a commentary (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002, 2nd  Ed.), p. 47 et 
seq. 
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self-determination may have several political outcomes, as enumerated in the General Assembly’s 
Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970)152: 
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration 
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. 
The classic formulation of the right to self-determination reflects these possible outcomes by 
emphasising process: that is, the right of a people to determine freely its political status. Drew has 
pointed out that, to have meaning, a process must also have substance: 
… the right to a process does not exhaust the content of the right of self-determination under 
international law. To confer on a people the right of ‘free choice’ in the absence of more 
substantive entitlements—to territory, natural resources, etc—would simply be meaningless. 
Clearly, the right of self-determination cannot be exercised in a substantive vacuum. This is 
both explicit and implicit in the law. For example, implicit in any recognition of a people’s 
right to self-determination is recognition of the legitimacy of that people’s claim to a 
particular territory and/or set of resources...[T]he following can be deduced as a non-
exhaustive list of the substantive entitlements conferred on a people by virtue of the law of 
self-determination...: (a) the right to exist—demographically and territorially—as a people; 
(b) the right to territorial integrity; (c) the right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources; (d) the right to cultural integrity and development; and (e) the right to economic 
and social development.153 
Most important to questions of substance is territory over which the right to self-determination may 
be exercised by establishing sovereignty. As Drew underlines:  
Despite its text book characterization as part of human rights law, the law of self-
determination has always been bound up more with notions of sovereignty and title to 
territory than what we traditionally consider to be ‘human rights’.154 
On the one hand, this principle raises the question of territorial integrity that, for example, comprises a 
core concern of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. In 
the East Timor case155 proceedings, Portugal further described the relationship between the people and 
the territory as a ‘principle of individuality’: i.e., the territory that forms the basis of a people’s right 
to self-determination is legally distinct from any other territory and is entitled to territorial integrity, 
forming a single unit which must not be dismembered, 156 particularly by a belligerent occupant: 
If an occupant controlled only part of a state and that part was not considered to be a distinct 
unit entitled to self-determination, the occupant would not be entitled to effect the secession 
of the occupied area (as in Northern Cyprus). Similar considerations imply that the occupant 
                                               
152 This Declaration, contained in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, is recognised as 
an authoritative interpretation of the fundamental legal principles contained in the UN Charter.   
153  C. Drew, ‘The East Timor story: international law on trial’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 
651 at 663, paragraph break suppressed and notes omitted. For a similar affirmation of the substantive core 
content of self-determination, see A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The impact of peremptory norms on the interpretation and 
application of United Nations Security Council resolutions’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 
59 at 64. 
154 Drew, ‘East Timor’, 663. 
155 East Timor case (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Rep, 1995, 90. 
156 On the territorial integrity of self-determination units, albeit within the context of decolonisation, see, e.g., A. 
Cassese, Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 
72 and 78-79. 
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would not be entitled to establish a new government in such a region even if its inhabitants 
supported such an act.157 
Further, 
… un territoire qui constitue l’assise du droit d’un peuple á disposer de lui même...ne peut 
changer de statut juridique que par un acte d’autodétermination de ce peuple. La Résolution 
1541 du 17 décembre 1960 de l’Assemblée générale précise bien cette norme.158 
On the other hand, in accordance with the inter-temporal rule (a structural principle of international 
law sometimes expressed in the Latin maxim tempus regit factum), the substantive content of self-
determination may be understood to change over time.159 This principle has arisen particularly in 
relation to conflicts tracing to former League of Nations mandates.  
Although Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter (which established the mandate system) did not 
use the term ‘self-determination’, it described the mandate system as providing ‘tutelage’ to peoples 
unprepared for independent statehood. 160 The Charter calls the duty to provide such tutelage ‘a sacred 
trust of civilization’: 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late War have ceased to be 
under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by 
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern 
                                               
157 E. Benvenisti, The international law of occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 183. See 
also A. Roberts, ‘The end of occupation: Iraq 2004’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 27 
at 28-29; and M. Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and peace operations in the twenty-first century, 
14, available at: http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/sassoli.pdf, In the separate opinion he appended to the Wall 
Advisory Opinion, Judge Koroma expressed this point more bluntly: ‘Under the régime of occupation, the 
division or partition of an occupied territory by the occupying Power is illegal’, ICJ Rep, 2004, 204 at 205, para. 
4. 
158  ‘A territory that constitutes the basis of the right of a people themselves to dispose cannot change in juridical 
status except by an act of self-determination by that people’: East Timor Pleadings, Portuguese Memorial (18 
November 1991), 195, para. 7.01, emphasis in quotation suppressed.  See also Wall Advisory Opinion Pleadings, 
League of Arab States Written Statement, 62, para. 8.2 and 76, para. 8.28. 
159 This principle provides that while the criteria for the existence of a right are determined by the law in force at 
the time it was created or vested, its substantive content does not remain fixed but is dynamic and evolves in 
accord with developments in the legal system. See, for instance, Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case 
(United States/Netherlands, 1928), 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1927-28) 829 at 845; also 4 
Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 3 at 4; and  22 American Journal of International Law (1928) 
867 at 883; South West Africa: second phase cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), ICJ Rep, 
1966, 6, dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka, 250 at 293-294; Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 31-32, 
paras. 52-53; Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 1975, 12, separate opinion of Judge de Castro, 127 at 
168-171; and Aegean Sea continental shelf case, ICJ Rep, 1978, 3 at 29-32, paras.71-76.  For commentary see T. 
Georgopoulos, ‘Le droit intertemporel et les dispositions conventionnelles évolutives: quelle thérapie contre la 
vieillesse des traités?’(2004) 108 Revue générale de droit international public 123; R. Higgins, ‘Some 
observations on the inter-temporal rule in international law’, in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of international law 
at the threshold of the 21st century: essays in honour of Krzysztof Skubuszewski (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996), p. 
173; R.Y. Jennings and A.D. Watts, Oppenheim’s international law (London: Longman, 1992, 9th ed.), p. 1281, 
§633.11; H. Lauterpacht , The function of law in the international community ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 
pp. 283-25; and S. Rosenne, Developments in the law of treaties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), pp. 76-80. 
160 Although the final text of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant did not use the term ‘self-
determination’, it was included in earlier drafts: see e.g. President Wilson’s Third Draft presented to the Paris 
Peace Conference on 20 January 1919, in DH Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume Two (London: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1928), p. 103. (‘... in the future government of these peoples and territories the rule of self-
determination, or consent of the governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably applied, 
and all policies of administration or economic development be based primarily upon the well-considered 
interests of the people themselves’.) 
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world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such 
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust 
should be embodied in this Covenant.161 
In its 1971 Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ ruled that the ‘sacred trust’ was to facilitate self-
determination:162  
52. ...the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing 
territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them. The concept of the sacred trust was confirmed and 
expanded to all ‘territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government’ (Art. 73). Thus it clearly embraced territories under a colonial regime. 
Obviously the sacred trust continued to apply to League of Nations mandated territories on 
which an international status had been conferred earlier. A further important stage in this 
development was the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960), which embraces all 
peoples and territories which ‘have not yet attained independence’... 
53. ...viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes 
which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain 
unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations 
and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and 
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation. In the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the last fifty years, as 
indicated above, have brought important developments. These developments leave little doubt 
that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of 
the peoples concerned. In this domain; as elsewhere, the corpus iuris gentium has been 
considerably enriched, and this the Court, if it is faithfully to discharge its functions, may not 
ignore.163 
 
3. The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination 
The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination has been affirmed in numerous international 
instruments and confirmed by the ICJ.164 In the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ observed:  
As regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court observes that 
the existence of a ‘Palestinian people’ is no longer in issue. Such existence has moreover been 
recognized by Israel in the exchange of letters of 9 September 1993 between Mr. Yasser 
Arafat, President of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, 
lsraeli Prime Minister. In that correspondence, the President of the PLO recognized ‘the right 
of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security’ and made various other commitments. In 
reply, the Israeli Prime Minister informed him that, in the light of those commitments, ‘the 
Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people’. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995 also refers a number of times to the Palestinian people and 
its ‘legitimate rights’ (Preamble, paras. 4, 7, 8; Article II, para. 2; Article III, paras. 1 and 3; 
Article XXII, para. 2). The Court considers that those rights include the right to self-
                                               
161 See Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations, (1920) 1 League of Nations Official Journal 9. 
162 Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 16 at 31, para. 53; reaffirmed in Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 
2004, 171-172, para. 88. 
163Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 31-32, paras. 52-53. 
164 For a collection of documents on the Palestine question in international law that bear on self-determination, 
among other things, see M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), Documents on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, 2005).  
CHAPTER II  LEGAL CONTEXT IN THE OPT | 61 
 
 
determination, as the General Assembly has moreover recognized on a number of occasions 
(see, for example, resolution 58/163 of 22 December 2003).165 
The question then is to identify the ‘objective existence’ of this right regarding the character of the 
‘people’ that holds the right to self-determination and the territorial unit for its expression. The 
substance of both has changed since the principle of self-determination was vested in the 
population(s) of Palestine as a whole, when the British Mandate was created in 1922.166  
The Mandate for Palestine was a Class A Mandate,167 defined by Article 22 of the League of Nations 
Covenant as territories that had previously formed part of the Ottoman Empire and that had ‘reached a 
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised 
subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as 
they are able to stand alone’. The British Colonial Secretary clarified its view of this provision as the 
self-determination of Palestine:  
His Majesty’s Government conceived it as of the essence of such a mandate as the Palestine 
mandate, an A mandate, and of Article 22 of the Covenant, that Palestine should be 
developed, not as a British colony permanently under British rule, but as a self-governing 
State or States with the right of autonomous evolution.168 
In the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British Government had also authorised a ‘national home for 
the Jewish people’ in Palestine, with the qualifier, ‘it being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine’. The League of Nations incorporated this Jewish national home project into the Palestine 
Mandate in 1922 with the same qualifier, 169 providing that the Zionist Organisation would function as 
the ‘Jewish agency’ which would cooperate with the Mandate authorities to facilitate Jewish 
immigration, naturalisation, and development of the country and making English, Arabic and Hebrew 
the official languages. Article 15 of the Mandate further stated that ‘No discrimination of any kind 
shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language’. Still, 
the Zionist Organisation interpreted ‘Jewish national home’ to mean the eventual formation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine. The implications of this policy for the Palestinian Arabs, which led to rising 
violence, forced the British Government to issue a 1939 White Paper clarifying that Britain envisaged 
a bi-national solution in a single unitary state with both Arabs and Jews would share power in such a 
way that their essential interests would be secured.170 This model was supported also by the 
recommendations of the 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry and the 1948 draft UN 
Trusteeship Agreement. The 1937 Peel Partition Plan171 and the 1947 UN Partition Plan172 
                                               
165 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 136 at 182-183, para. 118.  This was a unanimous ruling by the 
Court.  Although one judge found that the Court should have exercised its discretion and refused to accede to 
the request for an advisory opinion, and thus dissented from the Court’s formal conclusions, he nonetheless 
expressly affirmed that the Palestinian people possesses the right to self-determination, see Declaration of Judge 
Buergenthal, ICJ Rep, 2004, 240 at 241, para. 4.   
166 The Mandate entered into force in 1923.  
167.See Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 165, para. 70. 
168 See the statement dated 5 August 1937 by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the Colonial Secretary, at the League of 
Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty-Second (Extraordinary) Session devoted to 
Palestine, held at Geneva from 30 July 30 to 18 August 18 1937, including the Report of the Commission to the 
Council, Official No. C.330.M.222 1937. VI, p. 87. 
169 The Council of the League of Nation, Palestine Mandate, 24 July 1922. 
170 See Palestine: Statement of Policy, Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by 
Command of His Majesty, (1 May 1939), Cmd. 6019; Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry 
regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1946), Lausanne, 20 April, 1946 
(London: H.M.S.O. Cmd. 6808); and Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/277, 20 April 
1948. 
171 Palestine Royal Commission Report, July 1937, Cmd. 5479. 
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recommended partition and formation of a ‘Jewish state’ and an ‘Arab state’, thus proposing 
Palestine’s division into two self-determination units serving two distinct peoples. 
During the war between Zionist and Arab forces in 1947-48, Israel was declared an independent 
Jewish state in 78 percent of Mandate Palestine. The Palestinian Arab population’s right of self-
determination was left without expression and was effectively submerged as an international concern, 
displaced by concerns for the return of ‘Arab refugees’.173 It resurfaced only toward the end of the 
1960s, with the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the linking of the rights of the 
Palestinian people to national liberation struggles in Africa.  
In 1969, the UN General Assembly recognised the ‘inalienable rights’ of ‘the people of Palestine’, 
implying by reference to ‘refugees’ and ‘other inhabitants of the occupied territories’ that this people 
was a people distinct from the population of Mandate Palestine as a whole, which now included 
Jewish citizens of Israel.174 In November 1970, the General Assembly passed a resolution affirming 
‘the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination recognized as being 
entitled to the right of self-determination to restore to them that right by any means at their 
disposal’175 and condemning ‘those Governments that deny the right to self-determination of peoples 
recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine.’176 A 
week later, the General Assembly passed another resolution recognising that ‘the people of Palestine 
are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’.177 In 1973, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3070 declaring that both the Palestinian 
people and the peoples of southern Africa had a right to engage in armed struggle in pursuit of their 
right of self-determination.178  
Thus, since 1967, the ‘Palestinian people’ has come to mean the Arab population of Mandate 
Palestine that has not been incorporated into Israel through citizenship, although no sectarian or ethnic 
identity has been formally ascribed (and the nationality of Palestinian citizens of Israel remains a 
subject of some tension).179 In 1975, the General Assembly expressed its grave concern that no 
                                                                                                                                                  
172 General Assembly Resolution 181, (II), 29 November 1947. The Arab states opposed the Partition Plan and 
demanded independence in a single unitary state. One of their objections, among others, was that they did not 
think that a Palestinian state in the area allocated to it in the Plan would be viable. See the Official Records of 
the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 25 September – 
25 November 1947, UN Doc. A/AC. 14/32 and Add. 1, 11 November 1947. 
173 The 1948 war led to a fundamental change in the demographic composition of Palestine. See Janet L. Abu-
Lughod, ‘The Demographic Transformation of Palestine’ in Ibrahim Abu Lughod (ed.), The Transformation of 
Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1987, 2nd  Ed.), pp. 139-163.  The literature on the 1948 war is vast: for example, see Walid 
Khalidi, Why did the Palestinians leave? An examination of the Zionist version of the exodus of 1948 (London: 
Arab Information Centre, 1963); Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.), The War for 
Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, second edition). 
174 General Assembly Resolution 2535 (XXIV),10 December 1969, United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Part B, operative para. 1. 
175 See UN General Assembly Resolution 2649 (XXV), 30 November 1970.  
176 General Assembly Resolution 2649, ibid, operative para. 5. 
177.General Assembly Resolution 2672 (XXV),8 December 1970, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Part C, operative para. 1. 
178 General Assembly Resolution A/3070, (XXVIII), 30 November 1973, ‘reaffirms the legitimacy of the 
peoples' struggle for liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available 
means, including armed struggle.’ 
179 A recent example is the reaction of Palestinian citizens of Israel to then Israeli Foreign Minister Tipi Livni’s 
comment, ‘Once a Palestinian state is established, I can come to the Palestinian citizens, whom we call Israeli 
Arabs, and say to them 'you are citizens with equal rights, but the national solution for you is elsewhere.'‘ 
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progress had been made toward ‘the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in 
Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to 
national independence and sovereignty.’180 It also expressed concern that the Palestinians had not 
been able ‘to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and 
uprooted.’181 It then established a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People to assist them in exercising their right of self-determination.182 The General 
Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to ‘self-determination, national 
independence, territorial integrity, and national unity and sovereignty without external 
interference.’183 
The territorial scope of the Palestinian self-determination unit has also altered. As ratified by the 
League of Nations in July 1922, the Mandate for Palestine included within its territorial scope land 
east of the River Jordan. As the Balfour Declaration had also authorised a ‘Jewish national home’ in 
Palestine, this complicated British plans to grant part of the territory to Arab allies from World War I. 
In September 1922, the British government excluded Transjordan from all the provisions dealing with 
Jewish settlement.184 Although, technically, only one Mandate existed, Britain thus adopted separate 
administrative regimes for the two territories, administering the part west of the Jordan as ‘Palestine’ 
and the part east of the Jordan as ‘Transjordan’. Transfer of authority proceeded incrementally and 
culminated in the independence of Transjordan as a separate state under Hashemite rule.185 Expressly 
relying on this Agreement, in Jawdat Badawi Sha'ban v Commissioner for Migration and Statistics, 
the Supreme Court of Palestine ruled: 
Trans-Jordan has a government entirely independent of Palestine—the laws of Palestine are 
not applicable in Trans-Jordan nor are their laws applicable here. Moreover, although the 
High Commissioner of Palestine is also High Commissioner for Trans-Jordan, Trans-Jordan 
has an entirely independent government under the rule of an Amir and apart from certain 
reserved matters the High Commissioner cannot interfere with the government of Trans-
Jordan—at the most he can advise from time to time. His Britannic Majesty has entered into 
agreements with His Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan in which the existence of an 
independent government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of the Amir has been specifically 
recognised (see Agreement dated 20.2.28). It is clear there from that Trans-Jordan exercises 
its powers of legislation and administration through its own constitutional government which 
is entirely separate and independent from that of Palestine.186 
                                                                                                                                                  
Quoted in Ha’aretz, ‘Livni: National aspirations of Israel's Arabs can be met by Palestinian homeland’, 11 
December 2008. 
180 General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXV), 10 November 1975. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid, operative para. 3. 
183 See, e.g., General Assembly Resolution 33/24 of 29 November 1978, and General Assembly Resolution 36/9 
of 28 October 1981.  
184 See the statement by Lord Balfour to the League of Nations, 16 September 1922, regarding Article 25 of the 
Mandate for Palestine in 3 League of Nations Official Journal, November 1922, pp. 1188-1189; also the 
memorandum by Lord Balfour to the Council of the League of Nations revoking specific articles pertaining to 
the Jewish national home from the Mandate for Transjordan in 3 League of Nations Official Journal, November 
(1922), pp. 1390-1391. 
185. Incremental steps included the 22 March 1946 Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and 
Transjordan (146 BFSP 461 and UKTS No32, 1946)  and the 20 February 1928 Agreement between the United 
Kingdom and Transjordan respecting the Administration of the Latter (128 BFSP 273 and UKTS No7, 1930). 
On the separation of Palestine and Transjordan, see Crawford Creation of States, pp. 423-424. 
186 Jawdat Badawi Sha'ban v. Commissioner for Migration and Statistics (1945) (Supreme Court of Palestine 
sitting as the High Court of Justice, 14 December 1945), 12 Law Reports of Palestine 551 at 553. 
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This process culminated in the independence of Transjordan as a result of the 22 March 1946 Treaty 
of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Transjordan.187 As Crawford observes, the effect of this 
separation is that issues of self-determination in respect of ‘Palestine properly so called, that is the 
area west of the 1922 line’ must be considered on their own. The territory which became Transjordan 
is irrelevant in this equation.188 This is in accordance with the principle of uti possidetis iuris which is 
associated with the decolonisation process, and thus the exercise of the right of self-determination. In 
the Case concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina-Faso/Mali), the International Court ruled: 
23. ...The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the 
territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial 
boundaries might be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or 
colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case, the application of the principle of uti 
possidetis resulted in administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers 
in the full sense of the term... 
24. The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from 
international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one State from a colony of 
another, or indeed a colonial territory from the territory of an independent State, or one which 
was under protectorate, but had retained its international personality. There is no doubt that 
the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a State succession 
derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is expressed in the 
formula uti possidetis.189 
As a result of the administrative separation of Palestine and Transjordan, the uti possidetis rule 
excludes any consideration that the territory to the east of the River Jordan is relevant to the question 
of the self-determination of the Palestinian Arab population. The operation of uti possidetis may also 
be seen in both the granting of independence to Jordan in 1946 and the delineation of its boundary 
with Israel in Article 3 of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. 
Nevertheless, some sources have argued that the ultimate sovereign of the West Bank is properly the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, based on Jordan’s administration of the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, from 1948 until 1967.190 In this view, self-determination for Palestinians in the West Bank 
should be expressed ultimately through adoption of Jordanian citizenship and accession of West Bank 
land to Jordanian sovereignty. For example, for example, a former legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry stated: 
Since Israel seized the West Bank from the Kingdom of Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day War, this 
territory has essentially been disputed land with the claimants being Israel, Jordan, and the 
                                               
187 6 United Nations Treaty Series 74 (subsequently replaced by the 15 March 1948 Treaty of Alliance between 
the United Kingdom and Transjordan, 77 United Nations Treaty Series 994).  On the separation of Palestine and 
Transjordan, see Crawford, Creation of States, pp. 423-424. 
188 Crawford, Creation of States, p. 424. 
189 Case concerning the frontier dispute (Burkina-Faso/Mali), ICJ Rep, 1986, 554 at 556, paras. 23-24; see 
generally 565-567, paras. 20-25. This judgment was delivered by a Chamber of the International Court, 
comprising Judges Bedjaoui, Lachs and Ruda, with Judges ad hoc Luchaire and Abi-Saab.  Under Article 27 of 
the Statute of the International Court, a judgment given by a Chamber of the Court ‘shall be considered as 
rendered by the Court’. 
190 See, e.g., the arguments advanced by Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).  In a speech before the UN General Assembly on 2 
December 1980, Yehuda Z. Blum, Israel’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations said that the claims 
of the Palestinians to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were unfounded. He said that the 
Palestinians had already achieved self-determination in their own state, namely Jordan. See General Assembly 
Official Records, XXXVth session, Plenary Meetings, 77th meeting, 1318, paras. 108–13. 
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Palestinians. Its ultimate status and boundaries will require negotiation between the parties, 
according to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.191 
After the end of hostilities in 1949, Jordan did adopt a policy to incorporate the West Bank. On 24 
April 1950, the Jordanian House of Assembly promulgated a resolution which provided in part: 
in accordance with the right of self-determination...the Jordan Parliament, representing both 
banks, decides... 
1. Approval is granted to complete unity between the two banks of the Jordan, the Eastern and 
the Western, and their amalgamation in one single State...  
2. Arab rights in Palestine shall be protected. These rights shall be defended with all possible 
legal means and this unity shall in no way be connected with the final settlement of 
Palestine’s just case within the limits of national hopes, Arab cooperation and international 
justice. 
After the Six-Day War in 1967, the United States gave assurances to King Hussein of Jordan that it 
did not envisage that Jordan would be confined to the East Bank and was prepared to support the 
accession of the West Bank to Jordan ‘with minor boundary rectifications’.192 Reflecting this so-called 
‘Jordan option’, Israel’s stance between 1967 and 1988 was to ignore calls by West Bank Arabs for a 
separate existence, preferring instead to deal with Jordan.193  
On the other hand, the Political Committee of the Arab League declared that Jordan’s annexation of 
the West Bank violated its resolution of 12 April 1950, which had prohibited the annexation of any 
part of Palestine. A compromise was reached between the League and Jordan, and on 31 May 1950 
Jordan declared that the annexation was without prejudice to the final settlement of the Palestine 
issue.194 Only the United Kingdom and Pakistan formally recognised Jordan’s annexation of the West 
Bank (not including Jerusalem)195 and Jordan formally renounced its claim to sovereignty over the 
                                               
191 R. Sabel, The ICJ opinion on the separation barrier: designating the entire West Bank as ‘Palestinian 
territory’ (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 2005), available at: 
www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=89
3. 
192 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68: Vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli crisis and war, 1967 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004) [hereinafter XIX FRUS 1964-68], Doc. 506, Telegram 
from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 30 November 1967, 998; and Doc. 501, Telegram from 
the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 4 November 1967, 981 at 982-983. 
193 See XIX FRUS 1964-68, Doc. 448, Memorandum of conversation, 24 October 1967, 944 at 946; Doc. 491, 
Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 26 October 1967, 953 at 955; and 
Doc. 494, Memorandum from the President’s Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnston, 31 October 
1967, 961. Gerson notes that Israel did not contest the lawfulness of Jordan’s control over the West Bank, as 
shown by its calls for a peace treaty which contained border modifications: see A. Gerson, Israel, the West Bank 
and international law (London: Cass, 1978), p. 80.  In contrast, Blum claims that the ‘non-prejudice clause’ in 
the 1949 Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement froze the parties’ rights and claims to the territory of the West 
Bank. As long as this remained in force, no unilateral act could alter the rights of either party, thus Jordan’s 
purported annexation of the West Bank lacked any legal effect—see Y.Z. Blum, ‘The missing reversioner: 
reflections on the status of Judea and Samaria’ (1968)3 Israel Law Review 279 at 288. The Israel-Jordan 
Armistice Agreement terminated, at the latest, with the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967—see R. Sabel, 
‘The International Court of Justice’s decision on the separation barrier and the green line’ (2005) 38 Israel Law 
Review 316 at 324. 
194 For a dossier of the relevant documents, see M. Whiteman (ed.), 2 Digest of International Law (Washington 
DC: Dept of State, 1963) 1163-1168. 
195 For the United Kingdom’s statement of recognition, see 474 HC Deb (5th Ser) cols.1137-1139 (27 April 
1950), reproduced in Whiteman, 2 Digest of International Law, 1167-1168.  A scanned copy of the statement is 
available at: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/91/UKrecognizesIsraelJordan.pdf. 
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West Bank in 1988.196 In the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, the boundary employed was the 
Mandate boundary, as amended in 1922 when Palestine and Transjordan were constituted as separate 
administrative units. Article 3 provided, in part:  
1. The international boundary between Jordan and Israel is delimited with reference to the 
boundary definition under the Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a), on the mapping materials 
attached thereto and coordinates specified therein. 
2. The boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure and recognized 
international boundary between Jordan and Israel, without prejudice to the status of any 
territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.197 
The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip have thus become the self-
determination unit for the Palestinian people. In its written submissions to the ICJ during the Wall 
advisory opinion process, Palestine referred to these territories as ‘the territorial sphere over which the 
Palestinian people are entitled to exercise their right of self-determination’.198 Israel and the PLO have 
agreed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip form ‘a single territorial unit’ whose integrity is to be 
preserved pending the conclusion of permanent status negotiations.199 The UN General Assembly, in 
one of its latest pronouncements concerning the territorial dismemberment of the West Bank by the 
construction of the Wall, stressed ‘the need for respect for and preservation of the territorial unity, 
contiguity and integrity of all of the OPT, including East Jerusalem.’200 Similarly, following Israel’s 
‘Operation Cast Lead’ in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009, the Security Council 
stressed that the Gaza Strip constitutes an ‘integral part’ of the self-determination unit comprised of 
the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967.201 The Wye River Memorandum and the Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum contain provisions prohibiting ‘any step that will change the status of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.’202 Israel’s High Court of Justice, also 
relying on the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, has affirmed Israel’s recognition of the unity of 
the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit.203 The ICJ’s finding that the Interim Agreement 
                                               
196 This was announced by King Hussein in his 31 July 1988 Address to the Nation, reproduced at 
www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html and (1988) 27 International Legal Materials 1637. See also ‘Jordan: 
Statement Concerning Disengagement from the West Bank and Palestinian Self-Determination’, Address by His 
Majesty King Hussein to the Nation, 31 July 1988, (1988) 27 International Legal Materials 1637 at 1637-1645. 
197 Treaty of Peace between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel, 26 October 1994, 2042 
United Nations Treaty Series 35325, reproduced as UN Doc. A/50/73 and S/1995/83 (27 January 1995); and 
also United Nations Treaty Series, reproduced at: www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html, and (1995) 34 
International Legal Materials 43.  
198  See, e.g., Wall Advisory Opinion Pleadings, Palestine Written Statement, 239, para. 548 and 240, para. 549. 
199 See the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Article IV; and the 1995 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Article XI.1. For commentary, see 
R. Shehadeh, From occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories (London: Kluwer, 
1997), pp. 35-37.  The question of Jerusalem is, of course, a matter reserved for the permanent status 
negotiations: see the Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements, Understanding in relation to Article IV; and 1995 Interim Agreement, Articles XVII.1 and 
XXXI.5. 
200 GA Resolution 62/146, 18 December 2007. 
201 Security Council Resolution 1860, 8 January 2009. 
202 See Article V of the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organisation: Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998, 
(1998) 37 International Legal Materials, 1251, at 1255; and Article 8.10, Israel-Palestine Liberation 
Organisation: The Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, 4 September-. 1999, 38 International Legal Materials, 1465 
at 1468. 
203Ajuri v. IDF Commander, HCJ 7015/02, 3 September 2002, (2002) Israel Law Review 1, opinion of President 
Barak at 17-18, para. 22.  Lein noted, inter alia, that Israel incorporated the Interim Agreement in its entirety 
into its military legislation in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and that this legislation has not been revoked: 
see Y. Lein, One big prison: freedom of movement to and from the Gaza Strip on the eve of the Disengagement 
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affirmed the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination204 thus records the status and integrity of 
the West Bank and Gaza as the territorial self-determination unit upon which the Palestinian people is 
entitled to exercise the right to self-determination. 
 
C. Legal Status of the Occupied Palestinian Territories  
The Government of Israel has consistently challenged the status of the Palestinian territories as 
occupied, referring to them as ‘administered’ or ‘disputed’ territories. (Within Israel, this controversy 
is often elided entirely by calling the West Bank ‘Judea and Samaria’ and Israeli legal scholarship 
often employs this term.)205 For example, a former legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry has 
stated: 
Since Israel seized the West Bank from the Kingdom of Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day War, this 
territory has essentially been disputed land with the claimants being Israel, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians. Its ultimate status and boundaries will require negotiation between the parties, 
according to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.206 
Several reasons are proffered for arguing that the Palestinian territories are not occupied. One is that 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip lacked legitimate sovereigns when Israel seized them during the 1967 
war—the ‘missing reversioner’ argument—and thus the law of occupation does not apply. Israel has 
further claimed to annex East Jerusalem and thus remove it permanently from the regime of 
occupation. Other arguments tacitly accept that the Palestinian territories were under belligerent 
occupation but assert that their status has recently changed. In particular, the Oslo Accords are 
sometimes argued to have altered the status of the territories, a claim explored here through careful 
reference to the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding such agreements. Also, Israel’s 
unilateral ‘disengagement’ and withdrawal of settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005 is frequently 
argued to have terminated Israel’s status as occupying power there. Although the international 
community has rejected these arguments, the legal basis for doing so here must be established.  
 
1. The ‘Missing Reversioner’ Argument 
Although Israeli military legislation initially accepted the Fourth Geneva Convention as lex specialis 
in the OPT, and therefore that the West Bank and Gaza were occupied territories,207 it was not long 
after the 1967 war that this position was reneged upon and the ‘missing reversioner’ argument gained 
currency in Israeli legal and political circles.208 In essence, this argument contends that Israel does not 
have the status of belligerent occupant in the territories seized in the Six-Day War because neither 
Jordan nor Egypt were the displaced legitimate sovereigns over these territories in terms of Article 43 
                                                                                                                                                  
Plan (Jerusalem: B’Tselem/HaMoked, 2005), 20-21, available at: www.hamoked.org.il/items/12800_eng.pdf,  
204Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 182-183, para. 118. 
205 Judea and Samaria are names associated in Jewish tradition with Jewish kingdoms or regions located in 
territory now in West Bank.  
206 R. Sabel, ‘The ICJ opinion on the separation barrier: designating the entire West Bank as ‘Palestinian 
territory’’ (Jeruselem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 2005), available at: 
www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=89
3.  
207 Article 35 of Israeli Military Proclamation No. 3, June 1967, stated that Israeli military courts in the occupied 
territory ‘must apply the provisions of the [Fourth] Geneva Convention ... In case of conflict between this Order 
and the said Convention, the Convention shall prevail.’ 
208See Blum, ‘Missing Reversioner’, and M. Shamgar, ‘The observance of international law in the administered 
territories’ (1971) 1 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 262 at 263-266.  See also Gerson, Israel, the West Bank, 
and International Law pp. 76-82; and G. Gorenberg, The accidental empire: Israel and the birth of the 
settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 101.  
68 | LEGAL CONTEXT IN THE OPT                                                                               CHAPTER II 
 
 
of the Hague Regulations. (Notably, this argument contradicts arguments about ultimate Jordanian 
sovereignty discussed in the previous section.) According to the argument, as Jordan and Egypt had 
invaded the territory of Mandate Palestine in 1948 in order to eradicate Israel, they had used force 
unlawfully in contravention of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.209 Because they had 
unlawfully acquired control over the territories, Blum claims that Jordan, and by extension Egypt, 
were entitled at most to claim the status of belligerent occupants.210 As the purpose of the law of 
belligerent occupation is to recognise the occupant’s rights and obligations of governance while 
safeguarding the reversionary rights of the ousted sovereign, where the latter did not exist (because 
there is no ousted sovereign) only those rules intended to safeguard the humanitarian rights of the 
population apply.211  
In particular, Israel claimed that because the OPT did not constitute territories of a High Contracting 
Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the situation did not fall within the terms of Article 2 of the 
Convention which provides, in part: 
...the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties... 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
In this view, Israel is in lawful control of the territories as a result of measures taken in self-defence, 
to which no other State could show better title. Accordingly, Blum contends, Israel’s possession of the 
territories was ‘virtually indistinguishable from an absolute title...valid erga omnes’.212 
The ‘missing reversioner’ argument was rejected by the ICJ in the Wall advisory opinion. The ICJ 
ruled that the Convention applied to any armed conflict between High Contracting Parties and that it 
was irrelevant whether territory occupied during that conflict was under their sovereignty. This 
interpretation was based on textual exegesis, the drafting history of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
the practice of parties to the Convention, the views of the ICRC, General Assembly and Security 
Council, and also that of Israel’s High Court of Justice.213 This was a unanimous finding by the Court, 
as the sole dissenting judge, Judge Buergenthal, expressly concurred in this ruling.214 This conclusion 
had also been foreshadowed in the September 1967 memorandum of the then legal advisor to the 
                                               
209 Article 2(4) provides, ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations’. 
210 Blum, ‘Missing Reversioner’, pp. 288, 292-293.;  also Gerson, Israel, the West Bank, and International Law, 
pp. 78-79 (although Gerson thinks that Jordan may have been more than a belligerent occupant in the West 
Bank, inventing the category of trustee-occupant in the process); and Shamgar, ‘Administered territories’ at 
265-266. 
211 Blum, Missing Reversioner, pp. 293-294. 
212 Blum, Missing Reversioner, 294. See also Blum’s Secure boundaries and Middle East peace in the light of 
international law and practice (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1971), pp. 90-91; Gerson, Israel, the West Bank, 
and International Law, 80-81; E. Rostow, ‘Palestinian self-determination: possible futures for the unallocated 
territories of the Palestine Mandate’ (1978-79) 5 Yale Studies in World Public Order 147 at 160-161; and S.M. 
Schwebel, ‘What weight to conquest?’ (1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 64,  republished in 
Schwebel, Justice in international law (Cambridge: Grotius/Cambridge University Press: 1994),  p. 521, and in 
M. Shaw (ed.), Title to territory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 393.  Compare R.Y. Jennings and A.D. Watts, 
Oppenheim’s international law Vol. I: Peace (London: Longmans, 1992, 9th  Ed.), p. 704 n.8; and R.A. Falk and 
B.H. Weston, ‘The relevance of international law to Palestinian rights in the West Bank and Gaza: in legal 
defence of the intifada’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 129 at 138-144. 
213Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 173-177, paras. 90-101. 
214Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, ICJ Rep, 2004, 240, para. 2. 
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Israeli Foreign Ministry, Theodor Meron, which noted that the international community had rejected 
Israel’s claim that the territories were not occupied.215  
Further, as Gerson notes, Israel did not contest the lawfulness of Jordan’s control of the West Bank216 
and clearly sought to conclude a peace treaty after the Six-Day War which would have returned the 
West Bank to Jordan, albeit with modified borders. Jordanian repossession of the West Bank was the 
premise of the diplomatic negotiations and exchanges which preceded the adoption of Security 
Council resolution 242. This surely amounts to an implicit recognition by Israel that Jordan possessed 
title to the West Bank, thus negating the contention at the core of the missing reversioner argument 
and the rationale for claiming that the Fourth Geneva Convention is inapplicable.  
 
2. East Jerusalem: status as occupied territory  
Israel holds that East Jerusalem, the eastern part of the city held under Jordanian rule between 1948 
and 1967, has been annexed permanently to Israel and is no longer occupied territory. This claim was 
initiated in Amendment 11 to the Law and Administrative Ordinance of 1948, passed by the Knesset 
on 27 June 1967, which held that the ‘law, jurisdiction and administration’ of the Israeli state shall 
extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated by order of the government. The following day, the 
Israeli authorities used this amendment to place East Jerusalem, including its Old City, under Israeli 
judicial and administrative control. On the same day, by virtue of a municipal order, the Israeli 
Ministry of Interior extended the boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipality over that same area, 
incorporating the territory and the population of occupied East Jerusalem into the municipal and 
administrative spheres of its government. The East Jerusalem Municipality was ordered to cease 
operations on 29 June 1967 and Israel completed its annexation under the banner of integration of 
services. In 1980, Israel confirmed Jerusalem’s status as the capital of Israel through a Basic Law.217 
Thus, much as France did in Algeria,218 Israel absorbed East Jerusalem into its own territory and has 
proceeded to exercise sovereignty there. The intended permanence of this consolidation is clear from 
development planning since 1967, including an integrated ring of Jewish neighbourhoods and 
                                               
215.See Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, pp. 101-102.  Gorenberg provides a fragmented account of Meron’s 
opinion (pp. 99-102).  A scan of  the original Hebrew text of this opinion is available on Gorenberg’s website at: 
http://southjerusalem.com/settlement-and-occupation-historical-documents/, and a complete English translation 
on that of the Sir Joseph Hotung Programme in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle East 
(School of Oriental and African Studies, London) at: 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/lawpeacemideast/resources/48485.pdf.     
216 Gerson, Israel, the West Bank, and International Law, p. 80. Israel also recognised that Egypt had some 
interest in Gaza by virtue of Article 2 of the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, 26 March 1979, 1136 United Nations 
Treaty Series 17813 (registered by Egypt) and 1138 United Nations Treaty Series 17855 (treaty and annexes, 
registered by Israel) and ibid 17856 (agreed minutes, registered by Israel); also reproduced in (1979) 18 
International Legal Materials 362.  Article 2 provides, ‘The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the 
recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine...without 
prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.  The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable.  Each 
will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace’. 
217 Israel: Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. Passed by the Knesset on the 17th Av, 5740 (30th July, 1980) 
and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 980 of the 23rd Av, 5740 (5th August, 1980), p. 186; the Bill and an 
Explanatory Note were published in Hatza'ot Chok No. 1464 of 5740, p. 287; and the official English translation 
in 21 Laws of the State of Israel 75, and also M. Medzini (ed.), Israel’s foreign relations: selected documents, 
1947-1974 (Jerusalem: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1976), Vol. I, p. 245.   
218 After overthrowing the constitutional monarchy in 1848 and passing a new Constitution in November of that 
year, the colony of Algeria was declared to be an integral part of the metropolitan territory of France.  
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settlements surrounding the city and highways and a light rail system that connect Jewish settlements 
in occupied East Jerusalem to West Jerusalem.219 
Israel’s claim to sovereignty over the territory of East Jerusalem is invalid220 on several counts and 
has not been recognised as legitimate by the international community. First, as Israel gained control to 
East Jerusalem through the use of force, its claim to permanent annexation amounts to conquest.221 
The right of conquest has long been rendered defunct in public international law by the emergence of 
the prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force, an intrinsic corollary 
of the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, established as a 
peremptory norm of jus cogens.222  
Second, Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem dismembers the West Bank by dividing East Jerusalem from 
the rest of Palestinian occupied territory. As discussed in Chapter I, the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples223 and the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States emphasise the principle of 
territorial inviolability of territory under foreign domination.  
Third, international humanitarian law proscribes any alteration in the status of an occupied territory by 
the Occupying Power, in whom sovereignty can never vest. For example, Article 47 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention prohibits the deprivation of the rights of the occupied population ‘by any 
annexation by the [Occupying Power] of the whole or part of the occupied territory’. The authoritative 
commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention confirms that ‘occupation as a result of war, while 
representing actual possession to all appearances, cannot imply any right whatsoever to dispose of 
territory’.224 
In summary, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem is prima facie unlawful under international law, 
does not affect that territory’s status under international law, and does not impinge upon the 
application of jus in bello to protect the local population. The UN Security Council has supported this 
view, through several resolutions such as Resolution 252 of 1968, which declared that ‘all legislative 
and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem 
… are invalid and cannot change that status.’225 By breaching its obligation not to alter the status of an 
                                               
219 See Al-Haq, 40 Years after the Unlawful Annexation of East Jerusalem: Consolidation of the Illegal 
Situation Continues Through the Construction of the Jerusalem Light Rail (28 June 2007), available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=326.  
220 See Security Council Resolution 298 (25 September 1971), quoted in Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 
166, para. 75. 
221 The preamble to Security Council Resolution 267 (3 July 1969) on the status of the Old City of Jerusalem 
reaffirms ‘the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible’.   
222 International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, with Commentaries’ ILC 
Yearbook 1966 Vol. II, p. 247. See also Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ (1986), para. 190. For a 
detailed exposition of the emergence and consolidation of the illegality of territorial acquisition through the use 
of force, see I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 
217;  S. Korman, The right of conquest: the acquisition of territory by force in international law and practice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); and with specific reference to the June 1967 hostilities, I. Sagay, ‘International 
Law Relating to Occupied Territory: Can Territory be Acquired by Military Conquest under Modern 
International Law’ (1972) 28 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International at  56-64. 
223 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, paragraph 6 of which states, ‘Any attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
224 J. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva: ICRC, 1958), p. 275. 
225 UN Security Council Resolutions 252, 21 May 1968 and 267, 3 July 1969. See also UN Security Council 
Resolution 298, 25 September 1971 (‘all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the 
status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and 
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occupied territory, Israel has gone beyond what is permitted of an Occupying Power to the extent that 
it has effectively unlawfully colonised East Jerusalem and is preventing the exercise of self-
determination by its population. 
 
3.  Legal Implications of the Oslo Accords  
It could be argued that the Oslo Accords alter the legal framework of Israeli practices by terminating 
the condition of belligerent occupation, at least in Area A of the West Bank where nominal authority 
was officially handed over to Palestinian Authority. This argument is rejected below on four grounds: 
(1) Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits any change of status in occupied territory 
concluded through negotiations between the occupying power and local authorities under occupation; 
(2) the agreements do not fall under the status of special agreements; (3) the prohibition on a change 
of status is not obviated by the status of the PLO as a signatory; and (4) the substance of the Oslo 
Accords allocated negligible genuine territorial jurisdiction to the Palestinian Authority and their 
implementation has not improved conditions for the population under occupation.226  
 
a. The Oslo Accords: basic provisions  
As used here, the term ‘Oslo Accords’ refers to the formal agreements that resulted from direct talks 
between the Israeli government and the PLO, formalised first as the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements (1993) and elaborated in the Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip (1995).227 The Accords created a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority 
—styled ‘the Council’ in the agreement but generally called the Palestinian Authority (PA)228—that 
was to hold executive, legislative and judicial authority.229 In addition, the Accords stipulated three 
territorial categories or jurisdictional zones in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem, upon which a 
determination was deferred to ‘permanent status’ negotiations), known as Areas A, B, and C. In Area 
A, amounting to approximately 2 percent of the West Bank at the time under the 1995 Interim 
Agreement, and encompassing six of the major Palestinian cities, the ‘Council’ was to be vested with 
                                                                                                                                                  
legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that status’); 
UN Security Council Resolution 476, 30 June 1980; UN Security Resolution 478, 20 August 1980. It is notable 
that these denunciations of Israel’s attempts to alter the status of East Jerusalem were mirrored by the language 
of UN resolutions rejecting South Africa’s endeavours to grant independence to certain Bantustan territories as 
similarly ‘invalid’. See, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution 31/6A (1976).  
226 Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords, p. 15; O. Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons: the international 
legal status of Palestine during the Interim Period’ (1997-98) 26 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 27 at 65-69.  Even in those areas designated A in the Oslo Accords, which have the highest concentration 
of Palestinian population, Israel retains responsibility for Israeli citizens.  Moreover, Israel retains territorial 
jurisdiction over areas B and C, including its settlements, infrastructure and external relations: see Declaration 
of Principles, Article VIII, Public Order and Safety; Annex II, Agreement Minutes to the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government; Interim Agreement, chapter II, Article XII (1) and Chapter III, Article 
XVII (1-2). 
227 The Oslo Accords comprise: The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 
September 1993, (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 1525; the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, May 1994, (1994) 
33 International Legal Materials 622; The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 
1995, (1995) 36 International Legal Materials 551; Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron, January 1997, (1997) 
36 International Legal Materials 650 ; Wye River Memorandum, October 1998, (1998) 37 International Legal 
Materials 1251,  and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, September 1999, (1999) 38 International Legal 
Materials 1465. The latter two documents were focused on securing the compliance of the parties to implement 
prior agreements. These accords were preceded by Letters of Mutual Recognition in 1993.These agreements are 
sometimes termed collectively as the ‘Oslo Accords’, ‘Oslo’ or ‘the Oslo process’.  
228 This interim governing authority is officially called the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) but is 
commonly referred to as the Palestinian Authority (PA). 
229 Interim Agreement, Chapter 3, Article XVII (3).   
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exclusive authority over the internal affairs of the Palestinian population: e.g., the provision of health, 
education, policing, and other municipal services. Even within Area A, however, Israel retained pre-
eminent authority over its citizens, including settlers, thus maintaining overall territorial 
jurisdiction.230  
Within Area B, encompassing many Palestinian villages and towns and approximately 26 percent of 
the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority was vested with the same functional authorities, including 
public order of Palestinians,231 but Israel retained overriding responsibility for security and for 
protection of, and law enforcement against, Israelis.232 In Area C, comprising approximately 72 
percent233 of the West Bank, and composed of Israeli settlements, major road networks, military 
installations and largely unpopulated areas such as the Jordan Valley, Israel retained full authority and 
responsibility.234  
A different formulation was used in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, although stipulations were similar. 
The Palestinian Authority was responsible for the population and territory within the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho except for settlements and military installations. Israel retained overriding jurisdiction for 
internal and external security, for Israeli citizens throughout the Gaza Strip, and public order of 
settlements.235 In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PLO was prohibited from entering into 
agreements that amounted to foreign relations.236  
The Accords also stipulated that through time Israel was to transfer to the Palestinian Authority 
jurisdiction over portions of Area C, with the exception of Israeli settlements and military areas. 
These matters, along with others—such as the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, final borders, 
and water management—were to be negotiated as part of the permanent agreement and were excluded 
from Palestinian jurisdiction in the interim period.237 Israel also retained overriding authority to 
‘exercise its powers and responsibilities with regard to internal security and public order, as well as 
with regard to other powers and responsibilities not transferred’.238  
                                               
230 Declaration of Principles, Article VIII, Public Order and Safety; Annex II, Agreement Minutes to the 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government;  Interim Agreement, chapter II,  Article XII (1) and 
Chapter. III, Article XVII (1-2).  
231 Interim Agreements, Chapter 2, Article XIII, para 2; However, movement of Palestinian policemen in certain 
areas of Area B required approval and coordination by Israel.  See Chapter II, Article 8 (4-5).  
232 Interim Agreements, Chapter 2, Article 12 (1). 
233 The proportions of the West Bank cited above as constituting Areas A, B and C respectively derive from the 
1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those boundaries were to be gradually redrawn 
but have been frozen since the 1999 Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding 
Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations at 17 percent, 24 
percent and 59 percent respectively. 
234 Interim Agreement, Chapter 2, Article XI, Land, para. 3.  In addition, a special formulation for control was 
crafted for Hebron, dividing it into areas categorised as ‘H-1’ and ‘H-2’, due to the presence of Jewish settlers in 
the heart of the Palestinian populated Old City of Hebron.  The Palestinian Authority was to exercise all civil 
powers and responsibility over the Palestinian population in both sectors; however, in H-2, the location of the 
concentration of settlers, Israel would retain responsibility for public order and security.  See the Protocol 
Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (1997).  Like Hebron, a different formulation was used in the Gaza 
Strip, although it was effectively divided under areas of Palestinian authority and areas of Israeli authority, 
comprising Israeli settlements and military areas.  See Article 5, Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994).  As in the 
West Bank, control of air space and borders remained effectively under Israeli control, although the Palestinian 
Authority was allowed to establish a nominal presence at the crossing with Egypt.  
235 Article 5(1-3), Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994). 
236 See J Singer, ‘Aspects of foreign relations under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on interim self-
government arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza’ (1994) 26 Israel Law Review 268 at 269-273. 
237 Interim Agreement, Article XVII (1); Interim Agreement, Chapter 2, Article XI (2). 
238 Interim Agreement, Annex III, Article 4(4). 
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The Interim Agreement provided that, in the future when authority is transferred from Areas C to the 
PA, the PA would often remain obliged to cooperate with, provide data on, or secure Israeli 
permission regarding matters such as changes to the Palestinian population registry,239 the issuing of 
travel documents240, land registration,241 transportation or exploration of fuel,242 water243 
telecommunications and use of the electromagnetic sphere,244 or electrical infrastructural 
development, nature reserves245, and archaeology.246 Joint Committees established under the Accords 
enabled Israel to exercise a veto, thereby maintaining the status quo.247 Israel also retained an 
overriding veto of legislation passed by the PA.248  
 
b. Status of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as a Signatory   
The 1995 Interim Agreement was signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
However, by the terms of the agreement Israel did not transfer authority to the PLO but created a 
temporary regime—a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority—pending the outcome of the 
final-status negotiations (as noted, called the Palestinian ‘Council’ in the Agreement):249  
Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this 
Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred. 250 
Crawford comments that the Oslo instruments ‘are remarkably unforthcoming on issues of status, no 
doubt because of fundamental disagreements between the parties’.251 Singer, former Legal Advisor to 
the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated that, under the Declaration of Principles and thus 
throughout the interim period, ‘the Palestinian Council will not be independent or sovereign in 
nature’. Rather, ‘the military government will continue to be the source of authority for the Palestinian 
Council and the powers and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’.252 This 
                                               
239 Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix I, Article 28(4). 
240 Ibid., Article 28 (10).  
241 Ibid., Article 22(4)(b). 
242 Ibid., Article 15(5)(b)(2). 
243 Ibid., Article 40. 
244 Ibid., Article 36(b)(6) and (c)(2). 
245 Ibid., Article 25(4-7). 
246 Ibid., Article 15(5)(b)(2). 
247 See, for example, the stipulations of Article 40 of Appendix I of Annex III, Protocol Concerning Civil 
Affairs of the Interim Agreement on ‘Water and Sewage’and the Joint Water Committee, or Article 22(4) (b) 
thereof on the Professional Joint Committee to deal with land issues. 
248 This provision stipulated that draft legislation must be submitted to Israel for review and could be abrogated 
on grounds that it  deemed to amend or abrogate existing military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the 
Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the Declaration of Principles or the interim agreements.  See 
Interim Agreement, Chapter 3, Article XVIII (4-5). 
249 Article I(2) of the Interim Agreement provides: ‘Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and 
responsibilities transferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in 
accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to 
be assumed by the Council in this regard.  Accordingly, the term ‘Council’ throughout this Agreement shall, 
pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority.’ 
250On the status and powers of the Palestinian National Authority under the Interim Agreement, see Dajani, 
‘Stalled between seasons’, at 60-74. 
251 Crawford, Creation of States, p. 433. 
252  J. Singer, ‘The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements: some legal aspects’ 
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arrangement did not alter the condition of belligerent occupation. As Bruderlein notes, although the 
PA took over most of the responsibility for public services in the Gaza Strip under the Oslo 
agreements, 
The Oslo Agreements were never intended to determine the ultimate legal responsibilities of 
Israel towards the Palestinian population in the [occupied Palestinian territories]. They 
remained silent on this issue, leaving the question for the negotiation of the final status 
agreement. As a result, if the transfer of administrative responsibilities to the Palestinian 
Authority narrowed the scope of duties of Israel as the Occupying Power, it did not extinguish 
Israel’s responsibilities towards the Palestinian people.253 
Although other commentators agree that the PA is not sovereign, they claim that source of authority 
of the Israeli military administration is purely formal. Eyal Benvenisti, for example, argues that ‘the 
myth of continuity of the Israeli military administration’ through the agency of the Palestinian 
Authority is ‘a myth both parties, each for its own reasons, sought to maintain’.254 He claims that the 
parties’ agreed position did not reflect realities on the ground because, initially under the 1994 Gaza-
Jericho Agreement, control over the civilian population in the Gaza and Jericho areas was entrusted to 
the PA, and therefore Israel was no longer responsible for maintaining public order and civil life. 
Accordingly, in those areas, the Israeli occupation had ended as ‘the test for effective control is not 
the military strength of the foreign army which is situated outside the borders...What matters is the 
extent of that power’s effective control of civilian life within the occupied area’.255 Following the 
conclusion of the Interim Agreement, in relation to Areas A and B designated in the Agreement,256 
Dinstein advanced a similar argument. He claims that, to the extent that Israel relinquished ‘territorial 
jurisdiction with the functions of government’ to the PA ‘and that these functions are exercised in 
effect by the Palestinians’, Israel’s occupation of these areas terminated and it was no longer 
responsible.257 
This argument is not compelling. Although the PA’s competence and jurisdiction in these areas was 
cast in terms of territorial jurisdiction, Dajani notes that, in effect, ‘it governs a population, rather than 
a territory’.258 He points out that the PA’s limited competence in some areas is counterbalanced by 
Israel’s continued control over settlements which, in the West Bank, ‘are scattered between 
Palestinian population centers’. The areas formally under the jurisdiction of the PA are not 
contiguous: ‘Palestinians residing within them consequently remain subject to Israeli controls on 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1994) 1 Justice 4 at 6, available at: www.intjewishlawyers.org/html/justice.asp. 
253  C. Bruderlein, Legal aspects of Israel’s disengagement plan under international humanitarian law, p. 6,    
available at: www.ihlresearch.org/opt/pdfs/briefing3466.pdf.  
254 E. Benvenisti, ‘The status of the Palestinian Authority’, in E. Cotran and C. Mallat (eds.), The Arab-Israeli 
Accords: legal perspectives (London: CIMEL/Kluwer, 1996) p. 53: see also his ‘Responsibility for the 
protection of human rights under the Interim Israeli-Palestinian Agreements’ (1994) 28 Israel Law Review 297.  
Benvenisti’s analysis is based on the terms of the 1994 Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area: the 
thrust of his argument is equally applicable to the situation established under the Interim Agreement, which 
superceded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement—see Article 31(2) of the Interim Agreement. 
255 Benvenisti, ‘Status of the Palestinian Authority’, pp. 56-57, emphasis in original; see pp. 53-57 generally; 
also Benvenisti, Human rights, pp. 307-309. 
256 For a detailed analysis of the provisions of the Interim Agreement regulating the competence and jurisdiction 
of the Palestinian National Authority in Areas A and B, see Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons’, pp. 61-69.  
Dajani estimates (p. 63) that the residual area of Area C covered 35-40% of Gaza and 70% of the West Bank.  
Under the terms of the Agreement, this included all settlements, areas that Israel considered to be of strategic 
importance, and unpopulated areas, over which Israel was to retain territorial jurisdiction while the Palestinian 
National Authority assumed limited functional and personal jurisdiction over Palestinians only. 
257 Y. Dinstein, ‘The international legal status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—1998’ (1998) 28 Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 37 at 45. 
258 Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons’ p. 69; see also Crawford, Creation of States, pp. 443-444. 
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movement between towns and cities in the West Bank, as well as between the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip’.259 
Further, Israel retained exclusive personal jurisdiction in criminal matters over Israelis, even 
regarding offences committed in Areas A and B where, moreover, Palestinian civil jurisdiction over 
Israelis was seriously circumscribed,260 and in practice has proven to be non-existent. Also, in Area B, 
although the PA was to ‘assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians’, ‘Israel shall have the 
overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat 
of terrorism’.261 This retention of jurisdiction and, a fortiori, security competence, denies the PA full 
control of public order and civil life in these areas. Accordingly, even if a purely factual test for the 
termination of occupation is employed, its requirements are not fulfilled. Under the terms of the 
Interim Agreement, these Areas remained occupied. Consequently, the PA may best be seen as an 
institution to which the occupant has devolved limited administrative competence. The drafters of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention had envisaged that this could occur during a prolonged occupation, 
without terminating that occupation.262 Crawford aptly describes it as ‘an interim local government 
body with restricted powers’.263  
For purposes of this study, question remains regarding the significance of an ‘interim local 
government body’ and other provisions of the Oslo Accords for findings on colonialism or apartheid. 
The following sections address the implications of the Oslo Accords in three stages: first, reviewing 
the inviolability of rights provided under the Fourth Geneva Convention arising under Articles 7, 8 
and 47; second, confirming whether the Oslo Accords fall within the scope of Articles 7, 8 and 47; 
and finally, in light of these articles, assessing whether provisions of the Oslo Accords could serve to 
absolve Israel from responsibility under international law vis-à-vis the occupied population. 
 
c. Inviolability of Rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention 
World War II demonstrated that belligerent governments, particularly those whose territory was 
occupied, would conclude agreements with the occupying power often to the detriment of their own 
prisoners of war or civilian populations.264 These arrangements were ‘represented to those concerned 
as an advantage, but in the majority of cases involved drawbacks which were sometimes very 
serious.’265  
The drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention recognised that in situations of occupation, the 
occupied authority or its population was in a highly asymmetrical relationship with the Occupying 
Power and in a vulnerable position. The drafters were informed by events during World War II, when 
Occupying Powers intervened in occupied territories in various ways: for instance, by changing the 
constitution, dissolving the existing State, or creating new political or military organisations or 
political entities.266 Occupying Powers also annexed territory or took actions in anticipation of 
                                               
259 Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons’, p. 64. 
260 See Interim Agreement, Article XVII and Annex IV (Protocol concerning legal matters). 
261 Interim Agreement, Article 13(2)(a) 
262 See Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, pp. 62-63, and 272-276.  As Dajani observes, there is a 
presumption against the creation of a new State on a territory under belligerent occupation: see his ‘Stalled 
between seasons’, pp. 77-78.  These are generally seen as puppet States which lack independence.  Dajani 
argues that separation between the PLO and Palestinian Authority preserves Palestinian negotiators’ 
independence from Israel, and thus avoids the application of this presumption (pp. 90-91). See also Crawford, 
Creation of States, pp. 78-83 and 156-157; and K. Marek, Identity and continuity of States in public 
international law (Geneva: Droz, 1968, 2nd  Ed.), pp. 110-120.   
263.Crawford, Creation of States, 444: see also Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons’, 67. 
264 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 69 
265 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
266 Ibid., p. 273. 
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annexing such territory.267 In some instances, the authorities of the occupied territory, having come 
under pressure from the occupying power, concluded agreements prejudicial to protected persons.268 
These agreements included banning provision of humanitarian assistance, refusing to accept the 
supervision of a Protecting Power, or ‘tolerating’ the deportation or forced enlistment of protected 
persons.269  
The drafters thus made the principal concern of the Fourth Geneva Convention the protection of 
‘protected persons’—people ‘who at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in cases of a conflict or occupation in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying 
Power of which they are not nationals’.270 Recognising that protected persons could come under 
immense pressure to forfeit their rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the drafters addressed 
this problem specifically in Article 8:  
protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to 
them by the present Convention and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing 
Article, if such there be. 
The drafters also wanted to ensure that states could not take ‘refuge behind the will of the protected 
persons’ to justify their failure to comply with the provisions of the Convention271 and that an 
individual’s acquiescence to renounce rights did not ‘open a breach which others in much greater 
numbers might have cause of regret.’272 In this spirit, the drafters further emphasised the ‘cardinal 
importance’ of the non-derogability of the Convention’s protections.273 Article 47 states:  
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any 
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as 
the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said 
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories 
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the 
occupied territory. 
In sum, Articles 8 and 47 affirm that belligerents cannot conclude agreements which derogate from or 
deny to protected persons the safeguards of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Nor can any renunciation 
of rights by protected persons have legal effect.  
 
d. The Oslo Accords as Special Agreements  
The drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions included provisions in all four Conventions to preserve 
their protections even where ‘special agreements’ might be required. In the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, this provision is detailed in Article 7:  
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 11, 14, 15, 17, 36, 108, 109, 
132, 133 and 149, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special agreements for all 
                                               
267 Ibid., p. 275. 
268 Ibid., pp. 274-275. 
269 Ibid., p. 275 
270 Article 4, Fourth Geneva Convention. This provision extends to all who are not of the nationality of the 
occupying state (although with some exceptions as discussed later): see Pictet, Commentary to Geneva 
Convention IV, p. 46, n. 4.  The commentary notes that those not considered to be protected persons in situations 
of occupation include nationals of a state not party to the convention, nationals of a co-belligerent state, so long 
as the state has normal diplomatic representation in the occupying state, or persons who enjoy protection under 
the three other Conventions.   
271 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 76. 
272 Ibid., p. 75. 
273 Ibid.  
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matters concerning which they may deem suitable to make separate provision. No special 
agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons, as defined by the present 
Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them. 
In the same article, the drafters acknowledged that the provisions of the Convention might be 
supplanted by ‘more favourable measures’ that improve the status and conditions of protected 
persons: 
Protected persons shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the 
Convention is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are 
contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favourable measures 
have been taken in regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict. 
The Oslo Accords could be considered a series of special agreements concluded by Israel and the 
PLO. Several questions arise from this possibility: whether these special agreements fall within the 
limitations imposed by Article 47 regarding agreements with local authorities; whether the special 
agreements could be understood as ‘more favourable measures’ that obviate application of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention; and whether provisions of the Oslo Accords could in any way exonerate Israel 
from responsibility under international law for alleged policies of colonialism or apartheid.  
The PLO leadership was permitted to reside in the OPT only after July 1994. The agreements signed 
after the PLO leadership took up residence in the occupied territory would presumably fall within the 
scope of Article 47 and possibly also Article 8. However, when the first in this series of agreements, 
the Declaration of Principles (1993),274 was signed, the PLO was based outside the OPT. 
Consequently, the PLO was not, at least initially, within the scope of Article 8 and the definition of 
‘protected persons’ or unequivocally within the definition of ‘authorities of the occupied territory’ 
employed in Article 47. Thus the Declaration of Principles—which outlined the areas of 
responsibilities between the two parties and established the framework for future negotiations—could 
arguably constitute special agreements for purposes of the Convention.  
The status of the PLO leadership regarding Article 47 must be considered for its recognised role as 
‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ as well as changing conditions faced by its 
leadership. The PLO, although its top leadership was in exile until 1994, represented Palestinians 
residing both outside and inside occupied territory and was considered to be the national authority for 
negotiations with Israel.275 However, the PLO’s attempt to accede to the Geneva Conventions in 1989 
in the name of the State of Palestine had been declined by Switzerland on the basis that the question 
of Palestine's status as a state remained unsettled.276 Thus the PLO could not sign the Oslo Accords in 
the capacity of a High Contracting Party of the Geneva Conventions. After the PLO assumed 
residence in the OPT, it continued to negotiate and sign agreements on issues affecting the Palestinian 
protected persons and the occupied territory, although the Palestinian Authority is responsible for the 
implementation of these agreements.277 Once the Palestinian Authority was established, the PLO 
                                               
274 As noted earlier, the Declaration of Principles established a framework for limited Palestinian interim rule 
pending a permanent status agreement to end the occupation and the issues under conflict. The subsequent series 
of agreements elaborated upon the transitional arrangements set out in the Declaration of Principles.  
275 In the Madrid talks, launched in 1991, and subsequently in the Oslo talks, the PLO was considered to be the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.  The Palestinian negotiation team, devoid of members of the 
PLO because they were barred from participating by Israel and the US, took its direction from the PLO based in 
Tunis. See, for example, Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords, p. 120; and also Hanan Ashrawi, This 
Side of Peace: A Personal Account (New York: Touchstone, 1995), pp. 116, 147, and 199. 
276 Although the PLO did not formally accede to the Conventions, Switzerland considered its unilateral 
undertaking to be valid: see Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 173, para.91. 
277 Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons’, p. 71, maintains that the PLO does not have legal authority over the 
decisions of the PA that relate to local governance of the Palestinians in the OPT.  While that is true, the PLO 
negotiated the framework for the creation of the PA and its powers.  He also notes that while the PA has 
responsibility for municipal affairs within the OPT, it lacks the legal competence to make decisions regarding 
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negotiated subsequent agreements with Israel relating to the implementation of the Oslo framework. 
Hence, the PLO, rather than the Palestinian Authority, acted as the local authority in the occupied 
territories for purposes of Articles 7 and 47.278 Yet the PLO itself could not be considered clearly to 
fall under the status of protected persons while its institutional existence and indeed part of its 
leadership remained transnational. 
In light of this lack of clarity, one may turn instead to examine the content and context of those 
Accords. The Commentary to Article 47 notes that ‘agreements concluded with the authorities of the 
occupied territory represent a more subtle means by which the Occupying Power may try to free itself 
from the obligations incumbent on it under occupation law’. This underscores the need for emphasis 
on substance (e.g., obligations of the Occupying Power) in order to safeguard the protections of the 
Conventions, rather than a focus on form.279 The Commentary to Article 7 also emphasises substance 
over form, such as special agreements that are part of wider arrangements (such as armistice 
agreements).280 Applying this principle to the Oslo Accords indicates that actual conditions must be 
taken into account. For example, it could be argued that, should the Oslo Accords serve to institute the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the context of a two-state solution, this outcome would go 
beyond ‘special agreements’ by constituting ‘more favourable measures’, as noted in Article 7, which 
could ultimately relieve the Palestinian population of its status as ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. Indeed, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip would normally be considered to terminate application of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.  
Emphasising substance, however, the question would be whether a two-state solution, as actually 
implemented, would constitute ‘more favourable measures’ and truly fulfil the Palestinian right to 
self-determination and end the occupation of the OPT in its entirety. Article 2(d) of the Apartheid 
Convention and the history of South African Homelands (Bantustans) raise the question of whether 
establishing an ‘independent’ state (homeland) for the Palestinian people in only part of the OPT 
could be corollary to the racial enclave policy for which apartheid South Africa was notorious. 
Nominal independence in the Homelands was presented by the South African government as 
expressing and satisfying the right to self-determination of black Africans. Yet the international 
community determined that the Bantustans were tools of apartheid and denied them recognition on 
this basis. The criteria for determining when occupation has ended therefore cannot consist solely of 
claims by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (as local authorities under occupation) 
that Palestinians have assumed sovereignty in a nominally independent State. Whether nominal 
statehood improves the condition of protected persons and fulfils the right to self-determination must 
be determined. In order to conform with Article 47, any agreement that leads to the creation of a 
Palestinian state must not merely perpetuate Israeli occupation under another guise. 
 
As the purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention is to ensure the protection and well-being of 
civilians in time of war and occupation, any agreement that implicates the non-derogable provisions 
of the Convention should be considered as falling within the scope of Articles 7, 8 and 47. The Oslo 
Accords tacitly presupposed the continued applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention as they did 
not change the status of the OPT as occupied territory but rather expressly contemplated a transitional 
or interim period which would culminate in an agreement leading to a permanent settlement.281 Given 
                                                                                                                                                  
the ultimate status of the Palestinians within the OPT which, under the Oslo Accords¸ was to be addressed in the 
permanent status negotiations. 
278 Had the Accords provided for the Palestinian Authority to assume negotiations with Israel as the authorities 
of the occupied territories, then those agreements would clearly fall within the scope of the Convention: see 
Dajani, ‘Stalled between seasons’, pp. 69-74, for a discussion of the relationship between the Palestinian 
Authority and PLO during the 1990s.   
279 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 274. 
280 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
281 See Article I, Aim of Negotiations and Article V, Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations, 
Declaration of Principles.  
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the manner in which authority was transferred, as discussed below, it is clear that the territory 
remained occupied throughout this interim period and to date. This study of whether Israeli is 
practicing colonialism or apartheid in the OPT is therefore based on the assumption that the territories 
retain their ‘occupied’ status under international law.  
 
e. Implications of the Accords for Protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
The Oslo Accords conveyed putative legality to legal and administrative arrangements that Israel had 
established over the preceding twenty-four years in violation of the laws of occupation.282 For 
example, retaining jurisdiction in Area C enabled Israel to perpetuate settlement expansion, including 
by land expropriation or requisitions in violation of the Hague Regulations; destruction of private 
Palestinian property in violation of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; and the continued 
transfer of its population in violation of Article 49(6). The Interim Agreement explicitly recognised 
the land rights of Israeli companies and settlers within the occupied territory.283 Similarly, retaining 
overriding responsibility for security effectively enabled Israel to continue its practices  in violation of 
the Palestinian rights to life, to freedom from arbitrary detention, to freedom of movement, etc. The 
provisions on infrastructure and water infrastructure and allocation also reaffirmed discriminatory 
allotments in favour of Israeli settlers and settlements, pending a final status agreement (as discussed 
in Chapter III).284  
In sum, the Oslo Accords ratified mechanisms of control and discrimination that Israel had instituted 
within the OPT prior to 1993. As the provisions of these Accords constitute ‘special agreements’ 
under Article 7 of the Fourth Geneva Convention , and ‘agreements between the authorities of the 
occupying territory and the Occupying Power’ under Article 47, questions arise as to their legal 
implications. Article 7 stipulates that no special agreements shall adversely effect the situation of the 
protected persons, nor restrict the rights which the Convention confers upon them. Article 7 thus 
prohibits a belligerent from contracting out of its obligations owed to protected persons;285 Article 8 
prohibits a protected person from renouncing the protections of the Convention; and Article 47 
reaffirms these two articles and the non-derogability of the Convention’s provisions in cases in which 
the Occupying Power has annexed territory, implemented changes to institutions or the government of 
occupied territory, or entered into agreements with the authorities of the occupied territory. 
Before the Oslo Accords, Israel implemented policies and undertook practices which contravened the 
protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention, many of which are relevant to a study on practices of 
colonialism and apartheid. These include Israel’s establishment of settlements and its restrictions on 
land planning and development; Israel’s measures related to resource allocation and sufficiency of 
supplies particularly of water; its restrictions on movement and other forms of collective punishment 
which are largely directed towards the Palestinian population as a whole; and its use of torture and 
administrative detention. The Oslo Accords do not contain provisions which prima facia amount to 
violations of the Convention, but they do recognise those unlawful prior practices and, through the 
allocation of jurisdiction and authorities, enable or ratify a continuation of such violations.  
Article 7, in conjunction with Article 47 and Article 8, renders null and void those provisions of the 
Accords that ratify past violations of the Convention. The fact the PLO signed the Oslo Accords and 
in effect recognised Israeli practices which contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention is irrelevant in 
terms of Israel’s obligations. Israel cannot exonerate or exculpate itself from responsibility for these 
policies and practices by relying on the PLO’s ratification of the Oslo Accords.  
In summary, the Accords, or at least provisions of them, fall within the scope of Article 47 and 7. 
They articulate two distinct phases, an interim stage and a final agreement, with most provisions of 
                                               
282 Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords, p. 157. 
283 Interim Agreement, Annex III, Article 22(3).  
284 Interim Agreement, Annex III, Article 40(5). 
285 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 70. 
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the Accords stipulating arrangements for an interim phase.286 This, as shown above, reflected a 
continued occupation, the removal of the Israeli military from the immediate presence of Palestinian 
populated areas notwithstanding. The provisions of the Oslo Accords, particularly those of the interim 
phase, reflect what was anticipated in the commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention: that an 
Occupying Power would enter into an agreement in order to divest itself of responsibilities owed to 
the population.287  
Finally, the protections provided by the Geneva Conventions are for the primary benefit of the 
protected persons, not the Occupying Power. As the ICJ noted in finding that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention is de jure applicable to the territory Israel occupied in 1967, ‘the intention of the drafters 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention [is] to protect civilians who find themselves, in whatever way, in 
the hands of the occupying Power.’288 The Court went on to note that the Conference of Government 
experts convened by the ICRC after World War II recommended that ‘these Conventions be 
applicable to any armed conflict ‘whether it is or is not recognized as a state of war by the parties’ and 
‘in cases of occupation of territories in the absence of any state of war’’289, underscoring the emphasis 
on the protection of civilians. The commentary to Article 7 also stresses this point, noting that by 
restricting states’ sovereign right to enter into agreements with other belligerents, Article 7 represents 
a ‘landmark in the progressive renunciation by States of their sovereign rights in favour of the 
individual and the higher juridical order.’290  
Thus, in light of the emphasis on and intent of the Conventions to safeguard protected persons and the 
‘special agreements’ or provisions included in the Oslo Accords, these agreements must be viewed as 
falling within the scope of Article 7 and 47. Less important is that the PLO is a non-state actor and 
was thus not permitted to accede to the Convention. It considered, and unilaterally expressed, itself 
bound by Conventions. Moreover, the fact that the PLO was not recognised by Israel and that its 
leadership was prohibited from locating itself into the OPT prior to 1994 should not diminish its status 
as that of the authority of the occupied territory. Thus, although the first two agreements were signed 
when the PLO was still situated outside of the occupied territory, this should not negate the 
applicability of Articles 7, 8 or 47.  
The Oslo Accords, accordingly, did not alter the status of the OPT under international law. The law of 
occupation, and in particular the protections embodied in the Fourth Geneva Convention, continue to 
supply the fundamental legal framework which determines Israel’s rights and duties as occupant in its 
administration of the territories. Nor did the ‘Roadmap’, as approved by Security Council resolution 
1515 (2003)—which as the ICJ noted in its Wall advisory opinion, ‘represents the most recent of 
efforts to initiate negotiations’ to bring the conflict to an end291— alter the status of the Palestinian 
territories as occupied.292 Indeed, the preamble to the ‘Roadmap’ explicitly acknowledges that the 
                                               
286 Provisions related to permanent status agreement are very few, namely listing the issues to be addressed 
during permanent status talks, the timing of the talks and the caveat that arrangements reached during the 
interim period will not impact final status: see Article I and Article V (2)-(4) of the Declaration of Principles.  
The Declaration of Principles and the subsequent agreements recognize these phases.  It states that ‘the two 
parties agree that the outcome of permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by 
agreements reached for the interim period. See Article V (4), Declaration of Principles. 
287 This is not to say that the authors of the Oslo Accords did not intend to conclude a permanent status 
agreement eventually.  Whatever the intent, the provisions of the Accords aimed at divesting Israel from or 
limiting its responsibility over the Palestinian population. 
288 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 174 -175, para 95. 
289 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 175 , para 96. 
290 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 71. 
291 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 201, para. 162. 
292 See ‘A performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ 
annexed to a letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN doc. S/2003/529, 7 May 2003.  For Israel’s fourteen reservations see ‘Israel’s Response to the 
Road Map, 25 May, 2003, available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm.  In 
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territory is occupied when it states that a settlement negotiated between the parties ‘will resolve the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967’.  
Some also argue that Israel’s ‘disengagement’ from the Gaza Strip in 2005 terminated the regime of 
occupation there. As shall be shown in the next section, this is not the case. 
 
4. Continuing occupation of the Gaza Strip 
In August-September 2005, Israel evacuated its settlements and withdrew its land forces from the 
Gaza Strip. This was in accordance with its Revised Disengagement Plan of 6 June 2004,293 whose 
implementation was intended to ensure that: 
In any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and villages in the 
Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be 
part of the State of Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and 
villages, security areas and other places of special interest to Israel.294 
Israel then claimed that it no longer had permanently stationed forces in the territory,295 
From this point on, the full responsibility for events occurring in the Gaza Strip and for 
thwarting terror attacks against Israeli targets will be in the hands of the Palestinian Authority 
and its apparatuses.296 
On 12 September 2005, IDF Chief of Southern Command Major-General Dan Harel issued a decree 
ending military rule in Gaza by annulling the 6 June 1967 proclamation that originally instituted 
military rule.297 Subsequently, the Israeli Security Cabinet attempted to further the claim that the Gaza 
Strip was not occupied territory by declaring it a ‘hostile territory’ on 19 September 2007.  
The view that Israel had relinquished control and responsibility regarding the Gaza Strip and its 
population was endorsed by Israel’s High Court of Justice in its January 2008 decision in Jaber al 
Bassouini Ahmed et al v. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, in which the petitioners challenged 
Israel’s restrictions on the supply of electricity and gas to the territory. In this decision, the Court 
relied on the Government of Israel’s assertion that it was no longer in effective control of the Gaza 
Strip and thus no longer held it under occupation. The Court ruled: 
… since September 2005, Israel no longer has effective control over the events in the Gaza 
Strip. The military government that had applied to that area was annulled in a government 
                                                                                                                                                  
light of the temporal stipulation – a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005 
– as mentioned in the Roadmap, the Quartet (the EU, the UN, Russia and the US) launched the Annapolis 
process on 27 November 2007 to restart the moribund peace negotiations.  On 16 December 2008, the Security 
Council declared its support for the negotiations initiated at Annapolis and ‘its commitment to the irreversibility 
of the bilateral negotiations’. See Security Council resolution 1850, 16 December 2008.  
293  See ‘The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan: Addendum A - Revised Disengagement 
Plan – Main Principles’ and ‘Addendum B – Format of the Preparatory Work for the Revised Disengagement 
Plan’  (6 June 2004), available at: 
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm.  
294  Revised Disengagement Plan, Section 1 (Political and Security Implications), Principle Three. In his 
separate opinion appended to the Wall Advisory Opinion, Judge Elaraby stated that the Disengagement Plan’s 
claim that parts of the West Bank would become ‘part of the State of Israel’ was relevant in assessing the 
legality of the wall, as this demonstrated a clear intent to annex those areas in breach of international law. See 
the separate opinion of Judge Elaraby, ICJ Rep (2004), 246 at 253-254, para. 2.5. 
295  Revised Disengagement Plan, Section 2.A (Main Elements: The Process), Article 3(1), The Gaza Strip. 
296  IDF Spokesman, Declaration regarding end of military rule in Gaza Strip (12 September 2005), available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2005/Exit+of+IDF+Forces+from+the+Gaza+Strip+co
mpleted+12-Sep-2005.htm.  
297 IDF, Declaration regarding end of military rule in Gaza Strip (12 September 2005). 
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decision, and Israeli soldiers are not in the area on a permanent basis, nor are they managing 
affairs there. In such circumstances, the State of Israel does not have a general duty to look 
after the welfare of the residents of the Strip or to maintain public order within the Gaza Strip 
pursuant to the entirety of the Law of Belligerent Occupation in International Law. Nor does 
Israel have effective capability, in its present status, to enforce order and manage civilian life 
in the Gaza Strip. In the circumstances which have been created, the main duties of the State 
of Israel relating to the residents of the Gaza Strip are derived from the situation of armed 
conflict that exists between it and the Hamas organization controlling the Gaza Strip; these 
duties also stem from the extent of the State of Israel's control over the border crossings 
between it and the Gaza Strip, as well as from the relations which has been created between 
Israel and the territory of the Gaza Strip after the years of Israeli military rule in the area, as a 
result of which the Gaza Strip has now become almost completely dependent upon supply of 
electricity by Israel.298 
Similarly, some commentators have contrasted the degree of physical control exercised by Israel and 
by the Palestinian Authority (or Hamas) within the territorial confines of the Gaza Strip to conclude 
that Israel is no longer the occupant.299 This view is rooted in the traditional law of land warfare and 
essentially asserts that: 
some form of military presence on land remains a necessary condition for an occupation, i.e. a 
military occupation cannot be solely imposed by the control of the national airspace by a 
foreign air force...or of the national seashore by a foreign navy. The law of occupation 
belongs historically to the law of land warfare which requires, at its core, a land-based 
security presence.300 
Because the Gaza Strip is part of a self-determination unit, it must be questioned whether a unilateral 
assertion about its status by one party to the conflict is sufficient. An impartial determination, through 
the application of international law, would seem necessary, as observing the right to self-
determination is an obligation owed to the international community as a whole. At the conference that 
adopted the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the majority of participating 
States agreed that international humanitarian law could not be isolated and autonomous but had to 
operate in the context of general international law. International humanitarian law must adapt to 
conform with the principle expounded by the ICJ in the Namibia advisory opinion301 that ‘an 
                                               
298 Jaber al Bassouini Ahmed et al v. Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, HCJ 9132/07, delivered 30 
January 2008, opinion of President Beinisch, para. 12, available at: www.adalah.org/eng/gaza%20report.html.   
For commentary, see Y. Shany, ‘The law applicable to non-occupied Gaza’, paper delivered at the 
Complementing IHL: exploring the need for additional norms to govern contemporary conflict situations 
conference (Jerusalem, 1-3 June 2008), available at: 
http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Shany_The_Law_Applicable_to_gaza.pdf.   
299 For instance, Y. Shany, ‘Faraway, so close: the legal status of Gaza after Israel’s disengagement’ (2006) 8 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 369, and his ‘Binary law meets complex reality: the occupation of 
Gaza debate’ (2008) 41 Israel Law Review 68. See also Bruderlein, Legal aspects of Israel’s disengagement 
plan;  E. Benvenisti, ‘The law on the unilateral termination of occupation’, in A. Zimmermannand, T. Giegerich 
(eds.), Veröffentlichungen des Walther-Schücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel 
(forthcoming, 2009); A. Bockel, ‘Le retrait israelien de Gaza et ses consequences sur le droit international’ 
(2005) 51 Annuaire francais de droit international 16; M.S. Kaliser, ‘A modern day exodus: international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law implications of Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip’ 
(2007) 17 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 187; M. Mari, ‘The Israeli disengagement from 
the Gaza Strip: an end of the occupation?’(2005) 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 356; and I. 
Scobbie, ‘An intimate disengagement: Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the law of occupation and of self-
determination’ (2004-2005) 11 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 3, reprinted in V. Kattan (ed.), The 
Palestine question in international law (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008) 
p. 637. 
300  Bruderlein, Legal aspects of Israel’s disengagement plan, p. 9. 
301  See Y. Sandoz et al (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 1987), pp. 51-52. 
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international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the overall framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’.302 It therefore appears inadequate, if not 
illegitimate, to consider the question of the status of the Gaza Strip only within the narrow and 
essentially bilateral confines of the law of armed conflict. 
Before the implementation of the Revised Disengagement Plan, the Gaza Strip manifestly was 
territory occupied by Israel. Anticipating Israel’s implementation of the Revised Disengagement Plan, 
the Canadian Government’s International Development Research Centre commissioned a report—the 
Aronson Report303—to examine the implications of disengagement. The Aronson Report noted that 
when then-Prime Minister Sharon initially announced the unilateral withdrawal plan in April 2004, 
one declared objective was to end Israel’s role and responsibility as the occupying power in Gaza. In 
particular, the original plan provided that ‘no permanent Israeli civilian or military presence’ would 
remain in the evacuated areas and accordingly there would ‘be no basis for the claim that the Gaza 
Strip is occupied territory’.304 This express reference to Gaza as ‘occupied territory’ was deleted in the 
6 June 2004 Revised Disengagement Plan, however, which was approved by the Cabinet. The 
Revised Disengagement Plan provides only that: 
The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel’s responsibility for 
the Palestinians within the Gaza Strip. 
The meaning of Principle Six is intentionally ambiguous: it refers to the termination of Israel’s 
responsibility for the population of the Gaza Strip, but says nothing about the status of the territory 
itself.  
The Aronson Report argues that one of the reasons for this deletion was that the Israeli Cabinet had 
received legal advice to the effect that any claim regarding the end of occupation could not be 
maintained while Israel remained in control of the Philadelphi corridor (the Salah al Din border road), 
essentially a buffer zone along the Egypt/Gaza border, and arguably also ports and airports. Retaining 
control of these areas was seen as enough to give Israel de facto control over the territory and thus 
maintain the occupation.305 In the event, Israel reached an agreement with Egypt which took over 
security functions in the Philadelphi Corridor.306  
Still, in accordance the Revised Disengagement Plan,307 Israel remains in effective control of Gaza’s 
airspace and maritime zones:  
despite the withdrawal of its troops and citizens from Gaza and the formal abrogation of 
military rule, Israel continues to exercise considerable influence over life in the Gaza Strip: 
the IDF controls the airspace and territorial waters of Gaza; it governs the passage of persons 
and goods into Gaza from Israel (and the West Bank) and indirectly monitors passage in the 
Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt. In addition, Israel has not yet surrendered to the 
                                               
302  Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep (1971), 16 at 31, para. 53. 
303  A ‘lightly edited version’ of this report has been published as G. Aronson, ‘Issues arising from the 
implementation of Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip’ (2005) 34 Journal of Palestine Studies 49. 
304  Available at: http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments/264.shtml; and also  
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Disengagement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm.  
305  Aronson, ‘Issues arising’ 49-50. See also S. Roy, ‘Praying with their eyes closed: reflections on the 
disengagement from Gaza’ (2005) 34 Journal of Palestine Studies 64 at 70. 
306  For an account of the basic principles of the Israel-Egypt ‘military arrangement’ on the deployment of 
Egyptian border guards on the Egyptian side of the corridor, see the Israeli Cabinet Communique of 28 August 
2005, available at: www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2005/Cabinet+Communique+28-Aug-
2005.htm.  
307  Sub-section One.1 of Section 3 (Security Situation following the Relocation) provides: ‘The State of Israel 
will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive 
authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza 
Strip.’  
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Palestinian Authority the Strip’s population registration records and has not yet agreed to the 
opening of Gaza’s seaport and airport.308 
In December 2004, Shavit Matias, deputy to Israel’s Attorney-General for international law, argued 
that Israel’s control over sea and air ports did not affect the territory’s status:  
When we quit Philadelphi, even if the Palestinians don’t yet have a port or airport, the 
responsibility will no longer be ours. The area will not be considered occupied territory. 
When the Palestinians have a crossing to Egypt and additional options for transferring 
merchandise, even if there is no port yet, we have no responsibility.309 
Commentators are divided on the accuracy of claims like this. Some, such as Aronson, argue that 
because Israel retains a ‘security envelope’ around the Gaza Strip, controlling who and what goes in 
and out of the territory, disengagement did not terminate occupation.310 Israel controls and monitors 
what goods are allowed into and out of Gaza and collects duties and VAT, based on Israel’s rates, on 
behalf of the Palestinian Authority’.311 Passage through the Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip 
and Egypt is regulated by an agreement concluded between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, 
subject to an annexed statement of principles, and under the supervision of the European Union 
Border Assistance Mission.312  
In contrast stand the views of, for example, Bruderlein, Shany, and the Israeli High Court, which 
emphasise the nature of effective control, as derived from the traditional law of land warfare.313 This 
latter view is rather formalistic. The issue is not one of creating an occupation, which as a practical 
matter would appear to require the use of ground forces to create and maintain control,314 but rather of 
determining whether an existing occupation has been terminated. Termination of occupation could 
well involve considerations other than the formalistic assertion that occupation ends when the 
occupant withdraws from a territory, whether voluntarily or by force of arms. As Roberts counsels: 
                                               
308 Shany, ‘Faraway, so close’, p. 373.  For more detail, see Gisha–Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, 
Disengaged occupiers: the legal status of Gaza (Tel Aviv: Gisha, 2007), Chapter 3. 
309  See Aronson, ‘Issues arising’ 51. 
310 Aronson, ‘Issues arising’ 51-53.  See also Gisha–Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Disengaged 
occupiers, and Scobbie, ‘Intimate disengagement’.  
311   Gisha–Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Disengaged occupiers, 54-55. 
312  The instruments dealing with the Rafah crossing include: the Israel-PA Agreement on Movement and 
Access, annexed Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing (15 November 2005) and Agreed Arrangement on the 
European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egyptian Border (23 
November 2005, concluded at the invitation of Israel and the Palestinian Authority): available at: www.nad-
plo.org/listing.php?view=palisraeli_roadagree; and at: 
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+
from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm.   See also the EU Council press release 15011/05 (Presse 322) which 
gives an account of the mission of the Border Assistance Mission, available at: 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st15/st15011.en05.pdf.  
313 See Bruderlein, Legal aspects of Israel’s disengagement plan; Shany, ‘Faraway, so close’; and Jaber al 
Bassouini Ahmed et al v. Prime Minister and Minister of Defense HCJ 9132/07, opinion of President Beinisch, 
para. 12. 
314 Von Glahn raises the hypothesis of an occupation being created through control of a territory’s airspace: 
‘Since international law does not contain a rule prescribing the military arm through which an effective 
belligerent occupation is to be exercised, it might be theoretically possible to maintain necessary control through 
the occupant’s air force alone’.  Nevertheless he comments that the practical problems which would arise in this 
type of occupation ‘would seem to rule out such an experiment’.  See G. von Glahn, The occupation of enemy 
territory: a commentary on the law and practice of belligerent occupation (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 28-29. 
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the withdrawal of occupying forces is not the sole criterion of the ending of an occupation; 
and the occupant has not necessarily withdrawn at the end of all occupations.315  
By what criteria should an occupation be deemed to have ended? In the governing legal instruments, 
the conditions required to end an occupation are not as clearly delineated as those which determine 
whether and when an occupation has been established. As von Glahn comments, ‘most books on 
international law make little mention of the intricate and numerous problems arising at the end 
of...military occupation’.316 Traditionally, the test for the termination of an occupation was seen as a 
simple question of fact: ‘Occupation comes to an end when an occupant withdraws from a territory, or 
is driven out of it’:317 
the moment the invader voluntarily evacuates [occupied] territory, or is driven away by a 
levée en masse, or by troops of the other belligerent, or of his ally, the former condition of 
things ipso facto revives. The territory and individuals affected are at once, so far as 
International Law is concerned, considered again to be under the sway of their legitimate 
sovereign. For all events of international importance taking place on such territory the 
legitimate sovereign is again responsible towards third States, whereas during the period of 
occupation the occupant was responsible.318 
This test has become anachronistic. For one thing, it is inadequate for addressing contemporary 
practices: for instance, it does not account for termination of an occupation under the auspices of the 
Security Council, as occurred in Iraq.319 For another, it reflects a century-old view of the nature of 
warfare set out in the 1907 Hague Regulations, when the occupation of territory depended on the 
physical presence of troops on the ground. Apart from dropping bombs from balloons,320 aerial 
warfare did not then exist, nor did remote surveillance technology. In contemporary conditions the 
importance of air power was stressed by Major General Amos Yadlin, an Israeli air force officer, in 
2004 after he became head of Israeli military intelligence. He stated:  
Our vision of air control zeroes in on the notion of control. We’re looking at how you control 
a city or a territory from the air when it’s no longer legitimate to hold or occupy that territory 
on the ground.321 
                                               
315 A. Roberts, ‘The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 27 
at 28. 
316 Von Glahn, Occupation of enemy territory, p. 257. 
317  L. Oppenheim, International law: a treatise. Vol. II: Disputes, war and neutrality (London: Longmans, 
1952, 7th edition by H. Lauterpacht), p. 436. See also W. Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Factors in war to peace 
transitions’ (2003-2004) 27 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 843 at 845—‘The end of an occupation 
is a question of fact.  It will be brought about by any loss of authority over the territory in question’. 
318 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law,  p. 618. 
319. See Security Council resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), reproduced (2004) 43 International Legal Materials 
1459; and also A. Carcano, ‘End of occupation in 2004? The status of the multinational force in Iraq after the 
transfer of sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 41; C. 
McCarthy, ‘The paradox of the international law of military operations: sovereignty and the reformation of Iraq’ 
(2005) 10 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 43; and Roberts, ‘End of occupation’, n.155.  For critical 
accounts of the conduct of the occupation of Iraq, see E. Afsha, ‘Limits and limitations of power: the continued 
relevance of occupation law’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 563, available at: www.germanlawjournal.com; and 
G. H. Fox, ‘The occupation of Iraq’ (2005) 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 195. 
320. On the same day, 18 October 1907, that the Hague Peace Conference adopted its various conventions, it also 
promulgated Declaration XIV prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons.  This 
prohibited ‘the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar 
nature’.  Although technically still in force, this Declaration has few parties and has been rendered obsolete by 
subsequent practice. 
321. Quoted in D. Li, ‘The Gaza Strip as laboratory: notes in the wake of disengagement’ (2006) 35 Journal of 
Palestine Studies 38 at 48. 
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In the circumstances of Gaza, to consider only Israel’s withdrawal of ground troops in isolation is to 
ignore the wider normative and practical context. During the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, the 
view was expressed that in prolonged occupations there could be a gradual transfer of powers to the 
administrative departments of the occupied power without altering the fact of occupation.322  
Otherwise, it is possible that, even within the narrow confines of the law of armed conflict, Israel’s 
redeployment of permanent troops outside the borders of the Gaza Strip has not, in itself, terminated 
occupation. Benvenisti points out that Article 42 of the Hague Regulations is ambiguous as to whether 
the test of control it embodies is that of actual or potential control of the territory concerned.323 
Similarly Bruderlein cites the Tsemel case, heard before the Israeli High Court, which held that 
occupation forces do not need to be in actual control of all the territory and population, but simply 
have the potential capability to do so.324 This ruling is in accordance with the decision in the post-
World War II List case and also with the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the List case, the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, when 
considering the effect of resistance to occupation, ruled: 
While it is true that the partisans were able to control sections of these countries [Greece, 
Yugoslavia and Norway] at various times, it is established that the Germans could at any time 
they desired assume physical control of any part of the country. The control of the resistance 
forces was temporary only and did not deprive the German Armed Forces of its status of an 
occupant.325 
The view that effective occupation could lie in the capacity to assert control was also affirmed by the 
ICTY in Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic where it ruled that one of the guidelines to determine 
whether an occupation was established was whether ‘the occupying power has a sufficient force 
present, or the capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to make the authority of the occupying 
power felt’.326 Although Benvenisti concludes that, even employing the more stringent potential 
control test, the Gaza Strip is no longer occupied,327 other factors must cast doubt on this.  
Airspace and the territorial sea form part of a State’s territory. As envisaged in the Disengagement 
Plan, Israel is manifestly exercising governmental authority in these areas of Gaza. As a result, when 
we take into account the view that territory may be controlled from the air, it is clear that Israel’s 
withdrawal of land forces did not terminate occupation. This view is reinforced when we consider the 
ease with which Israeli land forces have re-entered Gaza on numerous occasions since 
‘disengagement’: for example, in June 2006 in ‘Operation Summer Rain’ and in December 2008-
January 2009 during ‘Operation Cast Lead’. To use the List formula, Israel has demonstrated that it 
                                               
322. See Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, pp. 62-63; for the travaux, see Final record of the 
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (Berne: Federal Political Department, 1949), Vol.II A, pp. 623-625, 
775-776 and 815-816, and Vol. II B, pp. 386-388.  See also Section III.3.c-d above on agreements made under 
Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, but compare Y. Dinstein, ‘The international legal status’. 
323 See Benvenisti, ‘Unilateral termination’, especially text to n.10, and text following n. 17. 
324  See Bruderlein, Legal aspects of Israel’s disengagement plan, p. 9 n. 14.  Tsemel v. Minister of Defence, 
HCJ 102/82, 37(3) Piskei Din 365; also cited employing a more extended quotation in Y. Lein, One big prison: 
freedom of movement to and from the Gaza Strip on the eve of the Disengagement Plan (Jerusalem: 
B’Tselem/HaMoked, 2005), pp. 73-74, available at: www.hamoked.org.il/items/12800_eng.pdf.  Tsemel is 
summarised in (1983) 13 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 360: see 362-363 in particular.  
325  See Trial of Wilhelm List and others (the Hostages trial), VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 34 
(1949), 55-56, quotation at 56. 
326  Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No.IT-98-34-T (trial judgment, 31 March 2003), available at: 
www.un.org/icty/naletilic/trialc/judgement/nal-tj030331-e.pdf, 74, para. 217.  In support of this ruling, the Trial 
Chamber cited as authority the United Kingdom’s Manual of military law of war on land, Part III, paras. 502 
and 506 (1958); the United States’ The law of land warfare: Field manual No.27-10, Chapter 6, para. 356 
(1956); and the New Zealand Defence Force’s, Interim law of armed conflict manual, paras. 1302(2), 1302(3) 
and 1302(5) (1992). 
327  Benvenisti, ‘Unilateral termination’, text to n.33. 
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‘could at any time [it] desired assume physical control of any part of the country’. These factors 
indicate that Israel did not relinquish control of Gaza in August 2005, but simply withdrew, or 
redeployed, the most visible aspect of its control—the stationing of troops within Gaza. 
This, however, is a transactional analysis, detached from the wider context of international law. 
Disengagement concerns a possible change in the international status of territory. Hence the principle 
of self-determination must play a significant role in the legal appraisal of disengagement, particularly 
in evaluating the implications for third States and international organisations. 
Israel and the PLO have agreed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip form ‘a single territorial unit’ 
whose integrity is to be preserved pending the conclusion of permanent status negotiations.328 Relying 
on the Interim Agreement, the Israeli High Court of Justice has affirmed Israel’s recognition of the 
unity of the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit.329 Therefore, Gaza alone cannot exercise a 
right of self-determination because that right belongs to the Palestinian population of the territorial 
self-determination unit as a whole, which comprises the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as well 
as the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Israel’s control over Gaza in relation to the transfer of goods, the levying 
of duties and VAT, and the control of the fuel and electricity supply would appear to deny the 
population the economic aspects of self-determination, as Gaza is unable to exercise ‘the right freely 
to determine, without external interference, [its] political status and to pursue [its] economic, social 
and cultural development’.330  
If it is correct to conclude that Israel’s unilateral attempt to change the international status of the Gaza 
Strip is in breach of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, then other States have a duty 
not to endorse the result Israel seeks to achieve. Even if self-determination is regarded only as an 
obligation erga omnes, as opposed to a jus cogens norm, then its breach entails a duty of non-
recognition for third States.331 Further, in its commentary on Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention regarding the conditions under which the Convention ceases to apply, the ICRC indicated 
that where a termination of occupation involves a change in the international status of the occupied 
territory: 
The Convention could only cease to apply as the result of a political act, such as the 
annexation of the territory or its incorporation in a federation, and then only if the political act 
in question had been recognized and accepted by the community of States; if it were not so 
recognized and accepted, the provisions of the Convention must continue to be applied.332 
Non-recognition of any change in the status of the Gaza Strip is thus doubly mandated.  
 
5. Israeli Settlements in the OPT  
Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention declares that ‘[t]he Occupying Power shall not deport 
or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies’. 333 The commentary to the 
                                               
328 See Declaration of Principles, Article IV; and Interim Agreement, Article XI.1; for commentary, see 
Shehadeh, From occupation to Interim Accords, pp. 35-37.  The question of Jerusalem is, of course, a matter 
reserved for the permanent status negotiations: see the Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Understanding in relation to Article IV; and 1995 Interim Agreement, 
Articles XVII.1 and XXXI.5. 
329  Ajuri v. IDF Commander, HCJ 7015/02 (3 September 2002), [2002] Isr LR 1, opinion of President Barak, 
17-18, para. 22.  See also Y. Lein, One Big Prison, pp. 20-21, who notes, inter alia, that Israel incorporated the 
Interim Agreement in its entirety into its military legislation in both the West Bank and Gaza, and that this 
legislation has not been revoked. 
330  General Assembly Resolution 2625. 
331  Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep (2004, 200, para. 159. 
332  Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 63. 
333For the avoidance of any doubt, even according to the highly controversial ruling of the ICJ in the Advisory 
Opinion on the Wall, about the cessation of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention after the general 
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Convention affirms that this clause was intended ‘to prevent a practice adopted during the Second 
World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied 
territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such 
transfers worsened the economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate 
existence as a race.’ 334 Prohibition of the transfer of settlers to occupied territory was confirmed as an 
international crime in 1998 by its inclusion as Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court as the war crime of ‘transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying 
Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or 
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory.’ 335 
 
a. Status of settlements under international humanitarian law 
The establishment of Jewish settlements336 in the OPT started immediately after the 1967 war337 and 
was formally declared a government agenda in 1977.338 The violations of Palestinian rights inherent in 
this practice derive from a discriminatory policy to channel resources (land, water) and financial and 
legal privileges to Jewish settlers at the expense and dispossession of the Palestinian residents.339 A 
fundamental tenet of the international law of belligerent occupation, resting on the pillar that 
occupation is intended to be only a temporary situation, is that the occupying power is prohibited from 
altering the status of an occupied territory. By contrast, the aim of the settlements in the OPT is to 
                                                                                                                                                  
close of military operations, Article 49(6) survives the one year time limit on application of certain provisions in 
the Convention in occupied territory laid down in Article 6(3), See A. Imseis, ‘Critical Reflections on the 
International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall’ (2005) 99 American Journal 
of International Law 102 at 106. 
334 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 276. 
335 On the difference between Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the 
Rome Statute see D. Kretzmer, ‘Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory: The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law’ 99 
American Journal of International Law 88 at 91. Kretzmer takes a view that the broadening of Article 49(6) in 
the Rome Statute by the addition the words ‘directly or indirectly’, indicates that not all measures taken to bring 
about a transfer are included in Article 49(6) itself; See also the Wall advisory opinion, para. 135. 
336 Settlements are defined as organised communities of Israeli civilians established on land in the OPT with the 
approval and direct or indirect support of the Israeli government. Apart from a few exceptions in East Jerusalem, 
residence in these communities is not open to Palestinians but only to Israeli citizens and to persons of Jewish 
descent entitled to Israeli citizenship or residency under Israel’s Law of Return. There are 149 settlements in the 
West Bank, excluding settlement ‘outposts,’ which are established, generally by ideological or religious Israeli 
settlers, without the authorisation of the government of Israel, and of which there are now over 100 in the West 
Bank                                                                                
337Between 1967 and 1979, Israel established altogether 133 settlements in the Arab occupied territories, 
including 79 in the West Bank and seven in the Gaza Strip. See the report of the Security Council Commission 
established under Resolution 446 (1979), available at: 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/2f86ce183126001f85256cef0073ccce/9785bb5ef44772dd85256436006c9
c85!OpenDocument 
338The government of Menachem Begin government, which came to power in 1977, regarded settlement of Jews 
in all parts of the historic land of Israel as a fundamental part of its policy. See C. Jackson, ‘Israeli West Bank 
Settlements, the Reagan Administration's Policy towards the Middle East and International Law’ 79 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 217 at 226. 
339 See Al-Haq, The Israeli Settlements from the Perspective of International Law (2000), available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/The%20Israeli%20Settlements%20from%20the%20Perspective%20of%20Internatio
nal%20Law.pdf. See also B'Tselem, Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories as a Violation of Human 
Rights: Legal and Conceptual Aspects (March 1997), available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199703_Settlements_Eng.rtf.   
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create facts that will predetermine the outcome of any political negotiations by making Israeli 
withdrawal from the settled parts of the territories unfeasible.340 
Although Israel is party to the Geneva Conventions, it disputes the applicability de jure of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention in the OPT, on several grounds that have been rejected by the ICJ, as discussed 
previously. Nonetheless, Israel argues that even if the Convention applies, its actions are not in breach 
of Article 49(6). The Israeli government, in defending the legality of the settlements, attempts to 
argue that Article 49(6) only prohibits forcible transfer of the population of the occupying power into 
occupied territory, and consequently does not concern voluntary or induced migration.341On this basis, 
Israel concludes, the settlements in the OPT are not illegal. However, nowhere does the relevant 
provision restrict its scope to forced population movement. Indeed, it specifically uses the unqualified 
term ‘transfer’ as opposed to ‘forcible transfer’ as found in Article 49(1), which prohibits the forcible 
transfer of protected persons from occupied territory. To this end, the ICJ has confirmed that Article 
49(6) ‘prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population…but also any measures taken 
by an occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into 
the occupied territory’.342 Accordingly, the ICJ resolutely concluded that ‘the Israeli settlements in the 
OPT (including East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law’.343 Similar 
conclusions have been reached by the UN Security Council344 and General Assembly,345 the High 
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions,346 the authoritative ICRC study on customary 
international humanitarian law,347 as well as the majority of legal scholars.348 
 
b. Legal status of the settlers 
As discussed above, Israel cannot invoke international law to authorise Jewish settlement in the OPT. 
Nor can it cast responsibility on the settlers themselves. Under international humanitarian law, 
responsibility for breaching the prohibition for transferring part of the occupant's civilian population 
into the territory under occupation is on the occupying power and not upon the individuals transferred. 
Some provisions of international humanitarian law apply to all individuals in occupied territories 
without distinction (see Articles 13-26 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). The duties and powers of 
the military commander differ, however, in relation to ‘protected persons’, as this group is defined in 
Article 4, and to others who are not protected. Israeli settlers do not come within the definition of 
                                               
340 See D. Kretzmer, The occupation of justice: the Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2002). See also Gorenberg, Accidental Empire. 
341  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Israeli Settlements and International Law,' May 2001, available at: 
http://tinyurl.com/2jlgb3.  
342 See Wall Advisory Opinion, para. 120.    
343 Ibid. 
344 See, for example, Resolution 465 (1980) in which the Security Council ‘Determines that all measures taken 
by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no 
legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those 
territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East’. See also Security Council Resolutions 446, 452, and 471. 
345 General Assembly Resolution 62/108 of 10 January 2008 is one of dozens of resolutions to this effect. 
346 See Declaration of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 5 December 2001. The 
High Contracting Parties are those States which have ratified and are bound by the Geneva Conventions. 
347 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law – Volume I: 
Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 457. 
348See, for example, Kretzmer ‘The Light Treatment’ at 89. 
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‘protected persons’ as they are nationals of the occupying power. Palestinians does fall into the 
category of protected persons as they are ‘in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power 
of which they are not nationals’.349 Yet the trend of the Israeli High Court in such cases is to impede 
Palestinian rights for the benefit of Jewish settlers350 by disregarding the fact that the very existence of 
the settlers impedes public order and civil life and constitutes a breach of the laws of occupation.351  
Such disregard for the special protection granted to protected persons is incompatible with the object 
and purpose of international humanitarian law,352 in particular, in enabling the infringement of 
protected persons' rights in favour of the occupying power’s nationals.353 The lex specialis norms of 
international humanitarian law354 hold that the rights of protected persons cannot generally be 
restricted, and that any exceptional restriction may only be in accordance with the limitation clauses 
in the relevant provisions. 
These basic principles have been distorted by Israel’s High Court of Justice, enabling the military 
commander to infringe upon Palestinian rights for the benefit of the settlers. First, the High Court 
determined that the military commander's general authority set out in Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations is not restricted to the persons protected under international humanitarian law. Rather, it 
is a general authority, covering any person present in the territory held under belligerent occupation:  
Indeed, in exercising his authority pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation, 
the military commander must ‘ensure the public order and safety.’ In this 
framework, he must consider, on the one hand, considerations of state security, 
security of the army, and the personal security of all who are present in the area. 
On the other hand, he must consider the human rights of the local Arab 
population’355  
Second, the High Court has refused to consider whether settlements are illegal under international 
law, holding that such an issue is political, and thus not justiciable, but rather a matter for the 
executive to decide. The High Court has further held that the rights of protected persons in the OPT 
are not absolute, but relative: ‘They can be restricted …. Some of the limitations stem from the need 
to take rights of other people into account. Some of the limitations stem from the public interest …’356  
                                               
349 See Mara'abe et al v. The Prime Minister of Israel et al, HCJ 7957/04, para. 18. 
350See Hess v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, HCJ 10356/02, 58 (3) P.D. 443. For an 
extensive overview of this trend see Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice.   
351See O Ben-Naftali, A.M. Gross and K. Michaeli, ‘Illegal occupation: framing the occupied Palestinian 
territory’, (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law 551 at 596 and Kretzmer, ‘The Occupation of 
Justice’.  
352See Articles 30–31 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, (1969), 1155 UNTS 331. 
353 See Articles 43, 48, 49, 55 of the Hague Regulations and para. 88 of the Wall Advisory Opinion. See also 
Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, p. 6, and ‘Illegal Occupation’, p. 21–36, A. Roberts, ‘What Is 
a Military Occupation?’ (1984) 55 British Yearbook of International Law 249 at 293-295; A. Wilson, ‘The Laws 
of War in Occupied Territories’ (1933) 18 Transactions Grotious Society 17 at 38. 
354 Compare with articles 13-26 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which apply humanitarian norms to every 
individual happens to be in the cccupied territory. For comprehensive discussion on the lex specialis doctrine 
applied by the ICJ, see O. Ben-Naftali and Y. Shany, ‘Living in denial: the application of human rights in the 
Occupied Territories’ (2003-04) 37 Israel Law Review at 17-118. For general discussion of the interplay 
between international humanitarian and human rights law, see F. Hampson and I. Salama, ‘Working Paper on 
the Relationship Between Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’, UN Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14,  21 June 2005. 
355 Mara'abe case, para. 28. 
356 Ibid., para. 25. 
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By confirming that the Military Commander must take into account considerations that are prohibited 
by the laws of occupation, the High Court legitimised the military commander's deviation from his 
authority and duties under international humanitarian law.  
According to the objects and purposes of the laws of occupation, the military commander must act in 
the best interest of the local population except where prevented from doing so by military necessity. 
Thus, Article 43 cannot afford settlers status equal to that afforded to protected persons under 
international humanitarian law. They enjoy, at most, the protection accorded to aliens in occupied 
territories (section II of the Fourth Geneva Convention). The rights of the settlers are to be tied to, and 
limited by, the specific obligations included in the humanitarian law of military occupation, which 
restrict the permissible actions of the occupying power357 and prohibit any attempts to change the 
nature of the occupied territory, either de jure or de facto through the creation of permanent ‘facts on 
the ground’.  
 
c. The jurisprudence of Israel’s High Court regarding settlements 
Long before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip began, the Israeli courts had adopted the 
dualist common law approach to the enforcement of international law in domestic courts.358 Rules of 
customary international law are regarded as part of the domestic law and as such are applied in 
domestic courts unless they contradict an act of parliament. Rules contained in treaties must be 
explicitly incorporated into domestic law by an act of parliament in order to apply and be applied by 
domestic courts. The laws of occupation prohibiting the establishment of civilian settlements in 
occupied territory, having acquired customary law status, are thus theoretically enforceable in Israeli 
courts.  
Israel’s High Court of Justice has considered petitions submitted by Palestinians regarding the legality 
of Israeli actions in the OPT,359 but has avoided dealing with the lawfulness of the settlements, ruling 
that general arguments relating to the legality of settlements are not justiciable.360 Moreover, the High 
Court has refused to regard the Fourth Geneva Convention as part of customary international law361 
and thus has exempted itself from expressing its opinion regarding the application of Article 49(6). 
While the High Court has thereby refrained from providing the state with explicit legitimisation for 
the settlement policy and from confirming its compatibility with the Fourth Geneva Convention,362 its 
decisions have, however, effectively supported the settlement project on various grounds. 
 The principles that have guided the High Court in these questions were first established in 1972 in the 
Helou case363 regarding Rafah, an area separating the Gaza Strip from the Egyptian Sinai. In this case, 
the High Court ruled that it was necessary for the purposes of security to evict the Bedouin inhabitants 
from their places of residence, even though the same land on which they were living was designated 
for Jewish settlement. In the decision, Judge Witkon stated: 
Clearly the fact that these same lands are in part or in full designated for Jewish settlement 
does not deny the security nature of the entire operation. The stated security considerations as 
                                               
357 See H. Krieger, ‘A Conflict of Norms: the Relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
in the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 265-291 at 284 
358 See R. Lapidot, ‘Public International Law’, in Forty Years of Israeli Law (Jerusalem: Harry Sacher institute 
for legislative research and comparative law, 1990), p. 807.  
359 For discussion over the Supreme Court jurisdiction to examine the legality of the Israeli army in the OPT see 
Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, Chapter One: Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Substantive Norms, pp. 19-
29. 
360 See Bargil v. Government of Israel, HCJ 4481/91, 47 (4) PD 210, 216.  
361 See, for example, Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 606/78, (1978) 33 (2) PD 113. 
362 See Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, p. 44.  
363 Abu Helou and others v. Government of Israel, HCJ 302/72, (1972) 27(2) PD 169. 
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reviewed and detailed in my honourable colleague's opinion, were not refuted, or imaginary, 
nor meant to camouflage other considerations. General Tal stated himself that the entire area 
(or part of it) is designated to be settled by Jews, which in this case constitutes a security 
measure.364 
This opinion paved the way for the establishment of settlements under the guise of military or security 
needs. In 1978, in the Beit El case,365 private land was requisitioned from Palestinian landowners on 
the pretext of military necessity and then consigned to civilian Jewish settlement in accordance with 
the Israeli military’s strategic regional defence plan.366 In this case, the High Court rejected the 
distinction between the needs of the occupying army and general security interests: 
… in our opinion, these distinctions hold no merit. As I have just stated, the current state is a 
state of combat, and the occupying power is responsible for ensuring public order in the 
occupied territory. It must also address the dangers presented from within the territory to itself 
and to the [occupying] state. The fighting nowadays has taken the form of sabotage actions, 
and even those who consider these actions (which affect innocent civilians), a form of 
guerrilla war-fare, admit that the occupying power is authorized, and even obligated to take 
all necessary measures to prevent them. The military aspect and the security aspect are 
therefore one and the same.367  
These two decisions provided the Israeli authorities with the legal basis for including political and 
other state interests in military considerations. Benvenisti has pointed out that this broad view of 
security imperatives paved the way for a policy of implanting settlements in ways incompatible with 
the occupying power's fundamental duty not to use the occupation as a means of acquiring territory by 
force.368  
In 1979, however, in the Elon Moreh case,369 the High Court deviated from the Beit El decision by 
confining ‘military needs’ to needs based on a rational, military-strategic analysis of the dangers faced 
by the state, and the measures needed to counter them, rather than ideological goals or outlook: ‘the 
military needs in that article cannot include, according to any reasonable interpretation, the national 
security needs in their wide meaning’.370 The factual record revealed that, under pressure from the 
militant Gush Emunim settlers' movement, the government, rather than the military authorities, had 
initiated establishment of the settlement. The High Court was convinced that, even if the military 
supported the decision for military reasons, the dominant consideration had been political. Therefore, 
the High Court held that the requisition order was invalid since the military cannot take such action on 
political grounds and, under international customary law, land in occupied territory can be 
requisitioned only for military needs.371  
                                               
364 Ibid., at 181, unofficial translation. 
365 Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 606/78, (1978) 33 (2) PD 113 (Beit El case). 
366 See the Beit El case. The court has also rejected the argument that the establishment of a civilian settlement 
can not be regarded as temporary use of the land accepting the governments' statement that the settlement will 
exist only as long as the army holds the land, subject to international negotiations which will determine the fate 
of the settlements. (This decision must be considered in its immediate political context: see p. 116-117 of the 
judgment.) 
367 The Beit El case, p. 117. (unofficial translation) 
368 Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 3. 
369 Dweikat v. Israel, HCJ 390/79, 34(1) P.D. 1 (hereinafter the Elon Moreh case). 
370 Elon Moreh case, p. 17.  For analysis of the atmosphere enabled the court to give this decision, see Kretzmer, 
The Occupation of Justice, pp. 88-89.    
371This decision was surprisingly especially because in the Matityahu case decision (Amira v. Minister of 
Defence case 34 (1) PD 90), issued in 1979, the court dismissed a petition in which an affidavit given by a 
General Reserves to support the petition refuted the security arguments for the settlement. The court found the 
affidavit unconvincing. The court also dismissed the argument that the requisition order was invalid since the 
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The High Court added: 
The decision to establish a permanent settlement which is designed to stand forever – even 
longer than the period of the military government which was established in Judea and 
Samaria – faces a legal obstacle which it cannot defeat. Since the military government cannot 
create in its territory facts for its military needs that are designed to exist even after the 
military regime ceases in that territory, when it is still impossible to know the fate of the 
territory after the end of the military regime, it is a prima facie contradiction, also shown by 
the evidence in this case, that the determining consideration that motivated the political 
echelon in deciding to establish the settlement was not a military consideration.372  
On one hand, this decision rejected the claim that the military requisition of private land for the 
establishment of permanent settlements could be lawful. On the other, the High Court did not address 
the illegality of the settlements themselves under international law and so enabled the continuation of 
the settlement activity on land not considered or acknowledged as private. Indeed, following this case 
the Israeli authorities pursued an intensive policy aimed at defining and gaining control over ‘state 
lands’ on which civilian settlements were subsequently built.373 Following the Elon Moreh decision, 
the Israeli Cabinet decided that all uncultivated rural land in the OPT would be declared ‘state 
land’.374 According to the Drobles Plan of 1978, which formed the basis for the settlement policy 
developed by the then Likud Government:  
state land and uncultivated land must be seized immediately in order to settle the areas 
between the concentrations of minority population and around them, with the object of 
reducing to the minimum the possibility for the development of another Arab state in these 
regions.375  
Two later High Court decisions dealt with the steps taken to declare land as state land and other 
aspects of the settlement policy, such as planning decisions, the building of roads, and the 
expropriation of land for that purpose. In the Al-Naazer case in 1981,376 the High Court held that 
‘local residents have no special rights in public property and the occupying power has a duty to 
protect such property against intrusion’. Moreover, the High Court held that, when doubt arises 
whether property is public or private, the presumption shall be that the property is public until 
ownership has been established.377 In the Ayreib case,378 the High Court held that the petitioner, who 
claimed rights in land that had been declared state land and who argued that the use of that land to 
build a new Jewish settlement was incompatible with the duty of an occupying power to administer 
                                                                                                                                                  
decision to make the order had been made by the cabinet committee on security rather than the military 
authorities.   
372 Elon Moreh case, p. 22 (unofficial translation). 
373 See B'Tselem, Land Grab, (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2002). 
374This was possible due to the fact that no comprehensive registration of land ownership existed for the West 
Bank or Gaza in 1967. See Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, p. 90 and references there.  
375See Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, p. 90 and references there to Master Plan for the Development of 
Settlements in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983, prepared by Matityahu Drobles. See also Al-Haq, The Israeli 
Settlements from the Perspective of International Law (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 2000), p.41. For more details on the 
content of the Drobles plan, see  Israeli Settlements in Gaza and the West Bank (Including Jerusalem) Their 
Nature and Purpose, Prepared for, and under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 
Rights of the Palestinian People, 31/12/1982 available at: 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/c25aba03f1e079db85256cf40073bfe6/b795b2d7fe86da4885256b5a00666
d70!OpenDocument.  
376 Al-Naazer v. Commander of Judea and Samaria (1981) 36 (1) PD 701. 
377 See criticism on this presumption in A Casesse, ‘Powers and Duties of an Occupant’ at 437-8. 
378 Ayreib v. Appeals Committee , HCJ 277/84, 40(2) P.D. 57 at 69. 
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public property as a usufructuary, lacked the standing or right to question the use of public land. The 
High Court also found it unnecessary to consider the fate of the land after the end of the occupation. 
In both of these decisions, the High Court did not consider the actual intentions of the authorities as a 
factor in determining the legality of their acts, as it did in the Elon Moreh case. As Kretzmer points 
out, ‘the most glaring feature of these decisions is their total detachment from the context of the 
government's land-use policy on the West Bank. Public lands are not regarded as land reserves that 
are first and foremost available for use of the local population; they are regarded as land reserves that 
serve Israeli interests (as perceived by those in power).’379 Kretzmer concludes that ‘article 55 is cited 
to legitimize this system of gaining control over state lands; it is ignored when the argument is made 
that the very same article limits the use that may be made of such lands’.380  
The planning and building of roads and highways in the occupied territories is intimately connected 
with settlement policy, having the purpose of integrating the West Bank settlements into Israel and 
enhancing accessibility between the two.381 In the Tabeeb case,382 the High Court dealt with 
expropriation of land for a highway. The expropriation was carried out under a Jordanian law that 
remained in force in 1967 regarding the acquisition of land for public purposes. The High Court 
assumed that the military authorities would not have gone to the trouble and expense of planning the 
highways if there was no military interest in them and so concluded, with no solid basis, that military 
considerations were the dominant factor in planning the roads network. This decision is contrary to 
the Elon Moreh judgment, in which the onus was set on the military authorities to prove that taking of 
private property was required for military needs.  
In the Ja’amait Iscan case,383 land in the Atarot area that had been purchased by a Palestinian 
cooperative (for the construction of a housing estate for teachers) was expropriated for the Atarot 
highway interchange.384 The petitioners argued that the highway network had been planned in the 
interests of Israel and not in the interests of the residents of the West Bank, and that this expropriation 
was therefore an unlawful use of power by a belligerent occupant. The petitioners added that Israel, as 
a belligerent occupant whose rule is by its very nature temporary, may not plan and construct projects 
that have long-term effects. In reply, the authorities argued that the highway system was being built 
for the benefit of West Bank residents. They argued that the position that existed at the beginning of 
the occupation could not be frozen and that it was the duty of the military government to further the 
interests of the local population in all walks of life, including transportation. In this decision, Justice 
Barak set the formula for military actions:  
The Hague Regulations revolve around two main axes: one – ensuring the legitimate security 
interests of the occupier in territory held under belligerent occupation; the other – ensuring 
the needs of the civilian population in the territory held under belligerent occupation.385  
In this case, too, the High Court was convinced that the planning was for the good of the local 
population: 
As we have seen, military rule must perform as a proper government authority, [it is] 
obligated to attend the needs of the local population and public life, and therefore it is granted 
                                               
379 Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, p. 93. 
380 Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, p. 94.   
381 See Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, pp. 70-71. 
382 Tabeeb v. Minister of Defense, HCJ, 202/81, PD. 36(2), 622. 
383 Jami'at Iscan Al-Moa l`imin al-Mahdudat al-Masauliyeh, Communal Society Registered at the Judea and 
Samaria Area Headquarters v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, HCJ 393/82, 
37(4) P.D. 785. 
384 This interchange connects the Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim (a large Jewish-Israeli urban 
settlement in the West Bank between Jerusalem and Jericho) highways together.  
385 See Jami'at Iscan Al-Moa l`imin 794. 
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ruling authority. While executing this authority, consideration must be given to the fact that 
we are dealing with prolonged military rule and with major population changes. Under these 
circumstances the Military Commander is authorised to make basic investments and to 
undertake long-term planning for the benefit of the local population ... Therefore it is clear 
that there is no wrongdoing in the preparation of the national highway system plan: the 
transportation needs of the local population have increased; the condition of the roads cannot 
be frozen. The Military Commander was thus authorised to prepare a road plan that accounts 
for current and future developments. Indeed, the roads will remain even following the end of 
military rule, but this is irrelevant. Drawing up these plans does not constitute a blurring 
between military rule and ordinary government. Furthermore the fact that the plan was drawn 
up in cooperation with Israel does not disqualify it, provided it was [drawn up] for the benefit 
of the local population.386 
In sum, the High Court’s jurisprudence on settlements is defined by a number of key points: it has 
avoided ruling on the legality of the settlements; rejected arguments based on the prohibition of settler 
population transfer as customary law; held general petitions against the settlement policy to be non-
justiciable; and accepted that a civilian settlement can serve military goals and can be temporary.  
The High Court has provided a framework of legality, within Israeli law, for Israel's settlement 
activity. Two groups of people now live in the West Bank: Jewish settlers, who are not protected 
persons for the purposes of the Fourth Geneva Convention but who enjoy privileges on the basis of 
their identity as Jews—both Jewish-Israeli citizens and Jews entitled to citizenship under the Law of 
Return—and Palestinians, who are protected persons but who are often deprived of basic rights in 
spite of that status.  
 
6. Prolonged occupation 
The previous section indicates that the High Court has sometimes held that special conditions obtain 
in cases of ‘prolonged military government’. The fundamental postulate of the regime of belligerent 
occupation is that it is a temporary state of affairs during which the occupant is prohibited from 
annexing the occupied territory. The occupant is vested only with temporary powers of administration 
and does not possess sovereignty over the territory.387 As noted previously, the principal rules of 
international law regulating the conduct of occupation are contained in the Hague Regulations, and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. It is universally accepted that the provisions of the Hague Regulations 
are not simply conventional but also form part of the corpus of customary international law.388 
                                               
386Jami'at Iscan Al-Moa l`imin, para. 36 (unofficial translation). 
387 See Ottoman debt arbitration (1925) 3 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 472 (1925-26); and 
also Benvenisti, Occupation, pp. 3-6; G.H. Hackworth, Digest of international law (Washington DC, 
Department of State: 1940), pp. 145-146; A. McNair and A.D. Watts, The legal effects of war (Cambridge UP: 
Cambridge: 1966, 4th  Ed.), pp. 363-369; L. Oppenheim, International law: a treatise. Vol.II: Disputes, war and 
neutrality (Longmans: London: 1952, 7th edition by H. Lauterpacht), pp. 436-438; G. Schwarzenberger, 
International law as applied by international courts and tribunals. Vol.II: The law of armed conflict (Stevens: 
London: 1968), pp. 166-173; and UK Ministry of Defence, The manual of the law of armed conflict (Oxford 
UP: Oxford: 2004) 278-279, paras. 11(9)–11(11).   
388 The customary nature of the Hague Regulations was declared by the International Criminal Tribunal at 
Nuremberg in the Trial of German major war criminals, Cmd. 6964 (1946) 65.  The customary status of the 
Regulations has since been affirmed by various other courts, see, e.g., In re Krupp (US Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg), 15 Annual Digest 620, 622; R v. Finta (Canadian High Court of Justice), 82 International Law 
Reports 425, 439; Affo v. IDF Commander in the West Bank (Israel High Court), 83 International Law Reports 
122, 163; Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth of Australia (Australian High Court), 91 International Law Reports 
1, 123.  See also T. Meron, Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (Clarendon Press: Oxford: 
1989), pp. 38-40; and J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (ICRC: Geneva: 1958), p. 614. As the Geneva Conventions have been ratified 
by all States, it can be claimed that their provisions represent general international law and not simply treaty 
commitments between the parties thereto.  This does not mean that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
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Accordingly, as Israel’s High Court has recognised, although Israel is not a party to the Fourth Hague 
Convention to which the Hague Regulations are annexed, the Regulations nevertheless regulate 
Israel’s activities in the OPT by virtue of their customary status. 389 
In the law of armed conflict, the question of ‘prolonged occupation’ is absent from the governing 
international instruments, and the notion has been little discussed in commentaries.390 Israel’s High 
Court has however referred to the question in a number of decisions.391 While Roberts cautions that 
                                                                                                                                                  
have customary status: on the relationship between customary and conventional sources in international 
humanitarian law see, for example, G. H. Aldrich, ‘Customary international humanitarian law---an interpretation 
on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ (2005) 76 British Yearbook of International Law 
503; M. Bothe, ‘Customary international humanitarian law: some reflections on the ICRC study’ (2005) 8 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 143; Y. Dinstein, ‘The ICRC customary international law study’ 
(2006) 36 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1; J. M. Henckaerts, ‘Customary international humanitarian law---a 
rejoinder to Judge Aldrich’ (2005) 76 British Yearbook of International Law 525 and his ‘The ICRC customary 
international humanitarian law study---a rejoinder to Professor Dinstein’ (2007) 37 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 259; J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary international humanitarian law.  Vol. I: Rules 
(Cambridge UP: Cambridge 2005), Introduction; W.H. Parks, ‘The ICRC customary law study: a preliminary 
assessment’ (2005) 99 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 208; and I. Scobbie, ‘The 
approach to customary international law in the Study’, in E. Wilmshurst and S. Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the 
ICRC Study on customary international humanitarian law (Cambridge UP: Cambridge: 2007), p. 15.  On the 
claim that the Geneva Conventions have achieved universal ratification, see J. A. Lavoyer, A Milestone for 
International Humanitarian Law (22 August 2006), available at: 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/geneva-conventions-statement-220906?opendocument.  
389 An overview of the consolidation of the Hague Regulations into customary international law was given by 
Acting President Shamgar of the Israel High Court in Bassil Abu Aita et al v. The Regional Commander of 
Judea and Samaria and Staff Officer in charge of matters of customs and excise, HCJ 69/81 (5 April 1983), 
37(2) Piskei Din 197 at 251-252, para. 19(b) (original Hebrew text), 7 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court 
of Israel 1 (1983-87) 46-47, para.19(b) (English translation), 63-64, para.19(d) (English translation available at  
www.http:elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/81/690/000/z01/81000690.z01.pdf).  Hereinafter, this case will be cited 
as Abu Aita.  Extracts from Shamgar’s opinion in Abu Aita are provided at 13 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 
(1983) 348.  
390 See Benvenisti, Occupation, pp. 144-148; A. Cassese, ‘Powers and duties of an occupant in relation to land 
and natural resources’, in E. Playfair (ed.), International law and the administration of occupied territories 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1992), pp. 426-427; Y. Dinstein, ‘The international law of occupation and human 
rights’(1978) 8 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 104 at 112-114, and his ‘Legislation under Article 43 of the 
Hague Regulations: belligerent occupation and peacebuilding’ (2004) 8 Harvard Program on Humanitarian 
Policy and Conflict Research, Occasional Paper No.1 available at: www.hpcr.org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper1.pdf; 
R. Falk, ‘Some legal reflections on prolonged Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank’(1989) 2 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 40; G. von Glahn, ‘Taxation under belligerent occupation’, in Playfair, op cit, p. 349; C. 
Greenwood, The administration of occupied territory in international law, in Playfair, op cit, p. 263; A. Roberts, 
‘Prolonged military occupation: the Israeli-occupied territories since 1967’(1990) 84 American Journal of 
International Law 44; E. Schwenk, ‘Legislative power of the military occupant under Article 43, Hague 
Regulations’ (1944-45) 54 Yale Law Journal 393 at 401;  and M. Sassoli, ‘Legislation and maintenance of 
public order and civil life by occupying powers’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 661 at 679-
680. 
391 Israel’s High Court fulfils two broad functions.  As the High Court it serves as a court of appeal from the 
decisions of lower courts, and as the High Court of Justice it acts as a court of first and last instance in petitions 
for the review of governmental actions, including actions taken in the Occupied Territories: see, for example, 
Benvenisti, Occupation, pp. 118-123; Y. Dotan, ‘Judicial rhetoric, government lawyers, and human rights: the 
case of the Israeli High Court of Justice during the intifada’(1999) 33 Law and Society Review 319 at 322-324; 
and D. Kretzmer, ‘The occupation of justice’, 10-11. The principal judgments of the High Court relevant to 
prolonged occupation include Christian Society for the Holy Places v Minister of Defence et al, HC 337/71, 2 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 354 (1972), and 52 International Law Reports 512; Electric Corporation for 
Jerusalem District Ltd v. Minister of Defence et al, HC 256/72, 5 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 381 (1975) 
[hereinafter Electricity Company No.1]; Jerusalem District Electricity Co Ltd v. Minister of Energy and 
Infrastructure and Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, HC 351/80, 11 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 354 (1981) [hereinafter Electricity Company No.2]; Ja’amait Iscan Al-Moa l`imin v. IDF Commander in 
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attempting to define the notion of prolonged occupation ‘is likely to be a pointless quest’,392 it raises 
two legal issues in particular—the effect of Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; and, more 
importantly, the exercise of the occupant’s legislative competence over the occupied territory under 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Depending on 
the way in which this legislative competence is exercised, consequential issues may arise as to 
whether the occupant has annexed the occupied territory, whether de jure or de facto, and thus 
whether the situation may be categorised as colonialism. 
A recurring theme in commentaries on the law of belligerent occupation is that both the Hague 
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention envisaged that an occupation would be of short 
duration.393 The drafters did not conceive that an occupation could last for decades and, as a result, it 
has been claimed that their provisions are inadequate to regulate a prolonged occupation: 
Considering the complexity of modern occupations, such as those during World War I and II 
in which large areas were occupied for long periods of time, raising a multitude of legal 
questions about the rights and duties of occupants in particular situations and the legal effects 
of the occupant’s actions after the war, the rules laid down in the landmark codes of the 1863-
1914 period and expounded in the literature and in military manuals seem fragmentary indeed 
and inadequate to guide occupation practices. But it must be considered that they were 
developed in a relatively peaceful period in which no major wars occurred and in which 
belligerent occupations were generally of short duration so that occupants were not forced to 
assume the full governmental burdens which had rested on the displaced sovereign. 
Consequently, while general principles were evolved, few specific rules developed because of 
a lack of factual situations requiring application of specific rules often enough to permit their 
growth into law.394 
The implications of the doctrine of prolonged occupation developed by the Israel High Court are 
discussed in section C.6(b) of this chapter, and Chapter III.B(3). 
 
 
a. Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
 
Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the Convention’s general application shall 
cease in occupied territory one year after the close of military operations, although specified articles 
will continue to bind the occupying power. In the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ ruled that as ‘the 
military operations leading to the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 ended a long time ago’, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Judea and Samaria, (1982) 37(4) Piskei Din 785, discussed in extenso in Kretzmer (above), pp. 69-71 and 
partially reported in translation as ‘A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Samaria Region 
v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al, HC 393/82’ (1984)  14 Israel Yearbook on 
Human Rights 301; Abu Aita, op cit.; Dwadin et al .v Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, HC 
4154/91, 25 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights  (1985) 333; Economic Corporation for Jerusalem Ltd v. 
Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al, HC 5808/93, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 322 (2000); and Na-ale—an Association for the Settlement of employees of the Israeli Aircraft Industry in 
Samaria v. the Supreme Planning Committee of the Judea and Samaria Area, the Sub-Committee for Mining 
and Quarrying et al, HC 9717/03, International Law in Domestic Courts database, ILDC 70 (IL 2004), also 
summarised as Na’ale v. Planning Council for the Judea and Samaria Region et al, 37 Israel Yearbook on 
Human Rights (2007) at 332. 
392 Roberts, ‘Prolonged occupation’ at 47. 
393 See, e.g., O. Ben-Naftali, ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’: rethinking Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention in the light of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory advisory opinion’ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 211 at 215 and 218; Ben-Naftali et al, ‘Illegal 
occupation’ at 596; Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 144; D.A. Graber, The development of the law of belligerent 
occupation 1863-1914: a historical survey (New York: Columbia UP, 1949), p. 290-291; and Roberts, 
‘Prolonged occupation’ at 47. 
394 Graber, Historical survey, p. 290-291. 
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Article 6 fell to be applied.395 It appears, however, that the Court misinterpreted the phrase ‘the 
general close of military operations’ contained in Article 6 as referring to ‘the military operations 
leading to the occupation.’ Indeed, according to the preparatory Conference of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, ‘the general conclusion of military operations means when the last shot has been 
fired’.396 This is clearly not the case in the OPT, where the armed conflict and military operations 
continue. 
 
On this basis, the ruling has been criticised by scholars,397 and does not correspond to official Israeli 
policy regarding the existence of an armed conflict in the OPT. In the Targeted Killings case,398 
President Emeritus Barak presumed that ‘between Israel and the various terrorist organizations active 
in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip...a continuous situation of armed conflict has existed since the 
first intifada’.399 Relying on the views of Professor Antonio Cassese, he held that the situation 
amounted to an international armed conflict,400 arguing that ‘the fact that the terrorist organizations 
and their members do not act in the name of a state does not turn the struggle against them into a 
purely internal state conflict’.401 President Emeritus Barak thus emphatically rejected the respondents’ 
plea that it was difficult to classify the nature of the conflict, ruling: 
 
for years the starting point of the Supreme Court—and also of the State's counsel before the 
Supreme Court—is that the armed conflict is of an international character. In this judgment 
we continue to rule on the basis of that view.402 
 
Consequently, given the contours of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it appears that the International 
Court erred when it ruled that Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention fell to be applied in the 
OPT. 
 
b. Legislative competence of the occupant 
Commentators recognise that circumstances may require that changes be made in the administration 
of occupied territory during a prolonged occupation in the interests of its population403 although, as 
Dinstein observes, this makes it ‘imperative to guard the inhabitants from the bear’s hug of the 
occupant’.404 A further complicating factor is that the need for change may partly arise as a result of 
the occupant’s own policies.405 
                                               
395 Wall Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep (2004), p. 185, para. 125; pp. 185-187, paras. 125-126. 
396 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. II A, p. 815. 
397 See, for example, Imseis, ‘Critical Reflections’ at105-109. 
398 Public Committee against Torture in Israel and Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and 
the Environment v. (i) the Government of Israel, (ii) the Prime Minister of Israel, (iii) the Minister of Defence, 
(iv) the Israel Defense Forces, (iv) the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, (v) Shurat 
HaDin—Israel Law Center et al, judgment of 13 December 2006 (the Targeted Killings case).  An official 
English translation of this judgment is available on the Israel Supreme Court’s website at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf.  
399 Targeted Killings case, opinion of President Emeritus Barak, para.16. 
400 Targeted Killings case, opinion of President Emeritus Barak, para.18. 
401 Targeted Killings case, opinion of President Emeritus Barak, para.21. 
402 Targeted Killings case, opinion of President Emeritus Barak, para.21. 
403 See, for example, Benvenisti, Occupation, pp. 147-148; Dinstein, ‘Occupation and Human Rights’ at 112 and 
‘Article 43’ at 8; Roberts, ‘Prolonged occupation’ at 52; Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 679; and Schwenk, ‘Legislative 
Power under Article 43’ at 401. 
404 Dinstein, ‘Occupation and Human Rights’ at 113. 
405 Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 147. 
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Under general international law, the legitimacy of legislative changes introduced by an occupant falls 
to be determined by reference to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, which has been augmented by 
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the 
latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public 
order and safety, while respecting , unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.406  
This is the standard English translation of the authoritative French text.407 It is, however, accepted that 
to render the key phrase ‘l'ordre et la vie publics’ as ‘public order and safety’ is unsatisfactory.408 
Following Schwenk, this phrase is better translated as ‘public order and civil life’ to import the idea 
that ‘la vie publique’ should be conceived broadly to refer to ‘the whole social, commercial and 
economic life of the country’.409 
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is seen as ‘a more precise and detailed 
[expression of] the terms of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations’,410 provides: 
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they 
may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat 
to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter 
consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the 
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered 
by the said laws. 
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to 
provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under 
the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the 
security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or 
administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. 
Although the first paragraph of Article 64 refers expressly to penal law, it is accepted that the 
legislative power conferred on the occupant by virtue of the second paragraph 64(2) is a general 
competence. This competence is, nevertheless, circumscribed. The occupant may only adopt new 
measures which are ‘essential’ in relation to the issues enumerated in paragraph 2—namely, in order 
                                               
406 On the interpretation of Article 43, see Y. Dinstein, Article 43; G. von Glahn, Occupation of enemy territory, 
Chapter Eight, and also his Taxation, 347-350; Greenwood, ‘Administration of Occupied Territory’); E. 
Playfair, ‘Playing on principle? Israel's justification for its administrative acts in the occupied West Bank’, in 
Playfair, Administration of occupied territories, pp. 207-215; Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, Chapter IV; M. 
Qupty, ‘The application of international law in the Occupied Territories as reflected in the judgments of the 
High Court of Justice in Israel’, in Playfair, op cit, pp. 92-98; Schwarzenberger, Armed conflict, pp. 191-207; 
Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’; Sassoli, ‘Legislation’; and J. Stone, Legal controls of 
international conflict (Maitland: Sydney: 1959, Rev.  Ed.), pp. 698-699. 
407 The French text reads: ‘L'autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci 
prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et 
la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays.’ 
408 See Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 7; Dinstein, Article 43, 2; von Glahn, ‘Taxation’, 348; Greenwood, 
‘Administration of Occupied Territory’, 246; Playfair, Principle, p. 207; Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 663-664; 
Schwarzenberger, Armed conflict, p. 180; and Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’, p. 393 n. 1 and 
398.  This misinterpretation was noted in the pivotal first case dealing with the implications of prolonged 
occupation decided by Israel’s High Court, Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defence and 
others: see 52 International Law Reports 512, opinion of Deputy President Sussman at 513-514.  This passage 
does not appear in the summary of the case provided at 2 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1972) 354.  
409 See Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’, 393 n.1 and 398; and also Greenwood, ‘Administration 
of Occupied Territory’ at 246; and Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 663-664. 
410 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 335. 
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that the occupant may fulfil its obligations under the Convention; for the orderly government of the 
territory; and to ensure its own security interests principally within the occupied territory.411 
Schwarzenberger claims that by adopting this enumeration ‘the Conference of 1949 took it for granted 
that it had not extended the traditional scope of occupation legislation’.412 Others argue, however, that 
Article 64(2) attenuates the restrictions on the occupant’s legislative competence imposed by Article 
43 of the Hague Regulations.413 The determination of which is the better view need not detain us. 
Israeli courts have rarely referred to Article 64414 and the most authoritative ruling on its import was 
delivered by the High Court in Abu Aita. In rejecting a plea that Article 64 prohibited the creation of 
new criminal offences by the occupant, Acting President Shamgar ruled that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention could not be pleaded before the Court, but even if this had been possible, the plea would 
not have succeeded. Article 64 permitted new criminal legislation aimed at maintaining the orderly 
government of the territory: 
In view of the recognized interpretation, this concept is parallel to the provisions regarding 
the permitted purposes of legislation arising under Article 43 [of the Hague Regulations].415 
Accordingly, for present purposes, we may conclude that Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
does not alter the basic rule regarding Israel’s legislative competence as occupant, although it 
provides further specification regarding the legitimate aims of that legislation. 
 
c. Limitations upon the legislative competence of the occupant 
By virtue of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, as occupant, Israel’s legislative competence is 
restricted to the adoption of measures ‘in his power’ which are aimed at restoring and ensuring public 
order and civil life, but it must respect ‘unless absolutely prevented’ the law which was in force in the 
Palestinian territories at the time the occupation was established. The gloss placed on this provision 
by Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is that any new measures must only be those 
‘necessary’ to enable the occupant to fulfil its obligations under the Convention, ‘to maintain the 
orderly government of the territory’, and to ensure the occupant’s security. Nevertheless, these new 
measures ‘must not in any circumstances serve as a means of oppressing the population’.416 
                                               
411 For commentaries on Article 64, see Ben-Naftali et al, ‘Illegal occupation’, at 594; Benvenisti, Occupation, 
pp. 100-105; Dinstein, Article 43, pp. 5-8; Pictet, Commentary, pp. 334-336; Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 669-670; 
and Schwarzenberger, Armed conflict, 193-195. See also T. Ferraro, ‘Enforcement of occupation law in 
domestic courts: issues and opportunities’ (2008) 41 Israel Law Review 331.There is a presumption against 
measures adopted by the occupant having extra-territorial effect.  In 1970, an Israeli military court sitting in 
Ramallah ruled that Article 64 only conferred extra-territorial legislative competence on the occupant in relation 
to ‘classical’ security offences, namely, those offences whose prevention was ‘necessary in order to preserve the 
physical security of the Occupying Power and its forces’—see Military Prosecutor v. Akrash Nazimi Bakir, 48 
International Law Reports 478 at 483-484 (nd). 
412 Schwarzenberger, Armed conflict, p. 194. 
413 For example, Ben-Naftali et al, ‘Illegal occupation’at 594; Benvenisti, Occupation, pp. 100-105; and Sassoli, 
‘Legislation’ at 670. 
414 There is a handful of cases decided in the early days of the occupation in which military courts relied upon 
Article 64, principally to provide the basis for their jurisdiction, see Military Prosecutor v. Halil Muhamad 
Mahmud Halil Bakhis and others (Israeli military court sitting in Ramallah, 10 June 1968) 47 International Law 
Reports 484 at 485-486; Military Prosecutor v. Zuhadi Salah Hassin Zuhad (Israeli military court sitting in 
Bethlehem, 11 August 1968) 47 International Law Reports 490 at 490-491 and 498; Military Prosecutor v. 
Akrash Nazimi Bakir (Israeli military court sitting in Ramallah, 5 March 1970) 48 International Law Reports 
478 at 481-484; and Military Prosecutor v. Mohammad Samikh Amin Ibrahim Al Nassar (Israeli military court 
sitting in Schechm, 26 August 1969) 48 International Law Reports 486 at 489. 
415 Abu Aita, 324/107/147, para.54. 
416 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 337. 
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Article 43 places the occupant under duties which must be balanced: the duty to ‘restore and 
ensure...public order and civil life’ has to be weighed against the duty to respect ‘unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country’. The latter recognises that the occupant possesses 
legislative power over the territory. The parameters of this power are flexible and open to 
interpretation, particularly because ‘this provision sets more of a guideline than a clear rule’.417 
Further, the duty to ensure public order and civil life ‘is not a definite and certain concept, but a 
notion depending on the circumstances of the particular case’.418 It is clear, however, that: 
international law does not recognize a general legislative competence in the belligerent 
occupant. Changes in the law of the territory will be contrary to international law unless they 
are required for the legitimate needs of the occupation.419 
There is doctrinal consensus that private law is generally ‘immune from interference on the part of the 
occupant’. Laws that concern ‘family life, inheritance, property, debts and contracts, commercial and 
business activities, and so forth’ are normally not suspended or altered by an occupant.420 
A further limitation inherent in the occupant’s legislative competence arises from the temporary—if at 
times prolonged—nature of occupation as a legal institution. The occupant’s powers are limited to the 
period of occupation, as it does not possess sovereign rights over the territory. Changes that it may 
legitimately introduce must be commensurate with the transitional and temporary nature of 
occupation.421 Further, as Schwenk emphasises, there are two distinct vectors to this legislative 
competence: 
While the occupant can restore public order and civil life only when they have been 
disrupted, he may legislate to ensure them in the absence of any disturbance. Hence the terms 
‘restoration’ and ‘ensurance’ are used alternatively rather than jointly... 
Thus it follows that, when public order and civil life have remained undisturbed, the validity 
of legislation under Article 43 depends on whether or not the legislating occupant was 
motivated by a desire to ensure them.422 
The duty to respect existing laws ‘unless absolutely prevented’ has never been interpreted literally, as 
some flexibility must be accorded to the occupant in the exercise of its administrative functions.423 
This phrase has been interpreted to import a criterion of necessity as a justification for an exercise of 
the occupant's legislative competence,424 but it is accepted that this is wider than military necessity:425 
                                               
417 Playfair, Principle, p. 207: see also Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 673-674; and Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under 
Article 43’ at 399-400. 
418 Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’ at 399. 
419 Greenwood, ‘Administration of Occupied Territory’ at 247, 
420 Von Glahn, Occupation of enemy territory, p. 99. 
421 Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 673. 
422 Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’, at 398-399. 
423 See, for example, Dinstein, Article 43, p. 4 and ‘Occupation and human rights’ at 112; E.H. Feilchenfeld, The 
international economic law of belligerent occupation (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace: 1942), p. 89; Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, p. 63; and Schwarzenberger, Armed conflict, 193. 
424 For example, see Dinstein, Article 43, pp. 4-5; H.P. Gasser, Protection of the civilian population, in D. Fleck 
(ed.), The handbook of humanitarian law in armed conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 256; 
Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 670; and Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’ at 401. 
425 For instance, von Glahn, Occupation of enemy territory, pp. 96-97; and Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under 
Article 43’ at 399-402. 
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The restoration of public order and civil life aims primarily, if not exclusively, at the interest 
of the population. Hence, a construction which confines the term ‘empêchement absolu’ to the 
military interest of the occupant seems too narrow, if not actually incorrect.426 
Accordingly, a balance must be drawn in observing this limitation. While the occupant is entitled to 
take its security interests into account, commentators recognise that legislative changes may be 
needed to protect or promote the interests of the population, particularly during prolonged 
occupations. Dinstein cautions, however, that an occupant’s interest for the welfare of the population 
is not above suspicion as ‘[p]rofessed humanitarian motives of the Occupying Power may serve as a 
ruse for a hidden agenda’. Accordingly, whether there is a real necessity for each new enactment must 
be examined,427 and the occupant is not entitled to assume a general duty to update the law lest this 
‘effectively grant the occupant almost all the powers a modern sovereign government would wield’.428 
During an occupation, the entity which decides whether legislation is necessary to restore or ensure 
civil life is the occupant.429 Dinstein suggests that an appropriate test to decide whether an occupant’s 
concern for the welfare of the inhabitants of occupied territory is lawful in the terms of Article 43 
hinges on whether it has the same concern for its own population. If the occupant enacts legislation in 
the occupied territory which is parallel (although not necessarily identical) to legislation adopted in its 
home territory, then Dinstein claims that this has a presumptive legitimacy. Should this not be the 
case, then the occupant’s professed concern for the welfare of the occupied territory ‘deserves to be 
disbelieved’.430 This test, expressly adopted by Israel’s High Court in the Abu Aita case,431 is 
inadequate: an occupant may not amend the law of occupied territory ‘merely to make it accord with 
[its] own legal conceptions’.432 Simply because the occupant has adopted a measure in its home 
territory does not mean that it is necessary to do so in territory it occupies. This has obvious dangers: 
In practice the standard implicit in the test may be abused by an occupant interested in a 
gradual extension of its laws to the occupied territory under a strategy of creeping 
annexation...It may not introduce changes simply on the ground that it is ‘upgrading’ the local 
institutions to the level obtaining in the occupant’s own country and that it is in the interest of 
the local population.433 
Finally, an occupant is incompetent to adopt any measure that breaches international law. To an 
extent, this restriction is apparent on the face of Article 64(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
                                               
426 Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power under Article 43’ at 400: see also Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 673. 
427 Dinstein, Article 43, p. 8. 
428 Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 147: see also Dinstein, Article 43, pp. 9-10; and also ‘In re Krupp and others 
(United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 30 June 1948)’, 15 International Law Reports 620 at 623: ’The 
occupying power is forbidden from imposing any new concept of law upon the occupied territory unless such 
provision is justified by the requirements of public order and safety’. 
429 See Muhammad Amin Al-Ja’bari v. Ahmad Ya’qub ‘Abd Al-Karim Al-Awini (Jordan, Court of Appeal of 
Ramallah, 17 June 1968), 42 International Law Reports 484 at 486: see also Ferraro, Enforcement of occupation 
law, pp. 349-350, but compare Benvenisti’s plea for more inclusive decision-making, Occupation, pp. 147-148, 
and see also Dinstein, ‘Occupation and human rights’ at 113. 
430 Dinstein, Article 43, pp. 9-10, and also ‘Occupation and human rights’ at 112: see also Christian Society for 
the Holy Places, Minister of Defence and others, 52 International Law Reports 512, dissenting opinion of Cohn 
J, 518 at 520; and T. Meron, ‘Applicability of multilateral conventions to occupied territories’ (1978) 72 
American Journal of International Law 542, 548-550. 
431 Abu Aita, opinion of Acting President Shamgar, 314-315/98-99/135-136, para.50.e: see also 13 Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights (1983) 348, 357: but compare Economic Corporation for Jerusalem Ltd v. 
Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al (2000) 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 
322, 324. 
432 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, 336; see also Roberts, ‘Prolonged occupation’ at 94; and 
Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 677. 
433 Meron, ‘Applicability of Multilateral conventions’ at 550. 
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which permits the occupant to adopt provisions ‘which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to 
fulfil its obligations under the present Convention’. Dinstein claims that, by extension, this provision 
allows the occupant to implement other obligations derived from customary and conventional 
international law. Thus, for example, in Tabib, the High Court ruled: 
The question [whether an absolute prevention exists] is one of the preferable and convenient 
means for achieving the purpose as stated at the beginning of Article 43, namely, ensuring 
‘public order’—a term that I propose to interpret as meaning the existence of an 
administration safeguarding civil rights and concerned about the maximal welfare of the 
population. 
If the achievement of this purpose requires a deviation from the existing laws, there is not 
only a right but, indeed, a duty to deviate from them.434 
Yet, as Kretzmer contends, expressly relying on the terms of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, 
‘[a]ny measure prohibited by international law is not in the occupant’s power’.435 It is self-evident that 
an occupant may not purport to use its legitimate powers conferred by the regime of occupation to 
pursue an end that is unlawful. 436 
Israel has asserted,437 however, that a prolonged occupation per se modifies the obligations imposed 
by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. The High Court has repeatedly relied on the claim that where 
an occupation is prolonged, the occupant is empowered to employ measures of a nature which would 
not be permissible during a short-term occupation.438 This view was expounded in detail by Acting 
President Shamgar in Abu Aita. The premise of this claim is that: 
The needs of any area, whether under military government or otherwise, will naturally change 
over the course of time, along with attendant economic developments...The length of time that 
a military government continues may affect the nature of the needs involved, and the urgency 
to effect adjustment and reorganization may increase as more and more time elapses. The 
argument...that there is no foundation for the idea that the duration of military government 
affects the character of the duties and the extent of the powers of military government [is] 
irreconcilable with the character of the duties and powers vested in it by Article 43. It is true 
that this article contains no rules as to adjustment or reclassification bound up with, or 
conditional upon the time element, but the effect of the time dimension is implicit in the 
wording, according to which there is a duty to ensure, as far as possible, order and public life, 
                                               
434 Tabib et al v. (a) Minister of Defence, (b) Military Governor of Tulkarem, (1983) 13 Israel Yearbook on 
Human Rights 364, opinion of Justice Shilo at 366. 
435 Dinstein, Article 43, p. 6; Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, p. 60: see also Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 674 and 
676-677. 
436 The High Court's interpretation of Article 43 has been criticised on the ground that it attenuates unduly the 
restrictions placed on legislative competence, substituting administrative convenience for the criterion of 
necessity: see, for example, Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, pp. 57-72; Playfair, Principle, p.  211 et seq; 
Qupty, ‘Judgments’ at 91-97; and Sassoli, ‘Legislation’ at 674: ’The practice of Israeli courts concerning 
legislation in the Israeli occupied territories is...very permissive’.  On the other hand, Cassese sees some merit in 
the approach adopted by the High Court: see his ‘Powers and duties’ at 423-427: see also J. Singer, ‘Aspects of 
foreign relations under the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements on interim self-government arrangements for the 
West Bank and Gaza’ (1994) 26 Israel Law Review 268 275-277.  Singer’s exegesis of Article 43 ignores the 
point that only factual authority, but not sovereignty, passes to the occupant. 
437  See von Glahn, ‘Taxation’ at 345-346. 
438. See, for example, A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Samaria Region v. 
Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al (1984) 14 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 
301, 307-308, and as Ja’amait Ascan, Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, p. 70; Dwadin et al v. Commander of 
IDF Forces in the West Bank (1985) 25 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 333, 334; Economic Corporation for 
Jerusalem Ltd v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al (2000) 30 Israel Yearbook 
on Human Rights 322, 324; and Na’ale v. The Supreme Planning Committee of the Judea and Samaria Area et 
al (IL 2004) ILDC 70 para. 6 and 37 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 332 (2007) at 333. 
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which patently means order and life at all times, and not only on a single occasion. The 
element of time is also decisively involved in the question of whether it is absolutely 
impossible to continue acting in accordance with existing law, or whether it is essential to 
adapt that law to new realities...It follows that the time element is a factor affecting the scope 
of the powers, whether we regard military needs, or whether we regard the needs of the 
territory, or maintain equilibrium between them.439 
Relying on Graber,440 Acting President Shamgar claimed that the Hague Regulations were too 
inadequate and fragmentary to guide the occupant and implied that, during a prolonged occupation, 
the occupant assumes sovereign powers of legislation: 
a lengthy military occupation, which would be required to find solutions for a wide range of 
day-to-day problems, similar to those an ordinary government would encounter, is likely not 
to find answers to its questions in the provisions of the Regulations.441 
Further, in his interpretation of the phrase ‘as far as possible’ employed in Article 48 of the 
Regulations, and the presumption that it bears the same meaning in Article 43, Shamgar flatly asserted 
that ‘there is no logic in applying the same criterion to a newly established military government and to 
a military government that has administered a territory with all the problems of civil administration, 
for ten years or more’.442 
To depart from the terms of Article 43 in a manner which effectively effaces the limitations it places 
upon the occupant’s legislative competence conflicts with the view expressed by the United States 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the IG Farben case. Although the Tribunal recognised that there 
were uncertainties in the law of armed conflict, it held that these did not arise in relation to the basic 
principles of the law of occupation contained in the Hague Regulations: ‘We cannot read obliterating 
uncertainty into these provisions and phrases of international law having to do with the conduct of the 
military occupant towards inhabitants of occupied territory.’443  
Yet the Israeli High Court has done precisely this by employing the doctrine of prolonged occupation 
to buttress an interpretation of the Hague Regulations that obliterated the restraints placed upon the 
occupant by Article 55. In Na’ale, two settlements in the West Bank, somewhat paradoxically, lodged 
an objection to a permit allowing the opening of a quarry. The petitioners argued that this would 
breach Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, which provides that an occupant is only the 
‘administrator and usufructuary’ of publicly owned buildings and estates located in occupied territory. 
This places on the occupant the duty to ‘safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them 
in accordance with the rules of usufruct’.444 The petitioners argued that quarrying consumed the 
property and thus breached the duty of usufruct. The High Court rejected this plea, ruling: 
even if quarrying cannot be considered as usufructing, no prohibition of such a kind of use 
applies in cases where an activity is done for the benefit of the local population or local 
needs.445 
                                               
439 Abu Aita, opinion of Acting President Shamgar, 313/97/133-134, para. 50(e): see also 309/94-95/128-129, 
para. 50(c).   
440 Graber, Historical survey, pp. 290-291. 
441 Abu Aita, opinion of Acting President Shamgar, 273/65-66/89, para.25.g. 
442 Abu Aita, opinion of Acting President Shamgar, 268/61/ 83, para.24.c. 
443 In re Krauch and others (IG Farben trial), (US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 29 July 1948), 15 
International Law Reports 668 at 677. 
444 For commentary on Article 55, see I. Scobbie, ‘Natural resources and belligerent occupation: mutation 
through permanent sovereignty’, in S. Bowen (ed.), Human rights, self-determination and political change in 
the occupied Palestinian territories (Kluwer: The Hague: 1997), pp. 232-234; see pp. 238-242 for an account of 
Israel’s exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in occupied Sinai and the Gulf of Suez. 
445 Na’ale v. The Supreme Planning Committee of the Judea and Samaria Area et al, ILDC 70 (IL 2004) and 37 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 332 (2007), quotation at 333. 
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This ruling is manifestly incorrect: its effacement of Article 55 also entails a clear breach of Article 43 
because this ruling validates a measure which violates international law.  
While recognising that prolonged occupations occur frequently, Roberts cautions against treating 
them as a special category. To do so might suggest that the law of occupation ceases to apply with its 
full vigour through the passage of time,446 and it has been claimed that there are few meaningful 
guidelines to determine what may constitute a legitimate deviation from the ‘normal’ rules of 
occupation during a prolonged occupation.447 Nevertheless, the Israeli High Court has repeatedly 
claimed that, where an occupation is prolonged, the occupant may introduce measures which would 
otherwise not be allowed. It has employed this doctrine effectively to remove the limitations placed 
on Israel’s legislative competence, qua occupant, by virtue of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. 
This is not merely in blatant disregard of the strictures imposed by Article 43, and thus in clear breach 
of international law, but it also conflicts with the decision of the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
in IG Farben.448 It has been rejected by commentators.449 This doctrine has been employed to, 
amongst other things, efface the legally mandated separation of the Israeli and Palestinian economies, 
as will be discussed in Chapter III.B(3).  
 
D. Application of Israeli Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
As noted earlier, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that an Occupying Power must uphold 
the existing law in occupied territory as far as possible: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the 
latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public 
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.  450  
When Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli 
Military Commander assumed all legislative powers. In East Jerusalem, the law in force until 1967 
was annulled and Israeli civil law imposed, but the Military Commander retained legislative powers in 
the rest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.451 These powers have been expressed through military 
proclamations, regulations, orders, and decrees. As years passed, Israel gave a very wide 
interpretation to the limited exception in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations that permits the 
Occupying Power to alter local legislation.452 As the situation in the Gaza Strip is treated elsewhere in 
this report, this section will focus on questions of law in the West Bank by way of illustration. 
Law in the West Bank, a product of numerous historical governments and occupiers (each of which 
maintained some of the law in force before its arrival, annulled some legislation and added to it) is a 
legal patchwork, consisting of Ottoman, British, Jordanian, and now Israeli military legislation. Over 
four decades of occupation Israeli military decrees have further annulled, amended, and supplemented 
Ottoman, Mandatory and Jordanian legislation. All the legal systems contributing to the law of the 
                                               
446 Roberts, ‘Prolonged occupation’ at 51. 
447 Benvenisti, Occupation, pp. 144-145. 
448 In re Krauch and others (I.G. Farben) trial, (US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 29 July 1948), 15 
International Law Reports 668 at 677. 
449 See, for example, Cassese, Powers and duties, pp. 419-420; von Glahn, ‘Taxation’ at 345-347, 373; and 
Greenwood, ‘Administration of Occupied Territory’ at 263. 
450  Regulation 43 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Including 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (the Hague 1907); see also Article 64 of the 
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949.  
451 See Military Proclamation No. 2, Concerning Regulation and Authority of the Judiciary (the West Bank 
Area), 7 June 1967, equivalent Military Proclamation for the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai. 
452 See the decisions of the High Court of Justice in the Christian Society for Holy Places and Abu Aita cases.  
106 | LEGAL CONTEXT IN THE OPT                                                                               CHAPTER II 
 
 
West Bank have territorial application: i.e., they apply to a geographic area. (Exceptions principally 
deal with family law and succession and are applied on a personal basis depending on the individual’s 
formal/nominal religious affiliation.453)  
In theory, the law in force in the West Bank is different from the law in force in Israel. The law 
applying to Israeli citizens (Jewish settlers) residing in the OPT is in theory different from the law 
applying to Israeli citizens residing within Israel’s recognised borders and territories annexed to Israel 
by Israeli state law (that is, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights). Moreover, in theory, the same law 
applies to Israelis in the West Bank as applies to any other person in that territory, including 
Palestinians and foreigners. In reality, through military and Knesset legislation, the Military 
Commander and the Israeli legislature have created legal segregation in many legal fields, such that a 
different body of law is applied to Israelis and Palestinians living in the same territory. The following 
discussion addresses how they operate in the West Bank through: 
• The application of Israeli civil legislation to settlement areas; 
• The extraterritorial application of Israeli civil legislation to Israeli settlers in the OPT, 
including Israel’s Basic Laws; 
• The personal application of Israeli military legislation to Palestinians. 
The outcome of all these techniques is the same: one legal system applies to Palestinians in the West 
Bank and another to Jewish settlers.  
 
1. Israeli Laws governing settlements and settlers 
a. Application of Israeli civil legislation to settlement areas 
The first technique by which laws are applied differently to Israelis and Palestinians living in the West 
Bank has been to incorporate elements of Israeli civil legislation into military orders dealing with the 
Jewish-Israeli municipal authorities (settlements) and their application to Israelis residing in the West 
Bank. This can be termed ‘channelling’, with the Israeli Military Commander serving as a channel for 
the application of Israeli domestic legislation to the OPT by virtue of his office and the decrees he 
issues. Channelling allows a number of Israeli laws to apply to the settlements and their annexed 
zones of territory, with necessary modifications that are mainly procedural and institutional.  
Most Israeli laws channelled into the West Bank law regulate the status and authority of governmental 
institutions within the boundaries of the settlements. For example, such channelling enables the Israeli 
Ministry of Environmental Protection to exercise its powers with respect to factory pollution in the 
settlements; grants the Israeli Ministry of Education authority over schools within the boundaries of 
the settlements; grants the Israeli Ministry of Health authority over medical facilities, and so forth. 
Thus channelling creates de facto Israeli enclaves within the boundaries of the West Bank (and 
previously also within the Gaza Strip).  
In particular, two military orders have authorised the Military Commander to regulate the 
management of municipal local councils454 and regional (Jewish) councils455 in the West Bank. 
Regulations of local councils provide that dozens of Israeli laws are applied within the boundaries of 
                                               
453 The Ottoman Mejelle and also the ‘Constitution of the Mandate’ – the King’s Order-In-Council – applied the 
laws of personal status (among which are the laws of marriage and divorce, child adoption, faith conversion and 
inheritance) in a personal manner to the members of the different denominations, so that the religious law of 
each member applied to him. This arrangement is therefore an arrangement of personal application of the law, 
rather than territorial application. 
454 Military Order No. 892, Order Concerning Administration of Regional Councils (Settlements), 1 March 
1981. 
455 Military Order No. 783, Order Concerning Administration of Regional Councils (Judea and Samaria), 25 
March 1979.  
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the settlements.456 Israeli rabbinical tribunals and local affairs courts have also been established within 
the boundaries of the settlements to deal exclusively with litigation between Jewish settlers. For 
political reasons, the occupying authorities have refrained from applying Israeli law in its entirety to 
the local councils; hence channelling has resulted in a partial rather than comprehensive application of 
Israeli law to the settlements.457 Nonetheless, this system creates legal ‘enclaves’ or ‘islands’ within 
the West Bank where laws apply that differ from those applying in the rest of the West Bank.458 This 
violates the principle of equality before the law, which constitutes the foundation of any modern legal 
system and is relevant to a review under the international legal prohibition on apartheid.459 Moreover, 
by conflating law in the settlements with law in Israel, channelling has the effect of creating a Jewish-
Israeli society that is integrated legally, socially, and economically across the Green Line.460  
 
b. Extraterritorial application of Israeli civil legislation to Israeli settlers 
The second technique by which different laws are applied to Israelis and Palestinians in the West 
Bank is primary legislation enacted by the Knesset that applies extraterritorially to individual Israelis 
residing or located in the West Bank. This category includes legislation authorising the Israeli 
executive to promulgate secondary legislation in the form of regulations and decrees that also apply to 
Israeli individuals in the West Bank. As noted earlier, this practice contradicts the norm that law 
should apply equally to all individuals within a territory.  
The most important law in this regard is the Extension of Emergency Regulations Law 1977,461 which 
authorises Israeli criminal courts to judge Israelis suspected of committing criminal offences in the 
West Bank according to the penal code and criminal procedure of the State of Israel. Section 2 
provides: 
a. In addition to the provisions of any law, the court in Israel shall have authority to 
deliberate, according to the law in force in Israel, a person located in Israel for his act or 
omission occurring in the Area [the West Bank] and also an Israeli for his act or omission 
occurring in the territory of the Palestinian Council, all in case the act or omission would have 
been offences had they occurred within the jurisdiction of the courts in Israel. 
[…] 
c. This Regulation does not apply to a person who at the time of the act or the omission was a 
resident of the Area or a resident of the territories of the Palestinian Council, who is not an 
Israeli.462 
This law therefore applies Israeli criminal law extraterritorially on a personal basis to Israelis in the 
West Bank, and to tourists and non-residents, with respect to offences they are alleged to have 
                                               
456 Section 140(B) of the Local Councils Regulations grants the holders of Israeli statutory powers to act also 
within the boundaries of the local councils in the West Bank and in accordance with Israeli law. The Appendices 
to the Regulations include a list of Israeli laws to be applied as aforesaid in the following fields: welfare laws, 
family laws, statistics laws, education laws, heath laws, labour laws, agricultural laws, apartment buildings laws, 
environmental laws, consumer, industry and trade laws, communications law.   
457 Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medinah, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel (5th Ed.), 1996, at p. 1181 
(Hebrew).  
458 Educational Enterprises v. Roth Yosef, Supervisor of Jewish Settlements in the Civilian Administration, HCJ 
10104/04 S.A.L. (unpublished; judgment dated 14 April 2006). 
459 Rubinstein & Medinah, op. cit., at p. 1182.  
460 E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (1993), at p. 135.  
461 The Extension of Power of Emergency Regulations Law (Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip – 
Adjudication of Offences and Legal Aid), 1977 [last amendment: August 6, 2003], LSI 1977, at p. 48. 
462 Ibid., section 2. 
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committed in the West Bank, except for the territories designated by the Oslo Accords for jurisdiction 
by the Palestinian Authority (‘Area A’). 
In addition, the Extension of Emergency Regulations Law applies a long list of Israeli laws to Israelis 
residing in the West Bank. Section 6(b) to the 1884 Addendum to the Law, extends the application of 
the laws detailed in the Regulations also to residents of the West Bank who are not Israeli citizens but 
who are entitled to immigrate to Israel by virtue of the 1950 Law of Return;463 that is, to Jews. Thus 
law is applied differently to Palestinians not only in respect to Israeli citizens in the West Bank but 
also to Jews who are not citizens but who are located in the occupied territory. Although the criminal 
prosecution of Israelis under military law (which applies to Palestinians) is theoretically possible, the 
express policy of the Attorney-General is not to do so.464 
This legal duality creates striking disparities of treatment. For example, a Palestinian arrested in the 
West Bank on suspicion of manslaughter may be detained for up to eight days before being brought 
before a military judge in a military court, where the pre-charge detention may be extended 
indefinitely. Being subject to military criminal legislation, such a prisoner can face a maximum 
penalty of a life sentence.465 By contrast, an Israeli settler arrested on the same grounds must be 
brought, within 24 hours, before a civilian judge in a civilian court for charges and faces a penalty of 
up to 20 years imprisonment.466  
Since 1967, the Knesset has enacted other laws that apply extraterritorially on an individual basis to 
Israeli citizens residing in the West Bank (and before disengagement, to settlers in the Gaza Strip). 
These include provisions regarding taxation, oversight of products and services, and the census. The 
rationale for this personal application was the special link created between the state and its citizens 
located in territory under its control. This reasoning is also the foundation for applying Israeli Basic 
Laws to Israelis residing in unlawful settlements in the occupied territories. In the Gaza Coast case in 
2005,  the High Court reasoned as follows:  
We are of the opinion that the Basic Laws grant rights to every Israeli settler in the vacated 
area. This application is personal. It derives from the control of the State of Israel over the 
vacated area. It is the outcome of the concept that the State’s Basic Laws regarding human 
rights apply to Israelis located outside of the State but in an area under its control by way of 
belligerent occupation. 467  
The outcome of the extraterritorial application of Israeli legislation on a personal basis, combined 
with the enclave law as described above, is that a settler lives within the framework of the West Bank 
law only in a very partial way: 
A resident of Ma’ale Adumim, for instance, is supposedly subject to the Military Government 
and to the local Jordanian law, but in fact he lives according to the laws of Israel both with 
respect to his personal law and with respect to the local municipality wherein he lives. The 
                                               
463 The Law of Return 5710-1950 provides that an oleh immigration visa be issued automatically to any Jew 
who wants one as well as to Jews in several categories, facilitating the use of this law to grant special rights and 
privileges, such as citizenship, to Jews exclusively. A substantive amendment in 1970 allowed oleh status to be 
extended to various family relations of Jews immigrating to Israel, including non-Jewish relatives, but the 
proportion of non-Jews affected by this change remains small. 
464 Rubinstein & Medinah, op. cit., at p. 1182, Fn. 39. 
465 See Sections 51A and 78 of the Decree Respecting Security Directives (No. 378). 
466 The Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement powers – Arrests), 1996, provides in Section 29(a) that an arrest 
by a Police officer stands for only 24 hours. Section 298 of the Penal Law, 1977 provides a maximum sentence 
of twenty years of incarceration for the manslaughter offence.  
467 The Regional Council of Gaza Coast et al. v. The State of Israel et al., HCJ 1661/05, Israel Law Review 
59(2) 481, 9 June 2005.  
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Military Government is nothing more than a symbol, through which Israeli law and 
governance operate.468  
In the Gaza Coast case, the High Court dealt with the constitutionality of the law authorising the 
evacuation of settlers from the Gaza Strip and their compensation, and did not deal with the 
applicability of the Basic Laws in terms of protecting Palestinians. According to the High Court, the 
Jewish settlers in the occupied territories enjoy the protection of Israeli Basic Laws469 while the 
Palestinians do not: 
In our opinion, the Basic Laws grant rights to every Israeli settler in the area to be evacuated. 
This jurisdiction is personal. It is derived from the State of Israel's control over the area to be 
evacuated. It is the fruit of a view by which the state's Basic Laws regarding human rights 
apply to Israelis found outside the state, who are in an area under its control by way of 
belligerent occupation. In light of this conclusion, there is no need to take a stand on the 
territorial applicability of the Basic Laws and there is no need to examine the question if they 
grant rights to non-Israelis in occupied territories or to Israelis who are not in territories held 
by Israel. This question raise problems that we do not have to deal with; and we will leave 
them open for further consideration.470  
However, as the High Court cannot legally strike down any law unless it is incompatible with the 
Basic Laws,471 in the No Compensation Law case472 the petitioners argued explicitly that a law 
affecting Palestinians (an amendment to the torts law denying Palestinians in the OPT the right to 
legal remedies for injury sustained due to the actions of Israeli occupying forces) was unconstitutional 
because it was incompatible with the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty—which, they argued, 
does apply to the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The petitioners argued first, that while the 
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation applies to every Israeli citizen and resident, the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty applies to every person. When the applicability of a Basic Law was 
intended to be limited, the limitation was explicit (for example, Article 6(b) of the law regarding the 
right of a citizen to enter Israel).  
                                               
468 Amnon Rubinstein, ‘The Changing Status of the Held Territories’ (1986) 11 Eyunei Mishpat 439, translation 
from Hebrew. 
469The Basic Laws of Israel are key component of Israel's constitutional law. These laws deal with the formation 
and role of the principal state's institutions, and the relations between the state's authorities. Some of them also 
protect civil rights. The main two basic laws that enshrine basic human rights are the Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty (which anchor the right to life, body, dignity, property, liberty, privacy, and the right to 
leave and enter the country and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which anchor the right of every person 
to freely chose his occupation. As apparent, several cardinal human rights are missing from these two Basic 
Laws such as the rights to equality, freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of religion, freedom of 
association and assembly, and others (despite this fact, the Israeli High Court has interpreted the right to dignity 
as including the right to equality and other cardinal rights). While these laws were originally meant to be draft 
chapters of a future Israeli constitution, they are already used on a daily basis by the courts as a formal 
constitution. Israel currently functions according to both material constitutional law, based upon cases and 
precedents (unwritten constitution), and the provisions of these formal statutes. As of today, the Basic Laws do 
not cover all constitutional issues, and there is no deadline set for the completion of the process of merging them 
into one comprehensive constitution. Generally speaking, these laws have precedence over regular legislations 
and they give the courts the authority to disqualify later legislation that contradicts them. The Basic Law: Himan 
Dignity and Liberty does not apply retroactively, thus preventing the constitutional challenges to any earlier 
legislation even if it contradicts the basic law. See Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medinah, The Constitutional 
Law of the State of Israel, (5th Ed.), 1996, at p. 1181 (Hebrew) and C.A. 6821/93, United Bank Mizrachi v. 
Migdal, 49(4) P.D. 221. 
470 See the Gaza Coast case, para. 80 and the Mara'abe case, para. 21.  
471 See the United Bank Mizrachi v. Migdal case. 
472 Adalah v. The Minister of Defense, HCJ 8276/05 (judgment dated 12 December 2006, translation by Adalah). 
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They argued secondly that the Basic Law expressly applies to every governmental authority and 
requires them to respect the rights set forth in Article 11 of the law.473 According to this article, every 
soldier carries in his kit bag not only the principles of Israeli administrative law, but also the Basic 
Law, and is required to respect the rights enshrined therein. Therefore, the Basic Law applies any time 
that a governmental authority infringes the fundamental right of any person. At a minimum, the Basic 
Law applies in every area under Israeli control. Any other conclusion, the petitioners argued, would 
lead to a constitutional apartheid regime, whereby an Israeli in the OPT is entitled to the protection of 
his fundamental rights while a Palestinian is denied such protection.  
However, in the No Compensation Law case the Court circumvented the question of the applicability 
of the Basic Laws to OPT Palestinians by stating that the rights that were infringed were granted by 
Israeli law that is not applicable extraterritorially.474 The same issue came before the High Court in 
relation to a petition challenging the constitutionality of the 2003 Citizenship and Entry Into Israel 
Law (the Family Unification case). This law prohibits the granting of residency or citizenship status to 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are married to Israeli citizens, who are, in the 
overwhelming majority of such instances, Palestinian citizens of Israel. Thus, the law bans family 
unification in Israel. In this case, the Court similarly refused to apply the protection of the Basic Laws 
to the Palestinians. President Barak’s minority opinion focused on the constitutional rights of the 
Israeli citizen to equality and family life and not on the rights of the ‘foreigner’ (i.e., the OPT 
Palestinian) spouse.475 
To sum up the High Court's position on this issue: in the occupied territories where Israel exercises 
effective control, Israeli settlers are granted the protection of the Basic Laws while the Palestinians 
are not, despite the provision of Article 11 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In relation 
to the Palestinians, former High Court President Aharon Barak stated: ‘Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza 
Region are not a state and are not democratic. Israeli control over them is by belligerent occupation. 
Israeli control did not arise from the choice of the local residents, but as the result of combat 
actions’.476  
 
c. Discrimination in the adjudication of rights 
The refusal of the High Court to rule on the legality of the settlements (discussed in section C(5)(c) of 
this chapter), combined with its rulings that Palestinians do not enjoy legal protections accorded to 
Israeli settlers, has led it to render judgments that cumulatively have dissolved the special protection 
accorded to the protected persons and thus the distinction between rights of Palestinians under 
occupation and rights of settlers. In effect, this approach has turned the tables to protect the interests 
of settlers over those of the local population. The most illustrative decision is the Hess case, in which 
the High Court authorised the Israeli army to seize Palestinian land and destroy structures in Hebron 
owned by Palestinians for the purpose of allowing Jewish settlers safe access to the Cave of the 
Patriarchs (Machpela Cave). Justice Procaccia wrote:  
Alongside the area commander's responsibility for safeguarding the safety of the military 
force under his command, he must ensure the well being, safety and welfare of the residents 
of the area. This duty of his applies to all residents, without distinction by identity – Jew, 
Arab, or foreigner. The question of the legality of various populations' settlement activity in 
the area is not the issue put forth for our decision in this case. From the very fact that they 
have settled in the area is derived the area commander's duty to preserve their lives and their 
                                               
473 It should be noted that in the Gaza Coast case, the court did not address Article 11 at all. 
474 Justice Gronis dissented from this opinion: see Ibid., paras. 2-3 of his opinion.   
475 See Adalah, et al. v. Minister of Interior et al, HCJ 7052/03, (judgment of 14 May 2006), available at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/520/070/a47/03070520.a47.htm.  
476Aharon Barak, Shofet be-Hevra Demoqratit [A Judge in a Democratic Society] (University of Haifa Press, 
Keter, Nevo, 2004), 147.  
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human rights. This sits well with the humanitarian aspect of the military force's responsibility 
in belligerent occupation.477 
The High Court added: 
…the worshippers who wish to go to the Machpela Cave by foot on Sabbaths 
and festivals wish to realize a constitutional right of freedom of worship in a 
holy place. This right is of special importance and weight on the scale of 
constitutional rights.478 
It further determined: 
In the framework of his responsibility for the well being of the residents of the 
area, the commander must also work diligently to provide proper defence to the 
constitutional human rights of the local residents, subject to the limitations 
posed by the conditions and factual circumstances on the ground . . . included in 
these protected constitutional rights are freedom of movement, religion, and 
worship, and property rights. The commander of the area must use his authority 
to preserve the public safety and order in the area, while protecting human 
rights.479 
In its rhetoric, the High Court regarded the Palestinians' rights as equal to Jewish settlers’ rights, 
requiring that opposing interests be balanced.480 The High Court then permitted, in principle and in 
practice, a violation of Palestinian rights for the benefit of the settlers. 
Another example is the case of Rachel's Tomb,481 in which the petitioners challenged the legality of a 
military order requisitioning land near Bethlehem to construct a bypass road and protective wall for 
Jewish worshippers wishing to go from Jerusalem to the site of Rachel’s Tomb. The petitioners 
argued that the order did not properly balance the rights of the worshippers with the property rights of 
the occupied population and the Palestinian right to freedom of movement within Bethlehem, both of 
which were violated by the order. In addition, the petitioners argued that the state of Israel was 
motivated by improper considerations in making the order, whose purpose, they argued, was not to 
ensure the rights and security of the worshippers but effectively to annex Rachel’s tomb to Jerusalem. 
The petitioners did not deny the rights of Israeli worshippers to have access to Rachel’s tomb. 
Therefore, the High Court's deliberations were restricted to whether the order provided a proper 
balance between the worshippers’ freedom of worship on the one hand and the petitioners’ freedom of 
movement and property rights on the other. 
The High Court concluded that the dispute was between constitutional rights of equal standing and 
importance and that the required balance is horizontal, allowing coexistence of all of these rights. In 
its deliberation, the High Court did not distinguish between the rights of the Palestinians and the rights 
of the Jewish worshippers482 or draw any distinction between the different sources of the rights and 
special protections given to the petitioners under international humanitarian law. As in the Hess case, 
Israeli ‘security’ imperatives were recognised by the High Court without question as justifying the 
infringement of Palestinians' fundamental rights. 
                                               
477Hess case, para. 14, at p. 460. 
478Hess case, para. 19, at p. 465. 
479 Hess case, para. 14, p. 461. 
480 The Hess decision was prior to the Gaza Coast decision, so it cannot be considered as setting new ruling on 
the issue of the applicability of the Basic Laws to Palestinians in the OPT.  
481 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Israel, HCJ 1890/03, 3 February 2005, available in English at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/900/018/N24/03018900.n24.pdf.  
482 Unlike Hess, this decision came after the Gaza Coast case; however, the court did not address the 
applicability of Basic Law to the Palestinians, as they would be applicable through the administrative law 
doctrine.  
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 In the Mara’abe case, Palestinian petitioners challenged the legality of the route of the Wall 
surrounding the Alfei Menashe settlement, which created a sealed enclave of Palestinian villages. The 
state claimed that the specific route was chosen for security reasons, to protect the life and safety of 
the settlers. The High Court accepted this argument, relying on its interpretation of Article 43 of the 
Hague Regulations. It concluded that, even if the Military Commander 
acted in a manner that conflicted the law of belligerent occupation at the 
time he agreed to the establishment of this or that settlement – and that 
issue is not before us, and we shall express no opinion on it – that does 
not release him from his duty according to the law of belligerent 
occupation itself, to preserve the lives, safety, and dignity of every one 
of the Israeli settlers. The ensuring of the safety of Israelis present in the 
area is cast upon the shoulders of the military commander.483  
This specific petition was accepted and the route of the Wall in the area in question was found to be 
disproportionate, leading the Court to order its re-routing. However, in its conclusion the Court again 
balanced security needs against the rights of the Palestinians while refusing to rule directly on the 
legality of the settlements. Ultimately, claims regarding protection of settlers were transformed into a 
judicial determination that a barrier constructed to incorporate the settlements into Israel is legal. 
We have reached the conclusion that the considerations behind the 
determined route are security considerations. It is not a political 
consideration which lies behind the fence route at the Alfei Menashe 
enclave, rather the need to protect the well being and security of the 
Israelis (those in Israel and those living in Alfei Menashe, as well as 
those wishing to travel from Alfei Menashe to Israel and those wishing 
to travel from Israel to Alfei Menashe). 
The High Court’s interpretation of Article 43 as allowing protection of the settlers through defence of 
the settlements disturbs and distorts the delicate balance between military concerns and humanitarian 
concerns that is basic to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. In this sense, the Mara'abe judgment 
follows the Hess precedent484 in which the fundamental distinction between protected persons in the 
OPT and nationals of the occupying power was conspicuously missing. Although the Hess judgment 
included a comprehensive analysis of the conflicting considerations and rights, the High Court’s 
balancing approach disregarded the condition of occupation and treated the situation as if it were a 
democratic society in which all individuals, Palestinians and Israeli settlers, have the same rights and 
duties. 
This fiction characterises the situation in the occupied territories. The ‘basic structure remains in 
place: the freedom of Jewish settlers to live in the OPT safely and travel freely is apparently hardly 
ever challenged, resulting in a regime that regulates people and their movements on the basis of 
ethnicity.’485 The result is that ‘the Palestinians have been denied most of the rights accorded to 
people under occupation’486 while settlers are protected in assuming authority over Palestinian land. 
As the settler population has reached almost a half-million, this trend has created systematic 
segregation and discrimination throughout the West Bank (as it did formerly in the Gaza Strip).  
The High Court’s latest stamp of legality for practices contrary to international law was extended to 
bypass roads for Palestinians. Road 443 is a main artery in the West Bank, built on Palestinian land as 
part of the Atarot interchange.487 Until the beginning of the second intifada, it was used by tens of 
thousands of Palestinian villagers to connect them to their neighbouring villages and to the city of 
                                               
483 Mara'abe, para. 20. 
484 Hess at 460-461.   
485 See Gross, ‘The Structure of Occupation’, p. 57. 
486 Ibid. p, 33. See generally Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice and Ben-Naftali et al, ‘Illegal occupation’. 
487 See Jami'at Iscan el-Moa l`imin. 
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Ramallah. Since the end of 2000, the army has prevented Palestinians from using it, limiting its use 
exclusively to Israelis. To meet Palestinian transportation needs, the Minister of Defence ordered the 
creation of an alternative road network, known as ‘Fabric of Life Roads’, built on Palestinian land 
confiscated for this purpose. The case is pending, but the High Court has asked the Defence Ministry 
to provide it with information on progress in constructing the ‘Fabric of Life Roads’ rather than stop 
or query their construction,488 effectively endorsing the military authorities' decision to build it.  
In routinely ignoring the facts, the rule of the law, and its own role in checking the actions of the 
military authorities, the High Court has effectively approved discriminatory practices in its 
adjudication of rights.  
 
2. Application of Military Legislation to Palestinians 
In the following chapters, reviewing Israel’s laws and practices in relation to the international legal 
prohibitions on colonialism and apartheid, this study will make reference, where relevant, to military 
legislation introduced by Israel in the OPT. Military orders, particularly those detailing criminal 
offences and periods of detention, are directed at Palestinians and are enforced by military courts 
established by Israel in the OPT. 
 
a. Military Legislation applying to Palestinians 
In the first three months of Israel’s occupation, over 100 pieces of military legislation were enacted in 
the West Bank. On the first full day of the occupation, Military Proclamation No. 2489 vested all 
legislative, executive and judicial powers in the Israeli Military Commander. To date, the military 
authorities have issued over 2,500 military orders altering pre-existing laws, the majority of which are 
directed at Palestinians. This matrix of military legislation regulates and controls everything from 
alcohol taxes490 to control of natural resources491 to which fruit and vegetables can be grown by 
Palestinians.492 Even where they do not formally discriminate between Palestinians and Jewish 
settlers, they do in practice, effect and, apparently, intent.493 
The most significant military orders that relate to ‘security’ are Military Order No. 378,494 concerning 
criminal offences and detention, and Military Order No. 1229,495 which allows for ‘administrative’ 
                                               
488 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel et al v. Minister of Defence et al, HCJ 2150/07. 
489  Military Proclamation No. 2, Concerning Regulation and Authority of the Judiciary, 7 June 1967. 
490  Military Order No. 38, Order Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 4 July 1967. 
491  See, inter alia, Military Order No. 92, Order Concerning Jurisdiction Over Water Regulations, 15 August 
1967. 
492  See, for example, Military Order No. 474, Order Concerning Amending the Law for the Preservation of 
Trees and Plants, 26 July 1972; Military Order No. 1039, Order Concerning Control over the Planting of Fruit 
Trees, 5 January 1983, Military Order No. 1147, Order Concerning Supervision over Fruit Trees and 
Vegetables, 30 July 1985. 
493  According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘In the same territorial area and under the same 
administration live two populations who are subject to two separate and contrasting legal systems and 
infrastructure. One population has full civil rights while the other is deprived of those rights. […] The settlers' 
lives, although they live in an area under military rule, are in almost every respect the same as those of Israeli 
citizens living in Israel.’ Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The State of Human Rights in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories, 2008 Report (Jerusalem: ACRI, 2008), p. 17. 
494  Military Order No. 378, Order Concerning Security Provisions, 20 April 1970. 
495  Military Order No. 1229, Order Concerning Administrative Detention (Provisional Regulations), 17 March 
1988. Due to numbering inconsistencies among Israeli military orders, Military Order No. 1229 is alternatively 
referred to as Military Order No. 1226, depending on whether it was issued individually or in a bound volume 
by the Israeli authorities. 
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detention without charge or trial for protracted periods. Military Order No. 378 details a wide variety 
of ‘security’-related offences and contains draconian detention and sentencing provisions. Article 78, 
for example, allows the Israeli military to detain Palestinians for up to eight days before being brought 
before a military judge, for up to 188 days before being charged with an offence, and for up to two 
years between being charged and brought to trial. The supervisor of an interrogation may also prohibit 
a Palestinian from seeing a lawyer for 15 days upon being detained.496 This period may be extended 
by the military judicial authorities to up to 90 days if deemed necessary for security or for ‘the good 
of the interrogation.’ 497  
Other military legislation deals with specific contexts as they arise. Military Order No. 1500,498 for 
example, was issued in April 2002 to provide for mass detention of Palestinians during military 
incursions in the West Bank. This order gave every Israeli soldier in the territory the authority to 
arrest Palestinians without providing a reason and without authorisation of a superior officer. It also 
allowed the occupying army to detain Palestinians for 18 days without bringing them before a judge.  
In relation to procedures for prosecuting minors, the principal piece of relevant legislation is Military 
Order No. 132, 499 which defines Palestinians aged 15 or under as minors and only those individuals 
aged 11 or under as a child. Thus, Palestinians aged 16 -17 are legally defined by Israel as adults 
(while in Israel an individual must be 18 years old to legally qualify as an adult). Although defining 
them as minors, Military Order No. 132 essentially provides that Palestinians aged 12-15 be treated 
under the same procedures as adults in the military legal system. Consequently, a Palestinian from the 
age of 12 is subject to prosecution under Israeli military legislation, including Military Order No. 378, 
under which they face, for example, sentences of up to ten years imprisonment for throwing a stone at 
a stationary object such as the Wall, and twenty years for throwing a stone at a moving vehicle.500 
Similarly, they are subject to a prison sentence of ten years for participating in a protest march or an 
unauthorised political meeting in contravention of Military Order No. 101.501  
A recent example of military legislation applying personally to Palestinians is the ‘Seam Zone Permit 
Regime’ (described in more detail in Chapter IV Part II.F), which establishes a special bureaucracy 
for processing applications for entry permits to the ‘closed’ Seam Zone. The system exempts Israelis 
from the prohibition to enter the Seam Zone and from the need to acquire a permit, and thus applies 
only to Palestinians residing in the West Bank and not to Jewish settlers. 
Furthermore, routinely and ostensibly to tackle existing or expected disruptions of public order, the 
Military Commander issues orders declaring a certain area to be a ‘closed military zone,’ or ‘closed 
area.’ Varying degrees of restrictions are imposed on such areas: e.g., complete closure and limiting 
access to Israeli military forces only; entry only by Jewish-Israelis and other Jews granted the 
privileges of Jewish-Israelis; or entry permitted to Palestinians but only with a permit from the Israeli 
authorities.502 Discriminatory implementation of closed area orders that are ostensibly non-
discriminatory is also commonplace. For example, Military Order No. 146503 declared the 
Latroun/Ayalon area of the West Bank to be a closed area in 1967. This military order has not been 
                                               
496  Military Order No. 378, Article 78C(c)(1). 
497  Military Order No. 378, Articles 78C(c)(2), 78D (b)(3), and 78D(b)(4). 
498  Military Order No. 1500, Order Concerning Detention in Time of Combat (Temporary Order), April 2002. 
499 Military Order No. 132, Order Concerning Adjudication of Juvenile Offenders, 24 September 1967.  
500 Military Order No. 378, Article 53A (2) and (3). 
501 Military Order No. 101, Order Concerning Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda, 27 August 
1967, which states that, ‘It is forbidden to conduct a protest march or meeting (grouping of ten or more where 
the subject concerns or is related to politics) without permission from the Military Commander. It is also 
forbidden to raise flags or other symbols, to distribute or publish a political article and pictures with political 
connotations.’ 
502 Military Order No. 151, Order Concerning Closed Areas (Jordan Valley), 1 November 1967. 
503 Military Order No. 146, Order Concerning Closed Areas, 23 October 1967. 
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amended or cancelled and the Israeli military authorities recently confirmed that it still applies.504 
Palestinian residents, who were forcibly transferred from this zone and whose villages there were 
destroyed, continue to be denied access to the area and to their land, yet Israelis are free to enter the 
area, in violation of the military order, to visit Canada Park, a recreational park that has since been 
established in the closed area by the Jewish National Fund.  
The military legislation described above pertains to the West Bank. The military legislative system in 
the West Bank was mirrored by a similar system in the Gaza Strip from 1967 until Israel’s 
‘disengagement’ from the territory in 2005, with identical versions of most important and non-area-
specific military orders being issued by the military commander in the Gaza Strip concomitant to 
those of his counterpart in the West Bank. Although the military orders for the Gaza Strip have been 
repealed since 2005, Israel retains authority over matters relating to administration of justice in Gaza 
through different tools, such as the extension of Israeli civil and criminal law over Palestinians in 
Gaza.505 
 
b. Enforcement by military courts 
Military laws are enforced through a military court system that has become ‘an institutional 
centrepiece of the Israeli state’s apparatus of control over Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.’506 
The military courts were established even before the Six-Day War ended, by Military Proclamation 
No. 3, Concerning Security Provisions in the West Bank and an equivalent proclamation in the Gaza 
Strip. Both proclamations outlined the jurisdiction of the military courts and details of procedure. 
These proclamations were replaced in 1970 by Military Order No. 378, Order Concerning Security 
Provisions, in the West Bank, and a parallel order for the Gaza Strip, Military Order No. 300, which 
expanded the jurisdiction of the military courts to cover a very broad range of security charges. Since 
2005, military law has no longer applied in Gaza and the Israeli military court system remains in place 
only in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), where Military Order No. 378 continues to be the 
primary piece of legislation regulating most of the military court process. 
The military court system in the OPT is represented by Israel as necessary for prosecuting security-
related offences. In reality, the system extends to govern regular criminal offenses and distinctly non-
security related offences such as traffic violations. As Jewish settlers in the OPT fall under the 
personal and extraterritorial jurisdiction of Israeli civil law and civil courts, the military court system 
is also defined by its discriminatory application to Palestinian civilians. 
Article 64 of Fourth Geneva Convention permits an occupying power to establish military courts in 
the territory it occupies, but such courts must adhere to several standards. They must be ‘set up in 
accordance with the recognised principles governing the administration of justice’;507 they may only 
be used to enforce penal provisions legally promulgated by the occupying power under Article 64; 
and they must not be used ‘as an instrument of political or racial persecution’.508 A brief discussion 
can address features of the Israeli military court system in the OPT in relation to these three standards. 
Regarding the first standard, Israel’s military court system in the OPT does not comply with 
international standards regarding due process and the administration of justice. For example, 
regarding a defendant’s right to be notified of the charges against him promptly and in a language he 
                                               
504 See John Reynolds, Where Villages Stood: Israel's Continuing Violations of International Law in Occupied 
Latroun, 1967-2007 (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 2007), pp. 39 and 87. 
505 See, for example, Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Detention) (Non-Resident Detainees 
Suspected of Security Offence) (Temporary Provision) Bill 5765-2005. 
506  Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), p.2. 
507  Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 340. 
508 Pictet, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, p. 340. 
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understands,509 a Palestinian defendant and his lawyer will be informed of the charges being brought 
only at the first hearing, after the indictment has already been filed with the military court. They are 
required to respond immediately, with no time to study evidence. Indictments, like all documents in 
the military courts, are written and presented to the courts only in Hebrew, a language the defendant 
and his counsel often do not understand. The Israeli military court system also allows lengthy 
detention periods before and between trial sessions and restricts the families of defendants and 
detainees from attending court hearings. Decisions of the military courts are not published.510 I 
Israel’s military court system also makes no presumption of innocence: the system has no established 
procedures to ensure that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to prove guilt, thus shifting the 
burden to the defence. The independence and impartiality of the military courts is also questionable. 
All of the judges are serving Israeli army officers, of whom many are without legal qualifications or 
any judicial background.511 
The result has been mass incarceration, with over a half-million Palestinians detained by Israel 
between 1967 and 2005512 and more than 150,000 Palestinians prosecuted in the military courts since 
1990 alone.513 Only in 0.29 percent of the 9,123 cases concluded in the military courts in 2006 was 
the defendant found not guilty.514 Only 1.42 percent of those cases went through a full evidentiary 
stage, consisting of the presentation of evidence and interrogation of witnesses.515  
Indeed, of those convicted by the Israeli military courts, approximately 95-97 percent were convicted 
as the result of plea bargains.516 This figure may reflect several factors. The high rate of plea bargains 
suggests that Palestinian defendants and their lawyers lack trust in the military judicial system. 
Evidence of torture during interrogation, reviewed in Chapter IV of this report, supports claims that 
prosecutions are often based on confessions or incriminating statements, which are procured through 
threats or physical measures during interrogation. Moreover, failure to plea bargain usually brings a 
more severe penalty. Whatever the factors contributing to these plea bargains, the rate of convictions 
indicate that due process is not functioning: detention hearings last on average three minutes and four 
seconds.517 
On the second standard, Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows military courts to 
prosecute only those infringements of penal laws that are enacted as essential to the welfare and rights 
of the local civilian population or to the absolute military needs or security of the occupying power. 
The Israeli military court system exceeds these limitations in two ways. First, military law extends to 
                                               
509   Article 71 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: ‘Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying 
Power shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they understand, of the particulars of the 
charges preferred against them.’ Article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
similarly entitles an individual accused of a crime to be ‘informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him.’ 
510  For a detailed technical analysis of the incompatibility with international legal standards of numerous 
individual aspects of the Israeli military court system, see generally Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The 
Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the Occupied Territories (Tel Aviv: Yesh Din, 
2007). 
511  Paul Hunt, Justice? The Military Court System in the Israeli-Occupied Territories (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 
1987), pp. 3-4 and 34-38. 
512  Figures from the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoners and Ex-Detainees, quoted in Al-Haq, Waiting for Justice 
(Ramallah: Al-Haq, 2005), p. 258. 
513  Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings, p. 19. 
514  Ibid, p. 10. 
515  Ibid, p. 119. 
516  Hajjar, Courting Conflict, p. 3. See also Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings, p. 120. 
517  Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the 
Occupied Territories (Tel Aviv, Yesh Din, 2007), p. 61. 
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issues unrelated to the rights of the Palestinians or the security of the Occupying Power: for example, 
tax evasion, unauthorised building, traffic violations, and other minor offences.518 From 2002-2006, 
the Military Prosecution filed more than 43,000 indictments to the courts, only a third of which were 
for offences defined as ‘security-related’ and only 1 percent of which involved defendants charged 
with intentionally causing death.519  
Second, military orders issued by Israel have changed existing laws in the OPT to an extent that 
greatly exceeds the legislative competence of the occupying power (as described above). Disregard 
for restricting changes to the local laws was indeed formalised in 1967, when Military Order (No. 
130), Concerning Interpretations provided that Israeli military orders ‘supersede any law [i.e. any law 
effective in the territory on the eve of the occupation], even if the former does not explicitly nullify 
the latter’.520 Thus, the military courts system's ‘ever-increasing jurisdiction has allowed it to try 
Palestinians for a range of offences, quite unrelated to national security questions; these include tax 
evasion, unauthorised building, and other minor offences.’521 As noted above, administrative offences 
(such as traffic violations) are also prosecuted by the military courts. From 2002-2006, the Military 
Prosecution filed more than 43,000 indictments to the courts, only a third of which were for offences 
defined as ‘security-related’ and only 1 percent of which involved defendants charged with 
intentionally causing death.522 In prosecuting such a broad range of offences, the Israeli military 
courts in the OPT contravene the rules of international humanitarian law.  
Most significantly for the purposes of this study, the primary raison d’être of the military court 
system is to buttress Israeli domination over the institutions and local population of the occupied 
territory. If established in an occupied territory, military courts should apply equally to all civilians in 
that territory. In practice, there is no evidence of Jewish civilians523 in the OPT being tried in military 
courts under military legislation. Instead, when Israeli settlers are prosecuted for offences committed 
in the OPT, this is done under Israeli civil law, in a civil court in Israel. As a result, a Palestinian and a 
Jewish settler who commit the same offence in the same territory will be tried in a different court, 
                                               
518   Kathleen Cavanaugh, ‘The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank And Gaza’ (2007) 12 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 197. 
519  Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the 
Occupied Territories (Tel Aviv, Yesh Din, 2007), pp. 9 and 36. 
520   Military Order No. 130, Order Concerning Interpretations (27 September 1967). 
521   Kathleen Cavanaugh, ‘The Israeli Military Court System In The West Bank And Gaza’ (2007) 12 Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law 197. 
522  Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings, pp. 9 and 36. 
523  Israeli army members accused of offences are processed and may be tried through military judicial 
proceedings in military courts, under the Military Justice Law 5715-1955. On this, Cavanaugh notes that ‘the 
experience of the IDF in the military justice system shifts the narrative from questions related to fair trial, which 
accompanies the discourse of Palestinians in the Court system, to one of impunity.’ See Cavanaugh, ‘The Israeli 
Military Court System’. 
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under different penal laws,524 with different procedures,525 and will invariably receive different 
sentences.526 
Further discriminatory attributes of the military court system relate to children and to ‘administrative 
detention.’ Different definitions of ‘minor’ and ‘children’ and their impact on sentencing were 
discussed earlier.527 In addition, the Israeli military has not established in the OPT any special juvenile 
court (as exists for minors in Israel); accordingly, Palestinian minors (defined by the Occupying 
Power as those 12-15) are tried in the regular military courts, under the same procedure as adults. 
Regarding administrative detention, the military courts function as a tool to legitimise arbitrary arrest 
and detention without charge, with Palestinians often interned for periods of years. The discriminatory 
ways in which this practice is applied in the OPT is examined further in Chapter IV(II)(D)(3).  
Finally, the scope of military law and the jurisdiction of the military courts is sufficiently broad to 
allow prosecution of Palestinians for political and cultural expression and association, movement to 
certain areas, various forms of non-violent protest, and failure to carry appropriate identification 
papers.528 On the basis of this expansive mandate, the Occupying Power can use the military courts in 
the OPT to suppress dissent and persecute Palestinians for political activity, rendering the Israeli 
military courts precisely the ‘instrument of political or racial persecution’ that the parameters of 
international humanitarian law seek to prevent.  
 
E. Conclusion  
This chapter has established the framework of international and Israeli law operating in the OPT, in 
light of which the applicability of international instruments regarding colonialism and apartheid must 
be considered. Three principle framing facts have been determined. First, the Palestinian people have 
the right to self-determination and the principles and instruments of international law relevant to self-
determination are applicable. Second, the Palestinian population in the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are protected persons under the terms of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, as these territories remain under belligerent occupation. Third, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the Hague Regulations apply generally to Israel’s obligations as an Occupying Power 
and these obligations are not altered by the prolonged nature of Israel’s occupation. 
Given these three factors, Israel’s laws in the OPT manifest prima facie as violations of international 
humanitarian law, both in violating specific prohibitions not to alter the laws in force, and by 
enforcing a dual and discriminatory legal regime on Jewish and Palestinian residents of the OPT. 
Israeli policy is to grant to Jewish settlers the protections of Israeli civil law and Basic Laws, under 
                                               
524  While Israeli civil law applies to Jewish-Israelis being prosecuted in civil courts, the military courts enforce 
Israeli military legislation against Palestinians, as well as sometimes the1945 Defence (Emergency) Regulations 
(despite the fact that these regulations were repealed by the British upon termination of the Mandate), and the 
pre-existing criminal law which applied in the territory before occupation (i.e., Jordanian criminal law in the 
case of the West Bank). 
525  With different criminal procedures applying in Israel and the OPT, the Israeli High Court of Justice has even 
rejected arguments that the substantial Israeli domestic law of criminal procedure should apply to suspects 
arrested in the West Bank under military orders who are detained in Israel. See Abed Al-Rachman Al Hamed v. 
General Security Services, HCJ 1622/96. 
526 Although not applicable in the legal system applying inside Israel, the death penalty is provided for in the 
military laws governing the OPT. See Military Order No. 378, Order Concerning Security Provisions, Article 
51(a). 
527 Here it is also worth noting that in contrast with basic human rights principles as well as Israeli criminal law, 
the military courts sentence Palestinians according to their age at the time of sentencing, as opposed to their age 
at the time the alleged offence was committed. With military trials routinely delayed, a Palestinian child, for 
instance, who is alleged to have committed an offence when under the age of 16, but turns 16 by the time of his 
sentencing, will be sentenced as an adult rather than as a minor. 
528 Hunt, Justice?, p. 7. 
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the jurisdiction of Israeli civil courts, while administering Palestinians living in the same territory 
under military law and military courts whose procedures violate international standards for the 
administration of justice. As a consequence of this system, Jewish residents of the OPT enjoy freedom 
of movement, civil protections, and services that Palestinians are denied, while Palestinians are 
deprived of the protections accorded to protected persons by international humanitarian law. 
Administered and enforced by the state’s military and having gained the imprimatur of Israel’s High 
Court of Justice, this dual system appears to reflect a policy by the State of Israel to sustain two 
parallel societies in the OPT, one Jewish-Israeli and the other Palestinian, and to accord these two 
groups very different rights and protections in the same territory. 
The question here is whether this legal system is adequately understood as entailing discrete 
violations of international humanitarian law, or whether it operates on such a comprehensive scale 
that it may suggest broader illegitimate regimes, notably colonialism and apartheid. The next two 
chapters address that question: first, by identifying specific criteria by which regimes of colonialism 
and apartheid can be identified; and second, by conducting an empirical review of Israeli policies and 
practices according to those criteria, to establish whether Israel’s belligerent occupation of the OPT 
has obtained the character of colonialism or apartheid.  
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Chapter III 
 
Review of Israeli Practices relative to the Prohibition of Colonialism 
 
A. Introduction  
This Chapter considers whether Israel’s exercise of control over the occupied Palestinian territories 
has exceeded the limits of authority permitted by international law to an Occupying Power, to the 
extent that Israel is not merely occupying but also colonising the OPT.  
As discussed in Chapter I, colonialism can be distinguished from other forms of foreign domination 
(such as prolonged belligerent occupation or other kinds of hegemony resulting in dependency) by an 
open claim to sovereignty by the dominant power or where a dominant power adopts measures that 
deliberately deny the people of the territory the full exercise of their sovereignty. The prohibition of 
colonialism draws on several principles of international law, especially the right of peoples to self-
determination and the prohibition of annexation.  
The primary instrument dealing with the prohibition of colonialism in international law is the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Territories.529 The Declaration 
rejects all forms of colonial domination on grounds that it violates fundamental norms of human rights 
and is a threat to international peace and security. It mentions the damaging effects of colonialism on 
‘international economic co-operation’, expresses concern for ‘the social, cultural and economic 
development of dependent peoples’, and affirms the right of peoples to ‘freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development’ and ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources’. It stresses 
that ‘inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence’.530 The Declaration also expresses a special concern for ‘territorial 
integrity’, mentioning it in three instances including operative paragraphs 4 and 6. These concerns 
reflect corollary rights and entitlements associated with self-determination, as discussed in Chapter I: 
‘(a) the right to exist—demographically and territorially—as a people; (b) the right to territorial 
integrity; (c) the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources; (d) the right to cultural 
integrity and development; and (e) the right to economic and social development’.531 
Formal annexation of occupied territory in violation of the rights of its indigenous population is prima 
facie a form of colonialism. To prevent this happening under the guise of occupation, the drafters of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention adopted Article 49(6), which prohibits the deportation or transfer by 
the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. The 
rationale for this provision was: 
                                               
529 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. In the Legal consequences for States of the continued 
presence of South Africa in Namibia ( South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 
(1970), ICJ Rep, 1971, 16, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Declaration was an important stage in 
the development of the law relating to non-self-governing territories at 31, para. 52. 
530 The trusteeship system, as established in the United Nations Charter, contradicts this injunction. Article 76(a) 
of the United Nations Charter cites the objective the trusteeship system as being ‘to promote the political, 
economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive 
development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided 
by the terms of each trusteeship agreement’. 
531 C. Drew, ‘The East Timor story: international law on trial’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 
65.  For a similar affirmation of the substantive core content of self-determination, see A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The 
impact of peremptory norms on the interpretation and application of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 59 at 64. 
CHAPTER III  PROHIBITION OF COLONIALISM | 121 
 
 
to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which 
transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political or racial reasons 
or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the 
economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate existence as a 
race.532 
This chapter section draws on the Declaration, the Fourth Geneva Convention and international law 
regarding self-determination in identifying the following practices as indicating that a belligerent 
occupation has obtained the character of a colonial regime, contrary to international law: 
(1)  violating the territorial integrity of occupied territory;  
(2) depriving the people of an occupied territory of the capacity for self-governance, by 
replacing their legal and political mechanisms;  
(3)  integrating the economy of the occupied territory into that of the occupant to an extent 
that inhibits the autonomy of the occupied territory;  
(4) depriving the population under occupation of permanent sovereignty over its natural 
resources; and  
(5) cultural domination, which further threatens the identity of the people of an occupied 
territory and thus its capacity to express its right to self-determination. 
As specific actions and policies associated with these practices also come under review in Chapter IV, 
which considers Israeli practices in light of the Apartheid Convention, discussion of practices in this 
chapter is confined here to central points, with cross-references to the later detailed discussion as 
appropriate. 
  
B. Review of Israel’s Practices in the OPT relative to Colonialism 
1. Violations of Territorial Integrity 
A common colonial practice was to create or redraw political boundaries without regard to pre-
existing social, legal or political practice. The Declaration accordingly emphases the importance of 
‘territorial integrity’ since the right of peoples to self-determination requires a coherent and viable 
national territory for its expression. The Declaration’s chapeau expresses a conviction ‘that all peoples 
have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of 
their national territory’. Article 4 then directs that ‘the integrity of [all peoples’] national territory 
shall be respected’. Article 6 emphasises that ‘Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of 
the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.  
As established earlier (see Chapter II.C), the territory designated in international law for Palestinian 
self-determination consists of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Israeli 
policy has fragmented this territory by dividing Palestinian areas of the West Bank into separate 
enclaves, connected by transportation points controlled by Israel (see Chapter IV.G(3)(a)). According 
to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 38 percent of the West 
Bank has been reserved for Israeli settlements and outposts, closed nature reserves, and closed 
military zones and are off-limits to Palestinian use. More than one-fifth of the West Bank has been 
declared a closed military zone. Approximately 10,122 hectares of agricultural land has been annexed 
to the settlements and Palestinians are banned from using or entering this land.533 Since Israel signed 
the Oslo Accord in 1995, Jewish settlements in the West Bank have more than doubled in population 
                                               
532 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to Geneva Convention IV relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of 
War (ICRC: Geneva: 1958) Commentary to Article 49, 283.  
533 UN OCHA, ‘The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the 
West Bank,’ (July 2007), p. 40.  
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to 270,000, according to a survey commissioned by the Israeli Defence Ministry.534 According to 
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the settler population in East Jerusalem at the end of 2008 has 
increased by 193,700, while the overall growth rate of the settlement population (excluding East 
Jerusalem) was at 4.7 percent compared to 1.6 percent for the Israeli population in general. This rate 
of growth supports statements of Israeli government leaders to the effect that Israel intends the 
majority of these settlements to be annexed permanently to Israel. 
Related policies stifle Palestinian economic and social development. Although the Oslo Accords 
accorded planning powers to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in most of the Gaza Strip and in Areas A 
and B in the West Bank, Israel retained full formal control over planning in Area C, which constitutes 
about 60 percent of the West Bank.535 Area B (26 percent of the West Bank) is partitioned by Israeli 
settlement blocs over which Palestinians have no planning authority, and which break up the 
territorial contiguity necessary to planning transportation and communications grids, agricultural 
management and other regional issues.536 Israel’s policy of denying construction permits in the West 
Bank and its policies of home and structural demolitions stifle Palestinian land use and planning in 
favour of settlement expansion and bypass road construction.537  
A further measure undermining the territorial integrity of the OPT is Israel’s construction of major 
highways integrating Israeli towns and cities with settlement blocs in the West Bank. This highway 
grid has profoundly altered the political geography of the West Bank. Prior to 1967, principal roads in 
the West Bank ran North-South along the highland spine, linking the principal cities of Jenin, Nablus, 
Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron, with access roads running laterally away to smaller 
towns and villages and to the Mediterranean coast.538 Central State planning of the current highway 
grid is indicated by the Settlement Master Plan for 1983-1986, which proposed a need for special 
roads to service planned Jewish settlements and ‘bypass the Arab population centres.’539 In 1984, 
Israel’s Road Plan Number 50 shifted the West Bank’s road system to a more east-west approach in 
order to integrate it into the Israeli road system for the benefit of Jewish-Israeli settlers. An attempt at 
a judicial challenge was unsuccessful540 and the road network in the West Bank, primarily if not 
always exclusively for settler use, continued to expand. By 1993, 400 kilometres of such roads had 
                                               
534 Cited in Uri Blau, ‘Secret Israeli Database Reveals Full Extent of Israeli Settlement’ Ha’aretz (1February 
2009), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1060043.html.  
535 Under the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), Area A 
(full Palestinian civil and security control) accounted for 2 percent of the territory of the West Bank, Area B 
(Palestinian civil and Israeli security control) for 26 percent, and Area C (full Israeli civil and security control) 
for 72 percent. Those boundaries were to be gradually redrawn but have been frozen since the 1999 Sharm el 
Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the 
Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations at 17 percent, 24 percent and 59 percent respectively. 
536 Btselem, Land Grab 85-90. 
537 See for example Amnesty International, Unlawful homes for Israeli Settlers, demolitions for Palestinians, 
Amnesty (31 March 2008), available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/feature-stories/unlawful-
homes-israeli-settlers-demolitions-palestinians-20080331; and Amnesty International, Palestinian Homes 
Demolished without Warning (11 March 2008), available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/news/palestinian-homes-demolished-without-warning-20080311. See also B’Tselem reports on Israeli’s 
policy of home demolitions, available at: http://www.btselem.org/english/publications/Index.asp?TF=06. 
538 Al-Haq, ‘Law in the Service of Man, ‘Israeli Proposed Road Plan for the West Bank, A question for the 
International Court of Justice’, 30 November 1984, at 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.nsf/c25aba03f1e079db85256cf40073bfe6/8ad0157015a6c53885256982005703
ab!OpenDocument.  
539 Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, Master Plan For 
Settlement of Samaria and Judea, Plan for Development of the Area for 1983-1986 (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 27 
(Hebrew), cited in B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank 
(B’Tselem, Jerusalem, 2004), p. 6.  
540 See Al-Haq, The Israeli Proposed Road Plan for the West Bank: A Question for the International Court of 
Justice? (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1984). 
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been built.541 With the Oslo agreements, plans for a further 650 kilometres of roads were swiftly 
formulated542and Israel spent US$600 million on bypass roads in 1995 alone.543 By July 2008, 
Palestinian travel was restricted on 430 kilometres of West Bank roads and banned entirely on 137 
kilometres.544 
In sum, Israel’s publicly funded settlement policy goes beyond isolated infractions of Israel’s 
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to suggest a State strategy to annex significant 
portions of West Bank territory permanently to Israel, thus permanently obstructing the Palestinian 
people’s exercise of the right to self-determination. This policy of precluding the possibility of an 
independent Palestinian State that can enjoy territorial integrity is in clear violation of the Declaration 
on Colonialism.  
 
2. Supplanting Institutions of Governance  
Law has functioned as a principal apparatus of control for colonial powers, who supplant pre-existing 
legal systems with their own laws or special laws that codify their domination over the territory.545 
Hence international humanitarian law limits modifications that the occupant may make to the existing 
legal system in occupied territory partly for this reason, in order to ensure that military occupation is 
temporary: ‘the occupier is not the territorial sovereign. He cannot legislate for the occupied people as 
he does within his own frontiers’.546 As discussed in Chapter Two, this premise underpins Article 43 
of the Hague Regulations, one of the pillars on which the law of belligerent occupation rests, which 
provides that the Occupying Power ‘shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as 
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.’547 
Thus, an Occupying Power is barred from ‘extending its own legislation over the occupied territory or 
from acting as a sovereign legislator’,548 except where absolutely prevented. Article 64 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention gives expression, in a more detailed form, to the parameters of this exception, 
which can be elucidated as allowing the Occupying Power to take legislative measures only when 
these are essential to the welfare and rights of the local civilian population or to the absolute bona fide 
                                               
541 Al-Haq, Discrimination Is Real: Discriminatory Israeli Policies in Israel, The Occupied Territories and 
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542 Samira Shah, ‘On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank’ (1997-1998) 29 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 221, 222. 
543 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, May 1996, 3. 
544 B’tselem, Statistics: Restrictions on Movement: available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Statistics.asp, accessed 21 September 2008. 
545 See Robert Home, ‘An ‘Irreversible Conquest’? Colonial and Postcolonial Land Law in Israel/Palestine’ 
(2003) 12(3) Social and Legal Studies 292. 
546 Alain Pellet, ‘The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place’, in Emma Playfair (ed.), International Law and 
the Administration of Occupied Territories (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 201. 
547 The original and binding French text of Article 43 reads: ‘L'autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé de fait 
entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et 
d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en 
vigeur dans le pays’. The phrase ‘public order and safety’ was a mistranslation of the French ‘l’ordre et la vie 
publics’ which, when correctly translated, refers to ‘public order and life’, implying a broader obligation not to 
interfere with a country’s existing institutions. The original and binding language of the Convention was French. 
See Edmund Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations’ 
(1945) 54 Yale Law Journal 393 n.1.  
548 Marco Sassòli, ‘Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers’ (2005) 
16 European Journal of International Law 661.  
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military needs or security of the Occupying Power. These two exceptions have been held to be of a 
‘strictly limitative nature’,549 with the occupying authorities precluded from abrogating or suspending 
the laws of the occupied territory for any other reason, particularly in order to make it accord with 
their own legal conceptions. 
 
a. Altering the laws in place in the occupied territory 
Measures taken by Israel in the OPT since 1967 have gone far beyond these permissible boundaries 
under the law of occupation. In the West Bank (and until 2005 in the Gaza Strip), pre-existing local 
laws and standards have been widely changed, modified and overridden through the imposition of 
thousands of military orders by the Occupying Power. This matrix of military legislation regulates and 
controls everything from alcohol taxes550 to control of natural resources551 to which fruit and 
vegetables may be grown by Palestinians.552 Neither the intent nor impact of such wide-ranging 
legislation is convincingly explained by military necessity.  
Military legislation in the West Bank was mirrored by a similar system in the Gaza Strip until Israel’s 
‘disengagement’ from the territory in 2005. While the Gaza Strip remains under belligerent 
occupation, as discussed in Chapter II, the Palestinian authorities now have autonomous authority 
over domestic security and civil law within the limits imposed by Israel. Israel presented the unilateral 
disengagement as serving to ‘dispel claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip’553 and the jurisdiction of Israeli military orders in Gaza was repealed. Nonetheless, the 
2006 Criminal Procedure Law554 allows Israel to incarcerate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip 
suspected of criminal offences in detention facilities in Israel and to prosecute them in Israeli civil 
courts.  
East Jerusalem was effectively absorbed into Israel within a number of weeks of the start of the 
occupation555 and as such is subject to the Israeli legal system in its entirety. The entire fabric of laws 
applicable in East Jerusalem has thus been transformed, as discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
 
b. Extraterritorial application of Israeli civil law to Jews in the OPT 
Israel applies its domestic law to Jewish settlers in the OPT, rather than the local law that was in force 
in the territory prior to the occupation. This practice cannot be considered in the category of 
capitulations, such as European privileges in the Ottoman Empire,556 because the OPT lack a 
                                               
549 Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol 4, (ICRC, Geneva, 1952), p. 
336.  
550 Military Order No. 38, Order Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 4 July 1967. 
551 See, inter alia, Military Order No. 92, Order Concerning Jurisdiction Over Water Regulations, 15 August 
1967. 
552 See, for example, Military Order No. 474, Order Concerning Amending the Law for the Preservation of 
Trees and Plants, 26 July 1972; Military Order No. 1039, Order Concerning Control over the Planting of Fruit 
Trees, 5 January 1983, Military Order No. 1147, Order Concerning Supervision over Fruit Trees and 
Vegetables, 30 July 1985. 
553 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Disengagement Plan – General Outline, 18 April 2004, Article 1(vi); 
Revised Disengagement Plan, 6 June 2004, Article 1(vi). 
554 Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Detention) (Detainees Suspected of Security Offences) 
(Temporary Provision) Law 5765-2006. The original bill provided that it should apply solely to non-residents of 
the State of Israel. 
555 For more on the colonial nature of the territorial annexation of East Jerusalem, see Section 5 below. 
556 On capitulations, see Edwin Pears, ‘Turkish Capitulations and the status of British and other foreign subjects 
residing in Turkey’ (1905) 21 Law Quarterly Review at 408-425; Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, ‘The Capitulations 
of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States’ (1923) 17 American 
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sovereign government that could grant even token imprimatur of a legitimate sovereign agreement. 
The practice is accordingly in violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. 
Jurisdiction over offences and civil matters in relation to Jewish settlers rests with the Israeli civil 
courts inside Israel, in contravention of Article 64(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.557 The Israeli 
Supreme Court has extended its jurisdiction over the actions of the Israeli occupying forces and 
authorities in the OPT, sitting in such cases as the ‘High Court of Justice’ (a practice stemming from a 
policy decision in 1967 by Meir Shamgar, then Israeli Attorney-General). The High Court 
subsequently ruled in 1972558 that it ‘had the power to judicially review any military activity taken 
beyond the borders of the Israeli democracy’.559  
Although an Occupying Power is permitted under Article 66 of Fourth Geneva Convention to 
establish military courts in an occupied territory, such courts must be ‘set up in accordance with the 
recognised principles governing the administration of justice’, must not be used ‘as an instrument of 
political or racial persecution’,560 and may only be used to enforce penal provisions legally 
promulgated by the Occupying Power under Article 64(2). That Israel’s military court system in the 
OPT is incompatible with fundamental international standards regarding due process and the 
administration of justice is well documented.561 Fair trial deficiencies are apparent regarding the right 
to prepare an effective defence,562 the right to a presumption of innocence,563 the right to examine 
                                                                                                                                                  
Journal of International Law at 207-233; Norman Bentwich, ‘The Abrogation of the Turkish Capitulations’ 
(1923) 5 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law at 182-188; and Norman Bentwich, ‘End of 
the Capitulatory System’ (1933) 14 The British Yearbook of International Law at 89-100. 
557 See Section III.D.6 above for a detailed discussion of the authority of Israeli legal institutions over Jewish 
settlers.  
558 See Christian Society for Holy Places v Minister of Defence et al, HC 337/71, 2 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 354 (1972) and 52 International Law Reports 512. In this case, the Court was asked to adjudicate on 
military activity in the OPT and gave a ruling on the merits without raising the question of jurisdiction. This 
expansion of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction has remained in effect since then. 
559 Michael Sfard, ‘The Human Rights Lawyer’s Existential Dilemma’ 38 (2005) Israel Law Review 154. 
560 Jean Pictet, p. 340. 
561 See, for example, Kathleen Cavanaugh, ‘The Israeli Military Court System In The West Bank And Gaza’ 
(2007) 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 197; Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of 
Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the Occupied Territories (Tel Aviv, Ramallah, 2007); Lisa Hajjar, 
Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2005); Al-Haq and Gaza Centre for Rights and Law, Justice? The Military Court System in the 
Israeli-Occupied Territories (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1987). In his 2007 Mission report on Israel and the OPT, UN 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, reported that the military courts ‘have an appearance of a potential lack 
of independence and impartiality, which on its own brings into question the fairness of trials’: see Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Addendum: Mission to Israel, including visit to the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.4, 16 November 2007, para 29. 
562 Lawyers appearing in the military courts have consistent difficulties meeting with their clients on account of 
the fact that they are normally detained in prison facilities inside Israel rather than in the OPT. The military 
courts are also defined by a lack of adequate facilities for taking confidential instructions; by the availability of 
court documents only in Hebrew; and by the provision of incomplete prosecution material. See Yesh Din, 
Backyard Proceedings, pp. 100-125. In practice, lawyers commonly take instructions from their clients minutes 
before the hearing in the military court and plea bargains are entered into to avoid harsher sentences.  
563 Article 9 of Military Order No. 378 stipulates that the Israeli law of evidence applies to proceedings in the 
military courts and therefore provides for the presumption of innocence. Practice, however, suggests a 
presumption of guilt, acquittals were obtained in just 0.29% of cases in the military courts in 2006. See Yesh 
Din, Backyard Proceedings, p.59.  
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witnesses,564 and the right to prompt notice of criminal charges.565 The military courts apply military 
legislation imposed in violation of international humanitarian law as described above, and are used as 
an apparatus of domination by the occupation to persecute Palestinians for ‘political’ activity.  
 
The personal scope of application of several Israeli laws includes all Jewish settlers in the OPT, 
whether they are Israeli citizens or not. A 1984 extension to the Emergency Legislation clarified that,  
For the purposes of the enactments enumerated in the Schedule, the expression 'resident in 
Israel' or any other expression occurring in those enactments denoting residence, living or 
having one's abode in Israel shall be regarded as including also a person who lives in a zone 
and is an Israeli national or is entitled to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return, 5710-
1950, and who would come within the scope of such expression if he lived in Israel. 
As only Jews and the immediate family members of Jews, even if not Jewish, are entitled to 
immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return, this law was openly discriminatory in conveying Israel’s 
civil law to Jewish settlers on grounds of their Jewish identity. Laws applicable to Jews in the OPT 
relating to military service, the Income Tax Ordinance, the Election Law,566 the Population Registry, 
and the National Insurance Law are covered by this provision.567 When Israel created local authorities 
for its settlements in the West Bank, it did not use existing Jordanian law to do so but rather 
established regional and local councils by Military Orders No. 783 and 892. Settlement councils 
assumed powers and functions significantly different to local municipal councils in the West Bank but 
almost identical to the local and regional councils inside Israel.568 
Particularly significant to the question of colonialism is Israeli legislation that formalises direct Israeli 
government responsibility for encouraging growth of settlements in the OPT. For example, in 1988 
Israel extended the provisions of the Development Towns and Areas Law569 to settlements in the 
OPT, thus conveying a broad range of special State benefits to settlers. Benefits under this law include 
special grants and concessions to investment in the settlement; permanent exemption from real estate 
taxes and employers’ taxes; a grant to cover costs of moving into the settlement; loans for purchasing 
apartments and for rent and utilities, which convert into a grant after three years’ residence in the 
settlement; free education from kindergarten through university; scholarships for technical education 
and a special budget for children’s extracurricular activities; and preferential allocations of 
professional training through the Ministry of Labour and Welfare. All these benefits are provided by a 
                                               
564 Full evidentiary trials entailing adequate examination and cross-examination of witnesses were conducted in 
just 1.42% of cases concluded in the military courts in 2006. See Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings, p.119.  
565 Indictments containing the charges against a defendant are given to his/her lawyer only on the day of the 
hearing to determine whether the accused remains in detention until the end of the proceedings. See See Yesh 
Din, Backyard Proceedings, pp. 92-99.  
566 Article 147 of the Election Law, consolidated version, 1969, grants settlers the right to vote, while Article 6 
denies the same right to Israeli citizens residing outside the ‘geographic boundaries’ of Israel. See further 
discussion in Chapter.  
567 Amendment and Extension of the Validity of the Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, 
Sinai and South Sinai –Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance), 5744-1984, Section 6.B(b). It should also be noted 
that in Regional Council Gaza Beach v. The Knesset, (HCJ 1661/05), para. 78-80, the High Court of Justice 
affirmed the applicability of the Israeli Basic Law to Jewish settlers in the OPT. The same law empowers the 
Minister of Justice to add other laws and regulations to this list, with the approval of the Knesset's Constitution, 
Law and Justice Committee.  
568 See Military Order No. 783, Order Concerning Administration of Regional Councils, 25 March 1979, and 
Military Order No. 892, Order Concerning Administration of Regional Councils (Settlements), 1 March 1981. It 
has been noted that the powers and responsibilities of the local councils established under Military Order No. 
892, for example, ‘are identical to the powers and responsibilities of ordinary Israeli municipalities, since the 
Order is a copy of the Israeli Municipal Ordinances (with some alterations’. See Meron Benvenisti, Israeli Rule 
in the West Bank: Legal and Administrative Aspects (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), p. 9. 
569 Development Towns and Areas Law, 5748-1988, Section 3(E). 
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government ministry, under the oversight of the Finance Ministry and the Economics and Planning 
Ministry. Administration is monitored and directed by a ‘Ministers Committee’ which includes the 
Ministers of Finance, Economics and Planning, Energy and Infrastructure, Defence, Building and 
Housing, Health, Education and Culture, Agriculture, Labour and Welfare, Interior, and Industry and 
Trade. Thus the Development Towns and Areas Law illustrates the extent of Israeli State involvement 
in a project of land annexation in the OPT. 
 
c. Subjecting the local population to foreign administration 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires that an Occupying Power sustain the local institutions 
administering public order and safety in the occupied territory (assuming they are operating in 
accordance with local law) ‘unless absolutely prevented’.570 The ‘unless absolutely prevented’ 
exception is construed narrowly to prevent an Occupying Power from imposing its own preferred 
model of governance or from exercising any hint of sovereignty.571 The Occupying Power’s 
prerogative ‘does not extend to the reconstruction of the fundamental institutions of the occupied 
area’.572  
Although a belligerent occupant, Israel has extended the ‘jurisdiction and administration’ of the State 
of Israel to East Jerusalem (see Chapter II.C(2)). At the same time, Israel established and charged a 
military government with the administration of security and civil matters in the rest of the OPT. This 
administrative separation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the OPT raises two principal questions: 
may the Occupying Power create different geographical units of administration? Further, is it lawful 
for the Occupying Power to integrate the administration of all or part of the occupied territory with the 
administration of its own State? Both answers must be negative.  
That Israel’s detaching East Jerusalem from the OPT is illegal is indicated by the international 
response to legislative measures taken by Germany during the First World War to divide occupied 
Belgium into two separate administrative districts (one Flemish and the other French-speaking), 
which ‘were unanimously considered to be illegal’.573 The illegality of partition is compounded in 
Israel’s case by the norm preventing any acquisition of sovereignty through occupation or the use of 
force. Even the Israeli High Court, albeit in relation to the administration of the rest of the West Bank, 
has acknowledged that an Occupying Power is required to administer occupied territory as a distinct 
entity, detached from its own territory.574 
Regarding the rest of the OPT, the Israeli military administration replaced the Jordanian and Egyptian 
institutions that operated prior to 1967. Military administrations were created to govern the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, for example, occupied by Israeli forces on 6 June 1967, 
an order was issued by the West Bank Area Commander before the Six-Day War had even ended, 
stating that: 
All powers of government, legislation, appointment, and administration in relation to the area 
or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised by me or 
by persons appointed by me for that purpose or acting on my behalf.575  
                                               
570 Sassòli, ‘Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers’.  
571 In addition, Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the occupied population shall not be 
deprived of any of the benefits of the Convention by any change introduced into the institutions or government 
of an occupied territory. 
572 Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961), p. 767. 
573 Sassòli, ‘Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers’. 
574 See Teacher's Housing Cooperative Society v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, 
H.C.J. 393/82. 
575 Military Proclamation No. 2, Concerning Regulation of Authority and the Judiciary, 7 June 1967. 
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Israel claimed that it had to transfer administrative powers to a military government because the West 
Bank had only a local administration and lacked a central government. However, Israel imposed a 
similar system in the Gaza Strip, which already had its own centralised legislative, executive and 
judicial branches, autonomous of the Egyptian government.  
The military governments of the two territories were both administered by a military arm, which was 
entrusted with ensuring security, and a civilian arm, which exercised administrative powers. These 
arms had little autonomy to make decisions separately on matters relating to their respective 
mandates, and were largely fused together. Further, the interdependence between the military 
governments for the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the government of Israel itself cannot be 
overstated: the OPT, excluding East Jerusalem which had been incorporated to Israel, effectively fell 
under the administration of Israel’s Ministry of Defence.  
In 1981, the military commander of the Israeli forces in the West Bank declared the creation of a Civil 
Administration in the West Bank.576 This step institutionalised the separation of military and civil 
functions in the military government, elevated the status of a large number of military orders from the 
status of temporary security enactments to the level of permanent laws,577 and enabled the Civil 
Administration to regulate and control daily social and economic life in the West Bank. It was seen as 
‘a unilateral declaration of a constitutional change … a change in the legal status of the territories it 
purports to legislate for’.578 The Civil Administration continues to function as an arm of the military 
government dealing with civil affairs in the West Bank, under the ultimate control of the Ministry of 
Defence.579 
Thus Israel has profoundly altered the systems of administrative governance in the OPT, and has done 
so in a manner which is effectively preventing the Palestinians from developing their own political 
institutions with genuine authority, thereby preventing their exercise of self-determination. It is useful 
to keep in mind Roberts’ observation in 1990, that the law of occupation has provided the basis for 
denying the inhabitants of the OPT normal political activity and has effectively kept them 
permanently under Israeli control as second-class citizens or worse. From this perspective, the longer 
the occupation lasts, the more the situation becomes akin to colonialism.580 
 
d. Preventing the local population from exercising political authority 
Decisions concerning the OPT are ostensibly made by the military government but, as noted above, 
are best understood as being ‘in the hands of Israeli cabinet ministers and government sub-
committees’581 who are also charged with building the settlements and managing related issues of land 
and resources. Palestinians have no say in these decisions. 
Even at the local level, the Palestinians are not assisted in developing free political institutions, but are 
actively obstructed from doing so. Between 1967 and 1980, for instance, municipal elections in the 
                                               
576 Military Order No. 947, Order Concerning Establishment of a Civil Administration, 8 November 1981. 
577 Jonathan Kuttab and Raja Shehadeh, Civilian Administration in the West Bank: Analysis of Israeli Military 
Government Order No. 947 (Ramallah, Al-Haq, 1982), p.14.  
578 Above, p. 8. 
579 It is notable that not long more than a month before the Civil Administration was created, an official Ministry 
of Defence spokesperson announced that this new administration would be under the direct control of the 
Minister for Defence. See J. Singer, ‘The Establishment of a Civilian Administration in the Areas Administered 
by Israel’ (1982) 12 Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights 278. 
580 A. Roberts, ‘Prolonged military occupation: the Israeli-occupied territories since 1967’ (1990) 84 American 
Journal of International Law, 44, 98. 
581 M. Rishmawi, ‘Administrative Detention in International Law: the Case of the Israeli-Occupied West Bank 
and Gaza’ (1989) 5 Palestine Y Int L at 267. 
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OPT were cancelled by the Occupying Power several times.582 In 1976, the Israeli government 
allowed elections but found that PLO candidates had swept the mayoralties. In 1982 and 1982, the 
Civil Administration dismissed the majority of the West Bank’s elected local councils and mayors and 
transferred authority over West Bank municipalities to Palestinian ‘village leagues’, whose assigned 
role was to enforce Palestinian cooperation with Israeli authorities rather than develop Palestinian 
political institutions.583  
The Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority ostensibly 
granted a degree of autonomy to Palestinians in the OPT, excluding East Jerusalem, but since Israel 
never relinquished its control over the OPT the Oslo Accords failed to provide an effective Palestinian 
government. Local decision-making is impeded through several methods, including legal and 
administrative barriers to planning and development, restrictions on external trade, freedom of 
movement, and the detention and imprisonment of Palestinian policy-makers (as detailed in Chapter 
IV). Although it was agreed in the initial Declaration of Principles that ‘the Civil Administration will 
be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn’,584 this did not happen, and thus 
led to the provision in the subsequent Interim Agreement that ‘Israel shall continue to exercise powers 
and responsibilities’585 not transferred to the Palestinian National Authority. 
By contrast, Jewish settlers in the OPT have been allowed to participate in high-level decision-making 
bodies, such as the Higher Planning Council, which determines land-use planning in the West Bank. 
Jewish-Israeli settlers also enjoy the democratic privilege of voting for representatives in the Knesset 
who can represent their concerns to the State of Israel, whose ministries administer the settlements, 
agriculture, industry, natural resources and infrastructure in the OPT.  
The Occupying Power’s military and administrative system therefore remains supreme, and many of 
the pre-Oslo military orders remain in force. Indeed, the Oslo Accords did not repeal or revoke any 
Israeli military orders but merely provided that they be reviewed jointly by both sides,586 which itself 
did not happen in practice. Thus, the unlawful Israeli-imposed amendments to the pre-existing local 
laws were retained and cannot be changed without Israeli approval. As a result, between 1967 and 
1993, Palestinians were forbidden ‘to conduct a protest march or meeting (grouping of ten or more 
where the subject concerns or is related to politics) without permission from the Military 
Commander’. They were also ‘forbidden to raise flags or other symbols, to distribute or publish a 
political article and pictures with political connotations’.587  
The Oslo Accords loosened or eliminated some of these restrictions on symbolic expression but 
tightened Israel’s control in substantive policy areas. Of particular significance is that, through a 
consensus provision in the joint committee system, Israel holds an effective veto over any law enacted 
by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).588 Moreover, the Accords did not eliminate Israel’s 
capacity or willingness to undermine Palestinian self-governance through military means. For 
example, after the elections in January 2006, the Israeli air force bombed the Palestinian Interior 
Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry. Arrests of numerous ministers and parliamentarians, 
and revocation of others’ IDs, have prevented them from carrying out their governmental duties. Fifty 
elected members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, more than one third of the total membership, 
                                               
582 See, for example, Military Order No. 80, Order Concerning Extension of Period of Service of the Local 
Administrative Authorities, 2 August 1967.  
583 See histories of this period in M. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 548-549. 
584 Article VII, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I), 1993 
585 Article I, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 1995. 
586 Article IX, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I), 1993. 
587 Military Order No. 101, Order Concerning Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda, 27 August 
1967.  
588 Article XVIII, .Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 1995. 
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were being detained by Israel by 2008.589 These arrests have paralysed the PLC’s ability to meet 
quorums and therefore to convene or function in its constitutional capacity.  
More than twenty-five years ago, Palestinian legal scholars asserted that Israel was acting as a 
‘sovereign government exercising complete legislative, administrative, and judicial authority over the 
[West Bank] and its inhabitants and instituting major changes in the West Bank economy, 
demography, and institutions’.590 Although the Oslo Accords transferred some authority to the PA,591 
power was transferred in areas of Israel’s choosing. The degree of autonomy transferred to 
Palestinians cannot challenge Israel’s overall demographic, economic, cultural and, perhaps most 
significantly, territorial domination. In effect, Israel relieved itself of the responsibility for 
administration and governance of certain Palestinian populations while retaining full control over the 
settlement areas and general control over the OPT as a whole, in a manner which clearly contravenes 
provisions in the Declaration.  
 
3. Economic Integration  
With the development of the prohibition of colonialism, States holding foreign territory in trust, such 
as under a League of Nations mandate, were strictly obliged to maintain or keep separate that territory 
from its own.592 This prohibition aimed both to forestall attempts by the administering State to annex 
the dependent territory, and to ensure the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the self-
determination unit. Since self-determination also has an economic component, the administering State 
was to ensure the economic integrity of the self-determination unit, by maintaining its distinct 
economic features and structure.  
Similar obligations regarding occupied territory are intended to ensure separate political and 
economic existence.593 An Occupying Power does not acquire sovereignty over the territory it 
occupies and is prohibited from annexing it. In keeping with this principle, the Occupying Power, is 
merely a ‘de facto administrator’594 and does not have the authority to extend its domestic legislation 
to the occupied territory.595 As noted previously, an Occupying Power’s authority to make changes to 
the laws in force is limited to legitimate security concerns and maintaining the public life of the local 
population.596 Moreover, the Occupying Power is under an obligation to create an administration that 
is separate and distinct from that of its own territory.597  
                                               
589 As of 20 May 2008, statistics from Addameer.  
590 Kuttab and Shehadeh, Civilian administration, p. 10. 
591 For evidence of Israel’s main objectives in formulating the idea of Palestinian autonomy as an interim 
arrangement, see Aryeh Shalev, The Autonomy-Problems and Possible Solutions, Paper No. 8, Centre for 
Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv Univeristy, January 1980), p. 55, summarised in Raja Shehadeh, From 
Occupation to Interim Accords (Brill, The Hague, 1997), p.15.   
592 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970), Declaration on principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, expressly provides that, under the UN Charter, the territory of a non-self-governing territory has ‘a 
status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it’.  
593 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, above fn.23, 273, para 2. 
594 Ibid. 
595UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford UP: Oxford: 2004), p. 284 
para.11.25; see Articles 47-49, 51-52, 55-56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
596 C. Greenwood, ‘The Administration of Occupied Territory’, in Emma Playfair (ed.), International Law and 
the Administration of Occupied Territories (Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1992), p.241. While other authorities such 
as Schwenk and Dinstein view Article 43 as providing the Occupying Power with greater leeway to amend 
legislation in force, all agree that the law cannot be amended for the purpose of benefiting the Occupying 
Power: see Yoram Dinstein, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent Occupation and 
Peacebuilding, Occassional Paper Series, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (Fall 2004), 
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The Occupying Power’s use of property situated in the occupied territory is also limited. Article 55 of 
the 1907 Hague Regulations provides:  
The occupying state shall be regarded only as an administrator and usufructuary of public 
buildings, real estate, forests, agricultural estates belonging to the hostile state and situation in 
occupied territory. It must safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in 
accordance with the rules of usufruct.   
The principle of usufruct permits the Occupying Power to enjoy the fruits of another’s property, 
including selling crops and timber, leasing it to others, but the occupant is prohibited from 
substantially altering the fundamental character of the property or destroying it.598 The occupant must 
respect the ‘substance or capital of publicly owned immovable property.’ 599 Hence, the Occupying 
Power may not exploit immovable property ‘beyond normal use’, sell the property or otherwise 
dispose of it or, for example, cut more timber than was cut prior to occupation. 600 The Occupying 
Power does not gain title to public immoveable property and thus cannot dispose of it at will. Private 
property, whether moveable or immoveable, cannot be confiscated,601 although it can be requisitioned 
and used temporarily by the Occupying Power. Nor can it be sold, even if the proceeds of the sale 
were given to the rightful owner at the end of the war. 602  
Different types of property – public and private, movable and immovable – entail different treatment 
under the 1907 Hague Regulations, as these have been interpreted in litigation arising principally out 
of World Wars I and II. The governing principle is that ‘under the rules of war, the economy of an 
occupied country can only be required to bear the expenses of the occupation, and these should not be 
greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be expected to bear.’603 Thus an Occupying 
Power is allowed to seize or appropriate only property required to fulfil the needs of the occupying 
army or to defray the costs of administering the occupation of the local population.604 The Occupying 
Power is prohibited from taking property for commercial purposes, whether to fulfil the Occupying 
Power’s domestic needs or benefit its own economy.605 It is also forbidden to remove from the 
                                                                                                                                                  
available at: http://www.hpcr.org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper1.pdf; and E. Schwenk, ‘Legislative Power of the 
Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations’ (1944-1945) 54 Yale Law Journal 393.   
597 C. Greenwood, ‘The Administration of Occupied Territory’, pp. 260 and 265. Although the obligation to 
create a separate administrative regime persists, Judge Kooijmans has observed that many Occupying Powers 
have not created a formal administration; see Separate Opinion Kooijmans, Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) ICJ Rep, 2005, 306 at 316-317, paras. 40-41.  
598See Iain Scobbie, ‘Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation through Permanent Sovereignty’, 
in S. Bowen (ed.), Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (Kluwer: The Hague: 1997), pp. 233-234. 
599 Ibid.  
600 Gerhard Von Glahn, The occupation of enemy territory: a commentary on the law and practice of belligerent 
occupation (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1957), pp. 176-178. 
601 This is provided by Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, save for the exception of private property, 
which falls into the category of munitions de guerre by virtue of Article 53. 
602 Von Glahn, The Occupation of enemy territory, p. 186. 
603 In Re Krupp, (US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 30 June 1948), 15 International Law Reports 620 at 622, 
see 622-625 generally: see also Trial of the Major War Criminals (In re Goering and others), (International 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1 October 1946), 13 International Law Reports 203 at 214-216; In Re Flick, (US 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 22 December 1947), 14 International Law Reports 266 at 271; In Re Krauch (IG 
Farben trial), (US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 29 July 1948) 15 International Law Reports 668 at 672-678; 
and N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and others v. The War Damage Commission, (Singapore Oil 
Stocks Case), 23 International Law Reports 810. 
604 See Articles 52 and 53, 1907 Hague Regulations.  
605 See, for example, E. Cummings, ‘Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories under the Law of Belligerent 
Occupation’ (1974) 9 Journal of International Law and Economics 533 at 574-78; US Department of State, 
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occupied territory any private or public property and to merge that property into its domestic 
economy.606 The economy of the occupied territory is to be kept intact, except for the carefully 
defined permissions afforded the Occupying Power.607 Otherwise, as Benvenisti has pointed out, 
economic integration may simply act as an incentive for the occupation to continue.608 
 
a. Israeli practices breaching the prohibition on economic integration 
Simultaneously with establishing settlements in the OPT, Israel undertook a policy to integrate the 
economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into the State of Israel.609 This policy included a range of 
measures designed to appropriate natural resources, redirect Palestinian labour to foster economic 
dependence on Israel, and integrate the capital markets.610  
The Israeli government has designated many West Bank settlement blocs as National Priority Areas, 
authorised to receive financial incentives—tax breaks, grants, and reduced fees—administered 
through Israeli government ministries.611 Israel has historically allocated larger proportions of 
financial resources to the Israeli local settlements authorities situated in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories than those situated in Israel.612 The economic and civil integration of settlements into Israel 
was achieved by extending Israeli customs and policing services to areas of the West Bank, as if they 
were in Israel.613 In 1967, Israel issued Military Order 31, which designated the West Bank as a 
distinct customs zone, but later that year Military Order 103 eliminated all tariffs and customs duties 
on goods entering the West Bank from Israel.614 
In his opinion in the Christian Society for the Holy Places judgment, Deputy President Sussman relied 
upon the prolonged nature of the occupation to rule that the occupant has a duty to adapt the law to 
respond to changing needs in economic and social matters. He concluded that the occupant has the 
duty to legislate for the welfare of the local population, a view that Kretzmer terms the ‘benevolent 
occupant’ approach:615  
                                                                                                                                                  
‘The Laws of War: Legal Regulation of Use of Force’, in 1979 Digest of United States Practice in International 
Law at 920-922; and E. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Occupation (Rumford Press: 
Washington: 1942), pp. 34-36. 
606 Cummings, p. 155, citing I. Vasarhelyi, Restitution in International Law (1964); and Greenwood, p. 251.  
607 In Re Krupp, 154 International Law Reports at 622-623. The laws of usufruct permit the occupier to continue 
the reasonable exploitation of already operating oil wells, but do not permit the development and exploitation of 
new oil fields: see U.S. Dept of State Memorandum of law on Israel's right to develop new oil fields in Sinai and 
the Gulf of Suez of 1 October 1976 16 ILM 733 (1977) 734; and Scobbie, ‘Natural Resources’, 239-240.  
608 Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 144. 
609 Geoffrey Aronson, Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada (Kegan Paul International and Institute for Palestine 
Studies, 1990), pp.14-19, 24-28; also Sarah Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), 147-150. 
610 Roy, Ibid., p. 147 
611 Btselem, Land Grab, p. 73-76. 
612 Btselem, Land Grab, p. 77-84. 
613 The Knesset adopted a Law for extending the validity of emergency regulations (Judea and Samaria and the 
Gaza Strip – Jurisdiction in crimes and legal aid) 2002 on 26 June 2002 and subsequently extended it until 30 
June 2012. This law was published in the Israeli ‘Law Book’ No. 1853 Page No. 458 on 27 June 2002;  קוח
 םוריח תעש תונקת לש ןפקות תכראהל) הזע לבחו ןורמושהו הדוהי- תיטפשמ הרזעו תוריבעב טופיש( ,סשתה‘ב -2002 . 
614 Military Order 103 of 1967. 
615 See David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 
(New York: SUNY, 2002), pp. 58-59. 
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In inquiring whether the legislative measures of an Occupying Power are at one with the 
provisions of Article 43, considerable importance attaches to the question of the motives of 
the legislator. Has he legislated in order to advance his own interests or out of a desire to care 
for the well-being of the civil population, ‘la vie publique’ of which Article 43 speaks? All 
agree that any legislative measure not concerned with the welfare of the inhabitants is invalid 
and goes beyond the authority of the Occupant.616 
The distinction Sussman drew between interests of the occupant and of the local population reflects 
the fundamental principle of the law of occupation: that the occupant is only in temporary 
administrative control of the territory and is not its sovereign. The territories involved—the occupied 
territory and the occupant’s home territory—are to be treated as separate entities. While this onus of 
separation is implicit in prohibitions against annexing occupied territory, it is also expressed in rules 
governing regulation of the economy of occupied territory 
In judgments hinging on its doctrine of prolonged occupation, Israel’s High Court has upheld 
measures that systematically efface the principle of the separateness of the occupied Palestinian 
territories. By including settlers within the category of inhabitants whose welfare the occupant must 
promote, the High Court endorsed an obliteration of the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
inhabitants. In Electricity Company No.1, the Court simply asserted that ‘the residents of Kiryat Arba 
must be regarded as having been added to the local population and they are also entitled to a regular 
supply of electricity’.617 Similarly, in Economic Corporation for Jerusalem, the Court held that in 
assessing changes during a prolonged occupation for the purpose of applying Article 43, a relevant 
‘new reality’ was the existence of settlements.618 In doing so, the Court thus conferred apparent 
legitimacy upon a situation unlawful in itself. 
The Court has also undermined the temporary nature of occupation by upholding changes made 
within the OPT which will subsist after the end of occupation, such as the construction of road 
systems linking the West Bank, and settlements, to metropolitan Israel,619 and the integration of 
                                               
616 Christian Society for the Holy Places v Minister of Defence and others, 52 International Law Reports 512, 
opinion of Deputy President Sussman at 515: see also ‘A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea 
and Samaria Region v Commander of the IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al’ (1984) 14 Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 301, opinion of Justice Barak at 304, and as Ja’amait Ascan, Kretzmer, Occupation 
of justice, p. 69: ‘The military commander may not consider the national, economic or social interests of his own 
country, unless they have implications for his security interest or the interests of the local population’.  
617 Electricity Corporation for Jerusalem District Ltd v. Minister of Defence et al, as discussed in Kretzmer, 
Occupation of justice, p. 65: this aspect of the judgment is not noted in the summary contained in 5 Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights (1975) 381. Settlers are not protected persons for the purposes of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention because they are nationals of the Occupying Power: see Article 4. 
618 Economic Corporation for Jerusalem Ltd v Commander of the IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region 
et al, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2000) 322 at 324. This is an even more marked feature in 
proceedings which pit the interests of the indigenous population against those of settlers, such as cases involving 
the confiscation of privately owned land in order to ensure the security of Jewish worshippers within the West 
Bank: see, for example, Hass v IDF Commander in the West Bank (the Machpela Cave case), HCJ 10356/02 (4 
March 2004) (2004) Israel Law Reports 53 (this case was joined with HCJ 10497/02, Hebron Municipality v 
IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria); Bethlehem Municipality v the State of Israel (Rachel’s Tomb case), 
HCJ 1890/03 (3 February 2005), available at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/03/900/018/n24/03018900.n24.pdf; also those dealing with the route of the 
barrier wall in the West Bank: for example, Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel and 
Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (HCJ 2056/04, 30 June 2004, 43 ILM 1099 (2004) and 
Mara’abe and others v. The Prime Minister of Israel and others (HCJ 7857/04, 15 September 2005, 45 ILM 
202 (2006). These judgments are also available in English on the website of the Israeli Supreme Court, 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html.  
619 See ‘A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Samaria region v. Commander of the IDF 
Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al’ (1984) 14 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 301 and as 
Ja’amait Ascan, Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, pp. 69-70; and compare ‘Tabib et al v. (a) Minister of Defence 
and (b) Military Governor of Tulkarem’ (1983) 13 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 364.  
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Palestinian electricity infrastructure to that of Israel.620 Water supplies have also been made dependent 
upon Mekorot, Israel’s national water company. Although in the Elon Moreh case, Justice Landau 
ruled that an occupant could not create facts (in this case a settlement) for its military purposes that 
were intended from the outset to last beyond the termination of military rule,621 this test was soon 
reformulated by Justice Cahan in Electricity Company No.2 to provide: 
generally, in the absence of special circumstances, the Commander of the region should not 
introduce in an occupied area modifications which, even if they do not alter the existing law, 
would have a far-reaching and prolonged impact on it, far beyond the period when the 
military administration will be terminated one way or another, save for actions undertaken for 
the benefit of the inhabitants of the area.622 
While in that case Justice Cahan held that there was insufficient reason to divest the Jerusalem 
District Electricity Company of its concession to supply electricity within the West Bank in favour of 
the Israel Electricity Corporation, this had occurred in relation to the supply of electricity to Hebron 
by virtue of the Electricity Company No.1 case. 
In Cooperative Society, Justice Barak affirmed Sussman’s views regarding the changing needs of the 
population of occupied territory expressed in Christian Society for the Holy Places, but found that the 
occupant’s authority extended ‘to taking all measures necessary to ensure growth, change and 
development’.623 The Court considered objections to a plan to build highways connecting towns in the 
West Bank with Jerusalem. During the proceedings the respondents had conceded that the roads 
would benefit residents of Israel and ease travel between Israel and the West Bank, but also argued 
that many West Bank residents travelled to work in Israel.624 Affirming the Court’s rulings in the 
Electricity Company cases on the legitimacy of the creation of permanent changes in occupied 
territory, Barak formulated the governing rule as: 
Long-term fundamental investments in an occupied area bringing about permanent changes 
that may last beyond the period of the military administration are permitted if required for the 
benefit of the local population—provided there is nothing in these investments that might 
introduce an essential modification in the basic institutions of the area.625 
Further, in order to carry out ‘fundamental investments and long-range projects for the benefit of the 
local population [...] the military administration is entitled to cooperate with the Occupying State’.626 
Kretzmer commented on this approach thus:  
The notion of ‘public benefit’ is intimately connected to political objectives and interests. The 
model applied by Justice Barak is reminiscent of a colonial model of governors who know 
what is best for the natives. Development is assumed beneficial and large highways must be 
for the public good, as must improved connections between the Occupied Territories and 
Israel itself. There is, however, nothing inherently good about development the adverse 
consequences of which may override benefits. It is quite true that people may opt for 
development despite its adverse consequences, but should a temporary regime make this 
                                               
620 See ‘Electricity Corporation for Jerusalem District, Ltd v. Minister of Defence et al’ (1975) 5 Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 381; and compare ‘Jerusalem District Electricity Co Ltd v. Minister of Energy and 
Infrastructure and Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region’ (1981) 11 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 
354. See also Jaber al Bassiouni Ahmed et al v. The Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (HC 9132/07, 30 
January 2008), unofficial English translation available at:  www.adalah.org/eng/gaza%20report.html.  
621 ‘Dweikat v. Government of Israel’, (1979) 9 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 345 at 350.  
622 ‘Jerusalem District Electricity Co Ltd, at 357. 
623 ‘A Cooperative Society, at 308-309. 
624 Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, p. 68. 
625 A Cooperative Society, at 310. 
626 Ibid., at 313.  
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irrevocable decision? Moreover, is improving connections between the West Bank and Israel 
necessarily for the good of the West Bank residents, on the not unreasonable assumption that 
many of these residents would prefer to break those connections?627 
 
b. Example of economic integration: value added tax 
The integration of the OPT’s economy into that of Israel is perhaps best revealed in the measures that 
gave rise to the proceedings in Bassil Abu Aita et al v The Regional Commander of Judea and 
Samaria and Staff Officer in charge of matters of customs and excise.628 The immediate cause was the 
introduction of value-added tax (VAT) into the occupied Palestinian territories. Notably, Feilchenfeld 
rejects the claim that an occupant may create a customs union between its territory and occupied 
territory because ‘this almost invariably would be an intrinsic measure of complete annexation which 
a mere occupant has no right to effect’.629 In essence, the economy of occupied territory must be kept 
separate from that of the occupant as ‘the economic substance of the belligerently occupied territory 
must not be taken over by the occupant or put to the service of his war effort’: 
The economy of the belligerently occupied territory is to be kept intact, except for carefully 
defined permissions given to the occupying authority—permissions which all refer to the 
army of occupation. Just as the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not be forced to help 
the enemy in waging the war against their own country or their country’s allies, so must the 
economic assets of the occupied territory not be used in such a manner.630 
The post-World War II tribunals may have been influenced to some degree in their strictures against 
economic convergence by the Austro-German customs union advisory opinion.631 In this opinion, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that Austria’s independence would be compromised if 
it lost its ‘sole right of decision in all matters economic, political, financial or other’.632 Axiomatically, 
if an occupant were to merge the economy of occupied territory with its own, then the latter would 
lose its independence. It would no longer be sovereign but effectively be annexed, contrary to the 
fundamental purpose of the law of occupation. 
In his opinion in Abu Aita, Justice Shamgar started from the proposition that the removal or continued 
maintenance of customs barriers between an occupant’s territory and the territories it occupies was a 
matter to be decided by the military government of the occupied territories. Its decision could not be 
contested provided its action caused no significant damage to the economy of the occupied 
territories.633 It had been decided at the start of the occupation that ‘the two economies would not be 
separated’ because the economy of the occupied territories was ‘umbilically tied to the economy of 
Israel’.634 This integration was effected by the removal of the customs barriers between the occupied 
                                               
627 Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, p. 70, note omitted. 
628 Bassil Abu Aita et al v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria and Staff Officer in charge of 
matters of customs and excise, HC 69/81 (5 April 1983), 37(2) Piskei Din 197 (original Hebrew text), 7 Selected 
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 1 (1983-87) (English translation) available at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/81/690/000/z01/81000690.z01.pdf  (English translation). Extracts from 
Shamgar’s opinion in Abu Aita are provided at (1983) 13 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 348. 
629 Ernst Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation (Washington: Columbia 
University Press, 1942) p. 83. 
630 In re Krupp, (US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 30 June 1948), 15 International Law Reports 620 at 622-
623: compare In re Krauch and others (IG Farben trial), (US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 29 July 1948), 
15 International Law Reports 668 at 674. 
631 Customs regime between Germany and Austria (Protocol of March 19th, 1931) advisory opinion, PCIJ, 
Ser.A/B, No.41 (1931). 
632 Austro-German customs union advisory opinion, PCIJ, Ser.A/B, No. 41 (1931) 45. 
633 Abu Aita, 223/23/31, para. 7. 
634 Abu Aita, 321/104/143, para. 52©. 
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territories and Israel and the introduction of uniform rates of indirect taxes.635 
 Invoking the prolonged occupation argument, that changing circumstances in occupied 
territory justify the introduction of new measures by the occupant in order that it may fulfil its 
obligation under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations to ensure civil life, Shamgar asserted that 
freezing the tax regime as it existed at the start of the occupation could, through time, be detrimental 
to the economy of occupied territory by preventing its development and adjustment to changes in the 
world and regional economy, as well as to changes in the economy of the occupant.636 He ruled that 
the proposed legislative change did adequately balance the welfare of the population of the occupied 
territories and Israel’s security: 
military government has a clear and direct interest in avoiding any disruptions in the regional 
economy and inter alia it will do all it possibly can to prevent as far as possible reduction in 
trade or increase in unemployment. To cut off existing markets, especially those created 
during the period of military government, has a direct effect on incomes and therefore upon 
the standard of living; unemployment is a fermenting and unsettling factor from the 
standpoint of security and both these phenomena are among those the military government 
tries to avoid in so far as possible; at least a military government that aspires to the good of 
the public in the territory, and the good of the security interests of the occupier in so far as 
possible and practicable.637 
In addition, Shamgar employed the parallel application argument, that because VAT had been 
introduced in Israel as well as in the occupied territories, this was a reasonable use of the powers 
granted to Israel by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.638  
As Kretzmer has observed, there is generally a strong connection between steps taken by the military 
authorities in the occupied territories and the political agenda of the Israeli government.639 Israel’s 
association agreement with the European Economic Communities had made its introduction of VAT 
vital as a consequence of the removal of customs barriers between Israel and European Economic 
Community (EEC) member States, and this has ‘had direct repercussions in the territories’: 
Economic integration—as a compelling motive for introducing the tax—was obviously a 
dominant factor in all decisions having implications on the economic relations between Israel 
and the territories.640 
Shamgar viewed the only alternative as being to separate the economies of the occupied territories and 
Israel, but to this he claimed, would breach Israel’s duties under Article 43 as it ‘would impede the 
possibility of a return to orderly life and prevent the effective observance of the duty regarding the 
assurance of ‘la vie publique’. Having accepted that a value added tax must be introduced in Israel, 
‘the wheel could not have been turned back without affecting the proper fulfilment of the duties 
deriving from Article 43’. Shamgar concluded that the integration of the economies required that strict 
attention be paid to parallel fiscal and economic developments: ‘The method of tackling economic 
problems in Israel cannot, it seems, stop at the old pre-1967 borders which today are open for passage 
of people and trade’.641 
Although Shamgar paid lip service to the autonomy of the military authorities in economic matters, 
this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the introduction of VAT was driven by Israel’s own 
economic policy. The military authorities simply ‘served as proxies for the implementation of 
                                               
635 Abu Aita, 222/22/29, para.7. 
636 Abu Aita, 272-273/64-65/88, para.25e. 
637 Abu Aita, 314/98/135, para.50e. 
638 Abu Aita, 314-315/98-99/135-136, para,50e. 
639 Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, p. 64. 
640 Abu Aita, 317/101/138, para.51. 
641 Abu Aita, 321/105/143-144, para.52(c). 
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economic policies decided upon by the Israeli body-politic’.642 It seems impossible to justify this by 
reference to the test that innovation within occupied territory should be determined by the interests of 
its population and not those of the occupant, all the more so when the rationale for its necessity was 
the earlier unlawful act of the integration of the economies. This was simply a case of compounding 
illegality under the guise of benevolence. 
 When one also takes into account the creation of water and electricity dependence—whose 
consequences gave rise to events leading to Jaber al Bassouini Ahmed et al v The Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence643—and the weight given to the interests of settlers unconnected with the 
administration of the occupied territories in determining policy, it seems clear that the interests of the 
Palestinian population of the OPT have been systematically subordinated to Israel’s domestic 
concerns. This rejects the rationale of the law of occupation, as it amounts to a de facto annexation, 
denying Palestinian interests their proper weight in the formulation of policy and certainly blocking 
Palestinian participation in policy-making. Although this situation has developed and persisted under 
the mantle of occupation, it is pointedly akin to colonialist behaviour as prohibited under international 
law.  
 
4. Violation of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
The right to self-determination entails substantive entitlements including the right of a people to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources:644 that is, ‘the right of a State or a people to 
dispose freely of its natural resources and wealth within the limits of national jurisdiction.’645 It also 
entails the right to prospect, explore, develop, and market such natural resources; the right to use its 
natural resources to promote national development; the right to conserve and manage natural 
resources pursuant to national environmental policies; the right to regulate foreign investment; and the 
right to an equitable share in trans-boundary resources.646 This right to freely use and exploit their 
natural resources for their own end constitutes an inherent right of a people and is a principle of 
customary international law.647 The exploitation or plundering of marine, water, and other natural 
resources of colonial and non-self-governing territories by foreign States or other economic interests 
                                               
642 Benvenisti, Occupation,  p. 143. 
643 HC 9132/07, delivered 30 January 2008, available at: www.adalah.org/eng/gaza%20report.html. 
644 See General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVI) (14 December 1962), Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources; General Assembly resolution 3201 (S.VI) (1 May 1974), Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order; and General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) (12 
December 1974), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Similarly, General Assembly resolution 
3295 (XXIX) (13 December 1974), Part IV, operative paragraph 8, and General Assembly resolution 57/132 (25 
February 2003), Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-
Governing Territories, both affirmed the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources of non-self-
governing territories, while the preamble of the United Nations Council for Namibia’s, Decree No. 1 for the 
Protection of Natural Resources of Namibia, adopted 27 September 174, noted that its aim was to secure ‘for 
the people of Namibia adequate protection of the natural wealth and resources of the Territory which is 
rightfully theirs’. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is also expressly identified as an aspect of the 
right of self-determination in Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) and 
Article 1 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976). See also C. Drew, 
‘The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 651 at 
663-664; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms’, pp. 52-53; and N. Schrijver, 
Sovereignty over natural resources: balancing rights and duties (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), Chapter 5. 
645 Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 260. 
646 Ibid., pp. 264-278. 
647 Ibid. The International Court of Justice recently affirmed the customary nature of this principle in the Case 
concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), ICJ 
Rep, 2005, 168 at 251-252, para 244. 
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violates this substantive right.648 As a corollary, blocking or frustrating the exploitation and 
development of a people’s natural resources also entails a violation of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.  
 
a. The Right to Water 
Water is essential to human life and accordingly subject to numerous concerns regarding human rights 
and international humanitarian law, The human right to water amounts to a collective right under 
common Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources is affirmed as constituting an element of the right to self-determination. Scholarly consensus 
is that an autonomous individual right to water does not exist in customary international law.649 
Nonetheless, while there is an absence of express references to water as a human right in general 
human rights treaties,650 it is an implicit right in the international bill of rights since its is 
fundamentally essential to the enjoyment of expressly enumerated rights,651 and is increasingly a 
matter of concern and attention for scholars, organisations, and States. As clarified in General 
Comment No.15 (2002) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to 
water:652 
Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Covenant specifies a number of rights emanating from, and 
indispensable for, the realization of the right to an adequate standard of living ‘including 
adequate food, clothing and housing’. The use of the word ‘including’ indicates that this 
catalogue of rights was not intended to be exhaustive. The right to water clearly falls within 
the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly 
since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival. Moreover, the Committee has 
previously recognized that water is a human right contained in article 11, paragraph 1, (see 
                                               
648 Affirmed General Assembly resolution 48/46 (10 December 1992) and General Assembly resolution 49/40 
(9 December 1994).  
649.See for example, A. Hardberger, ‘Life, liberty, and the pursuit of water: evaluating water as a human right 
and the duties and obligations it creates’ (2005) 4 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 331 at 
332-333, 337-338, 340 and 345; and J. Scanlon, A. Cassar and N. Nemes, Water as a human right? (Cambridge: 
IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No.51, 2004), p.12. 
650.In contrast, Article 14(2)(h) of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women requires States parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in rural areas and to ensure them the right to adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to 
housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications. Article 24(2)(c) of the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child includes, in its enumeration of the elements of the child’s right to health, 
the duty of States parties ‘to combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health 
care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate 
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental 
pollution’.  
651.See UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Economic, social and cultural rights: 
relationship between the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the promotion of the realization 
of the right to drinking water supply and sanitation. Final report of the Special Rapporteur, El Hadji Guissé, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/20 (14 July 2004), 8-10, paras.23-24 and 29; Amy Hardberger, Life, ‘Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates’ 4 Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights 331 at 337-338 and 345; S. C. McCaffrey, ‘A human right to water: 
domestic and international implications’ (1992) 5 Georgia International Environmental Law Review 1 at 1 and 
10-12; M.A. Salman and Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, The human right to water : legal and policy dimensions 
(Washington, Word Bank, 2004), pp. 56-60 ; and John Scanlon et al, Water as a Human Right?, pp. 4-5 and 18-
20. 
652.General Comment No.15, The right to water (Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11 (20 January 2003). For an account of the Committee’s role and 
competence to issue General Comments, see Salman and McInerney-Lankford, pp. 33-53. 
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General Comment No. 6 (1995)). The right to water is also inextricably related to the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12, para. 1) and the rights to adequate housing 
and adequate food (art. 11, para. 1). The right should also be seen in conjunction with other 
rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, foremost amongst them the right to 
life and human dignity.653 
The Committee observed that although the Covenant promotes the progressive realisation of rights as 
is dependent on available resources, it also imposes various obligations which have an immediate 
effect. In the case of the right to water, one core obligation immediately incumbent upon States is that 
this right must be exercised without discrimination of any kind.654 While the broad duty on States 
parties to realise the right to water is essentially one of due diligence, the General Comment states that 
its core obligations are non-derogable and no justification may be made for non-compliance.655 
In delineating the contours of the right, General Comment 15 identifies three types of obligation 
incumbent upon States parties, namely, the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil.656 Thus: 
The obligation to respect requires that States parties refrain from interfering directly or 
indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to water. The obligation includes, inter alia, 
refraining from engaging in any practice or activity that denies or limits equal access to 
adequate water; arbitrarily interfering with customary or traditional arrangements for water 
allocation; unlawfully diminishing or polluting water, for example through waste from State-
owned facilities or through use and testing of weapons; and limiting access to, or destroying, 
water services and infrastructure as a punitive measure, for example, during armed conflicts 
in violation of international humanitarian law.657 
A State’s obligation to protect requires it to prevent third parties from interfering ‘in any way’ with 
the enjoyment of the right to water, and includes the duty to adopt legislative and other measures to 
restrain third parties ‘from denying equal access to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably 
extracting from water resources, including natural resources, wells and other water distribution 
systems’.658 Further, States parties ‘should refrain at all times’ from imposing embargoes or other 
measures that prevent the supply of water or of goods and services essential to secure the right to 
water, and, ‘Water should never be used as an instrument of political and economic pressure’.659 
The prohibition of discrimination regarding water allocation is also consistent with the broader 
doctrine of reasonable and equitable use of shared water resources derived from customary 
international water law and codified in the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International 
Rivers and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses. In Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros project, the ICJ assumed that the 
doctrine of reasonable and equitable share formed part of customary international law.660 These 
instruments deal with surface and not groundwater (aquifer) resources and Israel is not a party to the 
1997 Convention. Nevertheless, in adopting the draft of the 1997 Convention which it presented to the 
                                               
653 Ibid., para. 3: notes omitted. 
654 Ibid., p. 8, para. 17, and in greater detail pp. 12-13, para. 37. 
655 Ibid., p. 13, para. 40. 
656 Ibid., pp. 9-11, paras. 20-29. 
657 Ibid., p. 9, para. 21, emphasis in original. 
658 Ibid., para. 23. 
659 Ibid., pp. 11-12, para. 32. 
660 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Rep, 1997, 7 at 56, para 85. 
Although this judgment was delivered before the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention entered into force, the 
Court cited it with approval in its finding that Hungary had been deprived ‘of its right to an equitable and 
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube’. 
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General Assembly, the International Law Commission simultaneously adopted a Resolution on 
confined transboundary groundwater, operative paragraph 2 of which provided: 
Commends States to be guided by the principles contained in the draft articles on the law of 
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, where appropriate, in regulating 
transboundary groundwater.661 
 
In August 2008, the Commission adopted draft Articles on the law of transboundary aquifers. Article 
4, in part, provides that: 
Aquifer States shall utilize a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system according to the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.662 
In its comments on an earlier draft of these Articles, Israel stated that this principle had ‘gained the 
recognition of States’.663 Accordingly, whether surface or groundwater, international watercourses 
such as those shared by Israel and the Palestinians must be divided fairly and reasonably between the 
two parties.664 
Thus, as the Occupying Power, Israel has legal obligations relating to water in the OPT under the 
principles of public international law. International humanitarian law does not significantly address 
the question of how water resources should be shared between the conflict parties,665 but under the 
Hague Regulations the permissible use of an occupied territory’s natural resources by the Occupying 
Power are limited to the needs of the occupying army, and may not exceed past usage levels. It is 
therefore unlawful for Israel to use water resources in the OPT to supply the Israeli settler population 
(unlawfully present in occupied territory) or the civilian population of Israel. Even if it does so, then it 
remains obliged to abide by principles of non-discrimination and equity under human rights and 
international water law in order to avoid compounding an already existing illegality. 
 
b. Water Rights and Allocations in the OPT  
Mandate  Palestine is a relatively arid region where water sources are scarce and increasingly costly to 
develop. Hence it is a matter of elevated concern in this study that Israel appears to have violated the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in relation to water resources in the OPT.  
The territory of Mandate Palestine has three main sources of natural fresh water. The Mountain 
Aquifer extends under both sides of the Green Line, including most of the West Bank and much of 
                                               
661 Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/8_3_1994_resolution.pdf. 
662 Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G08/615/84/PDF/G0861584.pdf?OpenElement. 
For commentary on these draft Articles, see International Law Commission, Fifth report on shared natural 
resources: transboundary aquifers, UN Doc.A/CN.4/591 (21 February 2008), available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/249/11/PDF/N0824911.pdf?OpenElement.  
663 See International Law Commission, Shared natural resources: comments and observations by Governments 
on the draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers, UN Doc.A/CN.4/595 (26 March 2008) 24, para.103, 
available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/284/80/PDF/N0828480.pdf?OpenElement.  
664 An assessment as to the constitution of ‘fairly and reasonably’ is to be based on a number of criteria, such as 
the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned, the population dependent on the 
watercourse in each watercourse State and the effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse 
State on other watercourse States. For a full enumeration of these criteria, see Article 6, UN Convention on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
665 Birgit Schlutter, ‘Water Rights in the West Bank and in Gaza’ (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 
3 at 621-644, 622. 
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central Israel.666 It is divided into Northern, Eastern and Western aquifers radiating from the ‘spine’ of 
the West Bank highlands. The Jordan River Basin is a surface-water system shared with Jordan, Syria 
and Lebanon. The Golan Heights comprises a major water shed that feeds this system and is the 
principal source feeding Lake Tiberius, the single largest source for Israel’s National Water Carrier. 
Along the coastal plain, the Coastal Aquifer is a smaller source and the only natural source for the 
Gaza Strip.667  
Upon the start of the occupation, Israel issued several military orders that integrated the water system 
of the OPT into the Israeli system denying Palestinian control over this resource. First, Military Order 
No. 92 (15 August 1967) vested all authority over water in the OPT in the Israeli military authorities 
and prohibited any individual from establishing, owning or administering a water institution (wells, or 
processing plants) without a new permit, which could be denied without explanation.668 Second, Israel 
declared the lower Jordan River a closed military zone, denying Palestinians direct access to it, while 
existing Palestinian pumps and irrigation ditches tapping the Jordan were destroyed.669 Third, Israel 
established new regulations for other districts that consistently curbed Palestinian access to water and, 
in some cases, vested the military commander with the power to appoint local water authority 
members or change the composition of the local water authority.670 Israel has also reduced water 
supply to the Coastal aquifer by diverting water runoff from reaching its natural destination, reducing 
access by Palestinians in Gaza.671  
In 1982, Israel placed the water supply system of the West Bank and Gaza under the control of the 
Israel’s national water company, Mekorot, thereby fully integrating Palestinian water into the Israeli 
system and situating it under Israeli control.672 Mekorot still supplies an estimated 54 percent of all 
                                               
666 The Mountain Aquifer is itself divided into three sub-aquifers, each of which contains a recharge area, from 
which water flows, and a storage area, in which water is collected. The Western Aquifer is by far the most 
significant in terms of the amount of water supplied. The majority of its recharge area is situated in the West 
Bank, while the majority of its storage area is located inside Israel. The water of Northern Aquifer and the 
Eastern Aquifer is located almost entirely in the West Bank. The division of the water of the Mountain Aquifer 
system between Israel, the settlements and Palestinians will be examined below. 
667 See, for example, Oxfam, Assessment Report Gaza, September 2006 (16 October 2006): available at: 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/AMMF-6VCH9B-oxfam-opt-
30sep.pdf/$File/oxfam-opt-30sep.pdf.  
668 Military Order No. 92, Order Concerning Jurisdiction over Water Regulations, 15 August 1967, and Military 
Order No. 158, Order Concerning Amendment to Supervision over Water Law of 19 November 1967, as cited 
in Center for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil, Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and 
Refugee Rights, Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and 
Housing in Palestine, (May 2005), p. 91, available at: 
http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/COHRE%20Ruling%20Palestine%20Report.pdf.  
669 Report of the Secretary-General prepared in pursuance of General Assembly decision 39/442,A/40/381, 
E/1985/105, 17 June 1985. 
670 See Military Order 484 Concerning Water Works Authority (Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour) of 15 
September 1972, establishing a water authority and specifying its functions and jurisdiction; this order was 
subsequently amended and then superseded by Military Order 1376, Order Concerning the Water and Sewage 
Authority (Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour) of 24 July 1991 which also made projects and functions of 
this authority subject to the Israeli authority in-charge and granted him authority to assume control if he felt it 
was not meeting its responsibilities, as cited in and COHRE and Badil, Ruling Palestine, A History of the 
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine (Badil and COHRE, 2005), 91. 
671 COHRE, Hostage to Politics: the Impact of Sanctions and the Blockade on the human right to water and 
sanitation in Gaza, (23 January 2008), p. 5, available at 
http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/COHRE%20Report%20-%20Hostage%20to%20Politics.pdf.  
672 COHRE and Badil, Ruling Palestine , 91. 
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water to Palestinians in the West Bank673 although it reduces Palestinian supply by 15–25 percent 
during the summer in order to meet consumption needs in Israel and the settlements.674 The Palestine 
Water Authority must purchase water from Mekorot, which is delivered through 25 connection points; 
this control enables Israel to cut water supplies to Palestinians as was threatened in 2006 in the 
Bethlehem area.675  
These policies reveal a pattern of discrimination in which Palestinians are systematically 
disadvantaged. In the West Bank, some 215,000 Palestinians now live in over 200 communities that 
are not connected to a running water network.676 As a result, they are forced to rely on harvesting 
rainwater and water purchased from expensive, privately owned water tankers. The Bertini Report 
notes that such water tankers ‘are subject to extensive restrictions on movement imposed by 
checkpoints and roadblocks throughout the West Bank. In some cases, water tankers are not permitted 
access to villages for several days.’677 By contrast, all 149 Jewish-Israeli settlements established in the 
OPT with the approval and support of the Israeli government are connected to a running water 
network. Israel’s superior pumping capacity also enables it to exercise control of water resources 
emanating from across the Western Aquifer Basis, which runs under both Israel and the West Bank. 
This helps to maintain the ‘skewed’ water distribution with an average of 363 mcm (million cubic 
metres) for Israel and 22 mcm for Palestinians.678 
 
c. Impact of the Oslo Accords on Water Allocation and Control 
Under the 1995 Israeli-PLO interim agreement, partial responsibility for water allocation passed to the 
Palestinian Water Authority.679 Although the Oslo Accords included measures that would supposedly 
make access to water more equitable, in effect they consolidated Israeli control over water in the OPT, 
through several measures.  
First, Oslo II ensured that Israel would continue to regulate the water supply.680 Shares would remain 
unchanged: the Israeli population would continue to consume 87 percent of the two underground 
                                               
673 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human 
Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, UN Doc. A/61/500/Add.1, 8 June 
2007, §29.  
674 Palestinian Hydrology Group, Water for Life, Continued Israeli Assault on Palestinian Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene During the Intifada (PHG, Ramallah, 2006), p. 13. The remainder is supplied by the statutory 
Palestinian Water Authority, by water departments of Palestinian municipalities and village councils and by 
independent public bodies such as the Jerusalem Water Undertaking.  
675 Ibid. 
676 See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the 
Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, UN Doc. 
A/61/500/Add.1, 8 June 2007, §.30.  
677 Catherine Bertini, ‘Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the UN Secretary-General’ OPT Mission Report, August 
2002, §45. 
678 Ibid. 
679 See The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 1995, Annex 
III, Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs, Article 40. One of the primary ways through which the Israeli authorities 
maintain control of Palestinian water resources is by virtue of their effective veto in the Joint Water Committee 
established by Water Committee. See, for example, Clemens Messerschmid, Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony 
over Shared Aquifers: The Palestinian Experience, presented at the Third International Workshop on Hydro-
Hegemony, London School of Economics, May 2007. 
680 Jan Selby, ‘Dressing up Domination as Cooperation: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations’ ( 2003) 
29 Review of International Studies 121,131. See also Birgit Schlutter, ‘Water Rights in the West Bank and in 
Gaza’ at 621-644. 
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water aquifers of the West Bank while Palestinians would continue to consume 13 percent.681 
Palestinians remained purchasers of water and confronted discriminatory pricing which favoured 
Israeli settlers, who benefit from highly subsidized rates.682  
The following table shows the division of water from the three sub-aquifers comprising the Mountain 
Aquifer as provided for in the Interim Agreement and in effect as of 2000:683 
 
Division/Aquifer 
Israel (incl. settlements) Palestinian Authority 
m³ Proportion m³ Proportion 
West 350 94% 22 6% 
North 105 70% 45 30% 
East 40 37% 67 63% 
Total 495 79% 134 21% 
 
Second, the Interim Agreement established a Joint-Water Committee (JWC), composed of equal 
numbers of Israeli and Palestinians, whose decisions were to be made by consensus.684 Supposedly a 
positive reform for Palestinians, the consensus provision enables either side to veto any proposal 
including alterations to the status quo ante.685 In this role, Israel has agreed only to those proposed 
Palestinian water projects that draw from the small Eastern Aquifer, while vetoing projects which 
would draw from the major Western Aquifer and approving Palestinian development projects from 
the Eastern Aquifer only if the Palestinians agree to Israeli demands to construct new and enlarged 
water supplies systems for its settlements.686 Concomitantly, Israel conducts water projects that serve 
the settlements even when the Palestinian side, exercising its right of veto through the JWC, votes 
against such proposals.687 As a result, water allocations continue disproportionately to favour Jewish 
settlers and to serve the growth and consolidation of settlements while stunting Palestinian 
agriculture. 
Third, although the Palestinian Water Authority has technical authority over West Bank wells, 
regulatory authority and ultimate control over supply and allocations reside with Israel. Decisions 
about allocation to Israeli settlers or Palestinian villages are still made by the Israeli Civil 
Administration.688 Military orders (enacted prior to Oslo) allow the Israeli military authorities to veto 
even those water projects approved by the JWC. Palestinian permits for digging wells for agriculture 
use are routinely denied,689 although permits are sometimes given for expanding existing wells for 
                                               
681 Figures derived form Israel and the PLO Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Schedule 10.  
682 Jan Selby, ‘Domination as cooperation’, p. 132. 
683 See B’Tselem, Thirsty for a Solution: Resolving the Water Crisis in the West Bank in the Occupied 
Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement (Jerusalem, B’Tselem, 2000), p. 30, based on The 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 1995, Annex III, Schedule 
10, Data Concerning Aquifers. 
684 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Washingtion DC, 28 September 
1995), Annex III, Appendix 1, Article 40(13,14). 
685 Israel and the PLO Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Schedule 8 (1.b) as cited in Selby, p. 15 
686 Selby, ‘Domination as cooperation’, p. 135. 
687 Ibid., p. 137. 
688 Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East,: the Hidden Politics of the Palestinian-Israeli Water 
Conflict (I.B. Tauris, London 2008), pp. 51-52. 
689 Ibid.; also Btselem, Thirsty for A solution, p. 42: available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200007_Thirsty_for_a_Solution_Eng.doc.  
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domestic use.690 In some parts of the West Bank, such as the southern Hebron Hills, permits are 
denied even for building cisterns.691  
In the Gaza Strip, water demand still far outweighs the recharge rate of the Gaza Aquifer. Over-
extraction by the Occupying Power has caused a deterioration of water quality, including high levels 
of salination from sea water intrusion. The partial natural replenishment of the Gaza Aquifer by the 
Wadi Gaza (flowing from the Hebron Hills in the West Bank) has been halted by Israel’s construction 
of an earthen verge in between, diverting the natural run-off and further entrenching separation of the 
Gaza Strip from the West Bank. By January 2008, 40 percent of the houses in the Gaza Strip had no 
running water.692  
Israel’s general blockage of supplies is also preventing Palestinians from accessing and managing 
what water they have. In 2008, the Coastal Municipal Water Authority, the authority responsible for 
the water wells and infrastructure, was struggling to maintain wells and sewage pumping stations due 
to lack of supplies and fuel necessary to operating the system.693 Water infrastructure projects, funded 
by the international community, have been put on hold for lack of spare parts, valves and waste-water 
pumps.694  
Far from meeting Palestinian needs, Israel’s water policy in the OPT is causing ‘de-development’ in 
the OPT. A United Nations study found that daily Palestinian consumption per capita in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip in the late 1980s was 139 litres and 172 litres respectively.695 In 2006, the total 
per capita daily water consumption for domestic, urban and industrial use by Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip was 60.5 litres696 and 88 litres697 respectively.  
By comparison, per capita consumption by Israeli settlers in the West Bank is 274 litres; in the Gaza 
Strip, prior to their removal, it was 584 litres.698 Discrimination in water consumption is not limited to 
domestic, urban and industrial use. While up to 14 percent of the OPT’s GDP is derived from 
agriculture, 90 percent of Palestinian farms are forced to rely on rain-fed methods due to their lack of 
access to water. In the 1990s, areas irrigated by Israeli settlers were, per capita, thirteen times larger 
than the areas Palestinians were able to irrigate in the West Bank.699 Israeli settlements in the Jordan 
Valley are particularly dependent on intensive irrigation for agriculture. When they had a settler 
population of approximately 5,000, these settlements were found to ‘consume an equivalent of 75 
percent of the water that the entire West Bank Palestinian population of approximately two million 
consumes for domestic and urban uses.’700 In the Gaza Strip, prior to Israel’s ‘disengagement’, 
                                               
690 COHRE, Hostage to Politics, p. 91. 
691 Amnesty International, Unlawful Homes, p. 76. 
692 Ibid., p. 2. 
693 COHRE, Hostage to Politics, p. 10. 
694 Ibid., p. 4; also OCHA, Special Focus, The closure of the Gaza Strip: The economic and Humanitarian 
Consequences, available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Gaza_Special_Focus_December_2007.pdf. 
695 See UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Water Resources of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory (New York: United Nations, 1992), Table 6: Estimates of the total and per 
capita annual water consumption in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel, mid-1980s. 
696 B’Tselem, Thirsty for a Solution, 2006. Figure is exclusive of the East Jerusalem area of the West Bank. 
697 Ibid., p. 54. The World Health Organisation’s recommended minimum quantity for basic consumption is 100 
litres (p. 57).  
698 Ibid., p. 56. 
699 See Foundation for Middle East Peace, The Socio-Economic Impact of Settlements on Land, Water, and the 
Palestinian Economy, Vol. SR No. 5, July 1998. 
700 Note by the Secretary-General, Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living 
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab 
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unlawful exploitation, unequal extraction and discriminatory distribution of water resources in favour 
of settlers were similarly salient features. At one point Palestinians in Gaza were paying up to twenty 
times more for water than Israeli settlers.701  
 
d. Impact of the Wall on Palestinian access to water 
Israel’s construction of the Wall in the West Bank suggests Israel’s intent to annex Palestinian water 
sources permanently since 70 percent of the Western Aquifer recharge area is located in this ‘seam 
zone’ between the Wall and the Green Line.702 The impact on Palestinian access to water has been 
immense:  
The construction of the barrier has closed off the access of Palestinians to 95 per cent of their 
own water resources (630 million m³ of 670 million m³ annually) by destroying 403 wells and 
1,327 cisterns. It has cut off access of owners to 136 wells providing 44.1 million m³ of water 
annually. The barrier has closed 46 springs (23 million m³/year) and 906 dunums of 
underground water (99 per cent of underground West Bank water). Consequently, over 7,000 
Palestinian agriculture-dependent families have lost their livelihood in a region where water 
resources are scarce and increasingly costly to develop. The latest barrier route will isolate 
another 62 springs and 134 wells in the ‘seam zone’.703 
That the Wall indeed is designed to capture water resources is suggested by its route, which is very 
similar to former Israeli water commissioner Menachem Cator’s ‘red line,’ drawn at the request of the 
government in 1977 to delineate the areas of the West Bank from which Israel could withdraw 
without having to relinquish its control over key water sources used to supply Israel and the 
settlements.704 The Wall will help annex to Israel major Israeli settlements in the OPT that are 
strategically located over key water resources for the purposes of control. The major settlements of 
Ariel and Emmanuel in the northern West Bank, for example, sit directly over the Western Aquifer 
                                                                                                                                                  
population in the occupied Syrian Golan, A/61/67, E/2006/13 (3 May 2006), 12-13, para.47. This statistic is 
drawn from a B’Tselem report which notes that these settlements had an approximate population of 5000, 
compared to a Palestinian population of two million—see B’Tselem, Land grab: Israel’s settlement policy in the 
West Bank (B’Tselem: Jerusalem: 2002), p.95. See also Note by the Secretary-General, Economic and social 
repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, A/62/75, 
E/2007/13 (3 May 2007), p.12, para. 40-41; Note by the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Committee to 
investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people and other Arabs of the 
Occupied Territories, A/61/500/Add.1 (8 June 2007), 10, paras. 29-30; Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, The humanitarian impact on Palestinians of Israeli settlements and other infrastructure 
in the West Bank (July 2007) 114, available at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/TheHumanitarianImpactOfIsraeliInfrastructureTheWestBank_full.pdf ; the 
World Bank, Two years after London: restarting Palestinian economic recovery (24 September 2007), pp. 22-
23, para. 64, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCMainReportfinalSept18&cover.pd
f ; B’Tselem, Thirsty for a solution: the water crisis in the Occupied Territories and its resolution in the final-
status agreement (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2000), especially Chapters 3-5. 
701 COHRE, Hostage to politics, pp. 5-6.  
702 Palestine Monitor, Fact Sheet: Water, available at: http://palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php?article14.  
703 UN Economic and Social Council, Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living 
conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab 
population of in the occupied Syrian Golan, UN Doc. A/62/75-E/2007/13, 3 May 2007, §. 40. 
704 See David Arsenault and Jamie Green, ‘The Effects of the Separation Barrier on the Viability of a Future 
Palestinian State,’ in Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information, Second Israeli-Palestine 
International Conference on Water for Life in the Middle East (Atalya, Turkey, 10-14 October 2004), available 
at: http://www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers/daniel.pdf.  
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and the Israeli government has indicated that these settlements will be annexed permanently to Israel. 
Permanent acquisition of the land and water resources of these areas would constitute annexation and 
thus a practice of colonialism. 
The measures taken by Israel, in law and in practice, regarding division, distribution and accessibility 
to water in the OPT indicate a pattern of denying human rights and exploiting the occupied territory 
for the benefit of the Occupying Power. Israel's water policies discriminate acutely in favour of Israeli 
settlers, and violate not just the Palestinian population’s right to water, but a plethora of other rights 
including the rights to health, to an adequate standard of living, and, most significantly for this section 
of the study, to permanent sovereignty over natural resources.  
 
5. Suppression of Palestinian Culture  
 ‘Culture’ eludes simple definition and is not easily codified, as its most valued elements may be 
experienced by people as intangible. A collective experience of cultural destruction and loss is 
nonetheless, for colonised peoples, a hallmark of the colonial experience. Most international law and 
norms relating to culture are either vague—the Declaration mentions ‘cultural rights’ but does not 
specify what they are—or relate to very specific practices like language and material culture such as 
art and religious sites.705 As a comprehensive discussion of this complicated field is beyond the scope 
of this study, this section will only touch on these concerns where they appear to correlate to a 
colonial project in the OPT. Under The Hague Regulations and customary international law, cultural 
property is singled out for protection during military occupation, such that its destruction, damage or 
threat is outlawed save under conditions of military necessity.706 Similarly, an Occupying Power is 
expected ‘to respect and safeguard cultural properties within the territory under occupation and 
prevent any misappropriation, theft, or vandalism directed against such properties.’707  
Israel’s military manuals include a ban on using cultural buildings of various kinds for military 
operations and place strict limitations on the use of places of cultural significance where their damage 
or destruction are likely as a result. Nonetheless, Israeli practice in the OPT displays a consistent lack 
of regard for cultural property. In particular, the protection and upkeep of religious buildings such as 
mosques,708 churches and cemeteries have fallen under the complex web of Israeli military orders 
relating to land and its ownership. For example, the maintenance and construction of buildings in East 
Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank requires a valid permit issued by an Israeli official acting as 
the registrar of lands and where the complicated and opaque procedures are not complied with, 
structures are often destroyed by the Israeli army or requisitioned for ‘military purposes’.709  
                                               
705 The most explicit statement on culture as an individual right expressed in Article 15(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries addresses cultural rights as collective rights by codifying a package of cultural 
rights associated with culturally distinct peoples living in post-colonial and other independent States. 
706 The Hague Regulations, Articles 27 and 56. Much of the 1954 Convention on the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is now regarded as customary as discussed in J. M. Henckaerts and L. 
Doswald-Back, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol 1: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. 127-135. 
707 Howard M. Hensal, ‘The Protection of Cultural Objects During Armed Conflicts’, in Howard M. Hensal 
(ed.), The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force (Ashgate, 2007), pp. 
39-104, 83. 
708 Perhaps the most prominent case over archaeology is Israel’s recent excavations at the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Both Palestinians and Israelis have accused the other of removing and/or 
damaging precious relics. See P. Reynolds, ‘In Jerusalem Archaeology is Politics’, BBC News (9 February 
2007). 
709 See for example, Military Order No. 25, Order Concerning Transactions in Property, and Related Laws, 18 
June 1967. 
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In an ironic use of provisions for respecting cultural heritage, amendments to the Jordanian 
Antiquities Law have enabled Israeli officials to categorise large tracts of land in the OPT as 
‘archaeological’ in nature and to prohibit landholders from building on lands without a special 
permit.710 No proof or documentary evidence is required for such decisions. As this land is often 
turned over to Jewish settlers,711 the declaration of heritage sites manifests as being less for their 
historical preservation than for their transfer to Jewish authority. Moreover, such sites are valued and 
protected by Israel primarily for their Jewish and Hebrew history, rather than their Islamic, Christian, 
Palestinian, and Arabic history. 
Israeli has also engaged in the renaming of towns, cities and regions in the OPT in a project to 
redesign and Hebraize the cognitive map of the region.712 Discriminatory linguistic policies were first 
applied extensively within the Green Line after Israel’s establishment and were carried over into the 
OPT after 1967.713  
Shortly after the West Bank was occupied in 1967, all printing, publishing and distribution of any 
material was brought under the purview of a designated person under the Military Commander. 
Military Order No. 50 requires a permit not only in relation to material produced within the OPT, but 
any materials brought from outside.714 Further, under Military Order No. 107, the military issued a list 
of banned publications, including works on Arabic grammar, and histories of the Crusades and Arab 
nationalism.715 Education that provides knowledge and training in cultural expression is also routinely 
impeded by various administrative and military measures of the Occupying Power.716 These practices 
damage the Palestinian knowledge base for new generations hoping to participate in Palestinian 
political, economic and cultural life. 
Palestinian cultural associations, often of a charitable nature, have also been closed down through 
vague references to ‘terrorism’ or ‘public safety’.717 Such closures hasten the erosion of the cultural 
life of the Palestinian people. 
 
 
 
                                               
710 Raja Shehadeh, The law of the land: settlements and land issues under Israeli military occupation (1993), p.  
86. 
711 For an example of this, see Shehadeh, The law of the land, p. 87. 
712 Meron Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948 (University of 
California Press, 2000), Chapter 3. 
713 On the situation inside Israel in particular, see Y. Suleiman, A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the 
Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter 5. 
714 Military Order No. 50, Order Concerning the Bringing and Distribution of Newspapers in the West Bank, 11 
June 1967. 
715 Military Order No. 107, Order Concerning the Use of School Books, 26 August 1967. 
716 At one point Israel controlled the admission and tenure of all primary, secondary and tertiary pupils and 
instructors, under Military Order No. 854, Order Concerning the Law of Education no.16 for the Year 1964 
(Amendment) (Judea and Samaria) (854), 1980. Although control over the education system was transferred to 
the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the military orders discussed are still in force and can be used by the 
Occupying Power at any time. 
717 For example in occupied Jerusalem alone 80 associations of a political, cultural, media, social or economic 
nature have been closed on the grounds of ‘public safety’. See Human Rights Bulletin for Jerusalem, Vol 2(1), 
February 2008, p.4. In relation to the recent closure and property destruction and appropriation of charities and 
orphanages in Hebron on the basis of alleged links to Hamas, see Al-Haq, ‘Defence for Children International et 
al’  24 April 2008, NGO statement on closure of Islamic Charities in Hebron, available at: http://www.dci-
pal.org/english/display.cfm?DocId=740&CategoryId=1. See also ‘Thousands Protest in Hebron against Charity 
Closures’, Ha’Aretz (27 March 2008), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/969278.html.  
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C. The Principle of Good Faith and the Duty not to Frustrate 
The Oslo Agreements afforded Israel jurisdiction over the OPT in many ways, including the Jewish 
settlements and connecting roads in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, Israel is obliged to act in 
good faith and exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that does not defeat the object and purpose of 
pursuing negotiations to reach agreement on the permanent status of the OPT.  
Israel’s continuing activities, particularly in relation to its control over the land, economy, and natural 
resources of the occupied Palestinian territories, breach its good-faith duty not to frustrate 
negotiations on permanent status issues or to pre-empt their outcome. These actions demonstrate an 
intention by Israel to consolidate its hold on the occupied Palestinian territories in order to perpetuate 
the denial of the exercise of self-determination on the part of the Palestinian population, in a manner 
which constitutes colonialism as prohibited under international law.  
This is clearly the case with East Jerusalem, which Israel has annexed. This measure breaches not 
only the law of occupation, which prohibits annexation, but also the more general prohibition of the 
annexation of territory acquired through the use of force, which has peremptory status. The measure 
has denied East Jerusalem’s indigenous population the free expression of its right to self-
determination by denying the opportunity to decide its political status and freely pursue its economic, 
social and cultural development. Thus it is a flagrant breach of the prohibition of colonialism. 
A broader expression of Israel’s colonial intent is its settlement policy in the West Bank. In the 
Revised Disengagement Plan of 6 June 2004, Israel claimed that, although implementation of this 
Plan would divest Israel of any continued responsibility for Gaza, in contrast: 
it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, 
including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and villages, security areas and other 
places of special interest to Israel.718 
Israel’s self-proclaimed intention to annex areas of the West Bank could not be clearer. It is 
manifestly analogous to the: 
practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions 
of their own population to occupied territory for political or racial reasons or in order, as they 
claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the 
native population and endangered their separate existence as a race.719 
The colonial nature of this enterprise is evidenced not merely by the physical fact of settlement but 
also the by associated legal regime that extends Israeli civil law and Basic Law extra-territorially to 
West Bank settlers on a personal basis, rather than subjecting them to the local law. As noted above, 
instituting separate legal regimes to govern settlers and the indigenous population is one characteristic 
of colonialism. 
Furthermore, the fact of prolonged occupation has been employed to justify legislative action that 
surpasses the limits of Israel’s authority as prescribed by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. On 
occasion, this authority has been used to effect changes that should be expected to endure beyond the 
end of occupation, such as the construction of infrastructure integrating Israel and the occupied 
territories: for example, the highway, electricity and water grids. Justice Barak stated the rule 
governing the legitimacy of these measures in the following terms: 
Long-term fundamental investments in an occupied area bringing about permanent changes 
that may last beyond the period of the military administration are permitted if required for the 
benefit of the local population—provided there is nothing in these investments that might 
introduce an essential modification in the basic institutions of the area.720 
                                               
718 Revised Disengagement Plan, Section 1 (Political and Security Implications), Principle Three, emphasis 
added. 
719 Pictet, Convention IV, Commentary to Article 49, p. 283. 
720 A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Samaria region v. Commander of the IDF 
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In response, Professor Kretzmer has commented that this ‘public benefit’ approach was: ‘intimately 
connected to political objectives and interests. The model applied by Justice Barak is reminiscent of a 
colonial model of governors who know what is best for the natives’.721 
On other occasions, the ‘prolonged occupation’ doctrine has been employed to support changes in the 
legal system of the occupied territories that mirror Israeli legal conceptions. The most far-reaching 
such change was the integration of the two economies through the assimilation of tax regimes and the 
eradication of customs barriers between Israel and the occupied territories. As President Shamgar 
observed in Abu Aita: 
Economic integration—as a compelling motive for introducing the tax—was obviously a 
dominant factor in all decisions having implications on the economic relations between Israel 
and the territories.722 
Moreover, these measures were not taken for the benefit of the occupied territories per se, but were 
rather determined by Israel’s own economic interests, namely, its association agreement with the 
European Communities: 
Israel's association with the Common Market made its introduction especially important as a 
side effect of the removal of customs barriers between the members of the EEC and Israel, a 
matter which understandably had direct repercussions in the territories. The integration of 
Israel into the EEC and the reduction of customs duties that followed in its steps 
automatically obligated, the existing political and economic situation, the imposition of the 
tax, which was present in all the countries of the Market, and the changing of customs 
duties.723 
Only if Israel intends to continue to consolidate its control of the OPT would the economic benefits 
arising under the association agreement need to be secured in this manner. As Benvenisti observes, 
economic integration may simply act as an incentive for the occupation to continue.724 In any event, 
Israel’s policy breaches the requirement that an Occupying Power keep separate its own economy 
from that of territory it occupies.  
Further, Israel’s policy of integrating the two economies indicates an intention to annex the territory 
as part of a policy of colonialism. As Feilchenfeld concludes, an occupant may not create a customs 
union between its territory and occupied territory because ‘this almost invariably would be an intrinsic 
measure of complete annexation which a mere occupant has no right to effect’.725 Imposing an 
economic policy that serves the interests of the occupying State yet denies the population of the 
occupied territory the exercise of the right to determine and pursue, without external interference, its 
own economic development is in itself, under contemporary international law, a denial of self-
determination, and constitutes colonialism. 
In tandem with these practices of annexation and economic integration, other Israeli practices in the 
OPT also constitute elements of colonialism. A characteristic feature of colonialism is the exploitation 
of the natural resources for the benefit of the colonising power. Apart from the exploitation of land for 
agriculture and industry, Israel exploits the water resources of the OPT for the benefit of its home 
population and for the benefit of its settlements. Not only does this policy breach the legal restrictions 
placed on Occupying Powers in their use of the natural resources of occupied territory (which are only 
to be exploited for the use of the occupying forces), it also breaches the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. This is a major component of the economic aspect of self-
                                                                                                                                                  
Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region et al’ (1984) 14 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 301 at 310. 
721 Kretzmer, Occupation of justice, p. 70. 
722 Abu Aita, 317/101/138, para. 51. 
723 Ibid., para. 51. 
724 Benvenisti, Occupation, p. 144. 
725 Feilchenfeld, p.  83. 
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determination. Thus, by denying the occupied population the right freely to determine the use of its 
essential natural resources, Israel also denies it the enjoyment of this element of self-determination. In 
this regard, the route chosen for the West Bank Wall can only be evidence of a colonial intent. It not 
only enfolds settlements, to secure the control of land, but also follows the ‘red line’ and thus 
delineates the areas of the West Bank from which Israel might withdraw or cede control without 
having to relinquish the key water resources used to supply Israel and the settlements. 
 
As the dominant power, Israel has the political and military force to determine the outcome of the 
permanent status negotiations and thus the eventual political status of the occupied Palestinian 
territories. Its efforts to maintain control over territory and natural resources for its own benefit evince 
a disinclination to fulfil its good faith obligation not to frustrate or pre-empt the outcome of these 
negotiations. It thus fails in its duty to promote the realisation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-
determination: on the contrary, its practices impede this process. This conscious denial of the right to 
self-determination constitutes the implementation of a colonial policy. 
 
 
C. Conclusion 
This Chapter has demonstrated that Israel’s practices in the occupied Palestinian territories constitute 
colonialism. Although international law provides no single decisive definition of colonialism, for the 
purposes of this study it is understood that a situation may be classified as colonial when the acts of a 
State have the cumulative outcome that it annexes or otherwise unlawfully retains control over 
territory and thus denies the indigenous population the exercise of its right to self-determination. This 
Chapter has reviewed five issues that are not only unlawful in themselves but that, taken together, 
makes evident Israel’s colonial domination of the OPT: violations of the territorial integrity of 
occupied territory; depriving the population of occupied territory of the capacity for self-governance; 
integration of the economy of occupied territory into that of the occupant; breach of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in relation to the occupied territory; and cultural 
domination. 
Israel’s purported annexation of East Jerusalem is manifestly an act of colonial intent. This is 
unlawful in itself as annexation breaches the principle underpinning the law of occupation that this is 
only a temporary situation that does not act to vest sovereignty in the Occupying Power, but 
annexation also breaches the legal prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the use of force. 
This prohibition has peremptory status as it is a corollary of the prohibition on the use of force in 
international relations enshrined in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter. The same may also be said of 
Israel’s acquisition of territory for the purposes of the construction of settlements, the Wall, and roads 
whose use is denied to Palestinians in the West Bank. By these acts, Israel has violated the territorial 
integrity of the OPT. 
The physical control exercised over these areas is complemented by the administration that Israel 
exercises over the OPT which prevents its protected population from freely exercising political 
authority over that territory. This determination is unaffected by the conclusion of the Oslo Accords 
and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority and Legislative Council. The devolution of 
power to these institutions has only been partial, and Israel retains ultimate control. By preventing the 
free expression of the Palestinian population’s political will, Israel has violated that population’s right 
to self-determination. 
The law of self-determination further requires a State administering a non-self-governing territory to 
keep that territory separate from its own in order to prevent its annexation. Similarly, it is also 
required to keep their economies separate. In addition, this is mandated by the law of occupation. 
Israel has consciously integrated the economies of the OPT within its own in breach of its obligations 
under international law. In particular, the creation of the customs union between Israel and the OPT is 
a measure of prohibited annexation. By virtue of the structural economic measures it has imposed on 
the OPT, Israel has violated the Palestinian population’s right of self-determination and its duties as 
an occupant. 
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The economic dimension of self-determination is also expressed in the right of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, which entitles a people to dispose freely of its natural wealth and resources 
within the limits of its national jurisdiction. Israel’s settlement policy and the construction of the road 
network and the Wall have deprived the Palestinian population of the control and development of 38 
percent of West Bank land. It has also implemented a water management and allocation system that 
favours settlers to the detriment of the Palestinian population. Not only is this contrary to the lawful 
use of natural resources in time of occupation, which is limited to the needs of the occupying army, 
but it is also contrary to international water law as the allocation employed is both unjust and 
inequitable. Moreover, it is significant that the route of the Wall is similar to the ‘red line’ that 
delineates those areas of the West Bank from which Israel can withdraw without relinquishing its 
control over key water resources that are used to supply Israel and the settlements. By its treatment of 
the natural resources of the OPT, Israel has breached the economic dimension of self-determination, 
the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Finally, self-determination also has a cultural component: a people entitled to exercise the right of 
self-determination has the right freely to determine its cultural development. Israel practices privilege 
the language of the occupier, while hampering the educational and cultural development of the 
Palestinian population. This is the last issue that makes Israel’s denial of the right to self-
determination in the OPT comprehensive. 
In his January 2007 report on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, 
Professor Dugard suggested that elements of the occupation were, at the very least, redolent of 
colonialism. This study has demonstrated that the implementation of a colonial policy by Israel has 
not been piecemeal but is systematic and comprehensive, as the exercise of the Palestinian 
population’s right to self-determination has been frustrated in all of its principal modes of expression. 
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Chapter IV 
Review of Israeli Practices relative to the Prohibition of Apartheid 
 
PART I: INTERPRETATION AND THE CHAPEAU OF ARTICLE 2 
(I) A. Prohibitions of Apartheid in International Law 
To assess whether the State of Israel is practising apartheid in the occupied Palestinian Territory 
(OPT), this report draws principally on the definition of apartheid contained in the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (hereafter, Apartheid 
Convention).726 Chapter I outlined the Convention’s history and its relationship to the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), confirmed that the 
prohibition of apartheid is a customary jus cogens norm creating obligations erga omnes, and 
established that, having ratified ICERD, Israel is obliged under Article 3 to ‘prevent, prohibit and 
eradicate’ racial segregation and apartheid in territories under its jurisdiction.  
The definition of apartheid in the Apartheid Convention is contained in Article 2 and reads in full as 
follows:  
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term ‘the crime of apartheid’, which shall 
include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in 
southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial 
group of persons and systematically oppressing them:  
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty 
of person:  
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;  
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily or 
mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;  
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or 
groups;  
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause 
its or their physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or 
groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and 
the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or 
groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights 
and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right 
to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right to a nationality, the 
right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;  
d) Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along 
racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group 
or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the 
expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof;  
(e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by 
submitting them to forced labour;  
                                               
726 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), entered into force 18 July 
1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, because they oppose apartheid. 
This chapter addresses in two parts the general components of this definition: the chapeau (first main 
paragraph), which establishes the purpose for which acts of apartheid are practiced, and the list of 
‘inhuman acts’ that follows. Part I addresses four general objections that might be raised in applying 
the terms of the chapeau to Israel's regime of occupation in the OPT: that Jews and Palestinians are 
not racial groups and so their relations cannot be understood within the ambit of apartheid; that Israeli 
domination of Palestinians is not on the basis of race but rather citizenship; that Israeli’s practices are 
not ‘committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination’ over Palestinians but are 
calculated only to defend Israel from a security threat; and that the Apartheid Convention cannot be 
applied outside of southern Africa. Part I also offers an overview of apartheid in southern Africa as a 
framework for later comparative discussion of specific practices. Part II then conducts a categorical 
survey of Israel’s practices in light of the six categories of acts cited in the Apartheid Convention. 
 
(I) B.  Race and Racial Discrimination in International Law  
The Apartheid Convention defines apartheid as a system of domination and oppression by ‘one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups’. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
also defines apartheid as ‘an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one 
racial group over any other racial group or groups’.727 This language could be interpreted to indicate 
that Jews and Palestinians must first be identified as ‘racial groups' in order to test for a regime of 
apartheid. Since the question of race is especially sensitive in this context for historical reasons, it 
must be approached here with due care.  
Until recently, international human rights law did not define race or clarify by what criteria groups 
should be understood as racial groups, ethnic groups or national groups. The United Nations Charter 
(1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and ICERD all prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of race as well as other identities, but none defines ‘race’ itself. In Article 1(1), ICERD lists 
‘race’ is one of several group identities that can be a basis for ‘racial discrimination’:  
the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life. [Emphasis added] 
Thus, ICERD provides a broad construction of the term ‘racial’ to encompass a wide range of group 
categories against which discrimination is prohibited. The Apartheid Convention invokes ICERD in 
its preamble and defines apartheid to ‘include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and 
discrimination as practised in southern Africa’. This reference to ICERD can be understood as 
indicating that the Apartheid Convention may be interpreted as applying to a system of 
institutionalised domination and oppression by one racial group over another in a broad sense and 
need not be limited to a narrow construction of ‘race’.  
This interpretation is supported by changing meanings and usages of the term ‘race’. The term ‘race’ 
was once considered an acceptable synonym for ‘people’ or ‘nation’.728 In the late-nineteenth century, 
race was developed as an off-shoot of European colonial discourse as a pseudo-scientific way to 
categorise the human species. Since the mid-twentieth century, when both these usages were finally 
discredited, races have become understood as identities that are socially constructed in each local 
                                               
727 Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B), entered into force 9 September 2002, Article 7(1)(j), Element 
4. 
728 Argentine nationalist Jose Ingenieros reflected this general usage when he wrote in 1915 that, ‘to say nation, 
is to say race; national unity is not equivalent to political unity, but to spiritual and social unity, to national 
unity’: ‘La formación de una raza argentina’ (1915) 11 Revista de Filsofía at 146.  
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setting and the term ‘race’ has fallen out of common use, except where speaking of racial 
discrimination. Contemporary theory of race now understands racial discrimination as resulting from 
‘racial formation’, in which a dominant group constructs a subordinate population as one racial 
category for the purpose of ensuring its political marginalisation and economic subordination.729 
Regarding groups that in earlier eras were called ‘races’, the term ‘race’ has been replaced by terms 
considered more scientifically and socially ‘correct’, such as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘nationality’: thus Serbs, 
Bosnians, and Roma are now called ethnicities or nationalities rather than ‘races’.730 
A change in terminology by itself does not necessarily ameliorate racial discrimination. The switch to 
a term like ‘ethnicity’ may even be made principally to disguise or deny persistent discrimination.731 
Consequently, whether groups are functioning socially as ‘racial groups’ (in the sense of imposing or 
being subjected to racial discrimination) cannot be determined reliably by whether they are called 
‘races’ in the local setting but must be determined by observing whether relations between the groups 
reproduce the practices of domination and oppression associated with racial discrimination. 
 
(I) B.1. The Politics of Racial Terminology in South Africa 
Practices in apartheid South Africa illustrate the need to approach racial identity as a social 
construction and also how the labels for group identities can be interchangeable and even 
manipulated. Superficially, the racial system constructed by the apartheid government was clinical 
and definitive. The Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 classified South Africans as ‘white’, 
‘Coloured’ or ‘Native.’732 Proclamation 46 of 1959 further divided the ‘Coloured’ group into ‘Cape 
Coloured’, ‘Cape Malay’, ‘Griqua’, ‘Indian’, ‘Chinese’, ‘other Asiatic’ and ‘other Coloured’.  The 
consequences of classification were immense, as it determined the daily reality of each person’s life. 
So-called ‘petty apartheid’ was the strict segregation of these groups in public facilities and space, 
such as South Africa’s beaches, according to race.  The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 
1953 required the provision of separate buildings, services and conveniences for the different racial 
groups.733  By the end of the 1950s, the use of all public facilities, from stations and post offices, to 
park benches and public toilets, was strictly controlled according to the race of the person wishing to 
use the particular facility.  Signs indicated which seat, or entrance, or cubicle, or beach was reserved 
for the use of this or that particular racial group. The system generated peculiar special arrangements: 
for example, black nursemaids were allowed on a ‘whites only’ beach if they were tending white 
children. 
At a practical level, various pseudo-scientific ‘tests’ were used to determine a person’s race:    
Fingernails have been examined.  Combs have been pulled through people’s hair: if the comb 
is halted by tight curls, the person is more likely to be classified Coloured than white.  In July 
                                               
729 See especially Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to 
the 1990s’ (New York: Routledge, 1994); also the collected studies in Paul Spickard (ed.), Race and Nation: 
Ethnic Systems in the Modern World (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
730 Recognition that race was a concept in flux inspired UNESCO to solicit essays in 1950, 1951, 1965 and 1967, 
issued in 1969 as Four Statements on the Race Question (COM.69/II.27/A, available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001229/122962eo.pdf. See David Keane, Caste-based discrimination in 
international law (Ashgate, 2007), pp.162-168. On evolving concepts of race and ethnicity, see also Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (Routledge, 
1986); Kenan Malik, The Meaning of Race: Race, History, and Culture in Western Society (New York 
University Press, 1996); and works by Anthony D. Smith, especially his classic, The Ethnic Origin of Nations 
(Blackwell1986). 
731 See Virginia Tilley, ‘Mestizaje and the ‘Ethnicization of Race in Latin America’, in Paul Spickard (ed.), Race 
and Nation: Ethnic systems in the Modern World (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). 
732 The term ‘Native’ was later changed to ‘Bantu’ and later still to ‘black’. 
733 Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook – Second Edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), , p. 53. 
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1983 an abandoned baby, named Lise Venter by hospital staff, was found near Pretoria.  To 
classify her by race, as the Population Registration Act demands, a strand of her hair was 
examined by the Pretoria police laboratory: she was then classified Coloured.734 
Yet the registry system and its identity tests laboured to administer a population with a full spectrum 
of physical features and pseudo-scientific methods generated endemic social confusion. Members of 
an extended family could be classified as belonging to different races. Parents classified as black 
could be told their children were coloured and must therefore live in a separate area. Children of the 
same parents might be given different classifications. Couples of different race groups (who had 
married before such unions were declared illegal) could find their children assigned indiscriminately 
to several other groups. A Race Classification Board took the final decision on disputed cases. 
Applications for changes in categories resulted in so-called ‘chameleons’, who were formally 
authorised to have changed racial identity.   
South African tests to determine an individual’s race did not solely use physical indicators, however, 
but included ‘general acceptance’ and ‘repute’.  Definitions of the racial groups in the Population 
Registration Act of 1950 included both ‘appearance’ and social ‘acceptance’:  
A White person is one who is in appearance obviously white – and not generally accepted as 
Coloured – or who is generally accepted as White – and is not obviously Non-White, 
provided that a person shall not be classified as a White person if one of his natural parents 
has been classified as a Coloured person or a Bantu ... A Bantu is a person who is, or is 
generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. 
That the term ‘race’ might be replaced by ‘ethnicity’ to obscure ongoing policies of racial 
discrimination was illustrated by ‘Grand Apartheid’ in South Africa. Apartheid was incontestably a 
racial system, but in the 1970s the apartheid government tried to deny this, affirming that the black 
population was actually divided into various ‘ethnic’ groups that properly constituted separate nations 
—Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tswana, Sotho, and so forth— which were defined by the white government 
according to various linguistic, cultural, historical and geographic criteria.735 This switch in 
terminology served two functions. First, it supported the white government’s claims that South Africa 
did not have a ‘black’ African majority, as the white population was larger than any one black ethnic 
group. Second, it supported the apartheid government’s argument that each black ethnic ‘nation’ 
would properly exercise its right to self-determination in a titular Homeland, also defined and 
delineated by the white government, thus allowing white (actually, Afrikaner) self-determination to be 
exercised in the rest of South Africa.736 The African National Congress always rejected this ploy, 
insisting that linguistic and cultural differences among the black population must not be politicised 
and that black political unity must be maintained to combat racial domination and oppression. 
 
(I) B.2.  Interpreting Identity: The International Criminal Tribunals  
The inherent difficulty of adjudicating group identities confronted the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). Even legal classification on identity 
documents—particularly relevant in the case of the Rwandan genocide—was found to be not entirely 
reliable.  
The ICTR, in the seminal Akayesu case, attempted to establish meanings for national, ethnical, racial 
or religious identities, as these are listed in Article 2 of its Statute (based on the 1948 Genocide 
Convention). The Tribunal held that a national group is ‘a collection of people who are perceived to 
                                               
734 Omond, The Apartheid Handbook, p. 26. 
735  See discussion of the Population Registration Act in Part I.D(1), and Part II.G(2)(a), below. 
736  See discussion and description in TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 5: see also discussion of Article 2(d) in section 
II.G(2)(a) of this chapter. 
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share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.’737 An 
ethnic group was defined as ‘a group whose members share a common language and culture’.738 A 
religious group is one whose members ‘share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.’739 
A racial group is one that shares ‘hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, 
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.’740 (Regarding the category of national 
groups, the ICTR drew on an earlier ICJ case involving nationality,741 but in social usage, the term 
‘nationality’ may also refer to groups without States, such as nationalities in the former Soviet Union, 
or identities retained through generations, as, for example, the origins of immigrant populations. 
ICERD uses ‘national origin’ which suggests this wider meaning.742) 
The Tribunals recognised that none of these categories could be externally determined with any 
reliability. Rather, local perceptions of group identities were a determinative factor in identifying 
protected groups. Even where identities were codified in legislation and identity cards, 743 the ICTR 
Trial Chamber found that what mattered principally was whether the victims considered themselves 
as belonging to one of the protected groups, or whether the perpetrator considered them as belonging 
to one of the protected groups.744 A 2005 ICTY judgment summarised this line of jurisprudence as 
follows:  
In accordance with the case-law of the Tribunal, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group is identified by using as a criterion the stigmatisation of the group, 
notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived national, 
ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.745 
The ICTR observed that, for all these identities, the protected group should be ‘stable and permanent’: 
membership is normally acquired by birth and is continuous, immutable, and not usually 
challengeable by its members.746 This seemingly ‘primordial’ quality—that is, the identity is 
perceived to be passed down through generations and therefore to be mostly immutable in group 
members—is thus the common denominator of identities based on race, colour, descent, and national 
and ethnic origin: that is, the groups cited by ICERD as being targets of racial discrimination.  
In conclusion, determining whether any group is a ‘racial group’ in the sense provided by the 
Apartheid Convention must begin from four premises. First, changing notions of race after the mid-
twentieth century have mostly purged the term ‘race’ from social discourse even where racial 
                                               
737 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, Akayesu 
Trial Judgment, para. 511. 
738 Ibid, paras. 512. 
739 Ibid, para. 514. 
740 Ibid, para 513. 
741 The ICTR cited the Nottebohm case: second phase judgment (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 1955, ICJ Reps, 4.  
742The United States Census, for example, groups ‘race’ and ‘national-origin’ as one category and specifies that 
these are self-identifications rather than externally determined: 2000 Census of Population and Housing: Profiles 
of General Demographic Characteristics (May 2001), available at: 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dp1/2kh00.pdf.  
743 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, paras. 400-1. See also the objective approach followed by the ICTR Trial Chamber 
in Akayesu, at para. 702.  
744 As the ICTR Trial Chamber made clear in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, either the victim is perceived by the 
perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a group slated for destruction, or the victim may perceive himself as 
belonging to the said group.  See para. 56. 
745 Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgement (TC), 17 January 
2005, para. 667, emphasis added. 
746 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, para. 511. 
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discrimination continues. Second, the group identities of ICERD—‘race, colour, descent, or national 
or ethnic origin’—are all understood in international law to be identities normally acquired at birth 
and retained throughout a person’s lifetime. Third, no absolute, measurable, and consistent criteria 
exist for distinguishing one of these identities from another, as the labels are frequently 
interchangeable and their use may be politicised. Fourth, racial identities are locally constructed: they 
emerge from economic and political relations in particular settings and do not necessarily hold for 
individuals across world regions. 
Accordingly, the question for this study is not whether Jews and Palestinians are ‘races’ in the older 
(discredited) sense but whether Jews and Palestinians in the OPT comprise ‘racial groups’ in their 
local relation to each other, in the sense of the Apartheid Convention: that is, groups in a relationship 
of domination, for which membership is understood to be acquired by birth and thus is experienced as 
immutable and incontestable for their members. 
 
(I) B.3. Race and Identity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories  
Group identities are in all cases complicated, but the full complexities of Jewish and Palestinian 
identities need not be explored here. In this section, Jewish and Palestinian identities are reviewed 
briefly for their various permutations of meaning to determine whether they correlate with the 
common element of perceived immutability that underwrites the group identities cited in ICERD.  
 
(I) B.3.a. Jewish Identity under the Terms of ICERD 
Today, Jews are not normally called a ‘race’. Indeed, it is a common observation that Jews come from 
‘all races’ in the sense of the old colour categories (black, white, Asian, and so forth). Like many 
groups we now call ‘ethnic’, Jews were called a ‘race’ up to the early twentieth century and some 
early Zionist thinkers, like Max Nordau,747 commonly used the term ‘race’ in speaking of Jews and 
Jewish interests in Palestine. The Memorandum of Association of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in 
Article 2(c) cites one objective of the JNF as being to ‘benefit, directly or indirectly, those of Jewish 
race or descendency’. When the term ‘race’ fell into disrepute around the middle of the twentieth 
century, it was especially discredited regarding Jews (after its dreadful deployment in Nazi Germany) 
and now is avoided as a term for Jews—except, notably, in references to racial discrimination against 
Jews (anti-Semitism). 
As discussed earlier, a change in label by itself is not meaningful regarding constructions of identity 
that involve racial discrimination. Testing for the existence of such constructions must consider rather 
whether the groups are understood locally to be identities acquired at birth and perceived as 
immutable, on the basis of which they have been constructed as being in a relationship involving 
domination and oppression.  
‘Who is a Jew’ is an age-old and even Talmudic question that remains highly contested in Israel (as 
elsewhere), particularly around questions of conversion.748 ‘Jewish’ is certainly a religious identity in 
the sense that Judaism is a religious faith and anyone can convert to Judaism if willing and able to 
follow the required procedures. Yet religious criteria are inadequate to defining ‘Jewish’, in several 
ways. First, Halakhah law 749as well as social norms provide that Jewish identity is conveyed from 
                                               
747 See also Max Nordau, Address to the First Zionist Congress, 29 August 1897, available at: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/nordau1897.htm.  
748 Most debates about conversion are between the Jewish religious movements and are pursued through the 
religious courts and other channels, but see, e.g., Tais Rodriguez-Tushbeim v Minister of Interior and  Director 
of the Population Register, Ministry of Interior (HCJ 2597/99) and Tamara Makrina and others v Minister of 
Interior and  Director of the Population Register, Ministry of Interior (HCJ 2859/99), decided 31 March 2005. 
749  See Tractate Kiddushin 68b. Talmudic debates were not greatly concerned with the question of Jewish 
identity but the terms for conversion were of serious concern. 
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mother to child: hence most Jews today are considered Jewish because they have a Jewish mother. 
Jews have indeed long been subjected to anti-Semitic attack, extending to pogroms and genocide, 
precisely because Jewish identity is seated notionally in bodies and bloodlines as well as faith.750 This 
importance of ancestry or descent to Jewish identity is codified in Israel’s Law of Return: 
For the purposes of this Law, ‘Jew’ means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has 
become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.’751 
Moreover, ‘Jewish’ is not a religious identity for those people who acquired Jewish identity at birth 
but do not practice or share Jewish religious faith, as they are secular or atheist. These people see 
themselves, and are seen by their communities, as Jewish solely on the basis of their Jewish 
descent.752  
Second, in the late nineteenth century, the Zionist movement conceptualized ‘Jewish’ as a national 
identity: that is, as a people or nation which has the right to self-determination in Palestine and that 
since 1948 has expressed this right through the State of Israel (as discussed in the next section). At the 
same time, the majority of Jews continue to live outside Israel, where in their home countries they are 
commonly understood as a 'religious group' or an ‘ethnic group’.753 Thus ‘Jewish’ may be an identity 
based on religion, descent, and/or national or ethnic origin depending on the context.  
The importance of ancestry to Jewish identity supports the core Zionist claim that Jews have the right 
to self-determination and sovereignty in modern Palestine by virtue of this ancestry. Israel’s 
Declaration of Independence states this claim plainly in affirming that all Jews today trace their lineal 
ancestry to an earlier national life in Palestine and so have an inalienable right to ‘return’ there:754 
ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. 
Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to 
statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world 
the eternal Book of Books.  
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their 
Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it 
of their political freedom.  
Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive 
generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they 
returned in their masses. […] 
The phrase ‘attained to statehood’ in this statement constitutes a claim that Jewish life in Palestine in 
antiquity was genuine national sovereignty and that all Jews today share this ancestral national origin. 
Its practical implication is that all others, who by virtue of their different descent are not Jews, do not 
possess a similar privileged right to a national life in Israel based on their ancestry. This nationalist 
                                               
750 The Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany, for example, defined ‘Jew’ as anyone descended from three Jewish 
grandparents or from two Jewish grandparents if that person was also active in a Jewish religious community. 
751 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2) 5730-1970. 
752 Arguments within Jewish communities about what behaviour is requisite to being Jewish sometimes 
reference who is ‘really Jewish’: see for example, Noah Efron, Real Jews: Secular versus Ultra-Orthodox: The 
Struggle for Jewish Identity in Israel (Basic Books, 2003). 
753 Literature on Jewish nationalist (Zionist) discourse is very wide reflecting its many currents: major architects 
include Teodor Herzl (The Jewish State, first published in Vienna in 1896), Vladimir Jabotinsky, Alan Ginsberg 
(Ahad Ha’am), David Ben Gurion, Yehuda Magness, Martin Buber, and many other political leaders and 
philosophers. 
754 See Israel's Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948 available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+of+S
tate+of+Israel.htm.  
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dimension of Jewish identity is further expressed in Israeli law and doctrine establishing Israel as a 
‘Jewish state’, as discussed next.  
 
(I) B.3(b) Jewish National Identity: Israel as a Jewish State 
Israeli Basic Law establishes Israel as the state of the Jewish people. Israeli Basic Law: Knesset755 
describes Israel as ‘the state of the Jewish people’. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty756 and 
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation757 both specify concerns with ‘the values of the State of Israel as a 
Jewish and democratic state’. The 1952 World Zionist Organisation–Jewish Agency (Status) Law,758 
whose importance is discussed below, also specifies that Israel is the state of the Jewish people: 
1. The State of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates are 
open, in accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate to it.  
That these provisions are not merely symbolic formulas but establish a basis in Israeli law for racial 
discrimination is clarified by other Israeli laws that build from the same premise of Jewish statehood. 
For example, Basic Law: Israel Lands759 provides that ownership of real property held by the State of 
Israel, the Development Authority and the Jewish National Fund must not be transferred but held in 
perpetuity for the benefit of the Jewish people. About 93 percent of land inside Israel falls into this 
category and cannot be leased by non-Jewish citizens of Israel.760 This law applies to any land in the 
OPT that is declared ‘state land’. Article 1 of the State Property Law of 1951761 provides that land 
becomes state land in any area ‘in which the law of the State of Israel applies’. As all Jewish 
settlements in the OPT are ostensibly built on state land (although this is only partly true, as discussed 
in I.C.5(c)) and large areas of the West Bank have been declared state lands and closed to Palestinian 
use, this places much of the West Bank under the authority of an Israeli state institution that is legally 
bound to administer state land for the benefit of the Jewish people. 
Similar discrimination is authorised by the 1952 Status Law, cited earlier, which confirms the Jewish 
Agency and World Zionist Organisation (hereafter JA-WZO) as the ‘authorised agencies’ of the state 
to administer Jewish national affairs in Israel and in the OPT.762 Their authority is detailed in a 
‘Covenant’ that provides for a Co-ordinating Board—composed half of Government and half of 
Jewish Agency members—and grants them broad authority to serve the Jewish people, including: 
                                               
755 Passed by the Knesset on the 12th Adar Bet, 5752 (17th March, 1992) and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim 
No. 1391 of the 20th Adar Bet, 5752 (25th March, 1992); the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in 
Hatza'ot Chok, No. 2086 of 5752, p. 60. 
756 Passed by the Knesset on 12 Adar 5752 (17th March 1992) and amended on 21 Adar, 5754 (9th March, 
1994). Amended law published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 1454 of the 27th Adar 5754 (10th March, 1994), p. 
90; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in Hatza'ot Chok No. 2250 of 5754, p. 289. 
757 Passed by the Knesset on the 22nd Shevat, 5718 (12th February, 1958) and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim 
No, 244 of the 30th Shevat, 5718 (20th February. 1958). p. 69; the Bill was published in Hatza'ot Chok No, 180 
of 5714, p. 18. 
758 7 Israel Laws 3 (1952).  
759 Passed by the Knesset on the 24th Tammuz, 5720 (19th July, 1960) and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 
312 of the 5th Av, 5720 (29th July, 1960), p. 56 ; the Bill and an Explanatory Note were published in Hatza'ot 
Chok No. 413 of 5720, p. 34. 
760 Israel Land Administration., ‘General Information: Background’, available at: 
http://www.mmi.gov.il/Envelope/indexeng.asp?page=/static/eng/f_general.html.  
761 State Property Law (5711-1951), passed by the Knesset on the 30th Shevat, 5711 (6th February, 1951) and 
published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No.68 of the 9th Adar Alef 5711 (15th February, 1951); the Bill and an 
Explanatory Note were published in Hatza'ot Chok No.54 of the 2nd Cheshvan, 5711 (13th October, 1930), p. 
12. 
762 The Status Law was amended in 1975 to restructure this relationship: see World Zionist Organisation–Jewish 
Agency for Israel (Status) (Amendment) Law, 5736–1975. 
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The organising of immigration abroad and the transfer of immigrants and their property to 
Israel; co-operation in the absorption of immigrants in Israel; youth immigration; agricultural 
settlement in Israel; the acquisition and amelioration of land in Israel by the institutions of the 
Zionist Organisation, the Keren Kayemeth Leisrael [Jewish National Fund] and the Keren 
Hayesod [United Jewish Appeal]; participation in the establishment and the expansion of 
development enterprises in Israel; the encouragement of private capital investments in Israel; 
assistance to cultural enterprises and institutions of higher learning in Israel; the mobilisation 
of resources for financing these activities; the co-ordination of the activities in Israel of 
Jewish institutions and organisations acting within the limits of these functions by means of 
public funds.763 
 
A principle task of the JA-WZO, as expressed in the Status Law, is to work actively to build and 
maintain a Jewish majority in Israel: 
 
… 5. The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the central task of the State of Israel and 
the Zionist Movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the 
Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all Jews, as individuals and 
groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the 
people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose.764 
 
This imperative was reaffirmed in the WZO’s operational platform, expressed in 2004 as the 
Jerusalem Programme, which reads: 
Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, brought about the 
establishment of the State of Israel, and views a Jewish, Zionist, democratic and secure State 
of Israel to be the expression of the common responsibility of the Jewish people for its 
continuity and future. The foundations of Zionism are: 
• The unity of the Jewish people, its bond to its historic homeland Eretz Yisrael, and the 
centrality of the State of Israel and Jerusalem, its capital, in the life of the nation; 
• Aliyah to Israel from all countries and the effective integration of all immigrants into 
Israeli Society. 
• Strengthening Israel as a Jewish, Zionist and democratic state and shaping it as an 
exemplary society with a unique moral and spiritual character, marked by mutual respect 
for the multi-faceted Jewish people, rooted in the vision of the prophets, striving for peace 
and contributing to the betterment of the world. 
• Ensuring the future and the distinctiveness of the Jewish people by furthering Jewish, 
Hebrew and Zionist education, fostering spiritual and cultural values and teaching 
Hebrew as the national language; 
• Nurturing mutual Jewish responsibility, defending the rights of Jews as individuals and as 
a nation, representing the national Zionist interests of the Jewish people, and struggling 
against all manifestations of anti-Semitism; 
• Settling the country as an expression of practical Zionism. 
                                               
763 Covenant Between the Government of Israel and The Zionist Executive called also the Executive of the 
Jewish Agency, signed 26 July 1954.  
764 World Zionist Organisation - Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 5713-1952 
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Relevant to the present study is that, in 1978, the head of the JA/WZO Settlement Department, 
Mattityahu Drobles,765 declared that the entire West Bank is an integral part of the Land of Israel and 
proposed a ‘master plan’ for settling Jews in the territory to consolidate this status.766 From this time, 
the JA-WZO extended its mandate into the OPT to serve Jewish-national interests according to the 
terms of the Covenant. Legal restrictions require that the Jewish Agency operates inside Israel and the 
World Zionist Organisation in the OPT, but this division of geographic ambit operates structure the 
partnership between the two agencies in building infrastructure that completes the fusion of the OPT 
into Israel: for example, by jointly building settlements that straddle the green line around the West 
Bank and the highway system that integrates Israeli cities and towns with West Bank Jewish 
settlements. Thus Jewish settlements in the OPT, built on ‘state land’ managed for Jewish-national 
interests by the Israel Lands Authority, are planned and established by institutions that are authorised 
by the State of Israel to serve the Jewish nation exclusively.  
The Status Law is linked to a second body of Israeli law and jurisprudence that distinguishes between 
citizenship (in Hebrew, ezrahut) and nationality (le’um). Other states have made this distinction: for 
example, in the former Soviet Union, Soviet citizens were also divided by nationalities although all 
nationalities had juridically equal standing. In Israel, by contrast, only one nationality has standing or 
rights and only one is associated with the state. According to Israel’s High Court, Israel is indeed not 
the state of the ‘Israeli nation’ but of the ‘Jewish nation’.767 Collective rights are reserved to Jewish 
nationality. For instance, the 1950 Law of Return768 serves the ‘ingathering’ mission cited above by 
allowing any Jew to immigrate to Israel and, through the Citizenship Law, to gain immediate 
citizenship. No other national group has a comparable right or any other collective right.  
 
This legal formulation and privileging of Jewish nationality shapes Israeli policy in the OPT in several 
ways. First, it has contributed to determining the demography of the OPT. About 1.8 million of the 
Palestinians now living in the OPT are refugees who fled or were expelled from homes inside Israel in 
1948, yet are not allowed to return to Israel and obtain Israeli citizenship because they are not Jews. 
Second, it has contributed to the construction of Jewish settlements in the OPT. As noted above, the 
Israel Lands Authority and the JA-WZO are authorised by Israeli State law to administer ‘state lands’ 
and property in the OPT in the interests of Jews only. As later discussion clarifies, Israel extends the 
services of these institutions—and Israeli civil law and protections—to Jews in the OPT whether or 
not they are Israeli citizens, on grounds of their Jewish identity. 
 
Since much of Israel’s presence in the West Bank involves the operations of the Jewish-national 
institutions, Israeli military policy to ensure the security of these agencies and their work—
particularly the construction and security of Jewish settlements—could be seen to have the purpose 
and effect of securing Jewish-national interests in the OPT and accordingly dominating the Palestinian 
population in the OPT on the basis of race. Whether Israeli state doctrine and law operates in the OPT 
to discriminate against Palestinians in ways consistent with the definition of apartheid in Article 2 of 
the Apartheid Convention is the subject of this study. 
Thus, Israeli law constructs Jewish identity as a national identity: that is, as a people which holds 
national rights to self-determination and sovereignty in historic Palestine. Israeli law does not 
                                               
765 As the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organisation operate in tandem, particularly in the Settlement 
Department which shares one office, Drobles is sometimes listed as head of one or the other. The distinction is 
essentially meaningless. 
766 World Zionist Organisation Department for Rural Settlement, ‘Master Plan for the Development of 
Settlement in Judea & Samaria 1979–1983, October 1978; available as U.N. Doc. S./13582 Annex (22 October 
1979). 
767 George Rafael Tamarin v. State of Israel, 20 January 1972, in Decisions of the Supreme court of Israel 
(Jerusalem: Supreme Court, 1972), vol. 25, pt. 1, 197 (in Hebrew).See also Roselle Tekiner, ‘On the Inequality 
of Israeli Citizens,’ Without Prejudice Vol. 1, No. 1 (1988), 9-48. 
768 Law of Return 5710-1950, 10 March 1970.  
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recognise any other national identity and rejects comparable rights to any other population resident in 
the territory of Mandate Palestine. Israeli law does not explicitly construct Palestinians as a distinct 
racial group, but formulating Jewish identity and rights in Israeli law and doctrine as being based on a 
shared ancestry tracing a national life in antiquity constructs all other groups—including Palestinian 
Arabs—as lacking any right to a national life in Palestine by virtue of their different ancestry. This 
formulation fits the concerns of ICERD by according different rights to groups on the basis of 
identities that are understood to be acquired at birth and are experienced as mostly immutable for 
group members. 
 
 (I) B.3(c). Palestinian Identity under the terms of ICERD 
‘Palestinian’ is experienced by Palestinians primarily as a national identity, associated with present 
residence or family origins in the territory of Mandate Palestine. During the British Mandate, 
‘Palestinian’ was a citizenship and Palestinians held Palestine passports, although Palestine was not 
then an independent State.769 As millions of Palestinians remain stateless and millions more have 
obtained the citizenship of third states, Palestinian national identity is thus associated with ‘national 
origin’ (rather than nationality in the sense of citizenship). Today Palestinian Arabs, wherever they 
reside,770 draw strongly on ideas of family origins and the frustrated need and desire for an 
independent national life in Palestine. By proposing Palestinian indigeneity in Palestine as the core of 
Palestinian identity, Palestinian nationalism directly challenges the Zionist claim of terra nullius in 
Palestine and a prior and pre-eminent Jewish claim to indigeneity in Palestine.  
Palestinian national identity is nested within the larger national identity of ‘Arab’. The Charter of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), composed in 1968, affirms the importance of Arab identity 
in Article 1: 
Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab 
homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.  
The PLO’s 1988 Declaration of Independence reiterated this view, invoking Arab nationalism and 
pan-Arab solidarity: 
The State of Palestine is an Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation, at 
one with that nation in heritage and civilisation, with it also in its aspiration for liberation, 
progress, democracy and unity. The State of Palestine affirms its obligation to abide by the 
Charter of the League of Arab States, whereby the coordination of the Arab states with each 
other shall be strengthened.771 
In this conception, the Palestinian nation is still part of the larger pan-Arab nation but it is the 
Palestinian people that holds the right to self-determination.  
Within the territory which formed Mandate Palestine , Palestinian identity is an ethnic identity in 
being distinguished by local customs and the Arabic language.772 Millions of Palestinians living 
elsewhere do not necessarily share these customs, however, though they may celebrate them 
                                               
769 See, for example, Mutaz Qafisheh, A Legal Examination of Palestinian Nationality under the British Rule, 
unpublished doctoral thesis (No. 745), University of Geneva, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales (Geneva, 2007). 
770 The Palestinian population totals some nine to ten million people, of whom about 3.9 million live in the OPT, 
about 1.3 million live in Israel, and about 1.8 million live as refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.  
771 Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Algiers, November 15, 1988: reproduced in Yehuda Lukacs, The 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – a documentary record 1967-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
772 On Palestinian national identity, see especially Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of 
Modern National Consciousness (Columbia, 1997). 
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symbolically as part of Palestinian nationalist expression, so ethnicity in the sense of customs and 
language is not a consistent factor in Palestinian identity.  
Religion is not a marker of Palestinian identity, due to the population’s mixed confessional 
composition.773 The PLO Charter affirms a non-discriminatory view of religion: 
Article 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy 
Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's 
religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without 
discrimination of race, colour, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look 
to all spiritual forces in the world for support.  
In this vein, the PLO Charter specifies that those Jews ‘who had normally resided in Palestine until 
the beginning of the Zionist invasion’ are considered Palestinians.  Nonetheless, Israeli policy and 
doctrine has constructed Palestinian identity as a religious identity to the extent that Palestinians are 
understood not to be Jewish. treat Palestinian Arabs fundamentally through their identity as non-Jews 
(understood in religious, national and ethnic terms) who must, on this basis, be excluded from Jewish 
settlements and adjacent lands in the OPT. Israel’s translation of this doctrine into specific policies 
and practices in the OPT is examined in Part II of this chapter. 
In conclusion, Jewish and Palestinian are group identities that are understood to be acquired at birth, 
in which membership is seen as continuous, immutable and not usually challengeable. On the basis of 
the two groups’ perceptions of themselves as distinct, third parties including the British Mandate 
authorities and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have treated them as 
such. Further, ‘Jewish’ functions in Israel-Palestine as a group identity in which ideas about descent, 
nation, religion, and ethnicity combine to support doctrines, promoted by the State and embedded in 
Israeli law, which hold that lineal Jewish descent from antiquity justifies extending special rights and 
privileges to Jews in historic Palestine, denying the rights of non-Jewish Palestinians. Thus Jewish 
and Palestinian identities, as they operate in the OPT in relation to each other, fit the concerns of 
ICERD regarding racial discrimination and function as ‘racial groups’ for the purpose of the 
definition of apartheid.  
 
 (I) B.4.  Inadmissibility of Discrimination based on Citizenship  
It may be argued that Israel cannot be held responsible for apartheid, whether under ICERD or the 
Apartheid Convention, because Palestinians under occupation are treated differently from Jewish 
settlers in the same territory not because Jews and Palestinians are locally constructed as racial groups 
but only because they are not Israeli citizens. In Article 1(2), ICERD provides that ‘this Convention 
shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this 
Convention between citizens and non-citizens’. Ex facie, Israel could rely on Article 1(2) to justify 
any ‘distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences’ it makes in favour of its own citizens in the 
OPT. 
It is submitted here that such a claimed justification would be in breach of Israel’s duty to apply 
ICERD in good faith, which is codified in Article 2(6) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties.774  Such a claimed justification would amount to an abuse of right on the part of Israel.775  
                                               
773 A survey in 1944 found that about 8 percent of the population of Palestine was Christian, although other 
sources put the proportion higher: see Table I: ‘Population of Palestine by Religions’ in A Survey of Palestine: 
Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry, Volume I, p. 141; reprinted by the Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, DC, 1991). 
774 Article 2(6), which is a codification of pre-existing custom, provides: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. 
775 On the doctrines of good faith and the related matter of abuse of right (abus de droit) see, for example, B. 
Cheng, General principles of law as applied by international courts and tribunals (London: Stevens, 1953), pp. 
106-160; H. Lauterpacht, The function of law in the international community (Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1933), 
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The rule in Article 1(2) must be construed, in the words of CERD ‘so as to avoid undermining the 
basic prohibition of discrimination’.776 The Committee adds: 
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the 
objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and 
are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.777 
As Keane has observed, ‘[s]uch distinctions cannot, however, be made on the grounds of race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin’.778  
The legitimacy of an occupant differentiating between its citizens and non-citizens to the benefit of 
the former within occupied territory accordingly must be determined by reference to the law of 
belligerent occupation.779 Only by virtue of being an occupant is Israel entitled to exercise jurisdiction 
in the OPT. By virtue of that same jurisdiction, Israel is also bound to apply ICERD.  This intrusion of 
specific context allows for the operation of the lex specialis principle in its second interpretative form: 
the ‘general’ law embodied in ICERD falls to be interpreted in the light of the ‘special’ law contained 
in the regime of belligerent occupation.   
The fundamental premise of the law of belligerent occupation is the protection of the territory’s 
civilian population who are not nationals of the occupying power—that is, ‘protected persons’ within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  This obligation arises from the 
occupant’s primary duty under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations to ‘take all the measures in his 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’.780  In passing, Gasser notes that an occupant 
should not observe provisions of the law in force in occupied territory which are incompatible with 
international humanitarian law binding upon the occupying power, expressly giving as an example 
                                                                                                                                                  
pp. 286-306; V. Paul, ‘The abuse of rights and bona fides in international law’ (1977) 28 Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 107; G. Schwarzenberger, ‘The fundamental principles of 
international law’ (1956) 87 Recueil des cours at 290-326; G. Taylor, ‘The content of the rule against the abuse 
of rights in international law’ (1972–73) 46 British Yearbook of International Law 323; H. Thirlway, ‘The law 
and procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989 Part One’ (1989) 60 British Yearbook of 
International Law 4 at 7-49; and G. White, ‘The principle of good faith’, in V. Lowe V and C. Warbrick (eds.), 
The United Nations and the principles of international law: essays in memory of Michael Akehurst (London: 
Routledge, 1994).  
776 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Comment No. 30: Discrimination Against 
Non-Citizens, 1 October 2004, paragraph 2.  
777 Ibid, paragraph 5.  
778 David Keane, Caste-based Discrimination in International Human Rights Law (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), 
p. 183. 
779 In the alternative, it may be argued that this approach is mandated by Article 31.3.c of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which requires treaties to be interpreted in good faith, taking into account 
‘any relevant rules of international law’. On this, see C. McLachlan, ‘The principle of systemic integration and 
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279. 
780 For exegeses of Article 43 see, for example, Y. Dinstein Y, Legislation under Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations: belligerent occupation and peacebuilding, available at: www.hpcr.org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper1.pdf;  
G. von Glahn, The occupation of enemy territory: a commentary on the law and practice of belligerent 
occupation (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 94-105; C. Greenwood, ‘The administration 
of occupied territory in international law’, in E. Playfair (ed.), International law and and the administration of 
occupied territory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 241; M. Sassòli, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and 
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Schwarzenberger, International law as applied by international courts and tribunals.  Vol.II: The law of armed 
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‘openly discriminatory measures’.781  If an occupant should not apply existing laws of this nature 
then, it follows, he should not introduce them. 
Leaving that consideration to one side, under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the occupying 
power may enact measures for the security of its forces within the territory (or suspend existing law if 
its application would prejudice their security) and for any other personnel required to fulfil its duty to 
maintain public order.  This is a strict requirement: 
the occupying authorities may not enact provisions other than those directly justified by 
considerations of military security or public order.782 
This requirement precludes the occupant’s introducing measures that differentiate between its citizens 
present in occupied territory who are not members of its forces or administration of occupation and 
civilians who are not its citizens (and therefore protected persons), to the benefit of the former.  This 
would be an ultra vires act, in breach of the scope of the occupant’s legislative powers under Article 
43 of the Hague Regulations.  The limitations imposed by this Article on the occupant’s legislative 
powers thus trump the provision in Article 1(2) of ICERD. 
 This consideration applies a fortiori to any measures favouring settlers who are present in the 
OPT illegally, in breach of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.783  Any attempt to justify 
measures favouring settlers (qua Israeli citizens) on the basis of Article 1(2) of ICERD could only be 
an abuse of right (abus de droit).784 Acting to consolidate the presence of settlers is not simply the 
pursuit of an improper purpose, it is the pursuit of an illegal purpose, and moreover one pursued 
knowingly from the start of the settlement process.  In September 1967, legal counsel to the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, Theodore Meron, advised the Israeli government that the creation of settlements in 
the occupied territories would breach the prohibition contained in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which, moreover, was: 
categorical and is not conditioned on the motives or purposes of the transfer, and is aimed at 
preventing colonization of conquered territory by citizens of the conquering State.785 
Finally, the argument that discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in the OPT is not racially 
motivated but is based purely on citizenship is tautological.  Under Israeli law, Palestinian refugees 
from within the Green Line and living in the OPT would not be prevented from returning to Israel and 
obtaining Israeli citizenship if they were Jews. CERD has expressed concern precisely with the case 
of long-term residents who are denied citizenship on the grounds of their race, ethnicity or descent 
group, as noted earlier. Regarding ‘access to citizenship’, CERD recommends that States: 
[r]ecognise that deprivation of citizenship on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin is a breach of States parties' obligations to ensure non-discriminatory enjoyment 
of the right to nationality;786  
                                               
781 Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘Protection of the civilian population’, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The handbook of 
humanitarian law in armed conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 255, para. 547(4). 
782 Gasser, Civilian population, p. 256, para. 548(2), emphasis added. 
783 The illegality of settlements, and thus of the presence of settlers, was a unanimous finding of the 
International Court in the Consequences of a wall advisory opinion: see the opinion of the Court, ICJ Rep, 2004, 
183, para.120, and the Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, 244, para.9. 
784 ‘A State or person acts in bad faith where it abuses its rights—by pursuing an improper purpose, taking an 
account of an irrelevant factor, or acting unreasonably—and does so knowing that it is abusing its rights’: 
Taylor, Abuse of rights, p. 333. 
785 See G. Gorenberg, The accidental empire: Israel and the birth of the settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2006), pp. 99-102: quotation from Meron’s opinion at 101. 
786 Ibid, paragraph 14,  
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Deprivation of citizenship arises in the present study in the context of Article 2(c) of the Apartheid 
Convention concerning the ‘right to a nationality’. 787  
Finally, it is significant to the question of citizenship that the Apartheid Convention defines the crime 
of apartheid in reference to ‘southern Africa’ and not only South Africa. This inclusive terminology 
reflected the practice of South Africa in extending apartheid practices into South West Africa (now 
Namibia), which South Africa had held under a League of Nations mandate and refused to relinquish 
after World War II. Thus through the 1960s, when the United Nations bodies condemned South 
Africa for extending its doctrine of apartheid into South West Africa,788 and in 1973, when the 
Apartheid Convention was adopted with language referring to ‘southern Africa’, South West Africa 
was not officially annexed to South Africa and its population did not hold South African citizenship. 
UN condemnation of South Africa for apartheid practices outside its sovereign territory and in respect 
to non-citizens is a legal precedent for applying the Apartheid Convention to Israel’s practices in the 
OPT, where Israel similarly exercises jurisdiction but not sovereignty.  
 
(I) B.5. Domination as the Purpose of Policy 
As noted in Part I(A) of this chapter, both the Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute  define acts 
of apartheid as being committed, respectively, for the purpose of or with the intention of maintaining 
domination and systematic oppression by one racial group over another. It could be argued that Israeli 
practices are not intended to maintain a relation of Jewish domination over Palestinians in the OPT, 
comparable, for instance, to white dominion over blacks in South Africa, but are only temporary 
measures to keep order, imposed on Israel by circumstances of conflict, until a peace agreement 
removes the need for domination. In other words, domination might not be the ‘purpose’ of Israeli 
policy, but only the means to an end, which is not domination but ultimately the exclusion of 
Palestinians from Israeli authority and responsibility. According to this argument, any system of 
domination over the Palestinians as a group in the interim is only to defend Israel from an exogenous 
security threat. 
‘Interim’ measures of domination, irrespective of their ultimate goal, still constitute domination as 
prohibited by the international legal definition of apartheid. The ‘Grand Apartheid’ strategy in South 
Africa reflected this formulation. After the 1960s, the apartheid regime in South Africa sought to 
resolve the political problems arising from its policy of racial domination by establishing black 
Homelands and forcibly transferring the black population out of white areas into the Homeland 
territories where, it was proposed, black ‘nations’ would become self-governing and ultimately 
independent (see Section G.2 in this chapter). This goal of ultimate exclusion, which would 
supposedly end long-term domination, was not held by international law to absolve the apartheid 
government of its international responsibility for eliminating its system of racial domination.  
This precedent indicates that Article 2 the Apartheid Convention is not concerned with any potential 
ultimate goals of a policy of domination and oppression. Rather, it is concerned with inhuman acts 
committed for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a system of domination and oppression by 
one racial group over another. Part II of this chapter will review Israel’s practices in the OPT to assess 
whether the inhuman acts prohibited by the Apartheid Convention are being committed, and, if so, 
whether in isolation or as part of a system of domination over Palestinians in the OPT. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
787 Ibid, paragraph 14,  
788 For example, GA Res. 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965 and GA Resolution 2145 (XXI) Question of South 
West Africa (1966). 
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(I) C.  Application of the Apartheid Convention outside southern Africa 
 
The Apartheid Convention takes its inspiration from apartheid South Africa not only in adopting the 
term ‘apartheid’ but in defining the ‘crime of apartheid’ in the chapeau of Article 2 as ‘similar policies 
and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in southern Africa’. This phrasing 
clearly indicates that the Apartheid Convention can be applied outside southern Africa, but it could 
also be interpreted to indicate that apartheid in southern Africa provides the precise and unique 
template or model by which all other potential regimes are to be tested for apartheid. 
 
This interpretation would be incorrect. Because an occurrence of apartheid outside of southern Africa 
will inevitably present unique features, reflecting local histories and social particularities, limiting the 
Apartheid Convention’s application too closely to practices of the South Africa apartheid regime 
could effectively exclude any other case from qualifying as a ‘crime of apartheid’. Acts in potential 
violation of international law are correctly measured against the provisions of the legal instruments 
drafted to address them; other cases where their violation occurred are illustrative. This interpretation 
of apartheid is supported by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which 
observed in General Comment 19, paragraph 1: 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination calls the attention of States 
parties to the wording of article 3, by which States parties undertake to prevent, prohibit and 
eradicate all practices of racial segregation and apartheid in territories under their jurisdiction. 
The reference to apartheid may have been directed exclusively to South Africa, but the article 
as adopted prohibits all forms of racial segregation in all countries.789 
Clark also contends that ‘the Convention is drafted in such a way as not to apply solely to the South 
African case, although South Africa is mentioned as an example’.790  The prevailing view of 
international legal scholars is that while the Convention was drafted specifically with southern Africa 
in mind, it is clearly universal in character and not confined to the practice of apartheid as seen in 
southern Africa.791 During the drafting of the Apartheid Convention, state representatives admitted 
that its terms could apply beyond the geographical limits of southern Africa.792 In the words of the 
Cypriot delegate: “When drafting and adopting such an international convention, it must be 
remembered that it would become part of the body of international law and might last beyond the time 
when apartheid was being practiced in South Africa.’793 
That the drafters of the Apartheid Convention intended that it supply a self-standing and universal 
human rights instrument can be read literally in Article I: 
                                               
789 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 19: Racial 
segregation and apartheid (Art. 3), 18 August 1995. 
790 Roger S. Clark, ‘Apartheid’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, Volume I, 1999, 643, pp. 
643-644. 
791 See, for example, Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, Second Edition, (Cavendish, 
2003), pp. 121-122. 
792 See the statement by Mr. Wiggins (United States of America), UN General Assembly, Official Records, 28th 
Session, 1973, 3rd and 4th Committees, 2003rd meeting, 22 October 1973, Agenda Item 53, Draft Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (continued) (A/9003 and Corr.1, chaps XXIII, sect. 
A.2, A/9095 and Add.1), p. 142, para. 36. (“Article I would be open to very broad interpretations going beyond 
both the intentions of its drafters and the geographical limits of southern Africa.”). See also the statement by Mr. 
Petherbridge (Australia) at p. 143, para. 4. (“…the concept of apartheid was being widened to such an extent 
that it could be applicable to areas other than South Africa.”) The additional words “as practised in southern 
Africa” inserted into Article 2 was first suggested by Mrs. Warzazi (Morocco) at the 2005th meeting, 24 October 
1973, p. 150, para. 12.  
793 See the statement by Mr. Papademas (Cyprus), ibid, pp. 142-143, para. 39. 
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The States Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime against 
humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and 
similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in Article 2 
of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat 
to international peace and security. [emphasis added] 
Reference to practices by the South African apartheid regime nonetheless proved useful to this study 
by providing some indication of what the international community sought to prohibit in adopting the 
Apartheid Convention. Reference to South Africa is therefore treated here as a comparative case 
useful to illuminating possible practices that fall within the ambit of the Apartheid Convention. Some 
differences in doctrine and practice distinguish the two cases: for instance, apartheid in South Africa 
entailed the legislation of racial micro-differences in ways not seen in Israeli discourse and the 
adjudication of group identities was accomplished differently. Other features, such as laws that 
provide privileged access to land by one group to the exclusion of others, are similar.  
 
(II) D. Apartheid in South Africa: Legislative Foundations 
Apartheid in South Africa established the State as the state of the white population exclusively by 
prohibiting black South Africans from having any voice in its governance. The policy of apartheid 
(Afrikaans for ‘separateness’, sometimes discussed as ‘separate development’) was adopted by the 
white Afrikaner nationalists who came to power in South Africa with the election victory of the 
National Party in 1948. Apartheid was designed Black South Africans were to be granted ‘self-
government’ over a number of isolated and ethnically based ‘homelands’, while the rest of the country 
was to remain the exclusive preserve of white South Africans.  Mokgethi Motlhabi points out that: 
Although the word ‘apartheid’ means (race) separation, it is often distinguished by Afrikaner 
writers from segregation, which has always been the norm of race relations in South Africa 
and was guaranteed by a pass system for Africans, first introduced by the British in 1809.  For 
the Afrikaner segregation, as opposed to apartheid, did not go far enough.  It still offered 
Black people some hope, according to them, that through education and adequate assimilation 
of Western civilization they could become equals of whites and finally have a share in the 
government of the country.  Apartheid not only did away with such ‘false hopes’, but went 
further to ‘retribalize’ black people by emphasizing their ethnic differences, separating them 
residentially on this basis.  As a result of this policy, most of the Africans would be resettled 
in their supposed homelands, visiting ‘white South Africa’ only as ‘migrant’ workers.794 
Soon after coming to power’,795 the National Party introduced a series of apartheid laws796 in order to 
implement its vision of a white South Africa serviced by black migrant workers.  The three legislative 
foundations underpinning the apartheid system were the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, the 
Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, and the Pass Laws, which included several acts.  Even though other 
legislation was to follow (discussed below), these statutes formed the bedrock of the apartheid state 
and sparked the Defiance Campaign of 1952, which in turn resulted in the arrest of thousands of 
South Africans who had taken part in the campaign and the banning of many of their leaders.797  
                                               
794 Mokgethi Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of black Resistance to Apartheid – A Social-Ethical Analysis 
(Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1984), p. xvii. 
795 The National Party came to power in 1948 under the leadership of Dr. D. F. Malan.  In 1954 Malan was 
succeeded as leader of the National Party by J. G. Strijdom, who in 1958 was replaced by Dr. H. F. Verwoerd.  
These three Afrikaner nationalist leaders are generally regarded as the prime architects of the policy of 
apartheid.   
796 Described by Brian Bunting in his book, The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1964) as ‘South Africa’s Nuremberg Laws.’ 
797 Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook, p. 16. 
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Sporadic violence and protests continued throughout the 1950s, culminating in the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960 when police shot dead 69 people who were protesting against the infamous pass 
laws.  A state of emergency was declared and the Unlawful Organisations Act was passed, outlawing 
the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).  In terms of this Act, 
those found guilty of furthering the aims of either of these two organisations could be convicted and 
sentenced to up to ten years imprisonment.  Both the ANC and the PAC went underground and took 
up arms against the apartheid government.  Dan O’Meara paints the following  portrait of apartheid 
South Africa during the 1960s:  
This was perhaps the bleakest period in South Africa’s dismal history.  The relentless, 
paranoid witch hunt for perceived enemies, the morally-blind and fanatical implementation of 
the smallest details of apartheid, the Mother Grundy censorship, and the imposition of 
fundamentalist Calvinist values on the broader society, all conspired to reinforce the most 
mean-spirited, petty-minded and ignorant parochial philistinism in public and intellectual life.  
These were years when Black Beauty was banned as subversive literature; when ‘swimming 
on Sundays’ was condemned as a moral outrage; when prominent theologians could seriously 
claim that the devastating drought of 1966 was God’s punishment for the fact that white 
women had adopted the miniskirt; when the whole society thrilled to salacious (and frequent) 
newspaper reports of the prosecution under the Immorality Act of pro-apartheid Dutch 
Reformed Church clerics, and thousands of other white males, who had slept with black 
women.798  
The Black Consciousness movement, led by Steve Biko, emerged in the late 1960s and contributed to 
the Soweto uprising which began on 16 June 1976.  The uprising started as a protest by 
schoolchildren against the compulsory use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools, 
before retaliatory state repression engulfed the entire country in a wave of violent anti-apartheid 
protests.  Hundreds of protesters were killed and imprisoned, and many others fled into exile.  
Violence and unrest continued throughout the 1980s, during which the apartheid regime declared 
successive states of emergency and ultimately adopted a ‘total strategy’ to resist what it called a ‘total 
onslaught’ from anti-apartheid forces.   
Finally, facing ungovernable mass protests and a failing national economy, in 1991 the last white 
nationalist President of South Africa, W. A. de Klerk, announced the unbanning of the anti-apartheid 
political movements, and the release of their leaders, including Nelson Mandela, the leader of the 
ANC.  The formal edifice of apartheid ended with the passing of South Africa’s Interim Constitution 
of 1994, which paved the way for the country’s first democratic election and the inauguration of 
Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s first black president on 10 May 1995.     
The apartheid legal system did not emerge fully formed when the Nationalist Party came to power in 
South Africa in 1948.  It was preceded by almost three hundred years of colonial oppression, which 
dispossessed black South Africans of their land, their rights, their political systems and authority, and 
their human dignity.  Key segregation laws that established the legal foundation for apartheid were 
indeed passed long before the Nationalist Party took power in 1948.799 The most significant of these 
were the Natives Land Act, No 27 of 1913 and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The 1913 Act 
made it illegal for blacks to purchase or lease land from whites except in reserves and thus restricted 
black occupancy to less than 8 percent of South Africa's land.800 In the Apartheid era, the reserves 
were converted into Bantustans (Bantu Homelands) and several were later declared 'independent' 
states within South Africa.801  
                                               
798 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years – The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party 1948-1994 
(Randburg: Ravan Press, 1996), p. 110. 
799 TRC Report, Vol. 1, CAP 2, para 6. 
800 The Cape was the only province excluded from the Act as a result of the existing black franchise rights that 
were enshrined in the South Africa Act. 
801 The Native Land Act was repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (No. 108) of 1991. 
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The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 laid the foundations for residential segregation in urban areas. 
The Act divided South Africa into 'prescribed' (urban) and 'non-prescribed' (rural) areas, and strictly 
controlled the movement of black males between the two. Each local authority was made responsible 
for the blacks in its area and 'Native advisory boards' were set up to regulate the inflow of black 
workers and to order the removal of 'surplus' blacks (those not employed). As a result, towns became 
almost exclusively white. Only domestic workers were allowed to live in towns. The 1923 Act was 
superseded by the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945, which was repealed by the 
Abolition of Influx Control Act No 68 of 1986. 
After 1948, the legal system underpinning apartheid evolved to meet changing conditions and rising 
resistance and came to penetrate every aspect of South African life, until its eventual demise with the 
emergence of a democratic South Africa in 1994. Segregation was systematically formalized by the 
National Party through a complex amalgam of legislation.802 The legal foundations of the system 
were the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 and the Pass Laws. 
The Population Registration Act of 1950 established that all South Africans must be categorised on 
the basis of race and carry at all times a card that stipulated their racial group. The Group Areas Act of 
1950 partitioned the country into different geographic areas allocated to each racial group. The Pass 
Laws then restricted people to their assigned area by restricting or prohibiting their entering any area 
not assigned to their group. Resistance to this system was ruthlessly suppressed. 
 A fuller picture of the statutes passed by the apartheid Parliament, here in chronological order, 
demonstrates the breadth of legalization for discriminating on the basis of race: 
 The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 banned the South African Communist Party as 
well as any other party that the government chose to label as 'communist’. It made membership 
in the SACP punishable by up to ten years imprisonment.  
 The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 prohibited disorderly gatherings.  
 The Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960 outlawed organisations that were deemed threatening 
to the government.  
 The Sabotage Act was passed 1962, the General Law Amendment Act in 1966, the Terrorism 
Act in 1967 and the Internal Security Act in 1976.  
 The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 created separate government structures for blacks. It was the 
first piece of legislation established to support the government's plan of separate development 
in the Bantustans.  
 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 allowed the government to demolish black 
shack-land slums.  
 The Native Building Workers Act and Native Services Levy of 1951 forced white employers to 
pay for the construction of housing for black workers recognized as legal residents in 'white' 
cities.  
 The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 prohibited people of different races from 
using the same public amenities, such as restaurants, public swimming pools, and restrooms   
 The Bantu Education Act of 1953 crafted a separate and inferior didactic scheme for African 
students under the aegis of the Department of ‘Bantu’ Education.  
 The Bantu Urban Areas Act of 1954 curtailed black migration to cities.  
 The Mines and Work Act of 1956 formalised racial discrimination in employment  
 The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act of 1958 entrenched the NP's policy of separate 
development. It set up separate territorial governments in the ‘homelands’, designated lands for 
                                               
802  TRC Report, Vol. 1, CAP 2, paras. 22-24 
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black people where they could have a vote. The map of South Africa thus had a white centre 
with a cluster of black states along its borders.  
 The Bantu Investment Corporation Act of 1959 set up a mechanism to transfer capital to the 
homelands in order to create employment there.  
 The Extension of University Education Act of 1959 created separate and ultimately inferior 
universities for blacks, coloureds and Indians. Under this act, existing universities were not 
permitted to enrol new black students.  
 The Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act of 1967 allowed the government to 
stop industrial development that employed black labour in 'white' areas and redirect such 
development to homeland border areas.  
 The Black Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 changed the status of the inhabitants of the black 
Homelands so that they were no longer citizens of South Africa.  
 The Afrikaans Medium Decree of 1974 required the use of Afrikaans and English on a fifty-
fifty basis in high schools outside the homelands. 
Select examples of this legislation will be discussed where relevant throughout the following review 
of specific practices of apartheid South Africa below, which is intended to inform and provide 
historical precedent for the review of Israel's practices in the OPT vis-à-vis the individual acts of 
apartheid detailed in Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention. 
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PART II: REVIEW OF ISRAELI PRACTICES IN THE OPT 
(II) A. Introduction 
This chapter now reviews Israel’s practices in the OPT as they relate to the definition of apartheid as 
formulated in Article 2 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid (henceforth ‘Apartheid Convention’). With the Apartheid Convention as a 
guiding framework, this chapter also takes account of the definition of apartheid drawn from Articles 
7(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute, along with the acts of racial discrimination prohibited by Article 5 
of ICERD. The latter provides an array of conventional norms by which Israel is bound, and which 
may fall within the prohibition of apartheid when committed as part of an institutionalised system of 
racial discrimination and oppression by a dominant racial group. The specific acts criminalised in the 
Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute (murder, torture, etc) and prohibited by ICERD do not 
define the practice of apartheid; but, rather, are its most severe manifestations.  
Each practice defined by the Apartheid Convention as an act of apartheid when part of an overall 
system of racial domination is addressed here in three parts: (1) the meaning of the provision of the 
Apartheid Convention and corresponding provisions of ICERD and the Rome Statute; (2) a short 
review of relevant laws, policies, and practices in apartheid South Africa; and (3) a discussion of 
relevant Israeli practices in the OPT. As commentary on the Apartheid Convention is scant, 
discussion of the provisions’ meaning is drawn principally from international human rights and 
humanitarian law. Discussion of apartheid practices and policies in South Africa draws principally 
from the 1998 report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which provides 
a concise and authoritative assessment. Discussion of Israeli practices and policies and their impact 
draws from reports and findings of the United Nations and other international organisations, 
jurisprudence of international and domestic courts including the Supreme Court of Israel, scholars of 
international law, and Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations. 
 
 
(II) B. Article 2(a)(i) – Denial of Right to Life by Murder of Members of a Racial Group 
B.1. Interpretation  
The formulation of Article 2(a)(i) of the Apartheid Convention is drawn from Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention. However, the relevant provision of the Genocide Convention speaks of 
‘killing’ rather than ‘murder’. This distinction is not insignificant.  The formulation in the Genocide 
Convention does not seem to distinguish between the taking of life sanctioned by law, such as the 
death penalty, and killings perpetrated beyond the law. The limitation in Article 2(a)(i) of the 
Apartheid Convention to the category of ‘murder’ is thus narrower.  
The South African apartheid regime practiced the death penalty, which was often used against 
opponents of apartheid, particularly for security-related offences. To the extent that such taking of life 
was sanctioned by South African law, and carried out in accordance with due process standards, it 
would not amount to ‘murder’ prohibited in this section. The Apartheid Convention’s prohibition 
rather relates – where the requisite intention has been established – to state sanctioned extra-judicial 
killings of individuals. Such killing also falls under the prohibition in Article 5(b) of ICERD of racial 
discrimination in the enjoyment of "the right to security of person and protection by the State against 
violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or 
institution." The crime against humanity of murder as defined by Article 7(2)(h) of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court amounts to an inhumane act of apartheid when perpetrated in the 
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group 
over another.  
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(II) B.2. Practices in apartheid South Africa 
Death became a core weapon used by Apartheid South Africa to secure white domination over blacks 
by eliminating its opponents and bringing the rest into submission. ‘Denial of right to life by murder’ 
included judicial killings that violated due process and extrajudicial killings such as shooting of 
demonstrators (such as at Sekhukhune, Pondoland, Sharpeville, and Soweto), murder of detainees in 
jail and detention facilities, and targeted assassinations by security agents and hit squads.  
The TRC took the view that use of the death penalty during apartheid was integral to maintaining the 
apartheid system. Between 1960 and 1994, over 2,500 people were hanged in South Africa.803 Of 
these, only one white person – John Harris – was executed for political crimes (bombing) within this 
34-year period.804 Hanging of apartheid’s opponents was almost a daily occurrence: during ‘the 
Christmas rush of 1988’, 28 people were hanged in one week.805 It emerged before the TRC that 95 
per cent of those hanged were black.  All of the condemned were sentenced by white (male) judges.  
Beyond sanctioned capital punishment, the TRC concluded that the apartheid state sanctioned murder 
of its opponents.806 Extrajudicial killings and targeted assassinations of members of the liberation 
movement were common. While statistical data is difficult to ascertain on the exact scale of 
extrajudicial killings, some indication can be obtained from the amnesty applications before the TRC 
which included 114 applications for the killing of 889 people.807  The State Security Council – which 
sat atop the National Security management System – initially targeted members of groups designated 
as ‘terrorist’ operating outside South Africa. These measures also targeted their supporters and hosts 
in cross-border raids that cost thousands of lives. In the tumultuous 1980s, the SSC agents began to 
target its enemies within South Africa.808 The murder of people in detention is well documented 
(Steve Biko’s death in detention perhaps the most publicised).809 
The TRC Report noted that the state's resort to targeted extrajudicial killings was done with the 
purpose of suppressing resistance to the apartheid regime. The reason for such recourse was that 
unexplained deaths were, by law, followed by an inquest which required access to the body of the 
deceased for examination of the cause of death.810 While often such inquests relied on the word of the 
police alone, with very little circumspect interrogation, the inquest forum allowed the victim’s 
families to appoint counsel to cross-examine police and other witnesses.811 In order to maintain 
control of the political circumstances, there was effective ‘condonation and tolerance of extrajudicial 
killings, which [led] to a culture of impunity throughout the security forces.’812  
 
The TRC identified that a pattern of targeted killings of political opponents and resistance forces was 
established in which such people were abducted, interrogated, and killed. More insidious was that 
such persons were held in detention and pressured by various means into providing information on 
resistance activities. Once information was gleaned from them, they were killed and never returned 
                                               
803  TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 3, para. 21.  
804 TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 3, para. 27. 
805 Testimony of Paula McBride, before TRC: see TRC Report, Vol.4, CAP 2, para. 49. 
806 TRC Report, Vol. 1, Ch. 2, para. 80. 
807 TRC Report, Vol. 6, Ch. 3, Ch. 1, p. 192. 
808 TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch. 2, para. 79. 
809 See TRC Report, Vols. 3 and 4.  
810  TRC Report Vol. 2, Chap 3, pp. 205-215. 
811  TRC Report, Vol. 6, Section 5, Chap 2, p. 627. 
812  TRC Report, Vol.6, Section 3, Chap 6, Part 2, p. 509. The Report identifies phrases used in security 
documents and Parliamentary speeches which implied killing with impunity of resistance members.  
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home to their families, which resulted in the dual effect of the families not knowing what had 
happened to their loved ones and with them being labelled with the stigma of being traitors.813  
 
One of the challenges faced by the TRC in the amnesty proceedings was that authorisation and 
command responsibility for extrajudicial killings was often hard to establish, since the rhetoric to kill 
political opponents was always extant. What is clear from statistical evidence is that a significant 
number of deaths in detention occurred, which is indicative, in part from requests for amnesty for 
such killings. The creation of the Civil Co-operation Bureau and Vlakplaas were particular instances 
indicative of planned and structured elimination of resistance by whatever means.814 Evident from the 
requests for amnesty were the means of extrajudicial killings that occurred. These applications were 
categorised by the TRC as (a) abductions followed by killing (deaths in detention, suicides, accidents 
and natural causes); (b) assassinations of persons considered to have a high political profile both 
inside and outside the country; (c) assassinations of individual MK and Azanian People’s Liberation 
Army (APLA) personnel both inside and outside the country, and (d) cross-border raids.815 
 
 
(II) B.3. Israeli practices in the OPT  
Since 1967, thousands of Palestinians in the OPT have been killed by the Israeli military forces in the 
name of maintaining Israel's occupation and regime of domination over Palestinians. During the two 
intifadas (1987-1993 and 2000 onwards), more than 6,000 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli 
army.816 One form of these killings, which is analogous to practices in apartheid South Africa, stems 
from the pattern of excessive use of force against civilian demonstrators protesting Israel practices in 
the OPT. Such killings form part of a broader policy of suppression of opposition to the Israeli 
occupation and disregard for Palestinian life.817  In accordance with the emphasis placed above on the 
Apartheid Convention’s prohibition on state-sanctioned policies of extra-judicial killing, the following 
discussion focuses on extra-judicial killing of Palestinians, the most severe manifestation of Israel’s 
intent to suppress opposition to the occupation and its practices.  
Over the course of the occupation, Israel has engaged in specific forms of killing in the OPT: the 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution818 of Palestinians opposing Israel's regime of occupation 
and designated for so doing as ‘terrorists’. The Israeli authorities routinely contend that such extra-
judicial killings are necessary due to difficulties in arresting suspects. However, a common form of 
                                               
813  TRC Report Volume 6, Section 5, Ch 2, p. 624. 
814   TRC Report Vol.6, Section 5, Chap 2, p. 628. 
815  TRC Report Vol.6, Section 5, Chap 2, p. 629. 
816 For statistics on fatalities during the first and second Intifadas see B’Tselem/ Israeli Information Centre for 
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories:  http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Index.asp. According to 
B'Tselem, the number of Israelis killed by Palestinians during the second Intifada from 29 September 2000 to 30 
September 2008 is 490 Israeli civilians and 90 Israeli security forces personnel.  See also the Palestinian Centre 
for Human Rights–Gaza (PCHR), ‘Statistics related to Al Aqsa Intifada: 29 September, 2000:  updated 27 
August, 2008’, available at: http://www.pchrgaza.org/alaqsaintifada.html.   
1. 817 Palestinian demonstrations against the Wall in the West Bank, for example, are consistently met 
with excessive and disproportionate use of force by Israeli forces. The village of Ni’lin is one case in point. See, 
for example, Al-Haq, Right To Life of Palestinian Children Disregarded in Ni’lin as Israel’s Policy of Wilful 
. http://www.alhaq.org/template.php?id=387(7 August 2008), available at:   sKilling of Civilians Continue 
818 ‘Extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions are legal terms used to describe killings which have taken 
place in circumstances which contravene international law. See Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/executions/questionnaire.  
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killing witnessed in the OPT is the summary execution of Palestinians already under the control of 
Israeli agents, who were killed rather than arrested or provided with medical treatment.819  
In the early 1990s, the Israeli army and the Border Police established undercover military units in 
which soldiers were disguised as Arab civilians (known in Hebrew as Mista’arvim). Their official 
mission was to capture ‘wanted’ Palestinians. However, many ‘wanted’ Palestinians who were 
supposed to be arrested were in fact assassinated.820 These units operated in conjunction with the 
General Security Services (GSS or ISA), and made use of intelligence information.821 Israel 
traditionally denied that these undercover units were assassination squads.822  
Israel altered its official policy regarding targeted assassinations following the outbreak of the second 
intifada in September 2000.823 The Israeli political establishment gave the army ‘a broader license to 
liquidate Palestinian terrorists’ and allowed the army ‘to act against known terrorists even if they are 
not on the verge of committing a major attack.’824 This policy was reportedly sanctioned by then 
Attorney-General, Elyakim Rubinstein,825 and marked the beginning of a period in which Palestinians 
suspected of engaging in resistance activities or opposing the regime are extra-judicially 
executed as part of Israel’s official security policy.  
 
Assassinations are carried out using guns fired by snipers, missiles fired from combat aircrafts, 
ground to ground missiles, tank-fire and explosive devices planted in cars and public telephone 
booths. To date, the killings have been carried out under circumstances that suggest a disregard for the 
lives of innocent bystanders. They also often occur even when the targeted person could have been 
arrested by the Israeli army.826  
One such ‘targeted killing’ was that of Salah Mustafa Muhammad Shehadeh, suspected leader of the 
Izz ad-Din al-Qassem Brigade, the military wing of Hamas. On 22 July 2002, the Israeli army targeted 
the building in which Shehadeh was staying, using a one-ton bomb dropped by an F-16 plane in a 
densely populated neighbourhood of Gaza City. Fifteen people were killed, including Shehadeh, his 
wife and nine children. Fifty others were injured as a result of the disproportionate attack.827 Other 
                                               
819 For details of four separate incidents of such extrajudicial and summary executions in the same area in a 
short period of time, see Al-Haq, Intervention to Diplomatic Representatives Regarding the Extrajudicial 
Executions of Palestinians in the Jenin Area (9 May 2007), available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=312  
820 See B’Tselem, Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (May 1992), available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/199205_Undercover_Units_Eng.doc; also Middle East Watch, A License to 
Kill: Israeli Undercover Operations Against ‘Wanted’ and Masked Palestinians (July 1993). 
821 Ibid.  
822 Ibid., p. 90. 
823 For historical background for the outbreak of the second Intifada, see Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide – Ariel 
Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians (London & New York: Verso, 2003), pp. 129-138; also Lies about 
Peace, Barak and Sharon War against the Palestinians. 
824 Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, ‘Kitchen cabinet okays expansion of liquidation list,’ Ha’aretz, 4 July 2001.  
825 See Gideon Alon, ‘Rubinstein backs IDF’s policy of ‘targeted killings’’, Ha’aretz (2 December 2001) 
(Hebrew): ‘…The Attorney General added that the term ‘liquidations’ damages Israel’s image and that it is 
preferable to use the phrase ‘targeted killings’ to describe the policy. The hits are carried out according to 
detailed orders, published by the military prosecutor’s office, and in accordance with international law, 
Rubinstein said.’ 
826 Ibid, pp. 11-12.  
827 See Matar v. Dichter, a federal class action lawsuit brought by the Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR) 
and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights – Gaza against the former Director of Israel’s GSS, Avi Dichter, 
charging Dichter with war crimes, extra-judicial killing and other gross human rights violations for his 
participation in the aerial bombing of a Gaza residential neighbourhood. The suit charges that Dichter provided 
the necessary intelligence and gave final approval to drop a one-ton bomb on an apartment building in the 
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targets have included militants and political leaders belonging to different Palestinian political parties 
and factions. Hundreds of Palestinian have been killed by targeted assassination since September 
2000, with hundreds more non-targeted civilian bystanders killed in the process. 
The Israeli Military Advocate General’s office opens investigations into the killings of Palestinians in 
the OPT only in exceptional cases.828 At the beginning of the second intifada, the Israeli High Court 
of Justice refused to consider the legality of Israel’s assassinations policy, stating in response to a 
petition that, ‘the choice of means of war employed by respondents… is not among the subjects in 
which this court will see fit to intervene.’829 However, following a petition filed in January 2002, the 
High Court accepted to hear a challenge to the legality of the assassinations policy.830 In its December 
2006 judgment, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that it cannot be determined that ‘targeted 
killings’ are always legal or always illegal: ‘All depends upon the question of whether the standards 
of customary international law regarding international armed conflict allow that preventative strike or 
not.’831  
 
The Court’s decision hinged on the definition of civilians and combatants under international 
humanitarian law and how ‘taking direct part in hostilities’ is construed. In this regard the Court 
applied a broad and vague interpretation of the phrase:  
(T)he ‘direct’ character of the part taken should not be narrowed merely to the person 
committing the physical act of attack; those who have sent him, as well, take ‘a direct part’. 
The same goes for the person who decided upon the act and the person who planned it. It is 
not to be said about them that they are taking an indirect part in the hostilities.832  
This interpretation corresponds with the Israeli political establishment’s position that all Palestinians 
involved in military resistance to the Israeli occupation are legitimate targets for targeted killings, 
including members of the Palestinian political and spiritual leadership.833 Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and 
                                                                                                                                                  
middle of the night, which killed fifteen persons and injured over 150 others.  Legal documents available at: 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/matar-v.-dichter.  
828Human Rights Watch, ‘Promoting Impunity – The Israeli Military’s Failure to Investigate Wrongdoing’ (June 
2005). See also H.C. 9594/03, B’Tselem, et al. v. The Military Judge Advocate General et al. (still pending), in 
which B’Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) demanded the initiation of criminal 
investigations in all cases of Israeli soldiers killing Palestinian civilians not involved in hostilities. See also Hala 
Khoury-Bisharat, ‘Israel and the Cultural of Impunity,’ Adalah Newsletter, Vol. 37 (June 2007), available at: 
http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/jun07/ar1.pdf. 
829 H.C. 5872/01, MK Mohamad Barakeh v. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, PD 46 (3), 1, dismissed 29 January 
2001. 
830 The petition was filed to the Supreme Court on 24 January 2002 by PCATI and LAW. See, H.C. 769/02, The 
Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, available at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf.  
831 Paragraph 60 of the judgment. 
832 Paragraph 37 of the judgment. For a different position see, Expert Opinion by Antonio Cassese, ‘On Whether 
Israel’s Targeted Killings of Palestinian Terrorists is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law’, available 
at: http://www.stoptorture.org.il. Some scholars have opined that this part of the court’s decision is adequately 
supported in the existing literature: see, for example, William J Fenrick, ‘The Targeted Killings Judgment and 
the Scope of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (2007) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 at 332-338. 
833 The Israeli leadership and army do not distinguish between Palestinian attacks on soldiers and settlements 
and Palestinian attacks on civilians. The Israeli Chief of Staff has declared that all members of Hamas are 
legitimate targets for assassinations. See Amos Harael, ‘The IDF presents moral arguments for assassinations,’ 
Haaretz (5 September 2003) (Hebrew), available at:  
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=337186. 
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Abd el-Aziz Rantissi are among the more prominent political and spiritual leaders of Hamas extra-
judicially executed by Israel in recent years.834  
While the main significance of the court’s judgment could be the attempt to transform the focus of the 
judicial review from policy to individual actions,835 the actions of the political leadership and the 
Israeli military in depriving ‘wanted’ Palestinians of their right to life has not been outlawed by the 
Courts. As in apartheid South Africa, extrajudicial killings by Israeli forces are sanctioned by the 
executive branch of the state, and constitute an integral part of an institutionalised system designed to 
eliminate dissent or resistance to the regime in order to maintain domination by one racial group over 
another. 
 
(II) C. Article 2(a)(ii) – Denial of Right to Life and Liberty of Person by Subjection to Torture 
or to Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(II) C.1. Interpretation 
The formal prohibition on the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is possibly the 
least contested component of the international human rights regime. Such conduct is prohibited by a 
number of different international and regional human rights texts and is outlawed even during times of 
war.836 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Similar – if not identical – 
phrases can be found in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and other regional human rights instruments. Furthermore, 144 states have ratified that UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT). Hence the language of Article 2(a)(ii) of the Apartheid Convention reflects a similar 
prohibition on torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but shifts the focus 
from the level of the individual to that of the group. While not making explicit reference to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 5(b) of ICERD prohibits racial 
discrimination in the enjoyment of "the right to security of person and protection by the State against 
violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or 
institution."  
Legal academics and practitioners generally agree that the prohibition is both absolute and non-
derogable. As Lord Bingham of the House of Lords recently stated, ‘[t]here can be few issues on 
which international legal opinion is more clear than on the condemnation of torture. Offenders have 
been recognised as the ‘common enemies of mankind’’837 Some have gone a step further by 
suggesting that the prohibition on torture is in fact part of customary international law and a jus 
cogens norm. In Delalic, the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) stated that the definition of Torture contained 
in the UN CAT was ‘representative of customary international law’.838  
Recent events at a global level – most notably the ‘war on terror’ – have brought these rogue practices 
back into the limelight and courts have had to grapple with alleged violations of what was hitherto 
                                               
834 See BBC News, ‘Israel’s ‘targeted killings’, (17 April 2004), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3556809.stm. 
835 Ben Naftali, ‘A Judgment in the Shadow of International Criminal Law’ (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 322. 
836 All four Geneva Conventions prohibit the use of torture. See also Article 2(2) of the UN Convention Against 
Torture. 
837 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for International Peace Operations, 255. 
838 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (a/k/a/ "Pavo"), Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo (a/k/a "Zenga") 
Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para. 459. 
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widely considered a settled area of human rights law.839 The violation of the prohibition on torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – like the crime of ‘apartheid’ – is an international crime.840  
Hence the International Criminal Court could – if the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional provisions are 
satisfied – exercise criminal jurisdiction over individuals responsible for torture committed as a crime 
against humanity (on a widespread or systematic basis).  It has been posited that States can exercise 
universal jurisdiction over such violations.841 In addition to constituting a crime against humanity in 
itself under the Rome Statute, torture can also amount to the crime against humanity of apartheid 
according to Article 7(1)(f) where "committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of 
systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and 
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime". The focus of the Apartheid Convention’s 
prohibition of the denial of the right to life and liberty of a person by their subjection to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is similarly linked to a concern with racial 
oppression; that is, the prohibition in Article 2(a)(ii) of the Convention is focused on instances of 
torture or cruel treatment or punishment connected with an overall apartheid policy of racial 
oppression. 
 
(II) C.2. Practices in Apartheid South Africa 
Torture of detainees and other abuses associated with detention were the main forms of violation 
reported to the TRC Commission. Torture with police impunity was indeed found to be the 
cornerstone of the detention system, as ‘extracting information, statements and confessions, often 
regardless of whether true or not’ allowed the state ‘to secure a successful prosecution and 
neutralisation of yet another opponent of the apartheid system’.842 The TRC estimated that as many as 
20,000 detainees were tortured in detention in the Eastern Cape alone. Nationally, it would be more 
than a hundred thousand.843  The TRC concluded that it was the policy of the Department of Prisons 
to use cruel, degrading and inhuman forms of punishment on prisoners including caning, ‘spare’ diet, 
leg irons and solitary confinement.844 
The TRC investigation revealed widespread torture of detainees by the security agencies in all the 
Provinces.845 The most frequently reported perpetrator was the security police.846 Detention was 
routinely accompanied by torture and sometimes led to death.847 Statements made to the Commission 
revealed routine assault and torture of detainees by police. Beatings were the most frequently 
mentioned violation, but electric shocks were also common and allegations of poisoning were made.  
Some detainees returned home blind and/or deaf, some mentally ill. Some of those jailed after 
sentencing were also mistreated.848 Prisons, as an institution of the state — together with the police, 
                                               
839 See further A (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005) UKHL 71, Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, Supreme Court of Israel, 1999 H.C. 5100/94 and U.S. 
Department of Justice, Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel 
to the President, August 1, 2002.  
840 Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure at 295. 
841 Ibid. 
842 Max Coleman (ed.), Crime Against Humanity; Analysing the Repression of the Apartheid State, Human 
Rights Committee of South Africa, Part A(3): ‘The Detention Weapon’. Available at: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/crime-
humanity/detention%20weapon.htm.  
843 TRC Report, Vol.4, Ch. 7, para. 14 . See entire volume for figures from other provinces. 
844 TRC Report, Vol.4, Ch. 7, para. 67. 
845 See generally TRC Report, Vol.3. 
846 TRC Report Vol.2, Ch. 7, para. 28. 
847 TRC Report, Vol.4 Ch. 7, para. 13; see Appendix to Ch. 7, ‘Death in Detention’.  
848 TRC Report, Vol.3, CAP 2, para. 15. 
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the judiciary and the security apparatus — were an integral part of the chain of oppression of those 
who resisted apartheid.849  
 
(II) C.3. Israeli practices in the OPT  
Since the OPT came under Israeli military rule in 1967, Israel has employed a policy of arresting and 
imprisoning Palestinians on a massive scale. In one count, at least 650,000 Palestinians, constituting 
around 20 percent of the total Palestinian population of the OPT and close to 40 percent of the male 
population, have been imprisoned at some time by the Occupying Power.850 Between the beginning of 
the second intifada in September 2000 and February 2007, approximately 45,000 Palestinians were 
imprisoned851. In February 2009, B’Tselem reported 7,940 Palestinians were being held in Israeli 
prisons, 548 of whom were in administrative detention (without trial).  Because arrest and 
imprisonment are often accompanied by torture and abuse used to extract confessions and gain 
information about resistance activities, it is arguable that a primary purpose of this policy is to 
suppress resistance to the occupation and cement Israel’s domination over the Palestinian population 
in the OPT.852 Mass imprisonment has also severely impacted the Palestinian community and families 
of prisoners in the OPT.853 
As noted by the UN Committee Against Torture in its Concluding Observations on Israel from 2001, 
the absolute prohibition on torture in international law has not been incorporated into Israeli law.854 In 
1999, the Israeli High Court of Justice held certain methods of interrogation to be illegal, but allowed the 
use of pressure and discomfort for the purpose of extracting information from interrogees.855 The High 
Court also indicated that agents of the General Security Services (GSS, also referred to as the Israel 
Security Agency, or ISA), who used torture in extreme circumstances on so-called ‘ticking bombs,’856 
                                               
849 TRC Report, Vol.4 CAP 7, para 1 and Human Rights Committee (1998), p. 55. 
850 Addameer, Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association, ‘Political Detention’. Available at: 
http://www.addameer.org/detention/background.html. 
851 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Press Release on the Occasion of Palestinian Prisoners Day’, 
14 April 2007. Available at: http://www.pcbs.pna.org/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/e-Prisoners_Day2007.pdf.  
852 See, e.g., Lisa Hajjar, ‘International Humanitarian Law and ‘Wars on Terror’: A comparative analysis of 
Israeli and American doctrines and policies,’ Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXXVI, no. 1 (Autumn 2006), 
pp. 21-42. 
853 See, for example, testimonies gathered by HaMoked – Centre for the Defence of the Individual and B’Tselem: 
The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, in ‘Absolute Prohibition: The 
Torture and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian Detainees’, May 2007. 
854 Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/A.57.44,paras.47-53.En?Opendocument. Israel ratified 
the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT) on 3 October 1991. It has placed two reservations to the Convention: ‘1. In accordance with Article 28 of 
the Convention, the State of Israel hereby declares that it does not recognise the competence of the Committee 
provided for in Article 20; 2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of article 30, the State of Israel hereby declares 
that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of that article.’ Israel has not signed the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention.  
855 H.C. 5100/94, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817. 
856 The term ‘ticking bomb’ is used to describe individuals who present an immediate physical threat to the 
security of the State of Israel or who hold information about such a threat, and refers to the race against time to 
prevent the threat from materializing. Proponents of the use torture to extract information from ‘ticking bombs’ 
justify their stance on the potentially great loss of life that could result from such a threat.  See generally, The 
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, ‘Ticking Bombs: Testimonies of torture victims in Israel’, May 
2007, available at: http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/140[1].pdf. See also, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive 
Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105 (6), October 2005, p. 1714, and 
David Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb’, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, October 2005, p. 
1140. However, Israel regularly perpetrates torture in situations that do not comply with the problematic ‘ticking 
bomb’ scenario. See, e.g., The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, ‘Ticking Bombs’, pp. 10-11. The 
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could avoid prosecution on the basis of the ‘necessity defence’ set forth in article 34K of Israel’s Penal 
Law.857  
Thus, the High Court has left a legal ambiguity regarding torture which has allowed for its continued use 
by the state and the GSS in the case of ‘security’ prisoners and detainees, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are Palestinians. According to statistics obtained from the Israel Prison Service, as of 6 
November 2006, from a total 9,498 ‘security prisoners,’ only 12 were Jewish.858 The Court also failed 
to define precisely the circumstances in which the necessity defence is available, leaving scope for a 
broad interpretation by the GSS and a concomitant continuation of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.859  
Following the High Court’s 1999 ruling and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, Israel has 
continued various practices including physical coercion that violate international law, notably the 
CAT and the ICCPR, against the many thousands of Palestinian prisoners incarcerated in its prisons 
and detention centres. Many of these practices were identified as subjects of concern by the UN 
Committee Against Torture in 2001,860 the UN Human Rights Committee in 2003,861 and the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
while Countering Terrorism in November 2007.862 According to the  Public Committee Against Torture 
                                                                                                                                                  
report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, to the UN Human Rights Council on 28 November 2007, 
Addendum (A/HRC/6/17/Add.1) stated that, ‘The Special Rapporteur was shocked by the unconvincing and 
vague illustrations by the ISA of when such ‘'ticking bomb’ scenarios may be applicable. He was troubled by 
the process by which individual interrogators would seek approval from the Director of the ISA for the 
application of special interrogation techniques, potentially rendering this as a policy rather than a case-by-case, 
ex post facto, defence in respect of wrongful conduct.’ Available at: 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/5f8dd0dc16603dd5852573aa0056d736!Open
Document.  
857 Article 34K of the Penal Law, entitled ‘Necessity’, stipulates that, ‘A person will not bear criminal liability 
for committing an act that was immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or 
property, either of himself or his fellow person, from a real danger of serious harm, due to the conditions 
prevalent at the time the act was committed, there being no alternative means for avoiding the harm.’ 
858 Letter from the Israel Prison Service to Adalah, dated 6 November 2006. 
859 See LAW – The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, The Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), and The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), 
‘Comments on Issues relating to Palestinian Detainees in the Third Periodic Report of the State of Israel 
Concerning the Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, September 2002, 
pp. 13-24, available at: http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/comments.pdf. The UN Human Rights Committee stated 
its concern that, ‘interrogation techniques incompatible with article 7 of the Covenant are still reported 
frequently to be resorted to and the ‘necessity defence’ argument, which is not recognized under the Covenant, 
is often invoked and retained as a justification for ISA actions in the course of investigations’, and 
recommended that Israel review its recourse to this argument. See, Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Israel, 21 August 2003 (CCPR/CO/78/ISR), para. 18, available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?Opendocument.   
860 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Israel, 23 November 2001, 
CAT/C/XXVII/Concl.5. 
861 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 21 August 2003, CCPR/CO/78/ISR. Available 
at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocument. 
862 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Addendum, Mission to Israel, Including Visit to Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, A/HRC/6/17/Add.4, 16 November 2007. Available at: 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/c25aba03f1e079db85256cf40073bfe6/7ad9a5183461be7e852573aa0058b5ba!Open
Document.  
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in Israel (PCATI), torture in Israel is ‘carried out in an orderly and institutional fashion.’863 On 2 
December 2008, Israeli human rights organisations filed a contempt of court motion to the High Court 
of Justice against Israel for its policy of granting GSS investigators à priori permission to practice 
torture in fundamental violation of the Court’s 1999 decision.864 The organisation submitted, inter 
alia, that, ‘[t]he contempt involved is particularly egregious, consistent and systematic and is 
enshrined in directives and procedures’, in particular the ‘necessity interrogation procedure’. 
In March 2009, nearly 8,000 Palestinian political prisoners were in detention in the Israeli prison 
system, classified by the Israeli prison services as security prisoners and detainees. This number 
included approximately 550 in administrative detention and others who were detained 
incommunicado, as well as around 400 children.865 Under Israeli law, an individual is considered to be 
an adult at the age of 18, whereas under Israeli Military Order No. 132, Palestinians in the OPT are 
considered by Israel to be adults at the age of 16. Thus, Palestinian juveniles are afforded the same 
harsh treatment and receive the same punishment as adult prisoners. This discrepancy has been raised 
as a matter of concern by the UN Committee Against Torture866 as well as by the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child.867   
The practice of torture and other forms of ill-treatment is most widespread during the arrest and 
interrogation of Palestinians by the Israeli military forces and Border Police.868 Particularly harsh 
interrogation methods are used by the GSS to obtain information and confessions. Between July 2005 
and January 2006, 49 percent of the Palestinians detained for interrogation by the GSS reported being 
beaten during the stages preceding interrogation, 33 percent being held in painful bindings, 34 percent 
being subjected to curses and humiliation, 23 percent being denied basic needs, and 67 percent 
reported being exposed to at least one of the above abuses.869 During interrogation by the GSS, 68 
percent of Palestinian prisoners reported being held in isolation during all or most of the interrogation 
period, 88 percent being held in solitary confinement and experiencing sensory deprivation during all 
or most of the interrogation period, 45 percent being deprived of sleep, 73 percent being given poor-
quality food, 96 percent being cuffed for protracted periods in the painful shabah position (in which 
the detainee’s hands and feet are tightly bound to a chair or low stool), 29 percent being subjected to a 
naked body search, and 73 percent to insults and other humiliations.870 The conditions of confinement 
in Israeli prisons also give rise to concerns of ill treatment that can amount to torture, including 
cramped and unhygienic living spaces and medical neglect. Israeli law permits the imposition of 
separate, harsher conditions of confinement on ‘security’ detainees as compared to ordinary criminal 
                                               
863 PCATI, ‘Back to a Routine of Torture: Torture and Ill-treatment of Palestinian Detainees during Arrest 
Detention and Interrogation,’ September 2001-April 2003, p. 12. Available at: 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/back%20to%20routine.pdf.  
864 For more information, see PCATI, ‘PCATI, ACRI, HaMoked filed a contempt of court motion to the High 
Court of Justice’ 2 December 2008, available at: http://www.stoptorture.org.il/en/node/1332. 
865 See B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, at  
http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp, and  
http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_in_Custody.asp.  
866 UN Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations: Israel (25 September 2002), 
A/57/44,paras.47-53, para. D(6)(d). Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/A.57.44,paras.47-
53.En?Opendocument.  
867 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Israel, 9 October 2002, 
CRC/C/15/Add.195., Article 62 (a). Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CRC.C.15.Add.195.En?Opendocument.  
868 See, e.g., PCATI, ‘No Defense: Soldier violence against Palestinian detainees’, June 2008. Available at: 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/No_Defense_Eng.pdf.  
869 B’Tselem, Centre for the Defence of the Individual, ‘Absolute Prohibition: The torture and ill-treatment of 
Palestinian detainees,’ July 2007, p. 38, available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200705_Utterly_Forbidden_eng.pdf.  
870 Ibid., pp. 63. 
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detainees simply because they are alleged to have committed offences defined as security offences.871 
These discriminatory conditions violate the fundamental rights of Palestinian detainees.  
By contrast, the handful of Israeli Jewish prisoners who are classified as ‘security’ prisoners, have 
been permitted to exercise numerous rights, including conjugal visits. For example, prisoner Yigal 
Amir, who was convicted in 1996 of murdering Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for ideological reasons, 
has since fathered a son in prison and has been allowed open visits with his family and phone calls. 
Similarly, Jewish-Israeli prisoner Ami Popper, who was convicted in 1990 of murdering seven 
Palestinian labourers and wounding 11 others, was married in prison in 1993 and fathered his first 
child in prison in 1995. He has since fathered another two children. He has also been granted leave to 
take furloughs from prison. No Palestinian security prisoner has been awarded such privileges.872  
As documented by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, a number of Palestinian detainees 
have been subjected to a form of psychological torture by the GSS, in the form of the arrest and 
exploitation of innocent family members of the detainees under interrogation, for the purpose of 
applying additional pressure to force a confession or obtain information.873 In some cases the GSS has 
informed prisoners, either falsely or accurately, that their relatives are also being tortured.  
Certain provisions within Israeli law facilitate the practice of torture at the stages of detention, 
interrogation and imprisonment. In some cases ‘security’ detainees are subject to a different set of 
laws and regulations governing criminal procedures during detention, with the result that individuals 
can be detained, deprived of their liberty, isolated from the outside world and interrogated by the GSS 
for up to three weeks, prior to being brought before a court. These harsher laws de facto apply almost 
exclusively to Palestinians, and virtually no Jewish prisoners or detainees are subjected to them.874 
Thus within the criminal justice system Israel has effectively created a distinct track for Palestinian 
detainees that operates in parallel with but separately from the ‘ordinary’ criminal track. The former is 
characterised by the systematic denial of due process rights and other basic rights and safeguards, for 
the purpose of maintaining a system of control and domination over OPT Palestinians. 
                                               
871 Regulation 22 of the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Detentions) Law (Enforcement Powers – 
Detention) (Conditions of Detention) – 1997. On the basis of this regulation security detainees are also not 
entitled to a daily walk in the open air or to use the telephone, even to call their attorney. Criminal detainees, by 
contrast, are permitted a daily hour-long walk in the open air and are allowed to make a daily telephone call to 
their attorneys, as well as daily calls to their family and friends. Criminal detainees are provided with a bed, 
while security detainees are provided a thin mattress and blankets; criminal detainees, but not security detainees 
are provided newspapers, books, TVs, radios a razor and mirror, an electric kettle, wall light, fan and heater. 
Some of the discriminatory conditions are hygiene-related: for example, the cells of security detainees do not 
contain a basin, and while criminal detainees’ cells must be sanitized and disinfected annually and provided with 
detergents, this is not the case for security detainees.  
872  See, e.g., Prisoners’ Petition 609/08, Walid Daka v. the Israel Prison Service (Nazareth District Court) (case 
pending). This political prisoner – a Palestinian citizen of Israel – is the first Palestinian to seek conjugal rights. 
873 For more information, see PCATI, ‘Family Matters, Using Family Members to Pressure Detainees’, April 
2008. Available at: http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/Fmily%20Matters%20full%20report%20eng.pdf. On 16 April 
2008, PCATI and a number of other Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations filed a petition to the 
Supreme Court of Israel to demand that the use of family members as means of exhorting pressure on suspects 
during interrogations by state authorities be absolutely prohibited. See H.C. 3533/08, Maisoun Suweti, et al. v. 
The General Security Services, et al. (case pending). 
874 The Criminal Procedure (Detainees Suspected of Security Offenses) Law 2006, for example, allows 
‘security’ detainees to be detained for 96 hours without any judicial oversight (in ordinary criminal cases, 
suspects may be detained for a period of 24 hours or 48 hours), to have their detention extended in their absence, 
not to be told of the court’s decision to lengthen their arrest, and to be denied access to legal counsel for a period 
of 21 days. The law was specifically enacted to provide Israel with greater powers to handle Palestinians from 
Gaza after the unilateral ‘disengagement’ and the dismantling of the Israeli military court system there in 2005. 
The law seeks to allow security suspects to be interrogated far from the purview of the courts, thereby fostering 
conditions conducive for detainees to be tortured and exposed to unlawful interrogation methods. See H.C. 
2028/08, The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, et al., v. The Minister of Justice, et al. (petition withdrawn 
24 March 2009),  
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No criminal investigation has been opened and no prosecutions have been brought against alleged 
Israeli perpetrators of torture and ill treatment. The inspector who investigates complaints of torture 
and ill-treatment against GSS interrogators is an employee of the GSS and therefore, in practice, the 
GSS is a self-regulating body. In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism raised his concerns 
‘about the ability of the inspector, as an employee of the Israeli Security Agency, to act truly 
independently from the Agency and thus vigorously investigate allegations of ill-treatment or 
torture.’875 According to data provided in Israel’s Fourth Periodic Report on the implementation of the 
CAT, in 2002-2005, the GSS inspector initiated some 386 examinations, of which only four resulted 
in disciplinary measures and not one in prosecution.876  
The impunity that was effectively afforded by the High Court’s 1999 decision (discussed earlier) was 
further consolidated in the General Security Service Law (2002), which specifies that a GSS employee 
‘shall not bear criminal or civil responsibility for any act or omission performed in good faith and 
reasonably by him within the scope and in performance of his function.’877 The lack of an effective 
mechanism to enforce CAT and Israel’s failure to ratify the Optional Protocol to CAT mandating 
independent visits to prisons have also contributed to a culture of impunity. The practice of torture and ill-
treatment is also facilitated by the recently amended Criminal Procedure (Interrogation of Suspects) Law 
(Amendment No. 4) 2008, which exempts the GSS and the police from making audio and video 
documentation of their interrogations of suspects in security offences (section 7), as well as the prison 
authorities’ policy of restricting the access of prisoners and detainees to legal counsel, often with the 
acquiescence of other state authorities and the courts. 
Thus Israeli State institutions provide protection to torturers. As noted, the High Court remains 
reluctant to enforce international standards prohibiting torture and ill-treatment. The State 
Prosecutor’s Office perfunctorily rejects complaints of torture, relying exclusively on internal GSS 
investigations, and the Attorney-General unquestioningly accepts the ‘ticking bomb’ and ‘necessity 
defence’ claims presented by the GSS. The result is that the policy of state-sanctioned torture against 
Palestinians continues unabated. 
 
(II) D. Article 2(a)(iii) – Denial of Right to Liberty of Person by Arbitrary Arrest and Illegal 
Imprisonment of Members of a Racial Group     
 (II) D.1. Interpretation 
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that, ‘No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.’ Article 9 of the ICCPR reiterates this prohibition on arbitrary 
arrest and states further that ‘no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law’. The ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee 
has posited that detention be classified as arbitrary if it continues beyond the period for which a State 
can provide appropriate justification.878 The deprivation of liberty permitted by law must not be 
‘manifestly unproportional, unjust or unpredictable, and [that] the specific manner in which an arrest 
                                               
875 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, to the UN Human Rights Council, Addendum, Mission 
to Israel, including visit to Occupied Palestinian Territory, 16 November 2007 (A/HRC/6/17/Add.4). 
876 The State of Israel, 4th Periodic Report Concerning the Implementation of the International Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, October 2006, para. 46 
(CAT/C/ISR/4): available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CAT.C.ISR.4.doc.   
877 Emphasis added. An official translation of the law into English is available at: 
http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C7E5F996-458F-4910-B343-
776C5A9495F8/0/GeneralSecurityServicesLawedited.doc.  
878 Baban v. Australia, Communication No. 1014/2001, Views adopted August 6, 2003, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001.  
184 | THE PROHIBITION OF APARTHEID  CHAPTER IV 
 
 
is made must not be discriminatory and must be able to be deemed appropriate and proportional in 
view of the circumstances of the case’.879 
Article 2(a)(iii) of the Apartheid Convention includes among ‘inhuman acts’ contributing to the crime 
of apartheid the denial of the right to liberty of person, ‘by arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of 
the members of a racial group or groups’. The term ‘arbitrary arrest’ mirrors the language of general 
human rights instruments.880 The Apartheid Convention cites the denial of liberty by ‘illegal’ (rather 
than arbitrary) imprisonment. This is unusual, because international human rights law typically speaks 
of ‘arbitrary arrest or detention’ with ‘arbitrary’ as the delineator of both arrest and imprisonment.  
Uncertainty may therefore arise in the interpretation of ‘illegal’ – illegal by what system of law?881 
Had the Apartheid Convention referred to arbitrary (rather than illegal) detention, it would have more 
clearly invoked international standards. It is unclear why the drafters of the Convention did not do 
this. The lack of any specific reference to the wording of this particular provision in the travaux 
préparatoires882 strongly suggests that it was a careless oversight rather than a carefully deliberated 
limitation. Inferring the intent of the provision as being in accordance with international standards 
would keep it in line with the overall aim of the Convention. Moreover, the ambiguity of the wording 
of Article 2(a)(iii) is rectified by its corresponding provision in Article 7(2)(h) of the Rome Statute, 
which defines the crime of apartheid as inhumane acts883 committed in the context of an 
institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over another, 
one such act being, under Article7(1)(e), ‘imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty 
in violation of fundamental rules of international law’.884 The stipulations of the Rome Statute are 
widely accepted as an improvement on the Apartheid Convention, and the ratification of the Statute 
by 108 States, with no demonstrable hostility to the apartheid provisions by non-States parties, attests 
to the customary nature of the crime of apartheid. Thus the inhumane act in question here, which 
amounts to the crime of apartheid if committed for the purposes of racial domination and oppression, 
can be construed as a deprivation of liberty by arbitrary arrest and detention in violation of the 
principles of international law.  
One manifestation of such arbitrary detention is administrative detention or internment, which entails 
the imprisonment of individuals without charge or trial by administrative rather than judicial 
procedure. As a concept it is intended to be an exceptional emergency measure, preventive rather than 
punitive in disposition, but has historically been used to imprison opponents of repressive regimes.885  
                                               
879 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary (Arlington: N.P. Engel, 
1993), at 173. 
880 See, for example, Article 9, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
881 For example, the most egregious arbitrary arrests and detention in South Africa came pursuant to the Pass 
Laws, which although inherently discriminatory, were legitimate under the prevailing domestic legal system. 
The same is true for Palestinians arbitrarily arrested and detained for being in a certain area without the required 
permit, or for constituting a ‘security threat’ without any evidence being openly presented against them, 
measures which are taken in the OPT in accordance with relevant Israeli military legislation and thus, according 
to Israel, are not ‘illegal’.  
882 UN General Assembly, Official Records, 28th Session (1973), Third Committee, Agenda Item 53, pp. 138-
170. 
883 As noted previously, the definition found in Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention refers to ‘inhuman acts’, 
while the Rome Statute speaks of ‘inhumane acts’ of apartheid. 
884 The Apartheid Convention refers to ‘inhuman acts’, but the Rome Statute refers to ‘inhumane acts’. 
885 Administrative detention has its origins in the measures adopted by the British authorities during the Boer 
Wars in South Africa at the end of the 19th century. The use of internment was a prominent feature of British 
oppression in Northern Ireland, where 1,874 Republicans were detained without charge or trial between 1971 
and 1975. During the same period, 107 Loyalists were detained under the policy of internment. [Statistics from 
CAIN Archive, Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland (1968 to the Present), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk]. 
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The use of the term ‘illegal’ in respect of the Apartheid Convention also brings the right of judicial 
review into the equation, such as contained in Article 8 of the UDHR and other human rights 
instruments. In the Barayagwiza case, the ICTR confirmed the established nature of the right to 
judicial review in respect of the lawfulness of detention.886 
 
(II) D.2. Practices in Apartheid South Africa  
In apartheid South Africa, detention of political activists was a primary means of repression.887 With 
the introduction of detention without trial in the 1960s, it became one of the main tools of control 
under apartheid.888 In the 1980s, detention was used also as ‘a preventive measure (as in 1986, where 
it affected whole communities), or as a deliberate form of intimidation’.889 The TRC has estimated 
that some 80,000 South Africans were detained without trial between 1960 and 1990, including about 
10,000 women and about 15,000 children under the age of 18. Up to 80 percent of these detainees 
were eventually released without charge and barely 4 percent of whom were ever convicted of any 
crime.890 In addition to constituting a human rights violation in itself, ‘detention without trial allowed 
for the abuse of those held in custody.’891 
The first of the security laws introduced by the National Party was the Suppression of Communism 
Act of 1950.  This Act was extremely broad in its scope, being aimed not only at the suppression of 
Communism as a narrowly defined political ideology, but also at the suppression of any doctrine 
‘which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by 
the promotion of disturbances or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions or by means which include 
the promotion of disturbance or disorder, or such acts or omissions or threats.’892  This scope 
embraced any doctrine of anti-racism that threatened white supremacy in South African governance. 
After many amendments and extensions, the Suppression of Communism Act was replaced by the 
Internal Security Act 79 of 1976, 893 which was also amended and extended as the struggle against 
apartheid intensified.  This latter Act provided for preventative detention for periods of twelve 
months.  These periods of detention could be successive and indefinite. The Act gave discretion to the 
Minister of Justice to detain any person on the basis of ‘security’ or ‘public order,’ without defining 
the parameters of those terms. The subjective nature of this vested discretion enabled the Minister, 
without due process or justification, to declare that someone should be detained, without the existence 
of objective factors to warrant such detention. It enabled the Minister to label someone as a threat to 
public order, whether or not any verifiable factors existed as to whether they indeed constituted such a 
threat. The effect of this discretion was to render the application of the law capricious and 
unpredictable. Criticism of such discretion is that it should never be widely construed. Contemporary 
principles of administrative and constitutional law preclude the arbitrary exercise of discretion, 
without due consideration. In fact modern constitutionalism suggests that the concept of an unfettered 
discretion, such as that afforded the Minister under the Internal Security Act, is anathema to the 
principle of legality.894 
                                               
886 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19. Appeals Chamber, Decision (3 November 1999), para. 
88. 
887 TRC Report, Vol.2, Ch. 7, para. 28.  
888 TRC Report, Vol.4, Ch. 7, para 22. 
889 TRC Report, Vol.4, CAP 7, para 13. 
890 Human Rights Committee (1998), p. 55; TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 3, para. 91.  
891 TRC Report, Vol.6, at 619. 
892 The Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950 (originally introduced as the Unlawful Organisations 
Bill), approved on 26 June, entry into force on 17 July 1950.  
893 Amending the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950. 
894 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2007),, at 45-46. 
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The apartheid regime also made frequent use of detention without trial in order to silence its 
opponents.  In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965, potential state witnesses in political trials 
could be detained without trial for a period of up to 180 days.  An even more draconian provision was 
put into effect by the Terrorism Act 83 of 1967, which allowed for indefinite detention without trial of 
those suspected of being ‘terrorists’.  Detainees could be held until they had replied ‘satisfactorily’ to 
all questions put to them under interrogation.  The Terrorism Act placed the onus on the accused to 
prove his innocence, rather than on the prosecution to prove his guilt.  The Act provided for a 
minimum sentence of five years upon conviction, and courts of law were prohibited from pronouncing 
upon the validity of any detention order, or ordering the release of any particular detainee, while such 
detainee was still being interrogated or awaiting charges to be brought against him.895 Under the 1976 
Internal Security Amendment Act in South Africa, the Minister of Justice was ‘given a completely 
subjective discretion to detain a person’896 when satisfied that the person may endanger the ‘security 
of the State’ or the ‘maintenance of public order,’ terms which were not defined anywhere in the Act.  
The apartheid regime also made use of banning and banishment to silence its opponents.  Many 
organisations and individuals were affected.  Individuals who were banned might be ordered to resign 
from political organisations, prohibited from attending gatherings, confined to certain magisterial 
districts, or subjected to house arrest.897  Banishment orders were used to isolate political opponents in 
remote rural areas in order to stifle their opposition to the apartheid system.  Motlhabi points out that 
certain banning orders were drafted effectively to banish the person concerned.898 
 
(II) D.3. Israeli practices in the OPT 
The deprivation of the liberty of Palestinians in the OPT manifests itself through Israel’s widespread 
use of ‘administrative detention’ against political opponents of the occupation and the use of military 
courts to try Palestinian civilians, including children. (The use of military courts as a tool of mass and 
often arbitrary detention of OPT Palestinians was described in Chapter Three, section D.2.) 
 
a. Administrative Detention in the OPT 
Under the Israeli military regime in the OPT, executive power is vested in the armed forces, who thus 
have authority to issue administrative detention orders. Israel bases such authority on the British 
Mandate Government of Palestine’s Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945,899  According to 
Regulation 108, a Military Area Commander was entitled to detain any person if he was of the 
opinion that it was ‘necessary or expedient to make the order for securing the public safety … the 
maintenance of public order or the suppression of mutiny, rebellion or riot.’ These regulations, as 
amended in 1946, did not oblige the commander to limit the duration of such an order, restrict his 
discretion, or prescribe rules of evidence. 
                                               
895 Mokgethi Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid – A Social-Ethical Analysis 
(Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1984), at 28-31. 
896 John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1978), p. 122. 
897 Mokgethi Motlhabi, The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid – A Social-Ethical Analysis 
(Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1984), at 32-33. 
898 Mokgethi Motlhabi ,Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid – A Social-Ethical Analysis 
(Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1984) at 33. 
899 Israel has used these Regulations even though they were formally repealed by the British immediately prior 
to the termination of the mandate by the Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council, 1948, and the Jordanian 
Constitution overturned them in the West Bank in May 1948.The Defence (Emergency) Regulations were thus 
not ‘the laws in force in the country’ at the time Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as required 
under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations to be valid. Israel therefore has been applying these laws illegally in 
the OPT. 
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Despite the apparent revocation of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, and despite much legal 
debate as to their validity in the State of Israel after its creation in 1948, the Regulations were used to 
institute administrative detention (primarily against Palestinian citizens of Israel) inside Israel until 
the passing of the Emergency Powers Law (Detention) of 1979.  
Following Israel’s occupation of the remaining Palestinian territory in 1967, administrative detention 
was also effected in the OPT on the basis of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations. This was the case 
until 1970, when Israel enacted its own laws relating to administrative detention by virtue of Military 
Order No. 378 (Order Concerning Security Provisions), Article 87 of which stipulated: 
[the Israeli] military commander, or anybody to whom he delegates his authority in his 
capacity, may issue an order determining that an individual be detained in whatever place of 
detention specified by the order. 
The provisions of Military Order No. 378 pertaining to administrative detention have been amended a 
number of times, most significantly by Military Order No. 1229 in 1988,900 which expanded the 
Israeli army’s authority to hold Palestinians in administrative detention and curtailed the rights of 
detainees. Under this legislation, military commanders are authorised to issue orders detaining 
individuals for up to six months901 without charge or trial. Such orders can be renewed indefinitely, as 
the military legislation does not impose any maximum cumulative period of administrative detention.  
In the case of some Palestinians, administrative detention orders are issued as soon as they are 
arrested, while in other cases, the individual will undergo prolonged interrogation before an 
administrative detention order is issued.902 A person detained by way of administrative detention is to 
be brought before the Military Court of Administrative Detention within 96 hours of the start of his 
administrative detention. In this review proceeding, held in camera, the military judge may confirm, 
set aside or shorten the administrative detention order. The procedures for additional review and 
appeals processes, which have been amended and re-amended numerous times, will be discussed 
below. 
Although the Israeli authorities have claimed that they use the policy of administrative detention as a 
preventative rather than as a punitive measure, and only against ‘those whose activities are considered 
hostile and constitute a continuous threat to security and public safety,’903 in practice this has proved 
to be far from the case. During the first 13 years of the occupation, the Israeli authorities consistently 
resorted to the administrative detention of Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 
lieu of providing them with formal charges and fair trials. By 1970, there were 1,131 Palestinians 
incarcerated under administrative detention orders.904 In response to strong international pressure, 
Israel began to phase out the use of administrative detention in 1980, the last administrative detainee 
of the time being released in 1982. On 4 August 1985, the Israeli cabinet announced that it was 
                                               
900 Military Order No. 1229 relates to the West Bank, its equivalent being Military Order No. 941 in the Gaza 
Strip. Due to numbering inconsistencies among Israeli military orders, Military Order No. 1229 is alternatively 
referred to as Military Order No. 1226, depending on whether it was issued individually or in a bound volume 
by the Israeli authorities. Military legislation and military courts are no longer used by Israel in the Gaza Strip 
since the 2005 ‘disengagement’, although arrests and detention of Palestinians from Gaza continue to be carried 
out under civil criminal legislation. 
901 Between 1989 and 1991, the maximum length of single administrative detention orders was increased to 12 
months under Military Order No. 1281. 
902 Suggesting that in such cases administrative detention is used as a punitive measure when the Israeli 
authorities fail to elicit any information or evidence in order to bring the individual to trial. 
903 From a public letter issued on 9 June 1989 by the Director of Human Rights and International Relations 
Department at the Israeli Ministry of Justice. Cited in Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege (Al-Haq, Ramallah, 1990), 
p. 286. 
904 Emma Playfair, Administrative Detention in the Occupied West Bank (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1986), p.4. 
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reintroducing administrative detention. Approximately 316 Palestinians were administratively 
detained by Israel between August 1985 and 9 December 1987.905  
Of the over 50,000 Palestinians arrested during the height of the first intifada between December 
1987 and December 1989, over 10,000 were placed under administrative detention.906 Military Order 
No. 1229, issued in March 1988, granted any Israeli military commander the authority to issue an 
administrative detention order. Thus, what was originally codified as an exceptional measure was by 
this stage being used as a common standard of detention.  
In the wake of the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, the Israeli military authorities once again 
increased their use of administrative detention vis-à-vis Palestinians, most notably to punish them for 
their political opinions, including non-violent political activities.  From September 2000 to September 
2002, cases involving the administrative detention of Palestinians increased from less than 100 to 
1,860.907 Between 2004 and 2006, a total of 8,150 administrative detention orders were issued by 
Israeli military commanders in the OPT.908 By March 2009, 550 Palestinians were being held in 
administrative detention, including eight elected members of the Palestinian Legislative Council909 
and six children.910 It is apparent that, as was the case in South Africa, administrative detention has 
frequently been used by Israel to silence opponents and suppress dissent. Some administrative 
detainees have been interned for continuous periods of up to six years. 
Another relevant piece of newly-enacted legislation is the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law 
(2008), which provides for the indefinite administrative detention of ‘foreign’ (that is, non-Israeli) 
nationals. The law effectively creates a third category of person, ‘unlawful combatants’, contrary to 
the distinction in international humanitarian law between combatants and civilians. The law allows a 
person suspected of being an ‘unlawful combatant’ to be held for up to 14 days without judicial review. 
If the detention order is approved by a court, the law allows the administrative detention of 
individuals for indefinite periods, or until such a time that ‘hostilities against Israel have come to an 
end’, and mandates judicial review of the detention only once every six months. The Supreme Court 
upheld the original law, enacted in 2002, on 11 June 2008.911 On 28 July 2008, the Knesset amended 
the law, adding even harsher provisions that include the extension of the period in which the detainee 
is denied access to legal counsel from 7 to up to 21 days. 
 
b. Incompatibility of Israel’s Practice with International Law 
Administrative detention is permitted under international law in very limited circumstances. With 
regard to international humanitarian law, Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does permit an 
occupying power to use internment, but only ‘for imperative reasons of security.’ It is untenable that 
imperative reasons of security demand that thousands of Palestinians be detained without charge, trial 
                                               
905 Al-Haq, Punishing A Nation (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1988), p.148. 
906 Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1990), p. 285. 
907 Unpublished statistics from Al-Haq database.  
908 Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of Due Process Rights in the Military Courts in the 
Occupied Territories (Yesh Din, Tel Aviv, 2007), p. 54. This figure comprises ‘initial’ administrative detention 
orders plus extension orders. 
909 Statistics from Addameer, Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association, 31 March 2009..  
910 See http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Minors_in_Custody.asp. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
generally accepted definition of a child under Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is “every 
human being below the age of 18 years’, with which Israel complies in relation to Israeli children. In contrast, 
Palestinians in the OPT aged 16 or more are legally categorised as adults, with Military Order No. 132, Order 
Pertaining to Juvenile Delinquents, defining an individual aged 14-15 as a ‘young adult’, and one aged 12-13 as 
a ‘juvenile’. Israel does not accept the applicability of the Convention on the Right of the Child in the OPT. 
911 See Crim. App. 6659/06, A. v. The State of Israel, available in English at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf. 
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or the right to have their imprisonment reviewed by an impartial body.912 In the realm of international 
human rights law, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
enshrines the rights of detainees to seek a judicial review to determine the lawfulness of their 
detention913 and of those arrested or detained to be informed of the reasons for arrest and detention, as 
well as implicitly prohibiting indefinite detention. It may be argued these and other related rights are 
to be upheld even in time of emergency. According to the UN Human Rights Committee: 
Safeguards related to derogation, as embodied in article 4 of the Covenant, are based on the 
principles of legality and the rule of law inherent in the Covenant as a whole. […]  In order to 
protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s 
decision to derogate from the Covenant.914. 
The Committee is of the view that administrative detention is unlawful where it amounts to arbitrary 
detention, or where it violates basic due process rights if information of the reasons for detention is 
not given, or if adequate judicial review of the detention is not available.915 
 
b (i). The arbitrary nature of Israeli administrative detention 
Under Military Order No. 1229, military commanders are empowered to detain an individual for up to 
6 months if they have ‘reasonable grounds to presume that the security of the area or public security 
require the detention’. Noting the arbitrary nature of imprisonment under these terms, as well as their 
conflict with the standards of international law, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has observed, 
The terms ‘security of the area’ and ‘public security’ are not defined, their interpretation being 
left to military commanders, and thus lack the level of precision required by the principle of 
legality.916 
A clear parallel to this policy is the 1976 Internal Security Amendment Act in South Africa, under 
which the Minister of Justice was ‘given a completely subjective discretion to detain a person’917 
when satisfied that the person may endanger the ‘security of the State’ or the ‘maintenance of public 
order,’ terms which were not defined anywhere in the Act, and as noted previously, afforded 
unfettered discretion to the Minister. 
The arbitrary nature of detention policy was supported historically by Zionist movement leaders, 
many of whom would later become prominent members of the Israeli Knesset, government, and 
judiciary but who, before the creation of the State of Israel, were themselves administratively detained 
                                               
912 Among the violations identified in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as grave breaches is wilfully 
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial. 
913 The right to review has recently been affirmed by the US Supreme Court in relation to internees in 
Guantanamo Bay. Internees being held as ‘enemy combatants’ were held to be entitled to habeas corpus review. 
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ___ (2008), 
914 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 
August 2001, paragraph 16. 
915 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8: Article 9, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 8 (1994), 
para. 4  
916 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Mission to Israel, including visit to Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.4, 16 November 2007, §. 25. 
917 John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
1978), p. 122. 
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under the 1945 Defence (Emergency) Regulations and at the time voiced strong opposition to this 
practice use by the British authorities.918 
 
b(ii). Failure to give reasons for administrative detention orders 
Under international human rights and humanitarian law, an administrative detainee should be 
informed promptly of the reasons for his or her detention.919 In accordance with Article 87 of 
amended Military Order No. 378, however, administrative detention in the OPT can be based on 
secret evidence, to which the detainee and his counsel are denied access. Almost all information 
presented to the court is classified and the review judge reserves the right not to disclose this evidence 
or even whether evidence exists. Consequently, Palestinians under administrative detention orders can 
be detained for months, if not years, without ever being informed about the reasons or length of their 
detention.   
 
b(iii). Lack of Adequate Judicial Review 
The Israeli authorities have argued that administrative detention is not an arbitrary form of detention, 
in part because administrative detention orders are subject to review. Nevertheless, existing review 
procedures are severely inadequate, and have been amended in the past in a way that undermines a 
detainee's access to justice.  For example, the quasi-judicial review process provided for before the 
first intifada was cancelled in 1988 by Military Order No. 1229, and detainees were allowed to appeal 
their detention to an advisory board authorised only to make non-binding recommendations. Military 
Order No. 1229 also cancelled the existing mandatory three-month periodical review of approved 
administrative detention orders by a military judge.920 This requirement was re-imposed in 1999 but 
subsequently revoked again during the second intifada. In some circumstances, review procedures of 
any description have been completely suspended by virtue of Israeli military orders, as was the case 
during Israel's large-scale incursions in West Bank cities in 2002.921 
In the case of appeals, Palestinian administrative detainees can submit appeals against their detention 
order before an appeal judge in an Israeli military court, where a process similar to that at the initial 
review hearing takes place.  However, Israeli military judges make extremely limited use of their 
powers, generally deferring to the military commander and upholding the detention orders. This is 
also true of appeals against administrative detention orders in Israel’s High Court of Justice. In both 
instances, the appeal decision can be based on confidential material or ‘secret evidence’ not provided 
to the detainee or his lawyer.  This places the detainee's counsel in the essentially impossible position 
of trying to prove to the judge that the order in question is not required for security reasons, without 
having access to any details of the evidence on which the administrative order is based. 
                                               
918 Knesset Records, Volume 9 (12 May 1951), p. 1807. Quoted in B’Tselem, Detained Without Trial: 
Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada (B’Tselem, Jerusalem, 
1992), p. 24.  
919 See ICCPR Article 9(2), Additional Protocol I, Article 75 (3); see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louis 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Law – Volume I: Rules (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 344. 
920 The original stipulations of Military Order No. 378 had been liberalised to a certain extent by Military Orders 
815 and 876 of 1980, which granted the right to ‘judicial review’ before a military judge within 96 hours of 
issuance of a detention order and made detention orders subject to periodic review by a judge at least once every 
three months. 
921 Military Order No. 1506 effectively precluded any right of review for Palestinians that had been 
administratively detained during these incursions. 
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c. Israel’s Discriminatory Use of Administrative Detention  
Israel’s discriminatory use of administrative detention as a measure against Palestinians is indicated 
by the relatively rare use of this practice against Jewish-Israeli settlers. Only nine Israeli settlers in the 
OPT have been administratively detained over the course of the occupation.922 The great difference in 
legal standards applied in implementing the measure against the two groups further indicates a policy 
of discriminatory treatment. Regarding the period of internment itself, while Palestinians are typically 
issued six month administrative detention orders which in many cases are renewed for a number of 
years, Israeli settlers have more commonly been ordered to forty or sixty days of detention.923 Further 
discrepancies arise regarding who can issue administrative detention orders. Israeli regional military 
commanders throughout the OPT may issued such orders at their own discretion with regard to 
Palestinians, while orders to detain Israeli settlers must be signed by the Minister of Defence.924 
Discrimination is further indicated by differential access to the courts. Even when charged with 
offences related to security in the OPT, Jewish-Israeli settlers are not tried before military courts as 
are Palestinians. The same is also true regarding the review of an order for detention without trial, 
which is done in the case of Palestinians by a military judge, whereas for settlers by a civil district 
court inside Israel. Further, the military has 96 hours following the detention under administrative 
order of a Palestinian before the military court must conduct the review.925 The equivalent period for 
Israeli settlers, being governed by standard Israeli criminal detention procedure, is 24 hours. There are 
no automatic periodic reviews of administrative detention orders by military courts for Palestinians 
during their detention, but if an Israeli settler is interned for six months, the order is reviewed by the 
District Court after three months. Finally, under Article 9(5) of the ICCPR, ‘[a]nyone who has been 
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.’ After 38 
years of occupation during which time tens of thousands of Palestinians were arbitrarily and 
unlawfully denied their liberty by being placed in administrative detention, Israeli settler Noam 
Federman in 2005 became the first victim of administrative detention to be awarded damages on the 
grounds of unlawful imprisonment.926 
The issue of illegal imprisonment in the Apartheid Convention arises in the context of the denial of 
the right to liberty for the purposes of sustaining a system of domination and oppression by one racial 
group over another. In the OPT, illegal imprisonment has manifested itself through the mass 
administrative detention of Palestinian civilians as an instrument of domination and control, as well as 
through the internment of specifically targeted persons voicing opposition to the regime. Elected 
members of the Palestinian Legislative Council have been and continue to be administratively 
detained to that end, while Israel’s use of administrative detention against human rights defenders is a 
trend that has proliferated in recent years, prompting the UN Special Representative on Human Rights 
                                               
922 B’Tselem, Statistics on Administrative Detention, available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Statistics.asp.  
923 See, for example, Amnesty International, Administrative detention cannot replace proper administration of 
justice, 11 August 2005, AI Index: MDE 15/045/2005, regarding the detention of alleged Kach activists 
Ephraim Hershkowitz and Gilad Shochat. 
924 For example, then Minister of Defence, Shaul Mofaz, ordered the arrest of Neria Ofen, a resident of Yitzhar 
settlement in the West Bank in relation to attacks against Palestinians in the run-up to the 2005 ‘disengagement’. 
See Chris McGreal, ‘Sharon delays Gaza withdrawal’, The Guardian, 10 May 2005. 
925 Amendment No. 43 to Military Order No.  378. In practice this period of detention without judicial review 
may be even longer if an administrative detention order is signed against a Palestinian after he/she been initially 
detained under criminal detention procedures, allowing a further 96 hours on top of the initial detention period. 
926 ‘Federman awarded damages for false imprisonment’, Jerusalem Post, 11 October 2005. No damages have 
been awarded to date. 
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Defenders to voice her concerns that in the OPT ‘administrative detention is being used as a means to 
deter defenders from carrying out their human rights activities.’927  
 
(II) E. Article 2(b) – Imposition on a Racial Group of Living Conditions Calculated to Cause its 
Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part 
In the chapeau of the Apartheid Convention, the States parties observe ‘that, in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, certain acts which may also be qualified as acts 
of apartheid constitute a crime under international law’. Article 2(b) of the Apartheid Convention later 
borrows language from Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as any of five 
acts ‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group’ including ‘(c) imposition on the group of living conditions calculated to cause its physical 
destruction in whole or in part’. The principle of intent is essential to this formulation.928  
In some cases, treatment of black South Africans under apartheid had devastating effects on people’s 
lives, especially in the immediate aftermath of the first mass population transfers when wretched 
living conditions resulted in wide-scale suffering and deaths through malnutrition, disease, and higher 
infant and child mortality.  As the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission confirmed, 
however, the South African government did not sustain an intentional policy to destroy blacks as a 
group. Indeed, ensuring that black Africans survived as a population to provide essential cheap labour 
for white-owned industries and businesses was a central mission of apartheid. 
This study does not find sufficient evidence to conclude that Israel has pursued policies and practices 
intended to impose on the Palestinians ‘living conditions calculated to cause its physical destruction in 
whole or in part’. It is noted that under the regime of military occupation imposed on the OPT since 
1967, Palestinians have also experienced thousands of killings by the Israeli military (as described in 
section II.B, above)929 as well as generally higher mortality rates due to rising poverty and 
malnutrition and inadequate medical care. Israel’s ‘siege’ or draconian closure of the Gaza Strip since 
2006 has especially created conditions inimical to human life through resulting shortages of potable 
water, electricity and basic nutrition and inaccessibility of essential medicines and medical care. It is 
further noted that the Independent Fact Finding Committee on Gaza found that, in ‘Operation Cast 
Lead' in January 2009, Israel’s actions satisfied the actus reus of the Genocide Convention. 930  
Nonetheless, the Committee on Gaza also recalled that the ICJ has found that a specific intent to 
destroy a group ‘could not be inferred from the siege of a city, deprivation of food and fuel, or from 
the obstruction of medical and humanitarian assistance’. 931  Israel’s policies concerning Palestinians 
in the OPT suggest a policy of collective punishment, war crimes and crimes against humanity but do 
not indicate an intention to cause the physical destruction of the Palestinian people.  
 
                                               
927 Report submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights 
defenders, Hina Jilani, Addendum - Mission to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
E/CN.4/2006/95/Add.3, 10 March 2006, para. 36. 
928 Two forms of intent are required to establish the crime of genocide arising from the act of ‘deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction’: the intention to inflict harm through the 
said conditions of life; and the special intention to destroy the relevant group in part or in whole. See G. 
Verdirame, ‘The Genocide Definition in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals’ (2000) 49 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 578-598; see also William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
929  See discussion in Section B, above. 
930 Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza, Report to the League of Arab States, No Safe Place (30 April 
2009), p.135, para. 551, citing Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia), ICJ Reports 118 (327–8): available at: 
www.arableagueonline.org/las/picture_gallery/reportfullFINAL.pd.  
931 Ibid., p. 129, para. 521.  
CHAPTER IV  PROHIBITION OF APARTHEID | 193 
 
 
(II) F. Article 2(c) – Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial 
group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the 
country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a 
group or groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human 
rights and freedoms, … 
This provision cites a range of measures that are cited as illustrative and inclusive rather than 
definitive or exclusive. Although this language indicates that other practices might be considered here, 
if relevant to preventing ‘participation’ and ‘full development’, this study confines its review of 
Article 2(c) to the measures cited, breaking them down into component provisions, slightly reordered 
here for purposes of discussion: 
1. Denial of the right to freedom of movement  
2. Denial of the right to freedom of residence 
3. Denial of the right to leave and to return to one's country  
4. Denial of the right to a nationality 
5. Denial of the right to work 
6. Denial of the right to form recognised trade unions 
7. Denial of the right to education 
8. Denial of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
9. Denial of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
According to the Apartheid Convention, ‘any’ of these measures constitutes an act of apartheid if it is 
calculated to prevent full development and participation in the political, social, economic and cultural 
life of the country and committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an overall system of 
domination by one racial group over another.  While most of these prohibited acts involve violations 
of civil and political rights, the language of the article is concerned with their impact on a group’s 
social and cultural development as well as its political and economic development. Thus examining 
the impact of Israel’s policies in terms of Article 2(c) requires considering a range of social indicators. 
A final section undertakes a portrait or snapshot study of conditions in the Gaza Strip in light of this 
provision.  
While Article 2(c) of the Apartheid Convention forms the basis for this discussion, it is further 
informed by Article 5 of ICERD. The latter similarly enumerates a list of both civil and political 
rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. All of the above-listed rights covered by the 
Apartheid Convention are also listed in ICERD and therefore must be guaranteed by state parties to 
all within their jurisdiction without discrimination. 
 
(II) F.1 Article 2(c)(1): Denial of the Right to Freedom of Movement 
(II) F.1(a) Interpretation 
In international law, the right to freedom of movement has what can be termed ‘internal’ aspects (the 
right to move freely and to choose one’s place of residence within the borders of the country) and 
‘external’ aspects, which include the right to leave one’s country and to return to it.932 Section F(1) 
will deal with ‘internal’ freedom of movement in the OPT; F(2) with internal freedom of residence in 
the OPT; and F(3) with the right to leave and return. The right to freedom of movement is guaranteed 
by numerous human rights treaties, most notably in Article 12 of the ICCPR. Flowing from the 
                                               
932 See John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton, NY: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), p. 136; see also article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; article 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. 
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guarantee contained in Article 5(d)(i) of ICERD that everyone should be enjoy the right to freedom of 
movement without racial discrimination, the Apartheid Convention condemns any legislative and 
other measures calculated to deny members of a racial group the right to freedom of movement. 
 
(II) F.1(b) Denial of Freedom of Movement: practices in apartheid South Africa 
The internal and external aspects of freedom of movement under international law—respectively, the 
right to move freely and to choose one's place of residence within the borders of a country and the 
right to leave one's country and to return to it—are equally protected by section 21 of South Africa's 
final Constitution (which provides inter alia that everyone has the right to leave the Republic and 
every citizen has the right to enter, to remain in and to reside anywhere in, the Republic).  The 
historical significance of the entrenchment of these rights in the South African Constitution is 
considerable.  Apartheid legislation imposed severe restrictions on all aspects of the freedom of 
movement.   
Denial of the rights to freedom of movement and residence was a core concern of apartheid policy in 
South Africa, toward whose enforcement the denial of other rights, such as freedom of expression and 
peaceful assembled, was oriented. In terms of the apartheid master plan, South Africa’s economically 
powerful urban centres were to be the sole preserve of the white race.  Africans were only to be 
allowed access to these areas for the purpose of providing labour to feed these economic engines of 
white South Africa. ‘Surplus’ Africans were to be relegated to a number of ethnically defined ‘Bantu 
homelands’ which later came to be known, infamously, as ‘Bantustans’.  In terms of apartheid theory, 
the African population consisted of ten ethnic groups, each of which was to be granted its own 
‘homeland’.  The plan was to grant independence to each of these ‘homelands’ over time.  The 
reasoning and philosophy behind this was as follows: 
In keeping with Afrikaner nationalism’s stress on the realisation of ethnic identity (volkseie), 
each of these ‘national/ethnic minorities’ was to be given the right to realise its divinely 
ordained national calling in its own ‘homeland’.  In introducing the Bill, Minister de Wet Nel 
explained to parliament that this new policy of ‘separate freedoms’ rested on three principles:  
‘The first is that God has given a divine task and calling to every People [volk] in the world, 
which dare not be denied or destroyed by anyone.  The second is that every People in the 
world of whatever race or colour, just like every individual, has the inherent right to live and 
develop.  Every People is entitled to the right of self-preservation.  In the third place, it is our 
deep conviction that the personal and national ideals of every ethnic group can best be 
developed within its own national community.  Only then will other groups feel they are not 
being endangered…  This is the philosophical basis of the policy of Apartheid.933  
The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 and the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act of 1955 
put in place the legal mechanisms to restrict the right of access by Africans to ‘white areas’.  In order 
to qualify to live in a white area, a black applicant had to qualify under Section 10 of the infamous 
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act.  Documentary proof had to be provided by the applicant of 
uninterrupted residence in the area for at least 10 years, or that the applicant had worked for the same 
employer for an uninterrupted period of at least 15 years.  Those fortunate enough to qualify were 
known in the jargon of the apartheid bureaucrats as ‘Section Tens’.  Despite the best efforts of the 
apartheid bureaucracy, thousands of people desperate for work continued to pour into the cities.  In 
the impoverished homelands to which they were relegated by the apartheid machine there was no 
work, but in the cities they were regarded as ‘illegal’, and were liable to be arrested, imprisoned, fined 
and deported.  The main mechanism of control was the hated ‘dompas’ or reference book, which 
every African over the age of sixteen was required to carry at all times, in terms of the Natives 
(Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952. A pass included a photograph, 
details of place of origin, employment record, tax payments, and encounters with the police. It was a 
                                               
933 Dan O’Meara Forty Lost Years – The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party 1948-1994 
(Randburg: Ravan Press, 1996), p. 73. 
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criminal offence to be unable to produce a pass when required to do so by the police. No black person 
could leave a rural for an urban area without a permit from the local authorities. On arrival in an urban 
area a permit to seek work had to be obtained within 72 hours. Dan O’Meara points out that:  
Until the formal abandonment of influx control in 1986, literally hundreds of thousands of 
Africans were convicted every year for not having a reference book in their possession.  
When coupled with the establishment of labour bureaux throughout the country, this enabled 
the state to begin to control and channel the flow of black labour as required in the various 
sectors of the economy.934 
The physical and psychological wounds which this system inflicted on black South Africans are 
incalculable: 
Subjected to forced removals from the ‘black spots’, endless pass raids, the mind-numbing 
racist bureaucracy in the labour bureaux, Africans were constantly reminded who was baas 
[boss] in the land of their forefathers.  And as Verwoerd pressed ahead with his planned ‘self 
government’ for the ‘ethnic homelands’, black South Africa was given the news that it was 
soon to be deprived of even this third-rate citizenship.  The baas decreed that as ‘temporary 
sojourners’ in a whites-only country, blacks were no longer even considered to be South 
Africans.  They would be given ‘separate freedoms’ in places many had never seen.935  
The use of courts of law to enforce a gigantic programme of social engineering meant that the South 
African legal system became increasingly burdened with the task of enforcing apartheid policy.  As 
David Harrison pointed out in his book written in the early 1980s: 
The courts are daily jammed with offenders.  In 1978, 273,000 arrests were made for pass law 
offences (50,000 more than in 1977), an average of 750 a day.  The magistrates work a 
production line of punishment: a fine here, imprisonment there; ‘endorsement out’; 
‘remanded for identification’; two minutes, rarely more, for a case…  No one knows how 
many ‘illegals’ are in the cities; in Soweto alone they may be half a million.  What is known 
is that they are the workers who will take any job that is offered for pay well below the 
recognised rate, just to keep body and soul together, to send a postal order to the family in the 
homelands, to buy school books and clothes and a better chance for the children.936 
Speaking of the Black Sash937 Advice offices in the early 1980s, Harrison points to the bureaucratic 
nightmare of the apartheid system: 
Here, every day, they are confronted with thirty years of Nationalist government.  Here, every 
day, they witness the toll on family life the system takes, the misery of the contract worker 
who seeks to have near him the children who are growing up without him; the 
incomprehension of the wife who asks only to live with the man she legally married; the tears 
of the young man, a boy really, who does not understand why, since he cannot find work, he 
is classified as ‘idle’ and must now leave his parents and be sent to a homeland he has never 
seen… Here the language is of ‘10(1)(a) and (b) and (c)’, of affidavits to prove employment, 
of letters to prove residence, of witnesses to prove birth, of certificates to prove existence.  
The labelled files in the Johannesburg office tell the story of the rows of patient black South 
Africans who wait: ‘Workman’s Compensation’, ‘Name Change’, ‘Employer’s Abuse’, 
                                               
934 Ibid., p. 70. 
935 Ibid, p.  111. 
936 David Harrison (1981) ‘The White Tribe of Africa’ Macmillan South Africa (Publishers) (Pty) Ltd: 
Johannesburg, p.  252. 
937 The ‘Black Sash’ was founded in 1955 to protest against the removal of Coloured people from the common 
voters roll. 
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‘Pensions’, ‘Administration Board’, ‘Farm Labour’, ‘Bribery and Corruption’, ‘Work Permit’, 
‘Endorsed Out’…938   
 
(II) F.1(c) Denial of Freedom of Movement: Israeli practices in the OPT   
Under military legislation, Jewish Israelis may not enter certain Palestinian towns and cities in the 
OPT without permission from the Israeli authorities. Otherwise, Jewish Israelis are free to move 
without constraint throughout the OPT,939 on roads reserved for their exclusive use. By contrast, the 
Palestinian population is subject to sweeping and collective measures restricting its movement, 
including interrelated networks of visible, physical obstacles and invisible, administrative 
impediments. Adverse impacts on Palestinian rights to health, to livelihood, to education, and to 
social and cultural activity as a consequence of movement restrictions are significant.  
 
i. Visible Infrastructure: Checkpoints, the Wall and Separate Roads 
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), by September 
2008, Israel had established 699 restrictions to physical movement in the West Bank,940 including 
checkpoints, roadblocks, trenches, earth mounds, road gates, and other physical barriers. A weekly 
average of 89 ‘flying’ checkpoints (established temporarily and without warning) were recorded in the 
West Bank at the same time,941 further controlling and disrupting Palestinian movement. Most of 
these checkpoints and barriers to movement are positioned such that they hinder Palestinian 
movement within the West Bank, rather than between the West Bank and Israel. Palestinians must 
present the necessary identity card or documentation required by the occupying authorities to cross a 
given checkpoint. In addition to restricting movement physically, the checkpoints constitute a 
psychological barrier to movement by imposing humiliating and dehumanising procedures.  
As well as serving to de facto annex part of the West Bank under the pretext of security, the Wall 
constitutes the most significant individual barrier to Palestinian movement. The ICJ has already held 
that “the construction of the wall and its associated regime impede the liberty of movement of the 
inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with the exception of Israeli citizens and those 
assimilated thereto.’942  
More than simply scattered structures of concrete, steel and earth, the barriers to movement erected by 
Israel in the OPT enforce the growing territorial fragmentation of the OPT, isolating Palestinians from 
their land and each other while securing Israel’s settlement enterprise and ensuring complete 
segregation between the two groups. This segregation is manifest through the network of separate 
roads for the exclusive use of Israeli settlers which connects Jewish settlements in the West Bank to 
each other and to Israel, while ‘bypassing’ Palestinian population centres. In creating a kind of ‘road 
                                               
938 David Harrison (1981) ‘The White Tribe of Africa’ Macmillan South Africa (Publishers) (Pty) Ltd: 
Johannesburg, p. 254. 
939 In theory Palestinian citizens of Israel enjoy much, if not all, of the same freedom of movement as Israeli 
settlers and other Jewish citizens of Israel travelling in the OPT, but in practice Palestinian citizens of Israel 
experience difficulties, due to racial profiling at checkpoints, for example. 
940 OCHA, Closure Update, 30 April – 11 September 2008, p. 4. 
941 Ibid. ‘Flying’ or mobile checkpoints are established at random by Israeli occupying forces for temporary and 
undefined intervals. They are often deployed on key transit roads during morning and evening peak travelling 
times. Delays of more than one hour are regularly reported at flying checkpoints and their unpredictable nature 
renders it difficult for Palestinians to make travel plans. Flying checkpoints are generally redundant in ensuring 
security, as they are typically set up between two permanent checkpoints, where Palestinian travellers will have 
already gone through a security check.  
942 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ (2004), para. 134. 
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apartheid’, this segregated highway system goes beyond apartheid practices in South Africa, as the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the OPT has pointed out.943 
The notion of a separate road system was first conceived by the Israeli occupying authorities during 
the surge in settlement activity in the late 1970s. The Israeli Settlement Master Plan for 1983-1986 
discussed the need for special roads to service planned settlements and ‘bypass the Arab population 
centres.’944 Road Plan Number 50 served to shift the existing north-south backbone of the West 
Bank’s road system to a more east-west centred approach in order to integrate it into the Israeli road 
system for the benefit of Jewish-Israeli settlers.945 Four hundred kilometres of such roads were built 
by 1993.946 Under the Oslo Accords, an expanded maze of bypass roads then effected the geopolitical 
division of the West Bank in order to accommodate the free movement of settlers throughout the West 
Bank without having to pass through areas administered by Palestinian Authority. At this time, plans 
for a further 650 kilometres of roads were developed to consolidate this bypass network.947 Israel 
demonstrated its commitment to implement such plans by spending US$600 million on bypass roads 
in 1995 alone.948 Thus the segregated road system became a reality and continues to be expanded and 
consolidated. 
Palestinian travel is prohibited on roads built for exclusive settler use, without exception.949 On a 
second category of roads, Palestinians must obtain special permits to travel and such permits are 
difficult to obtain. Palestinians who live in villages that can be accessed only by such roads are 
allowed on them with permits while Palestinian commercial vehicles and public transportation may 
similarly be permitted to use such roads.950 
The Israeli military enforces these prohibitions with manned checkpoints and army patrols. In recent 
years, the occupying forces have also blocked access from nearby Palestinian villages to what have 
become settler-only roads by means of physical roadblocks. Palestinian vehicles are not merely 
prevented from travelling on forbidden roads, but are also barred from crossing them in order to 
access roads upon which they are permitted to travel. In such cases, passengers have to get out of their 
vehicles, cross the road by foot, and find further transportation on the far side.951 
                                               
943 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied 
since 1967, John Dugard, 21 January 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/17, para. 30. 
944 Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, Master Plan For 
Settlement of Samaria and Judea, Plan for Development of the Area for 1983-1986 (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 27 (in 
Hebrew), cited in B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank 
(B’Tselem, Jerusalem, 2004), p. 6.  
945 See Al-Haq , The Israeli Proposed Road Plan for the West Bank: A Question for the International Court of 
Justice? (Al-Haq, Ramallah, 1984). 
946 Al-Haq, Discrimination Is Real: Discriminatory Israeli Policies in Israel, The Occupied Territories and 
Occupied East Jerusalem, Draft Paper Presented to the World Conference Against Racism, Durban, South 
Africa, 28 August – 7 September 2001, p. 24. 
947 Samira Shah, ‘On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank’ (1997–98) 29 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 221 at 222. 
948 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (May 1996), p. 3. 
949 Implementation by the occupying forces of the prohibition and restrictions described in this section is 
effected through the prohibition and restriction of the movement of vehicles belonging to Palestinian residents 
of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), distinguishable from the vehicles of Israelis and Israeli settlers by 
the colour of their registration plates, as required under Israeli Military Order No. 1251 of 18 August 1988.   
950 B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 
August 2007), pp. 16-17. 
951 B’Tselem, Ground to a Halt: Denial of Palestinians’ Freedom of Movement in the West Bank (Jerusalem: 
B’Tselem, August 2007), p. 20. 
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A prominent example of segregation on the highways of the West Bank is Road 443, the only main 
road in the southern district of Ramallah which dates back to the British Mandate. Until 2000, it was 
the main thoroughfare for 160,000 local residents, connecting the villages in the area to the city of 
Ramallah. Since then, the Israeli military has prohibited both pedestrian and vehicular Palestinian 
travel on the road952 and permanent physical obstacles have been placed at the exit points of the six 
Palestinian villages situated adjacent to the road. Use of this central artery has thereby been handed 
over for the exclusive use of Israelis, principally Israeli settlers commuting to and from Jerusalem. 
On 5 March 2008, Israel’s High Court of Justice issued a one-paragraph interim decision953 approving 
the prohibition of Palestinian travel on Road 443. The decision, described as ‘judicial hypocrisy’ by 
Professor David Kretzmer,954 effectively conveyed judicial approval to the discriminatory system of 
the separation of roads in the West Bank according to national origin. 
The effect of segregating road systems on the basis of national origin goes beyond limiting the 
movement of the occupied Palestinian population to the appropriation of Palestinian land. For 
instance, parts of Road 443, built in the 1980s, were constructed on land expropriated from 
Palestinians by the Israeli military. This expropriation was upheld at the time by the High Court of 
Justice955 on the basis that the road was intended primarily for the benefit of the local Palestinian 
population—the same population which is today prohibited from using the road.  
The allocation of Palestinian roads to Israeli-only use has been accompanied by the creation of a 
separate system of roads for Palestinians. Webs of bridges, tunnels and interchanges, where roads for 
settlers and roads for Palestinians meet, maintain segregation. Palestinian land continues to be 
expropriated for this purpose. A recent case was the expropriation of land east of Jerusalem for the 
purpose of constructing a new road, for Palestinian use, to circumvent the E1 area and the Ma’ale 
Adumim settlement bloc.  The aim is to bar Palestinian access to this area of the West Bank and to 
render Road 1 an Israeli-only road.956  The precedent of Road 443, however, demonstrates that even 
where roads are built in apparent attempts to provide some sort of recompense for violations of 
Palestinian freedom of movement, these roads may not always remain to the ‘benefit’ of the local 
population. With Palestinian access to Road 443 blocked, a new, separate “fabric of life’ road was 
opened in December 2008 by the Israeli authorities, to connect Beit Ur al-Fauqa (one of the 
Palestinian villages closed off from Road 443) to Ramallah, cutting through Palestinian agricultural 
land in the process.957 
The segregated road system has adverse impacts on potential sovereignty, self-determination and 
territorial contiguity.  The settler roads have been used to carve the West Bank up into cantons, and 
helped to turn Palestinian cities into controlled and encircled enclaves which have no space to expand.  
This effect is indeed a stated policy of the Israeli authorities, who have indicated their intention to use 
the bypass road system as a tool to ‘reduce the uncontrolled spread of Arab settlement.’958 
Accompanying this physical infrastructure of segregation and restriction is a complementary invisible 
                                               
952 This prohibition has been absolute, applying even in cases of emergency where urgent medical treatment is 
required. Vehicles delivering goods from Israel or other parts of the West Bank to Palestinian villages in the 
area are similarly not permitted to use the road anymore. 
953 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel et al v. Minister of Defence et al, [HCJ] 2150/07. 
954 Ethan Bronner, ‘Palestinians Fear Two-Tiered Road System’, New York Times, 28 March 2008. 
955 Jama'iat Iscan v. Commander of the IDF in Judea and Samaria, HCJ 393/82, 37(4) PD 785. 
956 See Al-Haq, Open Letter to Quartet Members: Israel’s Recent Land Confiscations East of Occupied 
Jerusalem, 1 November 2007, available at: http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=337.  
957 OCHA, The Humanitarian Monitor, No. 32 (December 2008), p. 7. 
958 See supra note 246, Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement Division of the World Zionist 
Organization, Master Plan For Settlement of Samaria and Judea, Plan for Development of the Area for 1983-
1986 (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 27 (in Hebrew), cited in B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads, p. 6. 
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system of administrative restrictions and military dictates that further impedes and controls 
Palestinian movement.  
 
ii. The Permit Regime 
The physical restrictions on Palestinian movement in the OPT are complemented by the closure of 
certain areas by military orders and by a pervasive permit system that limits movement through 
certain checkpoints, and confines the occupied population to specific roads and areas of the OPT.  
Since the 1990s, Palestinian entry to Israel, to settlement areas in the OPT, and to East Jerusalem from 
other parts of the OPT has been conditional on acquiring a personal entry permit. In addition, since 
2002, Palestinians have been precluded from accessing certain Palestinian areas without Israeli-issued 
permits. Significantly, Palestinians now require special permits to enter the areas in the ‘seam zone’ 
between the Wall and the Green Line, in addition to the Jordan Valley, all of which are integral parts 
of the West Bank. There are a host of other movement permits required for, inter alia, Palestinian 
public transport vehicles in general, for 
passenger and commercial vehicles to enter 
areas such as the seam zone, the Jordan 
Valley, and the Nablus district, and to leave 
areas under Israeli military siege. 
Humanitarian permits are needed for those 
who want to leave certain areas in order to 
receive medical care. Permits are also 
required for Palestinian movement between 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, 
these permits have become virtually 
impossible to obtain.959 
Indeed, requests for permits in general are 
very frequently denied, with the Israeli 
authorities placing unjustifiably burdensome 
obligations on applicants to prove that they 
pose no security risks, as well as why they 
need to go from one place to another inside 
the West Bank. The granting of a permit is 
treated as a favour which Israel’s District 
Coordination Office may grant to individual 
Palestinians in exceptional circumstances, 
rather than as an administrative formality.  
The Jordan Valley, which accounts for over 
25 percent of the West Bank and contains 
some of its most fertile agricultural areas, is 
another large swathe of Palestinian territory 
where Palestinian movement and access is 
significantly curtailed by physical and 
administrative obstacles to movement. Israeli 
military legislation in effect since the early 
days of the occupation designates most of the 
Jordan Valley as a closed area and stipulates 
that anyone wishing to enter that area must 
obtain a permit.960 At present, Israel controls 
                                               
959 For further details on the permit system see, for example, B’Tselem, Ground to a Halt: Denial of 
Palestinians’ Freedom of Movement in the West Bank (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, August 2007), p. 24-27. 
960 Military Order No.  151 of 1 November 1967. 
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the vast majority of the land, to which Palestinians are denied access and use. This denial has been 
implemented through particularly harsh and recently aggravated movement restrictions.961 An 
invisible wall of permits, checkpoints and restricted access roads allows Israel to exert total control 
over the movement of Palestinians to and from the Jordan Valley. 
In the early stages of planning the route of the West Bank Wall, the Israeli government considered 
building an ‘eastern Wall’ to run north-south in the eastern hills and separate the highlands from the 
Jordan Valley.962 This second wall would have reduced the Palestinian West Bank to highland 
enclaves entirely surrounded by walls that are passable only through gates guarded by Israeli security 
forces. Although the plan for the second Wall appears to have been suspended, it has been supplanted 
by a permit regime which has the same effect. Starting in 2005, entry was restricted to those with official 
documentation proving residence in the Jordan Valley, after which period entry was contingent upon the 
possession of an Israeli issued permit. Although these restrictions have eased slightly since 2007, entry 
remains at the discretion of the occupying forces, and private West Bank-registered vehicles remain 
prohibited from entering the Jordan Valley.  The extent and fragmenting effect of the permit system in 
the West Bank is illustrated in the map below.963 No such restrictions are placed on Israeli settlers, 
who, as noted, use separate roads to travel freely between settlements throughout the West Bank 
(including the seam zone and the Jordan Valley) and between the West Bank settlements and Israel.  
 
iii. Case Study: The ‘Seam Zone’  
A particularly egregious example of how visible and invisible restrictions on movement combine can 
be found in the ‘Seam Zone’ area between the Wall and the Green Line, along phase A of the Wall. 
On October 2, 2003, the Military Commander of Israeli military forces in the West Bank declared the 
Seam Zone to be a closed military zone in which civilians are not allowed.964 As of June 2007, 
seventeen Palestinian communities in which 27,520 Palestinians reside have been enclosed within the 
Seam Zone, physically separated by the Wall from the rest of the West Bank.965 If this gate and permit 
regime were extended to all land embraced by the completed Wall, around 60,000 Palestinians living 
in 42 villages would be trapped inside the Seam Zone.966 All of these residents are covered by the 
terms of closure and are required to submit to a rigorous permit regime even to live in their own 
homes in the Seam Zone. 
The same declaration of 2 October 2003 stated that this restriction does not apply to ‘Israeli’ persons, 
defined as a ‘citizen of the State of Israel, a resident of the State of Israel… and those entitled to 
immigrate to Israel by virtue of the Law of Return…’ As Israel’s Law of Return applies only to Jews, 
the last category meant that Jews who may not be citizens or legal residents of Israel were similarly 
exempt from the restriction. A system that denies or grants rights to access to territory on the basis of 
an identity defined as religious, ethnic, or national is a system of racial discrimination. 
The Major-General also signed, on the day of the declaration, a general permit exempting three ‘types 
of persons’: tourists, who may enter and stay in the Seam Zone ‘for any reason’; Palestinians holding 
                                               
961 B’Tselem, Israel has de facto annexed the Jordan Valley (13 February 2006). 
962 See Al-Haq, The Wall in the West Bank: State of Implementation of the International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion (November 2006), p. 5: available at http://tinyurl.com/alhaq-wall. 
963 Source: OCHA, Effect of closure and permit regime on Palestinian movement, November 2006. 
964 Declaration Concerning the Closing of a Zone No. 2/03/S (the Seam Zone), October 2, 2003. This area does 
not include East Jerusalem, almost all of which lies between the Wall and the Green Line, Palestinian territory 
already annexed by Israel. 
965 B’Tselem, available at: http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.  This figure does 
not include three communities that are presently situated west of the Wall but lie to the east according to the 
currently approved route.   
966 UN OCHA, ‘The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the 
West Bank,’ (July 2007), p. 50. 
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permits to work in Israel; and Palestinians holding permits to work in Israeli settlements, who may 
enter the Zone only for purposes of work and during work hours.967 The Major-General also 
authorised the Head of the Civil Administration of the West Bank to determine rules for Palestinian 
entry into the Seam Zone.968  
The Head of the Civil Administration subsequently issued a number of directives providing an 
intricate bureaucratic mechanism allowing Palestinians to apply for entry permits to the closed zone. 
Among others, separate forms for special permits were issued for the Palestinian residents of the 
Seam Zone, for farmers whose lands are in the Seam Zone, for professionals of various vocations, for 
workers in aid organisations who by virtue of their duties are required to enter the Zone, for business-
owners in the Seam Zone, for workers in the Zone and for Palestinians who wish to visit friends and 
relatives. Fifteen different forms were issued for Palestinians wishing to apply for entry into the Seam 
Zone969. Permits granted to Palestinians are usually limited to certain hours or certain seasons; for 
example, the Administration grants permits to owners of olive orchards only during the olive harvest 
season, claiming that there is no need to tend to the orchards between harvests. In addition, passage is 
prohibited into the Seam Zone (for a Palestinian holding a permit) other than by specified gates, and 
another procedure is required for entry with a vehicle, again with different forms: e.g., a ‘permanent 
resident application for passage with vehicle’ form; a ‘permanent resident application for admittance 
of a new vehicle into the Seam Zone’ form; and a ‘holder of personal permit application to enter with 
vehicle’ form.970 Of the sixty-seven gates which line the northernmost 200 kilometres of the Wall, 
only nineteen are open to Palestinians for use all the year round on a daily basis, while a further 
nineteen are open seasonally or for one or two days weekly, and twenty-nine are never open to 
Palestinians.971 In sum, this permit regime has created four classes of people: 
1. Citizens of Israel, residents of Israel and Jews of any nationality or residence, to 
whom the prohibition to enter and stay in the Zone does not apply.  
2. Tourists with leave to stay in Israel, who are granted a general and automatic permit 
that exempts them from applying for an entry permit. 
3. Palestinians working in Israel and in Israeli settlements, who are granted a general 
permit allowing them to enter or pass through the Seam Zone for work purposes.  
4. All other Palestinians, who are prohibited from entering or staying in the Seam Zone 
(including in their own homes) without a permit.  
In November 2003, the Israeli human rights organisation Ha’Moked– the Centre for the Defence of 
the Individual, petitioned the High Court of Justice to order the cessation of the construction of the 
Wall where it deviated from the Green Line.972 The petition, focusing on the legality of the Wall as a 
physical obstacle, also requested a Court order to cancel the declarations and decrees that compose the 
                                               
967 General Permit to Enter and Stay in the Seam Zone (Judea and Samaria), 2003, signed on October 2, 2003 by 
Major-General Moshe Kaplinsky.  
968 Declaration Concerning the Closing of a Zone, op cit., Section 4. 
969 Directives Concerning a Permit for Permanent Resident of the Seam Zone (Judea and Samaria), 2003; 
Directives Concerning Permits of Entry to the Seam Zone and Stay therein (Judea and Samaria), 2003, both 
signed on October 7, 2003 by the Head of the Civil Administration, Brigadier-General Ilan Paz. 
970 Directives Concerning Passageways in the Seam Zone (Judea and Samaria), 2003, signed on October 7, 2003 
by the Head of the Civil Administration, Brigadier-General Ilan Paz. 
971 Ibid. 
972 HCJ 9961/03 Ha’Moked – Centre for the Protection of the Individual v. The State of Israel et al. (still 
pending). The principal author of this section represents the petitioner in this petition.  
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permit regime.973 On January 2004, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel also petitioned the High 
Court of Justice to rule on the legality of the permit regime.974 
Following the submission of these petitions, several amendments were made in the permit regime. 
The first amendment was to unify the status of ‘Israelis’ and permanent Palestinian residents of the 
Seam Zone with that of tourists: i.e., instead of exempting Israelis, a general permit would be granted, 
exempting them from the need to apply for a permit for entry to the Seam Zone. Palestinian residents 
of the Zone no longer had to apply actively for special permits but were granted a general permit.975  
In addition, the general permit no longer included those entitled to enter Israel according to the Law 
of Return (i.e., Jews who are not citizens of Israel). This deletion was made because ‘in any case, they 
enjoy the status of tourists, and therefore the omission does not change anything for them’.976 
Although proclaimed by the High Court of Justice, this change has not been publicly announced and 
remains, four years later, unknown in the West Bank: signs at the Separation Wall’s crossings still 
include in the definition of ‘Israelis’ those entitled to Israeli citizenship according to the Law of 
Return.  
Eventually, the Head of the Civil Administration signed directives providing that Palestinian residents 
of the Zone are entitled to a ‘permanent resident of the Seam Zone certificate’, which shall allow them 
to pass through the gates.977 Now, in place of applying for a permit, the Palestinian residents of the 
Seam Zone were required to apply for a ‘resident certificate’. For that purpose, two new forms were 
issued: ‘Application for a Permanent Resident of the Seam Zone Certificate Form’ and ‘Application 
for the Granting of a New Resident of the Seam Zone Form’.  
All these and other amendments978 did not change the principle: for Palestinians, the Seam Zone is a 
closed area, except for those who can prove that ‘they have any business there’, and receive a permit 
(or permanent resident certificate). However, OCHA has found that only approximately 18 percent of 
Palestinian land owners or workers who farmed land in the closed zone in the northern West Bank 
before the construction of the Wall receive permits to access the area today.979 For Israelis and 
                                               
973 Court order No. 5 requested by the petitioner was: ‘…[Cancellation of] the Declaration Concerning the 
Closing of a Zone No. 2/03/S (the Seam Zone), 2003 (hereinafter: ‘the Declaration’) and… the Orders regarding 
Security Directives installed by its virtue concerning entry permits to the Seam Zone’. 
974 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria et al. 
(pending), HCJ 639/04. 
975 Declaration Concerning the Closing of a Zone No. 2/03/S (the Seam Zone) (Judea and Samaria), 
(Amendment No. 1), 2004; General Permit for Entry to the Seam Zone and Stay Therein (Judea and Samaria), 
(Amendment No. 1), 2004. Both were signed on May 27, 2004 by Major-General Moshe Kaplinsky. 
976 Interview, Military Legal Advisor for Judea and Samaria Bureau [date needed]. 
977 Directives Concerning Passageways in the Seam Zone (Judea and Samaria), (Amendment No. 1), 2004; 
Directives Concerning a Permanent Resident of the Seam Zone Certificate (Judea and Samaria), 2004. Both 
were signed by Brigadier-General Ilan Paz on June 3, 2004.  
978 Declaration Concerning the Closing of a Zone No. 2/03/S (the Seam Zone) (Judea and Samaria) 
(Amendment No. 2), 2005; signed on December 13, 2005 by the Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, 
Major-General Yair Naveh. Directives Concerning Permits to Enter the Seam Zone and Stay Therein 
(Amendment No. 1) (Judea and Samaria), 2005; signed by the Head of the Civil Administration, Brigadier-
General Kamil Abu-Rukkun on December 13, 2005. Directives Concerning Passageways in the Seam Zone 
(Amendment No. 2) (Judea and Samaria), 2005; signed on December 13, 2005 by the Head of the Civil 
Administration, Brigadier-General Kamil Abu-Rukkun. Declaration Concerning the Closing of a Zone No. 
2/03/S (the Seam Zone) (Judea and Samaria) (Extension of Effect and Amendment of Boundaries), 2005; signed 
on December 27, 2005 by the Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, Major-General Yair Naveh, 
applying the permit regime to the Fence section in phase B (from the village of Sallem going east to Tirat Zvi).  
979 OCHA Special Focus, The Barrier Gate and Permit Regime Four Years on: the Humanitarian Impact in the 
Northern West Bank, November 2007, p. 3. Available at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_SpecialFocus_BarrierGates_2007_11.pdf.  
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tourists, the Seam Zone is an open and free area; they require no certificate or document issued by the 
military authorities or the Civil Administration and can enter the Zone ‘for any reason’. 
 
iv. Access to Jerusalem and the Closure of the Gaza Strip  
Although Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem has been deemed illegal (as discussed in Chapter 
3.C.2), Israel continues to treat East Jerusalem as part of the sovereign territory of the State of Israel. 
Access to the city for Palestinian residents anywhere in the OPT outside East Jerusalem has, since 
1991, been limited to those who obtain personal entry permits similar to those required for 
Palestinians to enter Israel. The city is now surrounded by checkpoints, isolated from the rest of the 
OPT.980  
These restrictions are aggravated by the continued construction of Israeli settlements in East 
Jerusalem, in defiance of international law and in an attempt to alter the demographic balance of the 
city. The Wall, which weaves in and out of Palestinian villages, towns and neighbourhoods, blocks 
even access by Palestinians with Jerusalem residence identity cards to the city. Only five kilometres 
of the 168 kilometre section of the Wall within the Jerusalem Governorate actually follows the Green 
Line.981  
The population in the Gaza Strip also face severe restrictions on movement into and out of the 
territory. Despite the unilateral Israeli withdrawal of settlers and permanent military posts in 2005, 
Israel still controls the Gaza Strip’s air space, territorial sea and land borders, and closes down the 
crossings into and out of the Gaza Strip with great frequency. Following the election of Hamas and 
the capturing of an Israeli soldier in the Gaza Strip in 2006, and more particularly since Hamas’ 
complete takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, a near blanket closure has been imposed on the 
territory’s borders by Israel. Thousands of Palestinians have been stranded in Egypt for lengthy 
periods, while thousands more have been prevented from leaving the Gaza Strip, including students 
with scholarships to study abroad and patients with life-threatening conditions requiring urgent 
medical treatment unavailable in the Gaza Strip.  
 
v. Conclusion 
The systematic restrictions on Palestinian movement described above cannot be justified on 
reasonable security grounds and are unjustifiably sweeping in their application. They reflect a racially 
discriminatory premise that all Palestinians are potential security threats and their freedoms should 
therefore be curtailed on the basis of their identity as Palestinians. Moreover, Jewish-Israeli settlers 
living in the OPT remain relatively unaffected, indicating a system of racial discrimination. The 
World Bank—which has estimated that over 50 percent of the West Bank is now off-limits to 
Palestinians—has noted that it is ‘difficult to reconcile the Israeli use of movement and access 
restrictions for security purposes [with] their use to expand and protect settlement activity and the 
relatively unhindered movement of settlers and other Israelis in and out of the West Bank’.982  In 
2007, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed its deep 
                                               
980 See, for example, Al-Haq, Building Walls, Breaking Communities: The Impact of the Annexation Wall on 
East Jerusalem Palestinians (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 2005). See also B’Tselem, Ground to a Halt: Denial of 
Palestinians’ Freedom of Movement in the West Bank (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, August 2007), p. 63. 
981 UN OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities: East 
Jerusalem, Update No. 7, June 2007, p. 14.  
982 See World Bank Technical Team, Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and 
Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy (May 2007), p. 2. 
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concern over the “severe restrictions on the freedom of movement in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, targeting a particular national or ethnic group’.983 
As Israel’s restrictions on Palestinian movement have been estimated by the World Bank to render 
over 50 percent of the West Bank off-limits to Palestinians,984 they clearly obstruct Palestinians’ 
participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the OPT and impede their full 
development as a group, fitting the concern of Article 2(c). 
 
(II) F.2 Denial of the Right to Freedom of Residence 
(II) F.2(a) Interpretation 
The freedom to choose one’s residence, along with freedom of movement, is protected in Article 12 
of the ICCPR.  Everyone who is lawfully present within a territory under the jurisdiction of a state 
party to the ICCPR must enjoy the “freedom to choose his residence”. The right to choose one’s 
residence must be free from racial discrimination according to Article 5(d)(i) of ICERD. The Human 
Rights Committee has observed that “the right to reside in a place of one's choice within the territory 
includes protection against all forms of forced internal displacement. It also precludes preventing the 
entry or stay of persons in a defined part of the territory”.985 The Apartheid Convention condemns, in 
Article 2(c), any legislative and other measures calculated to deny members of a racial group the right 
to freedom of residence.   
 
(II) F.2(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa  
Throughout the twentieth century, restrictions on residence and property ownership divided the 
national territory of South Africa into racial zones, policed by check-points, random document checks 
and raids on homes. Freedom of movement and residence was therefore severely inhibited and strictly 
controlled. Issuing a passport, essential to the exercise of the right to leave the country, was a matter 
of government discretion and was routinely denied to opponents of the regime.986  
The effect of the pass laws in South Africa was to make people aliens in their own country. 
Movement of black people was controlled through the Group Areas Act, which designated where 
black people could live, and the pass system which kept tight control over their movement out of 
black areas. The State designated places of residence for the labour force in particular, requiring those 
working as migrant labourers (a classification consequent to their living in the homelands and 
working outside of them) to live in compounds.987 Those not permitted to reside and work in 
townships (by virtue of Section 10 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act)988 were relocated 
to the Bantustans, termed ‘homelands,’ where they were required to reside, and any travel outside of 
the homelands was determined by the travel restrictions and pass limitations. Violation of pass laws, 
                                               
983 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, March 2007, UN Doc. ICERD/C/ISR/CO/13, §. 
34. Emphasis added. 
984Ibid., p. 2.   
985 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (2 November 
1999), para. 7. 
986 Reflecting this history, section 20 of the South African Constitution (1996) guarantees freedom of movement 
to every person who is lawfully in the national territory. The right to freely choose a place of residence in the 
national territory—in many human rights instruments, closely associated with the freedom of movement—is 
covered in section 19. 
987  Evidence of this was especially marked in the mining industry where black mine workers were required, 
until the late 1980s to reside in mine compounds while White workers were free to choose where they lived. 
988  Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, Act No. 25 of 1945. 
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whether on purpose or accidentally (such as by forgetting one’s pass book at home), was the most 
common reason for the arrest of black people during the apartheid era. 
 
(II) F.2(c) Israeli practices in the OPT 
i. Palestinian Residency Rights in Occupied East Jerusalem 
In 1948, Zionist forces seized western Jerusalem while the eastern part of the city, held initially by the 
joint Arab forces, came under Jordanian rule. Between 1948 and 1967, Jerusalem remained divided. 
In the 1967 War, Israel conquered East Jerusalem and an additional 64 square kilometres of 
surrounding West Bank land and unilaterally defined this larger area as the expanded Jerusalem 
municipality. Israel then conducted a census that became the basis for granting permanent residency 
in the city. The population of East Jerusalem until June 1967 was 75,000 and the total population, 
including the annexed outlying areas, was 130,000.989 The number of Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem and the annexed surrounding areas who received permanent residency status by Israel in 
1967 was 66,000 and amounted to 25 percent of the population of the ‘united city.’990 Residents of 
Jerusalem who were not present in East Jerusalem during the census (for example, those studying or 
travelling abroad) lost their right to reside in East Jerusalem and could regain that right only by 
applying to the Israeli Ministry of Interior for family unification. More than 60,000 such Palestinians 
were not allowed to return to their homes in East Jerusalem.991  
Between 1967 and 2007 a very small number of Palestinian East Jerusalem residents had applied for 
Israeli citizenship.992 Instead, by 2007 approximately 253,000 Palestinians held Jerusalem permanent 
residency ID cards.993 Most Palestinians had refused to consider Israeli citizenship because it required 
them to swear allegiance to the State of Israel, implying de facto acceptance of the occupation. But 
after 2007, the number of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem who applied for Israeli citizenship 
rose sharply. 994 This rise was attributed to the residents' fear that they may lose their residency status 
altogether if their neighbourhoods were cut off from the city by the Wall and/or otherwise transferred 
to Palestinian control under future agreements. 995   
‘Permanent’ residency status is not permanent. The Entry into Israel Regulations of 1974, which 
amended the Law of Entry into Israel (1952), specified conditions under which permanent residency 
                                               
989 Memorandum concerning the measures taken by Israel with respect to the City of Jerusalem, Submitted by 
Ruhi Al-Khatib, 26 August 1967, printed in the Journal of Palestine Studies 145, Vol. 37 No. 1 (Autumn 2007) 
at 95. Ruhi Al-Khatib was the elected Mayor of Jerusalem from 1951 until he was dismissed by the Israeli 
authorities in 1967. 
990 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Press Release, 14 May 2007, 084/2007, 2: available at 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/hodaot2007n/11_07_084b.doc; Ir Amim website at http://www.ir-amim.org.il/; Maya 
Coshen, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2005, available at: http://www. 
jiis.org.il/imageBank/File/shnaton_2006/shnaton_C1005_2005.pdf.  
991 Ruhi Al-Khatib, Memorandum, supra. 
992 The UN High Commission of Refugees, ‘Israel: Citizenship Law’, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c2252,4565c25f59,4804c0ddc,0.html 
993 OCHA, June 2007, supra, p. 10. 
994 See Associated Press, ‘Israel reports jump in Jerusalem Arabs seeking Israeli citizenship’, Ha'aretz;  7 
November 2007; Shaked, R., ‘Thousands of Palestinians apply for Israeli citizenship’, Yedioth Aharanot (7 
November 2007), available at: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3468672,00.html.  
995 Israeli law professor Ruth Lapidot glosses over these difficulties in asserting that, ‘Israeli nationality was not 
imposed on residents of East Jerusalem, but it can be acquired by application on their part’: see Ruth Lapidot, 
‘Jerusalem and the Peace Process’ (1994) 28 Israel Law Review 2-3 (Spring 1994), available at:  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1994/7/JERUSALEM%20AND%20THE%20PEACE%2
0PROCESS%20-%20Jul-94.  
206 | THE PROHIBITION OF APARTHEID  CHAPTER IV 
 
 
in Israel would expire.996 Residency can also be revoked at the discretion of the Israeli Minister of 
Interior (see ‘centre of life’ discussion in the next section),997 but the bases for these decisions are 
unpublished, unclear, and change frequently.998  
Under Israeli law, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are not subjected to the same restrictions on 
movement as those imposed on the residents of the rest of the OPT. Those who were granted 
permanent residency status have the right to live and work in Israel without having to apply for 
special permits, are entitled to social benefits and health insurance, and have the right to vote in local 
elections (although few do so, as voting would signal recognition of the present Jerusalem 
municipality). Unlike citizens of Israel, permanent residents of Jerusalem cannot vote in elections for 
the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), cannot serve in Israeli public office, including serving as a judge. 
They can pass their residency status to their children only under certain conditions. 
211Israel has taken several measures that suggest a deliberate policy to reduce the number of 
Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem. Central to this is a measure adopted by the Israeli Ministry of 
Interior in 1995 regarding a ‘centre of life’ test for permanent residency in Jerusalem. According to 
this policy, the Minister will revoke the permanent residency of a Palestinian if his or her ‘centre of 
life’ is no longer in East Jerusalem. An absence of seven years or the procurement of residency or 
citizenship in another country is taken as proof that the resident’s centre of life has changed.999 The 
burden to prove that East Jerusalem is their ‘centre of life’ is on the Palestinian residents and the 
requirements include providing property tax bills, electricity and telephone bills, work certificates, 
and children’s school certificates for the past two to seven years.1000 Residing in a foreign country for 
a period greater than three years for purposes other than education is further grounds for 
revocation.1001  
Between 1996 and 1999, the Minister of the Interior revoked the permanent-residency rights of 
hundreds of Palestinians, on the grounds that they lived outside of Israel for extended periods, even if 
they lived elsewhere in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Israeli human rights organisations have 
dubbed these revocations ‘the quiet deportation.’1002 From 1967 to 2006, the Ministry of Interior 
revoked the permanent residency status of 8,269 Palestinians.1003 In 2005, the Ministry of Interior 
                                               
996 Badil, ‘Eviction, Restitution and Protection of Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem’ (April 1999), p. 17, available 
at: www.badil.org.  
997 Entry into Israel Law of 1952, Section 11(a). 
998 O. Feller, ‘The Ministry: Violations of Human Rights by the Ministry of Interior's Population Registrar’ (The 
Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2004), pp. 9-10 (Hebrew), available at: 
http://www.acri.org.il/portal.aspx?id=15.  
999  H.C. 282/88, Mabrook Awwad v. Yitzhak Shamir and The Minister of Interior; Administrative Appeal to the 
Supreme Court 5829/05, Dari et al v. The Ministry of Interior; see also Feller, p. 9; Entry to Israel Regulations 
No. 11 (a) and (c) of 1973. 
1000Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (Fact Sheets, Residency Rights), available at: 
http://www.jcser.org/english/index.html. 
1001 World Bank Technical Team (2007), Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank, p. 11, available 
at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/RafahCorridorMarch07.pdf.  
1002 B'Tselem and Hamoked. ‘The Quiet Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians’ 
(April 1997): available at: http://www.btselem.org/Download/199704_Quiet_Deportation_Eng.doc.  
1003  B'Tselem statistics (August 2008), available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Revocation_Statistics.asp. B'Tselem cites the following sources for 
its statistics: Ministry of the Interior (figures until 1994 are taken from the letter of the attorney Moriah Bakshi, 
of the legal department of the Ministry of the Interior, to attorney Mahliel Blass, of the Attorney General's 
Office, in HCJ 7316/75. The figures for 1995 to 1998 were provided to B'Tselem by the Ministry of the Interior 
on 13 February 2000. Figures for 2003 and 2004 were provided to the Jerusalem Centre for Social and 
Economic Rights by the Department for Strategic Planning of the Interior Ministry in letters from 16 June and 5 
August 2004.  B'Tselem did not cite its sources for the 2005 and 2006 figures. 
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revoked the permanent residency rights of 222 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem; in 2006 this 
number increased to 1,363.1004 
A second measure targets the registration of children. Under Israeli law, a ‘non-Jewish’ child born in 
Israel to parents who are permanent residents is entitled to the same legal status as the child's 
parents.1005  Therefore, if both the mother and the father are permanent residents of Jerusalem and 
their child was born in East Jerusalem or Israel, they can register the child at the Ministry of Interior 
and the child will also become a permanent resident. If the parents register the child before the age of 
one, registration usually goes smoothly and the parents are not required to present proof that their 
‘centre of life’ is in Jerusalem. However, if the child is not registered before his or her first birthday, 
the parents are required to submit numerous documents and affidavits, certified by an attorney, 
proving that their ‘centre of life’ is in Jerusalem.1006  
Israeli law is silent regarding the residency status of children of Palestinian permanent residents of 
East Jerusalem if the child was born outside of Israel, including in areas of the OPT other than East 
Jerusalem. The Interior Ministry changes its policies frequently regarding the registration of such 
children and presently makes it difficult for parents to do so. If the child was born in the rest of the 
West Bank or in the Gaza Strip, the Ministry claims that, according to the Citizenship and Entry into 
Israel Law (Temporary Order)-2003, the assumption is that the child's ‘centre of life’ is in those 
territories and the child will not be registered.1007 If the child is 14 years old or less, then the Interior 
Ministry will grant the child ‘A5-interim residency’ for two years. After the two years, the child will 
be registered if there is proof that the child's ‘centre of life’ is in Jerusalem.  If the child is over 14 
years of age, the child has to apply for family reunification, which is usually denied.  Alternatively, 
the child can apply for temporary visitor permits.1008  
For children who were, for one reason or another, registered in the West Bank despite the fact their 
‘centre of life’ is in East Jerusalem, the Israeli High Court of Justice has decided that the Ministry 
should deal with these individuals on a case-by-case basis.1009 If one of the parents is a Jerusalem 
permanent resident and the other parent is from the OPT, the law states that the child is entitled to 
permanent residency status.1010  In fact, the Ministry of Interior requires that the parents prove that 
their ‘centre of life’ is in Jerusalem. During the time that the child is not registered, the child is not 
entitled to health insurance or social benefits.1011  
The cumulative effect of Israel’s restrictions on Palestinian residence in East Jerusalem is to serve a 
policy aimed at maintaining a Jewish majority in the city that underpins the State’s regime of control. 
 
                                               
1004 Ilan Shahar, ‘Interior Ministry increasingly revoking East Jerusalem Arabs' residency permits,’ Haa'retz 
(June 24, 2007), available at: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/874161.html. 
1005 Entry to Israel Regulations of 1974, section 12. 
1006 Interview with Attorney Yutam Ben Hillel, Hamoked, 13 October 2008. 
1007 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘Stateless Persons in Israel’, prepared for the US State 
Department's Human Rights Report, September 2007, available at: http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/USEmbassy.pdf; 
also B'Tselem and HaMoked ‘Forbidden Families: Family Unification and Child Registration in East Jerusalem’ 
(2004, January), p. 26; available at: http://www.btselem.org/Download/200401_Forbidden_Families_Eng.doc; 
and Feller, p. 20. 
1008 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law 2005, Article 3A. 
1009 Administrative Appeal 5569/06, Ministry of Interior v. Eweisat et al. (Supreme Court). 
1010 Entry to Israel Regulations of 1974, section 12. 
1011 Feller, supra, p. 20. 
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(ii) Family Unification  
(ii)(a) Family Unification in International Law 
Customary international law allows a state to deny entry to a foreigner to its territory or to place 
conditions on the alien's entry.1012  However, when the foreigner is married to a citizen/ national or a 
resident of the state then the state cannot arbitrarily interfere with their right to maintain a family life 
together.1013  
Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as ‘the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.’ The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which Israel is a state 
party, establishes in Article 10(1) that: ‘The widest possible protection and assistance should be 
accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its 
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children.’ 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also recognises the importance of 
family rights. Article 2(3) of the ICCPR states that: ‘(1) The family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State; (2) The right of men and 
women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.’ In addition to the 
state’s obligation to protect the family unit, Article 17 of the ICCPR directs states not to arbitrarily or 
illegally interfere with the privacy, family, or home of a person.  The International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families is testament to the 
importance placed on the family under international human rights law.1014 
While the right to family unification is not expressly stated in international treaties and ‘there is no 
international obligation put on a country to permit aliens to enter its sovereign territory even for the 
purpose of family unification’, there is universal consensus that the right to a shared family life is 
entitled to protection from the state.1015  For example, despite giving states broad discretion on issues 
related to the entry of aliens into the state, the European Court of Human Rights recognizes the right 
to family life and that protecting this right may require the imposition of positive duties on the 
state.1016   
The laws of occupation require states to respect the rights of the family in occupied territory. Article 
27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that: ‘Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, 
to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, 
and their manners and customs.’ 
Although neither Article 27 nor the ICRC commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention provide 
detailed guidance as to what is meant by the term ‘family rights,’ the requirement that ‘family life 
must be respected as far as possible’ has been established as a norm of customary international 
humanitarian law.1017 Israel recognises such norms as applicable to its actions.1018 
                                               
1012 L. Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories: Laws, Regulations and Facts’ 
(May 2007), p. 1: available at: http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/7990/1/CARIM-RR_2007_05.pdf. 
1013Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification’,  p.1. 
1014 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, adopted by GA Res 45/158 (1990), entered into force 1 July 2003. 
1015 Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification’, p. 1. 
1016 Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification’, p. 23.  
1017 Jean-Marie Hankerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law - Volume 1: 
Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 379. 
1018 David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 31. 
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Furthermore, it is a general principle of international law that any restriction imposed on a person’s 
rights should be proportionate to the end sought. Considering the importance of the rights involved 
and the existence of alternative means to achieve the designated end, such as in-depth security 
investigations of each individual applicant, it is clear that the absolute ban on family unification 
contravenes international humanitarian and human rights law.  
 
(ii)(b) Family Unification for Palestinians in the OPT, excluding East Jerusalem  
Three months after its occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip in 
June of 1967, Israel conducted a census of the Palestinian population in these areas. New military 
orders were then passed making the possession of an Israeli-issued identity card a condition for 
permanent residency in the OPT.1019 These new orders supplemented the military orders passed in the 
immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War which declared the OPT closed military zones, making entry 
and exit subject to the permission of the Regional Military Commander. As a result of these orders, an 
estimated 325,000 Palestinians1020  who had fled the fighting or who were outside what became the 
OPT at the time of the armistice were excluded from returning, causing severe disruption to their 
family lives.  
Shortly after the census, the Israeli authorities instituted a ‘family unification’ process that was to 
allow Palestinians registered in the census to apply for the return of family members who, as a result 
of the military orders, had lost their residency in the OPT.  From 1967 through 2000, Israel 
implemented a rigid ‘family unification’ policy in the OPT. This policy was neither transparent nor 
accessible, involved lengthy and expensive bureaucratic procedures and was then repeatedly changed 
to match perceived political or policy imperatives. In 2000, the outbreak of the second intifada was 
used as a pretext for Israel to cease operating even this flawed ‘family unification’ process. 
In the five years following the Six-Day War, only first degree relatives who became refugees 
following the war, excluding males aged 16-60, were allowed to return. Of some 140,000 requests for 
family unification, only 45,000-50,000 people were approved.1021 From 1973 onwards, when even 
more stringent criteria were imposed, until 1983, when the policy was re-evaluated and further 
restricted, approximately 1,000 applications were approved per year, while some 150,000 remained 
pending. The increased restrictions reduced successful applications from 1984 onwards to a few 
hundred a year. The reason given for the change in the process was that ‘over the years, the type of 
requests for family unification changed significantly, and deviated from the original objectives of the 
said policy, dealing instead with families that had been created after the war.’1022 The 1990s saw 
quotas set of a few thousand applicants per year through decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court and 
then the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement. In the OPT in 2000, Israeli froze the family 
unification process entirely. In 2007, more than 120,000 applications for family unification in the 
West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip were still pending.1023 
Israel's intention to exercise demographic control over all of the territory is further illustrated by its 
policies relating to child registration. Between 1967 and 1987 children under 16 who were born in the 
OPT or born abroad to a parent who is a resident of the OPT were allowed to be officially registered 
as residents.1024  However, this policy was changed in 1987 per an order issued by the military 
                                               
1019 Al-Haq, Occasional Paper No. 8: The Right to Unite, (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1990), p. 3. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 Ibid., p. 4. 
1022 B’Tselem & Hamoked, Perpetual Limbo: Israel's Freeze on Unification of Palestinian Families in the 
Occupied Territories (2006), p. 9, quoting the Response of the State Attorney's Office of 18 November 1992, 
Section 6 in HCJ 4494/91, Sarhan et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria et al. 
1023 B’Tselem, Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 2007 Annual Report, p. 37. 
1024 Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification’, p. 6. 
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commander and children over the age of five were denied registration.1025 In 1995, the interim peace 
agreement authorised the Palestinian Authority to register children without Israel's approval as long as 
one of the child's parents was registered. Nevertheless, between December 2002 and September 2005, 
Israel refused to recognise the registration of children whose ages were between 5 and 16 who were 
born abroad.1026  In September 2005, Israel again decided to accept the registration of children under 
the age of 16, but those who had already turned 16 continued to encounter difficulties, although they 
had applied for registration prior to turning age 16.1027 
Due to the significant obstacles to achieving family unification and the lengthy procedures involved, 
many families were forced to rely upon repeatedly obtaining short-term visitor permits to stay 
temporarily in the OPT with their families. These permits were subject to a capricious bureaucracy 
similar to, or sometimes as part of, the family unification process. However, the grant of these permits 
was also frozen in 2000. In effect, Palestinians living in the OPT and wishing to form a family where 
one spouse is not resident of the OPT must forgo the unity of their family or forgo living in his or her 
homeland.  
A policy that deliberately aims to stifle the formation and unity of Palestinian families within the OPT 
through the systematic denial of the rights to freedom of residence and to return to their country 
therefore clearly contributes to preventing the full development of Palestinians as a group. Israel’s 
policies in the OPT, far from providing families with the protection and assistance required by 
international human rights law, in fact prevents specific families from living together and hinders or 
prevents unification of Palestinian families. 
An interpretation that Israel’s ban on family reunification serves the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining racial domination in the OPT is supported by the fact that no such restrictions are placed 
on Jewish families wishing to reside (unlawfully) in the OPT. On the contrary, Israel’s efforts to 
restrict the ability of Palestinians to unify and form families in the OPT have been paralleled by 
concerted efforts to transfer Israeli individuals and families into the OPT. This illegal transfer has 
been achieved primarily through massive government investment in settlement infrastructure and the 
provision of numerous incentives to encourage Jewish individuals and families to move to the 
unlawful settlements. Thus, Israel's practices and policy regarding family unification contravenes 
international human rights law, in that they are clearly discriminatory, and in forming part of an 
overall system which dominates and subjugates members of the Palestinian population, amounts to 
acts of apartheid.1028  
 
(ii)(c) Family Unification between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians from the OPT  
As East Jerusalem is part of the OPT, its Palestinian residents are 'protected persons'. Since Israel's 
annexation of East Jerusalem, however, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were granted permanent 
residency status and thus like Israeli citizens and Israeli civil laws also apply in their case.   
East Jerusalem residents who marry a Palestinian spouse from the OPT and wish to live with their 
spouses in East Jerusalem have to apply to the Israeli Ministry of Interior for ‘family unification.’1029 
Between June 1967 and May 2002, the Ministry of Interior granted family unification and allowed 
such couples to live in East Jerusalem, albeit after many years of foot dragging and bureaucratic 
                                               
1025 Order number 297, 5729-1969, section 11(a) (amended by order no. 1208 of  13 September 1987) as cited in 
Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification’, p. 7.  
1026 A. Ashkar, Perpetual Limbo: Israel's Freeze on Unification of Palestinian Families in the Occupied 
Territories (B'Tselem and Hamoked, July 2006), p. 26; Abu Mukh, ‘Family Unification’, p. 9;  
1027 Ashkar, ibid., p. 26. 
1028 See also Schocken, A., ‘Citizenship law makes Israel an apartheid state,’ Ha'aretz (29 June 2008). 
1029 Forbidden Families, op cit. 
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delays. Between 1993 and 2002, an estimated 100,000-140,000 residents of the OPT gained status to 
reside in East Jerusalem and Israel as a result of the family unification process.1030  
In May 2002, the Israeli government issued Decision No. 1813, which froze the processing of all 
family unification applications by citizens or residents of Israel and East Jerusalem involving 
Palestinian spouses from the OPT.1031 Various statements by government officials made it clear that 
the freeze was due to the government's fear that Palestinians were achieving a ‘creeping right of 
return’ through the family unification process.1032 The freeze had grave effects, as Palestinian 
residents of Israel whose spouses were from the OPT had either to leave Israel, in order to live with 
their spouses, or live in Israel with a spouse who did not have legal status. Unlike some Palestinians 
who have Israeli citizenship, East Jerusalem residents who decide to move to the OPT risked losing 
their permanent residency status residents because their ‘centre of life’ is no longer in Jerusalem.1033   
In July 2003, the Knesset amended existing legislation, the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, by 
passing a temporary order that extended the government’s 2002 freeze on ‘family unification’ 
applications involving Palestinian spouses from the OPT. The new law exclusively targeted 
Palestinian residents of the OPT, leaving the general policy for residency and citizenship status for all 
other foreign spouses unchanged, including Israeli settlers living in the OPT. Immediately thereafter, 
in August 2003, Adalah filed a petition to the High Court of Justice challenging the constitutionality 
of the law. In the petition, Adalah argued that the "law constitutes one of the most extreme measures 
in a series of governmental actions aimed at undermining the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel, as 
well as Palestinians from the OPT."1034 Before the court, Israel justified Government Decision No. 
1813 and the subsequent law by arguing argued that Palestinians who had been granted status in Israel 
through family unification were increasingly involved in assisting ‘terror’ organizations. Israel 
referred to twenty-three individuals (out of thousands of status-receivers) allegedly involved in 
‘terror’, but did not provide details of these cases to the court. Moreover, even if reliable, this figure 
constitutes a relatively tiny number of people and the Government Decision, and the law upon which 
it is based, are disproportionate. In May 2006, the High Court rejected the petition in a split 6 to 5 
decision, which effectively approved the law.1035  
By contrast, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its 2007 Concluding 
Observations on Israel found that “such restriction targeting a particular national or ethnic group in 
general is not compatible with the Convention, in particular the obligation of the State party to 
guarantee to everyone equality before the law (Articles 1, 2 and 5).’ The Committee thus 
recommended that Israel “revoke the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order), and 
reconsider its policy with a view to facilitating family reunification on a non-discriminatory basis.’1036 
Instead, in March 2007 the Knesset passed an amendment to the law (which maintains the ban on 
family unification where one spouse is a Palestinian from the OPT) by extending the ban to family 
unification where one spouse is a resident or citizen of Syria, Lebanon, Syria, Iran or Iraq – states all 
defined by Israeli law as ‘enemy states’ – and/or an individual defined by the Israeli security forces as 
residing in an area where activity is occurring that is liable to endanger Israeli security. A Supreme 
Court petition filed in May 2007 challenging this new law is currently pending.1037 
                                               
1030 Forbidden Families, p. 15. 
1031 Forbidden Families, p. 9. 
1032 Forbidden Families, p. 18. 
1033 Regulation 11(c) of the Entry to Israel Regulation – 1974. 
1034 See Adalah, ‘The Nationality and Entry into Israel Law’, Special Report: Ban on Family Reunification (20 
December 2008), available at: http://www.adalah.org/eng/famunif.php. 
1035 Adalah, et.al., v. Minister of Interior, et. al. (decision delivered 14 May 2006), H.C. 7052/03. 
1036 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Israel, March 2007, 
UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, at para. 20. 
1037 Adalah v. The Minister of Interior, et. al. (case pending), H.C. 830/07. 
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In this petition, Adalah argued that the law constitutes racial discrimination as it bars certain 
individuals from family unification solely on the basis of their nationality.1038 It also prevents 
Palestinian citizens of Israel from having contact with their families, with members of the Arab nation 
or with the Palestinian people, in violation of international law.1039 
Tens of thousands of Palestinian families have been by affected by the ban on family unification since 
2002.1040  In 2004, it was estimated that the ban affected between 16,000 and 24,000 families.1041 
Separating and discriminating against Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem in such a systematic fashion, using mechanisms that are institutionalised by law and 
explicitly privilege Israeli Jews over Palestinians, results in the oppression and domination of the 
former over the latter.  
 
(iii) Conclusion 
A group of Israeli policies measures restrict Palestinian rights to freedom of residence. Israel policy is 
to reduce the number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem by revoking their permanent residency status if 
they are unable to prove that their centre of life is East Jerusalem. Further, a myriad of restrictions are 
placed on family unification for Palestinians in the occupied territory and in Israel. These measures 
often leave Palestinians with few choices but to leave Israel or the OPT or to live illegally there 
without status. This mirrors, to some degree, the Group Areas Act and the Pass Laws in apartheid 
South Africa, which severely inhibited and strictly controlled the freedom of residence for black 
South Africans. As did the apartheid regime in South Africa, Israel justifies these measures under the 
pretext of ‘security’. Contrary to such claims, they are in fact part of an overall regime aimed at 
preserving demographic superiority of one racial group over the other in certain areas.  
 
(II) F.3 Denial of the Right to Leave and Return to one’s Country 
(II) F.3(a) Interpretation 
The right to leave and return to one’s country was legally recognised as early as 1215 in the English 
Magna Carta, which provided that ‘[i]t shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out our 
Kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water’.  The right of an individual to return 
to his country is guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 12(4)), 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13(2)), which is reflective of customary 
international law.1042 The Apartheid Convention prohibits the denial of the right of members of a 
racial group to leave and return to their country as part of a system of domination and oppression 
against that group, thus drawing on Article 5(d)(ii) of ICERD, which prohibits racial discrimination in 
the application of those rights.  
The right to return to one’s ‘own country’ applies even if the territory in question is disputed or has 
changed hands. The law of nationality, a subset of the larger ‘law of nations’, stipulates that in case of 
state succession, the newly emerging successor state must allow habitual residents of a territory 
                                               
1038 Ibid, p. 15. 
1039 Ibid, p. 25. 
1040 See, for example, H.C. 4608/02, Abu Assad, et. al. v. The Prime Minister of Israel, et. al.: available at: 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/famunif.php#2002_petition, and Perpetual Limbo. 
1041 UN OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities (June 2007), 
Update #7, p. 4 and 23. 
1042 Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states, ‘Everyone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and return to his country’; Article 12 (4) of the International Convention on Cultural 
and Political Rights states, ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’; Article 
5(d)(ii) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination protects ‘the 
right (of everyone) to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country.’ 
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undergoing change in status or sovereignty to exercise their right to return to their own homes or 
places of origin, regardless of where they may have been on the actual date of succession.1043 The 
right of return does not only apply to those individuals directly expelled and their immediate families, 
but also to their descendants who have ‘maintained close and enduring connections’ with the area.1044  
 
(II) F.3(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa 
The right of black South Africans to leave and return to their country was limited in several ways. The 
policy that affected millions of black people was the Homelands policy, which unilaterally redefined 
the country to which black South Africans belonged by partitioning sections of South Africa into 
titular ethnic states. As discussed in greater detail later (see section II.F.4(b)), The Bantu Homeland 
Citizenship Act permanently divested black South Africans of their citizenship and purported to 
eliminate any juridical claim to a right of return.1045 Millions of black South Africans were forcibly 
transferred into the Homelands and a cluster of laws restricting freedom of movement, expressed 
ultimately as visa requirements, then prohibited them from returning to white areas, which were now 
another ‘country’. Access to white South Africa was controlled by the South African Government’s 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. 
A policy of the apartheid regime that targeted its political opponents was to deny a passport, essential 
to the exercise of the right to leave the country and a matter of government discretion. Legislation 
permitted those who were determined to leave the country to apply for an ‘exit permit’, but exit on 
this basis essentially led to statelessness.  
 
(II) F.3(c) Israeli practices in the OPT 
Contrasting Israeli legislation and practice as it relates to Palestinian refugees, who face draconian 
barriers to returning to their country of origin, and Jewish immigrants, who can enter Israel freely and 
qualify for automatic citizenship on grounds of their Jewish identity, provides evidence of 
discriminatory measures for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination of one racial 
group over another.  
When the first Arab-Israeli war ended with the signing of an armistice in 1949, some 750,000 
Palestinians had become refugees.1046 In addition, Israel’s invasion and occupation of East Jerusalem, 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June 1967 resulted in some 550,000 Palestinians being displaced, 
the majority of whom fled or were expelled to Jordan.1047 By 31 December 2007, the number of 
people registered with the UN Relief Works Agency as ‘Palestine refugees’ had increased to over 4.5 
                                               
1043 See the International Law Commission’s Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States, which reflected customary international law in 1948. 
1044 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27 (1999), para 21. 
1045 TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 5, para. 23. 
1046 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims (Vintage Books, New York, 2001), p. 252. The figure of 750,000 is used 
as this is the most commonly figure cited for Palestinian Arab displacement in 1948 in the prevailing literature. 
Statistics for refugee figures have been as high as 935,573 according to UNRWA registrations, to as low as 
530,000 according to some Israeli sources. The British Foreign Office estimated the total number of refugees to 
be 810,000 in February 1949 and then issued a revised estimate of 600,000. The UNCCP Technical Office gave 
a figure of 760,000. The US Government estimated a total refugee population of 875,000 as of 1953. For further 
information see Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2002 (Bethlehem: Badil 
Resource Centre, 2003), p. 25, Note to Table 1.1. 
1047 See Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-
second session, Supplement No. 13, 1 July 1966 – 30 June 1967, UN doc. A/6713. See also Survey of 
Palestinian Refugees, ibid. 
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million, some 1.8 million of whom live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.1048 The remaining 2.7 
million people registered as refugees with the UN remain displaced in the surrounding countries of 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.1049 
Under human rights law, these refugees, as well as their descendants, have the right to return to their 
former places of habitual residence. Thus General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948 stipulated that 
Palestinian refugees should be permitted ‘to return to their homes’ at the earliest practicable date: 
… the [Palestinian] refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to 
property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible.1050 
Israel has failed to comply with this stipulation. Palestinians expelled in 1948 have not been allowed 
to return to their homes, regain their property, or obtain residency or citizenship in Israel. Palestinian 
refugees are excluded by Article 3 of the 1952 Citizenship Law from eligibility for Israeli citizenship 
on grounds that they were not ‘in Israel, or in an area which became Israeli territory after the 
establishment of the State, from the day of the establishment of the State [May 1948] to the day of the 
coming into force of this Law [April 1952 ]’. 1051 Only by maintaining continuous residence in Israel 
from 1948 to 1952 were Palestinians living inside Israel eligible to acquire Israeli citizenship and thus 
remain in the country. 1052  
Moreover, the great majority of those Palestinians who fled their homes in 1967 have been prevented 
by Israel from returning to the OPT,1053 in contravention of Security Council Resolution 237.1054  Of 
refugees registered with UNRWA now living in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, 650,000 originally 
resided in land now in the OPT. An estimated 90,000 Palestinian residents of the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, were abroad at the time of the 1967 war and were thus not registered in the 
census conducted thereafter by Israel.1055 The Israeli authorities refused to consider Palestinians not 
registered in the census as legal residents of the OPT and employed administrative measures to 
prevent them from returning.1056 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) has repeatedly expressed concern on this and called on Israel to “to assure equality in the 
right to return to one’s country’.1057 
By contrast, the State of Israel actively encourages Jewish immigration to Israel and, since 1967, 
Jewish residency in Israeli settlements in the OPT. Article 1 of the 1950 Law of Return states that 
                                               
1048 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Figures as of 
31 December 2007, available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/uif-dec07.pdf.  
1049 Ibid. 
1050 GA Res. 194 (III), 11 December 1948, paragraph 11. 
1051 Nationality (Citizenship) Law 5712-1952, LSI, Vol. XI, p. 50. 
1052 See Victor Kattan, “The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians”, 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 
(2005), pp. 67-102 at pp. 85-87. 
1053 Only 14,000 were allowed back in to the West Bank by September 1967, when the census was conducted. 
After that, ‘only a trickle of “special cases” were allowed back, perhaps 3,000 in all’. See Benny Morris, p. 329. 
1054 UN Security Council Resolution 237 of 14 June 1967. 
1055 See Badil, Occasional Bulletin No. 18 (July 2004), p. 3, available at: 
http://www.badil.org/Publications/Bulletins/Bulletin-18.htm.  
1056 Ibid. 
1057 See, for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 
Israel, 70th session, 19 February – 9 March 2007, UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, March 2007, para. 18. 
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‘Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh’.1058 This provision was supplemented by 
Article 2 of the 1952 Citizenship Law, which bestows automatic Israeli citizenship on any Jew who 
enters the country under the Law of Return. These laws ensure that Jews do not need to meet the 
prohibitively restrictive criteria (namely proof of continuous residence from 1948 to 1952) imposed 
on any Palestinian wishing to return to their country or, since 1967, the OPT.  
Finally, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the State of Israel has authorised the Jewish Agency and 
World Zionist Organisation to act as its ‘authorised agencies’ to promote Jewish immigration to 
Israel. This differential treatment further signifies that Israel’s state policy is to convey different rights 
and privileges to Jews and Palestinians in ‘returning’ to the country. The US State Department has 
noted that the 1950 Law of Return and the 1952 Citizenship Law are explicitly discriminatory, 
concluding that they ‘confer an advantage on Jews in matters of immigration and citizenship’.1059  
 
(II) F.4. Denial of the Right to a Nationality 
(II) F.4(a) Interpretation 
Although still a relatively fluid concept in international law, nationality in its simplest form can ‘be 
deemed to be the political and legal bond that links a person to a given State and binds him to it with 
ties of loyalty and fidelity, entitling him to diplomatic protection from that State.’1060 Nationality is a 
basic prerequisite for the exercise of political rights, as well as having an important bearing on the 
individual’s legal capacity. The powers of a State to confer and regulate nationality are therefore 
circumscribed by its obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.1061  
The right to nationality, in this sense, is affirmed in the American Declaration of the Rights of Man 
(Article 19), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 15), the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (Articles 1 and 10), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Article 24(3)), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 20), the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (Article 7) and the European Convention on Nationality (Article 4). Protection 
from racial discrimination in the exercise of one’s right to nationality is ensured by Article 5(d)(iii) of 
ICERD. 
Since World War II, ‘denationalization’ or the unilateral revocation of an individual’s citizenship by 
the State—especially on a mass scale and on discriminatory grounds—has been illegitimate.1062 Van 
Panhuys writing in 1959 noted that “strong feelings are aroused … if deprivation of nationality is 
based on grounds which are generally deemed rejectable, such as racial discrimination. This is 
particularly true if applied on a large scale.’1063 Weis has written: 
                                               
1058 Law of Return 5710-1950 Passed by the Knesset on the 20th Tammuz, 5710 (5th July, 1950) and published 
in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 51 of the 21st Tammuz, 5710 (5th July. 1950), p. 159; the Bill and an Explanatory 
Note were published in Hatza'ot Chok No. 48 of the 12th Tammuz, 5710 (27th June, 1950), p. 189. The term 
oleh refers to an individual making aliyah (Hebrew: ‘going up’), a religious Jewish concept that has been 
appropriated for Israeli civil law to refer to Jewish immigration to Israel. 
1059 US Department of State, 1983 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, p. 1286. It is also evident that 
‘[a]part from its implications for immigration, the Law of Return is used in legislation in import duties in a 
fashion that discriminates between Jew and Arab’. See John Quigley, ‘Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of 
Israel’ (1991–92) 2 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 221 at 230. 
1060 See Proposed Amendment to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, 
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 January 1984, in Elihu Lauterpacht and 
C.J. Greenwood (eds.), International Law Reports (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1989), p. 295, para. 35. 
1061 Ibid., p. 294. 
1062 See Paul Abel, “Denationalization”, 5 Modern Law Review (1942), pp. 57-68 (examining the Nazi 
denationalization decrees of 1941 in the context of contemporary international law).  
1063 V. Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1959), p. 163. 
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Considering that the principle of non-discrimination may now be regarded as a rule of 
international law or as a general principle of law, prohibition of discriminatory 
denationalization may be regarded as a rule of present-day general international law. This 
certainly applies to discrimination on the ground of race which may be considered as 
contravening a peremptory norm of international law but also … to discrimination on the other 
grounds mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, i.e. sex, language and religion.1064 
The terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are often used interchangeably and loosely by politicians and 
lawyers to indicate a legal connection between individual and state.1065 Nationality is essentially a 
term of international law and denotes that there is a legal connection between the individual and state 
for external purposes. Citizenship is a term of constitutional law and is best used to describe the status 
of individuals internally, particularly regarding civil and political rights to which they are entitled.1066 
Normally, an individual’s citizenship and nationality are the same: e.g., to refer to ‘French’ or 
‘Chinese’ nationality—for example, as inscribed on a passport—signifies ‘French’ or ‘Chinese’ 
citizenship (unless ‘nationality’ is used more loosely in the sense of ‘national origin’, as discussed in 
section C.1).  
However, as discussed earlier, Israeli law distinguishes between citizenship and nationality in 
constructing Israel as the state of the Jewish nation and not an ‘Israeli nation’. Israeli citizenship may 
be held by anyone who qualifies under the Citizenship Law and some 1.3 million Palestinians today 
hold Israeli citizenship. Jewish nationals, whose interests are served through parastatal institutions 
such as the Jewish National Fund and Jewish Agency, then enjoy special privileges authorised also 
through Israeli Basic Law. These special privileges include exclusive access by Jewish nationals to 
most of the state’s territory, while other national groups holding Israeli citizenship lack comparable 
privileges. Given the importance of this distinction in Israeli law, which is channelled into the OPT to 
provide Jewish civilians with comparable privileges, the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ will be 
used in this discussion as appropriate. 
 
(II) F.4(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa 
A key device by the apartheid regime in South Africa to ensure racial separation was by depriving 
black Africans of their South African citizenship. In this policy, black African citizens were forcibly 
relocated to the so-called Homelands if they were not already living there, where they were to be 
given the citizenship of those Homelands and stripped of their South African citizenship when those 
Homelands were declared independent.1067 As Dr. Mulder, the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development told South Africa’s Parliament on 7 February 1978: 
[I]f our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black people are concerned, 
there will be not one black man with South African citizenship…[E]very black man in South 
Africa will eventually be accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable 
way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these 
people politically.1068 
‘Denationalisation’, as it was termed in apartheid South Africa, required first establishing 
governments in the Homelands and ultimately declaring them ‘independent’. As discussed elsewhere, 
the Bantu Authorities Act (No 68) of 1951 provided for establishing separate black authorities on 
                                               
1064 P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (The Netherlands: Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979), 
p. 125. 
1065 John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective (Cape Town: JUTA, 2000), p. 208. 
1066 Weis, Nationality and Statelessness, pp. 4-5. 
1067 See John Dugard, ‘South Africa’s Independent Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization’, 10 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy (1980), pp. 11-36. 
1068 72 House of Assembly Debates, col. 579, 7 February 1978, quoted in Dugard, ‘South Africa’s Independent 
Homelands’, p. 16. 
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tribal, territorial, and regional bases. In 1959, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act provided 
for creating eight national units for African self-government supposedly reflective of African ethnic 
groupings (Xhosa, Zulu, Ndebele, Swazi, Basotho, Batswana, Bapedi, Venda, and Tsonga). Under the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (No 46) of 1959, each ethnic group had a Commissioner-
General who was tasked to develop a homeland that would, in name, ultimately be allowed to govern 
itself independently without white intervention. In 1970, the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act then 
compelled all black people to become a citizen of the homeland that responded to their ethnic group, 
regardless of whether they'd ever lived there or not. Their South African citizenship was then removed 
when the Homeland was declared ‘independent’. The Bantu Homelands Citizens Act was designed to 
ensure that no black person would eventually qualify for South African citizenship and the right to 
work or live in South Africa. 
In 1972, Zululand and Bophuthatswana were granted self-governing status, while Transkei, which had 
been self-governing since 1963, was given more autonomy as the model homeland. Transkei was 
declared ‘independent’ in 1976 and Bophuthatswana followed in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 
1981. Black Africans holding these new citizenships became aliens in South Africa and could only 
occupy their own homes in the urban areas by special permission of the Minister.1069  
 
(II) F.4(c) Israel practices in the OPT 
International humanitarian law is concerned with situations in which an Occupying Power has 
assumed temporary authority over people who ‘find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in 
the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’.1070 Arguably, 
the Occupying Power therefore has no role or responsibility regarding the nationality (citizenship) of 
protected persons except to refrain from imposing its own citizenship on them. Nonetheless, this study 
finds that Israel denies Palestinians living in the OPT the right to nationality, in the sense of 
citizenship, in two ways.  
The first is by prohibiting Palestinian refugees who are now living in the OPT from holding 
citizenship in Israel, the state that formed in the territory of their birth. Under the British Mandate, 
Palestinian Arabs held ‘Palestinian’ citizenship, as did Jews living in Palestine.1071 This citizenship 
was effectively extinguished with the dissolution of the Mandate and the formation of Israel in part of 
Mandate Palestine. As the war of 1947-48 entailed a mass refugee flow of Palestinian Arabs from 
territory that became the modern State of Israel into what are today the OPT (as well as surrounding 
states), Palestinian refugees now living in the OPT have the right of return and the right to citizenship 
in Israel as the successor State in that part of Mandate Palestine where they were formerly habitual 
residents.1072  
Yet, as noted earlier (in section F.3(c) on the right to return to one’s country), Palestinian refugees 
from what became the internationally recognized territory of modern Israel are not permitted to return 
to their homes or obtain citizenship in Israel. This ban is enforced through Israeli laws determining 
                                               
1069 TRC Report Vol.2, para 40 
1070 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 4.  
1071 During the British Mandate of Palestine (1922-1948), no distinction was made in the Palestine Citizenship 
Order in Council regarding the acquisition of citizenship on grounds of race or religion (Official Gazette, 16 
September 1925, p. 459). The exception was the preference granted to Jews by Article 7 of the Mandate, which 
provided that there would be provisions framed in the law “so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian 
citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.” 
1072 The cause of this refugee flow has been examined through close review of related documentary evidence 
and oral accounts by Israeli historian Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé to indicate that it resulted from a deliberate 
programme of ethnic cleansing by Zionist and Israeli forces under the command of Ben Gurion. Different 
interpretations and claims about this history are beyond the scope of the present study as they do not affect the 
rights of return for Palestinian refugees or nondiscrimination regarding citizenship provided by international 
law. 
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citizenship, which discriminate on the basis of Jewish and non-Jewish identity and which are 
particularly relevant to the case of residents of Palestine who fled the fighting during the 1947-49 war 
and after the establishment of the State of Israel (on 14 May 1948) and then attempted to return and 
obtain citizenship.   Under Article 2 of The Citizenship Law (1952)—which provides that, ‘Every 
person who immigrated according to The Law of Return, will be a citizen of Israel’—Jewish residents 
would acquire citizenship immediately upon return, even if citizenship had been acquired in Mandate 
Palestine through immigration (and not birth). A Palestinian returnee, however, would have had to 
reside in Israel continuously from May 1948 to April 1952—that is, through the worst of the 
fighting—in order to qualify for citizenship. In 1980, The Citizenship Law was amended by adding 
Section 3A, which somewhat eased the difficult process of acquiring citizenship.1  Yet, Section 3A 
leaves in force the distinction between the conditions of acquiring citizenship for Jews as compared to 
non-Jews, even if both candidates for citizenship have a similar history of leaving and re-entering the 
State. 
In Albadawi v. The Military Governor of Galilee-Nazareth, et. al. and Abu Ayash v. The Military 
Governor of Galilee-Nazareth, et. al., the Supreme Court ruled that if a person left the country 
voluntarily, that person was not allowed to re-enter Israel and the authorities were allowed to deport 
him.  On the other hand, if s/he had been expelled and returned within a reasonable time, s/he was 
entitled to residency.  The interpretation of leaving voluntarily is greatly disputed, considering the 
circumstances surrounding the establishment of the State, and its determination is left to the court’s 
discretion. 
This treatment violates the principle that habitual residents of a territory that becomes a new state are 
entitled to acquire citizenship in the successor state.1073 Israel’s intention to discriminate on the basis 
of race in this regard is expressed by the Law of Return (1950) and the Citizenship Law (1952),1074 
which facilitate the acquisition of Israeli citizenship by Jewish immigrants but deny the right of return 
and citizenship to Palestinian refugees.  
Second, Israel has so far denied the Palestinian people living in the OPT the right to citizenship in a 
separate state by sustaining the occupation and refusing to withdraw to allow an independent 
Palestinian state to be established there. Depriving Palestinians of the right to nationality (citizenship) 
in the OPT, when viewed in light of the commission of other inhuman acts as set out in Article 2 of 
the Apartheid Convention, points towards the maintenance by Israel of a system of Jewish domination 
over Palestinians in the OPT. 
                                               
1073 The Treaty of Neuilly (1919), the Rumanian Minorities Treaty (1919), the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the 
Treaty of St. Germaine (1919), the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), and the Treaty of 
Lausanne (1923), all support the view that nationality followed the change of sovereignty so that those persons 
habitually resident in a territory that became a new state or part of a new state would automatically acquire the 
nationality of that state. See Articles 39 (Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality), 44 (Greek nationality), 51 and 52 
(Bulgarian nationality) of the Neuilly Treaty; Articles 36 (Belgian nationality), 84 (Czechoslovakian 
nationality), 91 (Polish nationality), 105 (nationality of the Free City of Danzig) and 112 (Danish nationality) of 
the Versailles Treaty; Articles 64-65 (Austrian nationality), 70-71 (Italian nationality) of the St Germain Treaty; 
Article 57 (Hungarian nationality) of the Trianon Treaty; Articles 102 (Egyptian nationality), 117 
(Cypriot/British nationality); 123 (general), 129 (Palestinian nationality) of the Sèvres Treaty; and Article 30 of 
the Lausanne Treaty. See both volumes of the Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 (New York: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1924). Brownlie is of the view that the precedent value of these treaties is considerable 
due to the uniformity of practice and the importance of the treaties concerned. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), p. 657. An attempt to codify the law of 
nationality in 1929, for the purposes of international law, concluded that nationality followed the change of 
sovereignty, unless the persons concerned declined the nationality of the successor state. See Article 18 of the 
Draft Convention on Nationality prepared in anticipation of the First Conference on the Codification of 
International Law, The Hague, 1930, Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, 1929, in 29 American 
Journal of International Law Special Supplement (1929) at 15. See also the decision by the Tel Aviv District 
Court in A.B v. M.B. 6 April 1951 (1950) 17 International Law Reports at 111. 
1074 Law of Return 5710-1950; Law of Return (Amendment 5714-1954), Law of Return (Amendment No. 2) 
5730-1970 and the Citizenship Law 5712-1952. 
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Thus most Palestinians in the OPT and in refugee camps of surrounding states have been rendered 
stateless (although some have acquired the citizenship of a third state). Presently, peace negotiations 
are ostensibly aimed toward a two-state solution that will create a Palestinian state in the OPT and 
provide Palestinians now resident in the OPT with citizenship in that state. If it is created, however, 
South Africa’s practice of denationalising black citizens by forcibly relocating them to black 
Homelands suggests a qualification: that Israel would not thus be absolved of its obligation to allow 
Palestinians who fled homes inside Israel and are now living in the OPT (and abroad) to return to 
Israel and obtain citizenship in Israel, the successor state governing the territory of their original 
residence. Otherwise, Israel could be found further to violate the Palestinians’ right to nationality.  
 
(II) F.5 Denial of the Right to Work 
(II) F.5(a) Interpretation 
The right to work, as defined by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), refers to the right of everyone to gain their living by work they freely 
choose or accept. Under Article 6, a state is required to safeguard this right by providing the necessary 
tools to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive 
employment. The Apartheid Convention condemns any legislative measures and other measures 
calculated to deny members of a racial group the right to work. In a similar vein, Article 5(e)(i) of 
ICERD requires that “[t]he rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and 
favourable remuneration” shall be enjoyed free from racial discrimination.  
 
(II) F.5(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa 
In apartheid South Africa, the right to work was restricted through two general methods. First, 
individuals were restricted to certain kinds of work on the basis of their race, enforced through the Job 
Reservation Act (1963) and other measures that restricted skilled and higher-paid jobs to whites. 
Second, pass laws made it impracticable for blacks to apply for work in white areas other than at jobs 
specifically authorised for them, such as domestic work. 
The pass laws were implemented in both an ‘inclusionary’ and ‘exclusionary’ fashion so as to afford 
opportunities for employment to workers classified as resident in the Bantustans or townships while 
precluding those same workers from accepting particular employment by virtue of their race. The 
system of job reservation served to restrict such opportunities.1075 
The employment of foreign labour initially facilitated the use of exploitative labour practices as South 
African employers needed only to offer foreign workers a better, or comparable, wage in order to lure 
them to join the workforce.1076 However, with the prohibition of foreign labour recruitment in the 
1970s more reliance was placed on the domestic labour force to fill job vacancies. The net effect of 
this trend was to eventually lead to an increase in wages, in concert with increased labour militancy 
against oppressive labour legislation.  
South African workers could be broadly categorised as those who were permitted, under Section 10 of 
the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act,1077 to live and work in towns without permission to do 
so, and those who fell outside that category. The so-called ‘Section 10’ workers were those who had 
been born in a particular urban area, or had worked there continuously for 10 years, or who had 
worked for successive employers over 15 years. This categorisation created an effective ‘urban 
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citizenship’ requirement beyond that of national citizenship, and successfully restricted employment 
opportunities. Workers would be cautious to leave a particular urban area for fear of losing their 
Section 10 status, creating an insidious dependence by workers on a given city. This meant that where 
labourers were in abundance in a particular urban area employers were given wider options of 
exploitation given that workers would rather accept a lower paying job while maintaining their 
Section 10 status, than opt for the uncertainty of seeking a right of movement outside the designated 
urban area in search of employment elsewhere. 
Those workers falling outside Section 10 designation, but still within the urban areas, were allocated 
work by the Labour Bureau.1078 These workers were in the best bargaining position, and also better 
able to find more suitable work as they were not as restrictively tied to their jobs as were the Section 
10 workers. The Reikert Report1079 suggests that both labourers and Labour Bureaux avoided the strict 
implementation of the regulations under this legislation, in part because proof of a given status was 
cumbersome and bureaucratic, and because flouting the legislation had advantages (if only nominally 
so) for both employers and labourers. Workers desperate for employment would take whatever 
employment they were able to find, allowing employers and bureaucrats alike to disregard regulatory 
parameters for enforcement of the labour regulations, but nonetheless having the effect of either 
restricting movement due to labour contingencies, or to exploit the labour force in the absence of 
adequate worker mobilisation. 
 
(II) F.5(c) Israeli practices in the OPT 
(i) Labour and the Economy in the OPT 
In 1967 before the Six-Day War, agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza accounted for 37 percent of 
the GDP while industry and construction accounted for 13%.1080 Since 1967, the Palestinian economy 
has been transformed into a wage sector highly dependent on the Israeli economy as well as foreign 
aid. Between 1967 and 2000, jobs inside Israel became increasingly important to Palestinian labourers 
and Palestinians became core workers in Israel’s construction industry both within Israel and in the 
OPT. After the occupation began, Israel initially encouraged Palestinian labourers from the OPT to 
work in Israel and opened the market in the OPT to Israeli imports and the Israeli market to OPT 
exports. These measures exposed the local Palestinian economy to market forces that resulted in high 
differences in wage levels and economic structures between Israel and the OPT. Israel also limited 
trade from the OPT with Jordan and has not allowed significant public investments in the OPT other 
than those exclusively serving Jewish settlements.1081 The first intifada, which began in 1987, caused 
many Palestinian labourers to return to agriculture in the OPT, but punitive restrictions imposed by 
the Israeli government—such as closing the checkpoints to Palestinian workers—and employing 
foreign workers instead of Palestinians resulted in a major loss of jobs and reduced wages. After the 
Oslo Accords were signed in the early 1990s, the Palestinian economy entered a period of rapid 
growth and by 1999 real GDP had grown to $4,512 million.1082  
In 2000, however, after the beginning of the second Intifada, Israel instituted a strict closure policy 
and GDP fell to $3,557 million.1083 The economy in the OPT recovered briefly in 2003 but remained 
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severely affected by Israeli restrictions on exports and movement. In 2003, 47 percent of Palestinians 
lived below the poverty line and as many as 600,000 Palestinians could not afford basic needs such as 
food, clothing and shelter.1084 With expenditures of less than US $1.50 a day per person, the 
population as a whole became vulnerable to economic shocks.1085 
Following the restrictions on Palestinian workers, Israel has sought out cheap foreign migrant labour 
from countries in Asia and Eastern Europe as a replacement.1086 Palestinian unemployment rates, 
which had run about 10 percent before 2000, reached 25 percent by 2003.1087 The GDP of the OPT 
fell 6.6 percent between 2005 and 2007, from $4,443 million1088 to $3,901 million.1089 In 2005, 53 
percent of households were living below the poverty line of $385. In 2006, the number of people 
living in deep poverty almost doubled to over one million.1090 
Another negative factor has been the impact of the direct physical damage to Palestinian land, 
resources and property by Israeli military forces. For example, from June 2006 to May 2007, the 
Israeli army destroyed around 12,900 dunums of cultivated land, 332 greenhouses and uprooted 
around 2,775 fruit trees in the West Bank alone.1091 
The right to work for Palestinians in the OPT has thus been impacted upon greatly by restrictions on 
labour imposed by Israel’s occupation and by damage imposed by Israeli policies on the Palestinian 
economy as a whole. Among the main factors that continue to depress the Palestinian economy in the 
OPT are the harsh restrictions on Palestinian mobility, Palestinian labour flow into East Jerusalem and 
Israel, and the imports and exports of goods.1092  
 
(ii)  Impact of Movement Restrictions on Palestinian Labour  
As a result of the second Intifada and a spike in Israeli security measures, the number of physical 
obstacles to Palestinian movement in the West Bank has increased from 376 in August 2005 to 699 in 
the autumn of 2008.1093 Coupled with a host of other restrictions on movement (including the Wall, 
restrictions in the Seam Zone, and difficulties for Palestinians to obtain permits, as discussed earlier), 
farmers are increasingly prevented from accessing their farmland. The effects are devastating since 
agriculture, fishing and forestry account for 15.1 percent of the Palestinian workforce.1094 In 2007, 30 
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out of 57 communities surveyed by the UN in the West Bank did not have direct, regular access to 
their land: 
Restrictive gate openings and permit allocations are already having a negative impact on 
agricultural practices and on rural livelihoods. Many farmers cultivate their land infrequently 
or not at all, or have changed to lower maintenance and lower yield crops. The longer term 
consequences for these communities are uncertain, as they lose contact with the land on 
which they depend both for their present livelihood and for their future survival… [In the 
closed area between the wall and the Green Line] some 70 percent of the almond trees have 
now died because of lack of regular maintenance. In the past, the land in the closed area 
produced about 10 tons of almonds. The fresh almonds were worth 5 NIS per kilo and were a 
valuable asset to the village.1095 
In 2007, the World Bank estimated that the Separation Wall was costing the Palestinian economy 2-3 
percent points of the GDP annually.1096 The permit system that accompanies the Wall but applies 
more broadly to restrict Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank is reminiscent of the Pass 
Laws in apartheid South Africa which made it impracticable for blacks to work in certain white areas 
of the country. Similarly, like in apartheid South Africa, difficulties in obtaining the necessary permits 
have compelled many Palestinians to attempt to enter East Jerusalem or Israel illegally in search of 
work, thus fuelling disregard for labour laws and exposing these workers to arrest, detention and 
heavy fines. 
The system of roads in the West Bank is also designed to restrict movement between cities and 
villages, it is estimated that over 50 percent of land in the West Bank is inaccessible to Palestinians 
due to settlements, road blocks and other 'closed' areas.1097 Many of the main roads are limited to cars 
with Israeli license plates and as a result Palestinians need to take long, circuitous routes through 
multiple checkpoints to travel to neighbouring areas. Officials of the World Bank have commented: 
Unsurprisingly, these restrictions make the movement of people and goods more expensive, 
inefficient and unpredictable and therefore have a particularly chilling effect on economic 
activity. Beyond the personal hardship, an economy cannot run effectively if there is significant 
uncertainty about the ability of workers to reach their jobs, of goods reaching their markets, and 
of entrepreneurs being present to manage their place of business.1098 
Israel has also suppressed the Gaza fishing industry by restricting how far from the coast the 
fishermen can fish. In the 1990s, they were allowed to travel 12 nautical miles off shore and were 
hauling in around 3,000 tons of fish a year; in 2008, they are hauling in less than 500 tons a year.1099 
The Oslo Accords provided that Gaza fishermen could travel 20 nautical miles from the coast but this 
has not been enforced. In 2008, there have been multiple cases where Israeli army patrol boats have 
attacked fishing boats, arrested fishermen and in one instance fired a grenade at a fishing boat in the 
waters of Northern Gaza.1100 With agricultural exports greatly reduced by Israeli restrictions, the 
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impact has been severe. In 2007, a senior U.N. official warned that, ‘The Gaza Strip will soon become 
entirely dependent on foreign aid and face “disastrous consequences’ if Gaza remains sealed off’.1101 
None of the above restrictions on movement and the transportation of goods apply to Israeli Jewish 
settlers living in the West Bank, who have free access to all goods and uninhibited freedom of 
movement between the West Bank and Israel related to their work, trade, and social networks. By 
contrast, Palestinians who formerly comprised a significant part of the workforce can no longer seek 
employment in East Jerusalem or Israel. 
 
(iii) Restrictions on Access to Jobs in East Jerusalem and Israel 
In the year 2000, 146,000 Palestinians were employed in Israel.1102 By 2007, this number had 
decreased to 66,806, a third of whom had a Jerusalem ID card or a foreign passport.1103 In 2005, a 
daily average of approximately 44,800 Palestinians worked in Israel.1104  These workers were earning 
around $405 million a year (around 7 percent of GDI).1105 After the elections to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council in 2006, at which time Hamas obtained a majority of seats, labour flows dropped 
to 25-30,000 per day.1106 Even prior to the election, the Israeli government adopted a policy to aim to 
diminish the number of permit-holding Palestinian workers to zero by 2008.1107  
By 2007, 90.7 percent of the Palestinian labour force worked inside the OPT.1108 The median monthly 
wage for Palestinians inside the OPT is much lower, at NIS 1696.2 in the West Bank and NIS 1435.8 
in Gaza, compared to the wages of Palestinians inside Israel, which stand at NIS 2677.6 .1109 In 
contrast the average monthly salary for Israelis employed in Israel is NIS 8,237.1110 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern about the restriction 
of labour into Israel in its concluding observations of 2003: 
19. The Committee continues to be gravely concerned about the deplorable living conditions 
of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, who - as a result of the continuing occupation 
and subsequent measures of closures, extended curfews, roadblocks and security checkpoints 
- suffer from impingement of their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
enshrined in the Covenant, in particular access to work, land, water, health care, education 
and food.  
20. The Committee also expresses concern about the rate of unemployment in the occupied 
territories, which is over 50 per cent as a result of the closures which have prevented 
Palestinians from working in Israel.  
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22. The Committee is concerned about the fact that it is extremely difficult for Palestinians 
living in the occupied territories and working in Israel to join Israeli trade unions or to 
establish their own trade unions in Israel. […] 
36. The Committee further recommends that the State party ensure that workers living in the 
occupied territories are permitted to continue to work in Israel.1111 
Within the OPT, the Palestinian workers most affected by Israel’s closure policy is the sector of the 
labour force working in East Jerusalem but living elsewhere in the West Bank. An integral part of the 
West Bank, East Jerusalem was for decades its economic centre. With the tightening of restrictions 
after the outbreak of the second intifada and the subsequent construction of the Wall, Palestinians 
living elsewhere in the West Bank need permits to work in East Jerusalem, which in practice are very 
difficult to obtain. Certain sectors have been particularly impacted by the restrictions from working in 
East Jerusalem: many teachers in Palestinian schools in Jerusalem can no longer teach and many 
doctors and nurses working in hospitals in Jerusalem have been forced to leave their positions. 
According to UN estimates, 95% of Palestinians from elsewhere in the West Bank and 77% from East 
Jerusalem itself had difficulties reaching their workplace in 2007.1112  
 
(iv) Restriction of Imports and Exports 
Unemployment is also fostered by restrictions on imports and exports of primary products. Industries 
that depend on the flow of goods have experienced an increase in transportation costs, resulting in a 
reduction in profits and efficiency. Agriculture, fishing and forestry currently generate around 25 
percent of all Palestinian exports and this sector is directly affected by difficulties in export and the 
restrictions on free movement of goods.1113 In 2004, the World Bank examined the effects of such 
restrictions of trade: ‘Closures are a key factor behind today's economic crisis in the West Bank. They 
have fragmented Palestinian economic space, raised the cost of doing business and eliminated the 
predictability needed to conduct business.’1114  
In 2005, imports and exports totalled almost $3.4 billion, accounting for 83 percent of the Palestinian 
GDP.1115 Since 2005 and over the last three years, Israel has prohibited the movement of goods 
through most checkpoints in Gaza other than the Karni crossing; Karni itself was closed for most of 
2006 violating the Agreement of Movement and Access. Instead of letting the agreed number of 150-
400 trucks through, on average only twenty per day were allowed.1116 Currently, of the 12 commercial 
checkpoints to the OPT only one in the West Bank (Jericho) and one in Gaza (Karni) allow for the 
movement of goods.1117 Traders' maintenance of a regular delivery schedule is impossible, not to 
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mention the damaging of goods during inspection and waiting periods. As a result many buyers have 
ceased their contracts with Palestinians because of the unreliability of delivery schedules.1118 
By 2006, exports had declined by 3 percent while imports rose 20%; $581 million in goods were 
being exported and $3,631 million were being imported. The trade deficit reached 73 percent of GDP. 
At the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development it was stated that ‘Israeli closure 
policies and the losses of the local production to imports, notably from Israel, accounts for over 55 
percent of the Palestinian trade deficit.’1119  
The impact of these restrictions on the Palestinian population is most evident in the spike in 
unemployment and the lack of future work opportunities for younger Palestinian generations. Many 
businesses that rely on the movement of goods have been bankrupted on account of increased costs 
and inefficiency due to unpredictable delivery schedules, resulting in major job losses. 
In 2007 with a total population of around four million people in the OPT and the working age 
population (15+) standing at two million, only 46.3 percent were active in the labour force.1120 The 
unemployment rate in the OPT in 2007 was 23.2%,1121 contrasting with the 8.3 percent unemployment 
rate in Israel1122 and a 12.2 percent average in the Middle East (2006).1123 Just before Israel’s most 
recent military attacks on the Gaza Strip in December 2008–January 2009, the UN reported that 
unemployment in the besieged territory had reached 49.1%.1124 In the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, which saw widespread destruction of factories, offices and shops, the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics estimated that the unemployment rate will have jumped to more than 60%.1125 
As a result of Israel’s policies, both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have become increasingly 
dependent on foreign aid. Israeli restrictions on the Palestinian right to work serve to prevent full 
participation in the economic life of the OPT and to hinder Palestinian development.  
 
(II) F.6  Denial of the Right to Form Recognised Trade Unions 
(II) F.6(a) Interpretation 
Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights provides that: ‘The 
States Parties... undertake to ensure (a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade 
union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and 
protection of his economic and social interests... The right of trade unions to establish national 
federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union 
organizations; (c) The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those 
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prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security 
or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; (d) The right to strike, 
provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.’ 
Furthering the protection from racial discrimination in one’s exercise of “the right to form and join 
trade unions’ enshrined in Article 5(e)(ii) of ICERD, the Apartheid Convention establishes denial of 
“the right to form recognized trade unions’ as an act of apartheid where committed in the context of a 
system of domination and systematic oppression by one racial group over another.  
  
(II) F.6(b)  Practices in apartheid South Africa 
During apartheid, black South African trade unions were denied official standing by the government. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act, formerly the fundamental labour relations law for the White 
population, defined a ‘trade union’ as being made up of ‘any number of employees in any particular 
undertaking, industry, trade or occupation’.1126 However, under the Act, an ‘employee’ was 
specifically characterized as ‘any person (other than a native) employed’;1127 and therefore black 
African trade unions were excluded from the Act's domain.1128 In addition, black Africans were 
prohibited from representing workers, and the appointment of black Africans as union officers was 
forbidden.1129  
Black African unions nevertheless existed. The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
formed in the 1950s became the leader of the anti-apartheid struggle in the labour movement. The 
militancy shown by the trade union movement in support of union recognition and higher wages soon 
translated into political mobilisation against apartheid structures.1130 Union leaders were consistently 
arrested and harassed for political campaigning. In 1977 the Apartheid government realized that it had 
to exert greater control over African trade unions and initiated the Wiehahn Commission to study 
labour legislation. The commission recommended legalizing black unions to control native labour 
activists. Black unions were recognized in 1979. The Afrikaner Trade Institute, which represented 
Afrikaner commercial interests, was forced to negotiate with black labour leaders for the first time in 
1980. Nevertheless black unions could not achieve all their most pressing goals and were prevented 
from conducting themselves professionally until the Apartheid regime fell. 
The South African Trade Union Council (later TUCSA) was formed to represent registered trade 
unions in opposition to the state’s interference in the operation of private unions. African unions were 
not recognised by the state at this time and, until 1962, were not permitted to join TUCSA. The 
leadership of TUCSA was closely affiliated with government thereby ensuring favourable disposition 
from the state in favour of white labour unionists, and against black unions. In concert the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956 and the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 denied any 
African the right to participate in collective bargaining.1131 
However, the effect of the 1979 reforms in labour law, following the Wiehahn Commission, 
encouraged black labour unions to register in the hopes of the apparent legitimation and recognition of 
black labour unions. While the freedom to organise was now allowed, in practice this was not always 
so in the workplace where employers sought any means to eradicate unionisation amongst members, 
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and where workers were identified to be union members they were often faced with summary 
dismissal (and therefore not afforded the protection that collective bargaining and fair labour practices 
would demand). Dismissals also occurred on a large scale where workers were seen to have organised 
in the workplace. While this served to undermine the trade unions it effectively propelled the trade 
union movement to increasing militancy and action. 
The eventual enactment of the Labour Relations Act 51 of 1982 removed the oversight of the Minister 
of Manpower in labour disputes and vested that authority in the industrial court alone. Workers were 
then able to enforce fair labour practices to a greater extent than before, with labour unions using the 
courts of law to enforce their rights. This mobilisation through the courts, along with frequent strike 
action, destabilised the regime’s reliance on the subservience of union workers, and was likely one of 
the causes of its impending downfall. 
 
(II) F.6(c) Israeli practices in the OPT  
The 1994 Paris Protocol on Economic Relations1132 calls upon Israel to ‘respect any agreement 
between…a trade union representing Palestinian workers in Israel and ….an organization representing 
employers in Israel.’  
 
(i) Palestinian Trade Unions under Israeli Civil Administration 
Palestinian trade unions existed during the British mandate of Palestine, but primarily represented 
industrial labourers. Only one in seven Palestinian workers was unionised at that time.1133 Trade 
unions in the West Bank flourished under Jordanian administration until King Hussein curbed 
political reforms in 1957, resulting in a fall in the number of unions. The largest organized labour 
body at the time was the General Federation of Unions (GFU) with headquarters in Amman, and later 
in Nablus. The GFU evolved into the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU), and 
its headquarters are still in Nablus.  
After the 1967 Six-Day War and initiation of Israel’s occupation of the OPT, the Israeli economy 
underwent rapid growth which increased Israel’s demand for cheap labour. The newly occupied 
Palestinian territory proved valuable for Israel because it contained ‘a large pool of unskilled, cheap 
labour with no political rights.’1134 To take full advantage of these workers Israel restrained economic 
development in the OPT, and prevented Palestinian workers from organizing. As a result trade unions 
were forced to go underground. Initially, Israel did not recognise Palestinian trade unions and 
attempted to close them down. Union leaders were arrested, abused, exiled, jailed, harassed, and 
deported. Israeli forces raided union centres, destroyed union files and documents, and closed down 
union offices. Union leaders and representatives were prevented from meeting. As a result Palestinian 
unions were greatly weakened, and had no leverage over Israeli employers.  
The Israeli government also attempted to prevent workers in the OPT from organizing new unions. 
For example, the Union of Construction and General Workers in the small village of Ya’abad in the 
West Bank had only 150 members, but Israeli troops raided its offices twice in the 1970’s, destroying 
archives, posters and publications. The union’s leaders were detained and imprisoned several times 
without charge. In the Gaza Strip, unionisation was banned by the military commander. Under 
pressured from the International Labour Organization (ILO), Israel agreed to lift the ban on 
unionization in 1979, but ‘insisted that unions could not hold elections or extend their membership to 
                                               
1132 Signed by Israel and the PLO as part of the Oslo process, the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations 
established a customs union to formalise existing economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians and 
provide a framework for “interim-period” economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  
1133 Nina Sovich, ‘Palestinian Trade Unions’ (2000) 29 Journal of Palestine Studies 4 at 66-79. 
1134 Joost R. Hiltermann, ‘Mass Mobilization under Occupation: The Emerging Trade Union Movement in the 
West Bank’, MERIP Reports, No. 136/137; and ‘West Bank, Gaza, Israel: Marching toward Civil War’ 
(October- December, 1985) at 26-31.  
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the handful of aging men who had been members before 1967.’1135 When the Builders and Carpenters 
Union decided to hold elections in violation of Israeli military orders, many of its members were 
harassed and beaten.1136  
The Histadrut, Israel’s national trade union, was founded in Palestine in 1920 as a Jewish trade union 
to promote Jewish workers’ rights and employment, as well as the settlement of Jewish immigrants. 
Before and after the creation of Israel, the Histadrut acquired a number of industrial conglomerates 
and Israel’s largest bank, Bank HaPoalim, and was for a time the largest employer in the country. 
Thus the Histadrut has played an important role in the building of the Jewish state and functions 
effectively as a quasi-state institution. It has not worked in the interests of Palestinian labour but has 
cooperated with the Israeli army to tighten control over the Palestinians in the OPT.1137 Dues of 11 
percent are deducted from Palestinian workers’ wages for the national insurance tax, but Palestinians 
‘did not benefit from most of the rights that this tax is supposed to cover: e.g., unemployment 
compensation, old-age pension, disability benefits, a monthly child allowance, and vocational 
training’.1138 Palestinian workers also pay 1 percent of their wages as membership dues to the 
Histadrut, although they do not receive the benefits associated with membership.  
The Israeli government placed no such restrictions on Israeli unions and unions established by settlers 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Histadrut strikes are never confronted violently; Jewish union 
members are never targeted by the Israeli police or military because of their affiliation with specific 
trade unions.  
 
(ii) Effects of the Oslo Accords 
With the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, Palestinian trade unions gained more freedom to 
function in the areas that fell under Palestinian Authority control. They lobbied the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) to pass laws that benefited workers and labourers. They initiated training 
courses and hired litigators to take factory owners and employers to court over violations of labour 
right. Israel, however, did not recognise Palestinian trade unions even though roughly 116,000, or 
approximately 20 percent of the OPT Palestinian labour force worked in Israel between 1993 and 
2000.1139 Moreover, union leaders were still harassed and trade unions were systematically targeted by 
raids and closures.  
The 1994 Paris Protocol on Economic Relations states that:  
Israel will respect any agreement reached between the Palestinian Authority, or an 
organization or trade union representing the Palestinians employed in Israel, and an 
organization representing employees or employers in Israel, concerning contribution to such 
organization according to any collective agreement.1140 
Palestinian unionists interpreted this article of the protocol to mean that the Israeli government would 
allow them to function in Israel. At a minimum, they expected Israel to allow their lawyers to 
represent union members in Israeli courts. The Israeli government and Histadrut refused to allow this 
because they considered it as an infringement on their sovereignty. Unable to reach its workers in 
Israel, the PGFTU agreed to have the Histadrut provide four Palestinian lawyers with Israeli 
citizenship to represent Palestinian workers in Israeli courts. The Histadrut employs the lawyers, 
                                               
1135 Paul Cossali, ‘Gaza's Trade Unions’ (1988) 17 Journal of Palestine Studies 2 at 194-197.  
1136 Ibid. One union official was ordered to cancel the election’s results; when he refused, his son was kidnapped 
and assaulted by Israeli soldiers. 
1137 Dani Ben Simhon, ‘Unmaking of the Histadrut’, Challenge 88 (November 2004), available at: 
http://www.workersadvicecentre.org/Challenge88-Histadrut.htm.  
1138 Ibid. 
1139 European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation [citation needed]. 
1140 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the PLO, Paris 29 April 1994. 
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decides what cases they are allowed to pursue and controls their access to the national labour court, 
even though the Histadrut is a major employer and, as mentioned previously, participated in the 
exploitation of Palestinian labourers before Oslo. The Histadrut’s de facto control over the conditions 
in which the PGFTU can take legal action strips the latter’s negotiating power and violates its right to 
defend workers from abuses.  
In 1994 the PGFTU and the Histadrut began normalization. Problems quickly arose when the 
Histadrut refused to discuss recompensing Palestinian workers for the 1 percent of their wages that the 
Histadrut took as dues.1141 In 1995 they agreed that the PGFTU would receive half of the 1 percent 
dues that Palestinian workers paid to the Histadrut, but in practice the Histadrut often delayed the 
monthly payments, further increasing tension and bitterness between the unions. The Histadrut also 
retained control over when the PGFTU could litigate, rendering the PGFTU powerless to represent its 
workers in disputes.1142 Thus even during the Oslo period, Palestinian trade unions never achieved the 
status that black African trade unions achieved in the 1980s under the Apartheid regime. 
 
(iii) Palestinians Working in Israeli Settlements in the OPT 
Trade unions for Jewish Israeli settlers in the OPT are regulated by the Israeli government primarily 
through the Histadrut, whereas Palestinian trade unions are theoretically regulated by the Palestinian 
Authority primarily through the PGFTU. Palestinian trade unions, however, are prohibited from 
functioning in Israeli settlements. The Israeli government’s policies, and the settler employers’ 
treatment of Palestinian labourers, have resulted in unfavourable consequences for Palestinian 
labourers, ranging from unpaid wages to illegal arrests of striking Palestinian workers.  
For example, at the Lieberman factory in Mishor Adomim industrial park in the West Bank, 
Palestinian workers were informed of the Israeli High Court’s ruling on 10 October 2007 that required 
Israeli companies operating in the OPT and employing Palestinian labourers to follow Israeli labour 
laws.1143 Palestinian labourers at the Lieberman factory accordingly requested their employer to 
comply with Israeli standards that provide safer working conditions. He refused their request and they 
resorted to striking. They also went to the PGFTU’s centre in Jericho and asked for advice so that they 
would not break any laws during their strike. The PGFTU, in turn, supplied them with lawyers that 
explained their legal rights. The PGFTU also informed the Histadrut. On 14 November 2007, after 
two days of striking, Israeli police arrived at the Lieberman factory and evicted the Palestinian 
workers from the industrial park.1144 
The PGFTU was unable to take action as it is overwhelmed by ‘hundreds of cases of clear and severe 
violations by Israeli employers’ of labour rights. These include Palestinian workers being forced to 
wear distinctive uniforms and yellow arm bands to distinguish them from Israeli workers, not being 
allowed to eat in the same place as Israeli workers, even dying on the job. According to 
representatives of the PGFTU: 
But we are restricted. We can’t get to job sites to monitor working conditions. In most cases 
we cannot meet with the lawyers hired by the Histadrut, and in many cases the labourers 
whose rights have been violated cannot get to the lawyers either. The lawyers assigned to us 
are not very knowledgeable about the Palestinian workers’ situation in the OPT, and many of 
them are not very experienced. The Histadrut does not allow us to get more lawyers. We may 
                                               
1141 The Palestinians estimated the sum owed to them at NIS 1.5 Billion. The Histadrut agreed to give them NIS 
8 million when the final agreement was reached.  
1142 Nina Sovich, ‘Palestinian Trade Unions’ at 66-79. 
1143 See Agence France Presse, Israel labour law apply to Palestinian workers, 10 October 2007. 
1144 Sawt Al-‘Aamel (The Voice of Labourers), PGFTU journal, January 2008 Edition. 
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succeed in a limited amount of cases, but the vast majority never even reaches the court. Our 
hands are tied.1145  
Legal action is also very expensive, especially since only Israeli lawyers can represent Palestinians. 
The vast majority of Palestinian workers, and most small unions, cannot afford continually to hire 
lawyers to attempt to take their employers to court, especially as the chances of a Palestinian winning 
a case in an Israeli court are slim.1146  
Israel’s policy of suppressing Palestinian trade unions, as well as carrying out direct military attacks 
against their property,1147 has no reasonable security motivation, and serves to obstruct Palestinian 
development and impede participation in economic life.  
 
(II) F.7. Denial of the Right to Education 
(II) F.7(a) Interpretation 
The right to education, first outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequently 
detailed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICECSR), 
requires a state to provide free compulsory primary education, generally available and accessible 
secondary education and, based on capacity, equally accessible higher education. The Apartheid 
Convention condemns any measures calculated to deny members of a racial group the right to 
education. This echoes Article 5(e)(v) of ICERD, which prohibits racial discrimination with regard to 
“[t]he right to education and training” As a minimum, under international law, States must not act in a 
way which negatively impacts on the right to education, particularly through discriminatory practices. 
 
II) F.7(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa 
In apartheid South Africa, the Bantu Education Act, Act No 47 of 1953 established a Black Education 
Department in the Department of Native Affairs, which would compile a curriculum that suited the 
"nature and requirements of the black people". The author of the legislation, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd 
(then Minister of Native Affairs, later Prime Minister), stated that its aim was to prevent Africans 
receiving an education that would lead them to aspire to positions they would not in any event be 
allowed to hold in South African society. Instead Africans were to receive an education designed to 
provide them with skills to serve their own people in the homelands or to work in labouring jobs 
under whites. Later, the Extension of University Education Act, Act 45 of 1959 ended admission of 
black students to white universities (mainly the universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand). It 
created separate tertiary institutions for whites, coloureds, blacks, and Asians. 
Under Apartheid the divergence between African education and that of Whites was especially 
pronounced due to the system that forced all school-going children to learn Afrikaans, the language of 
the oppressor. Objection to the implementation of this policy is what sparked the 1976 riots in 
Soweto.1148 Other precipitant factors included the chronic under-education of Africans through a 
                                               
1145  Interview with Mr. Al-Fuqaya’, Board of Trustees of PGFTU, 12 August 2008 at PGFTU offices, 
Ramallah, West Bank. 
1146 Yoav Dotan, ‘Judicial rhetoric, government lawyers, and human rights: The case of the Israeli High Court of 
Justice during the Intifada’ (1999) Law & Society Review [citation needed]. 
1147 On 7 March 2002 Israeli fighter jets bombed the PGFTU’s office in Gaza, destroying it completely. On 5 
July 2007 Israeli soldiers raided the PGFTU’s offices in Ramallah, destroying PGFTU computers, files and 
documents. On 28 February 2008 Israeli fighter jets bombed the PGFTU’s ‘Workers’ Folk House’ in the Gaza 
Strip.  
1148  Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa (New York: Knopf, 1990), p. 301. See also Alfreda A. Sellers 
Diamond, ‘Constitutional Comparisons and Converging Histories: Historical Developments in Equal 
Educational Opportunity Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New 
South African Constitution’, 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 853, 873 (1999); Eric Berger ‘The Right to Education 
under the South African Constitution’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 3 at 616. 
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programme of inculcated subordination. The curriculum lacked education in some of the most 
fundamental subjects – such as Mathematics and Science – that either gave the skills for further 
qualification or the ability to be employed in positions that job reservation precluded them from 
attaining.1149 The syllabuses taught histories replete with racial segregationist philosophies, such as 
White superiority and African evil.1150  
The system of Bantu Education introduced by the National Party eventually began to impede the 
economic growth of the country, for the need for skilled workers rose as there were no qualified 
people to fill those job vacancies. Having under-trained black students who could otherwise have 
filled these posts obstructed the economic development of the country, and necessitated a change in 
policy which lowered the pass requirements to enable a greater number of pupils to gain automatic 
entrance into secondary schools. The consequence of this was a dramatic increase in school 
enrolments, with concomitant space shortages and overcrowding in schools.1151 Yet the determined 
policy of shaping the learned curriculum was not swayed by this change, and the policy of separate 
education persisted while resistance fomented. 
 
(II) F.7(c)  Israeli practices in the OPT 
Israel has no policy to develop school curricula on the basis of ethnicity, race, or nationality 
comparable to the system imposed by South Africa’s Bantu Education Act. In East Jerusalem, a 
subsidies and privileges administered through the ‘Jewish national institutions’ (such as the Jewish 
Agency) privilege Jewish schools over Palestinian schools through budgets and access to state funds. 
In the rest of the West Bank, Palestinian children are not allowed to attend Jewish schools in the 
settlements, but this restriction is part of the general territorial compartmentalisation of the territories 
on the basis of identity and is not specific to education.  
Occupation policy has been to allow Palestinians to establish their own curricula, schools, and 
universities. Currently, 2,415 primary and secondary schools and 22 universities and technical 
schools, run by the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, private institutions and Islamic and Christian 
organisations, serve Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.1152 Enrolment is exceptionally high, 
comparable to a country like Iceland, which is ranked first in the Human Development Index and had 
a secondary education enrolment rate of 88 percent in 2005: 1153 
In spite of the harsh conditions in which schools have had to operate, impressive achievements 
have been made during the past five years. The education system has experienced massive 
expansion and attained equitable access, reaching a level of development that by most accounts 
is comparable with middle-income countries. Enrolment in basic education is universal, and the 
enrolment rate for secondary education is above 80 percent. These figures put the West Bank & 
Gaza in the lead in the MENA region. Equally important is the high enrolment rate in tertiary 
education—above 40 percent for the 18-24 age group—which is high when compared with 
middle-income countries. The fact that for the first time Palestinian children participated in 
                                               
1149  Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash - The Soweto Revolt: roots of a revolution (London: Kallaway, 
1979) and Mokubung 0. Nkomo, 'The Contradictions of Bantu Education' (1981) 5 Harvard Educational 
Review at 126-38. 
1150  Harold Wolpe, 'Educational Resistance', in John Lonsdale (ed.), South Africa in Question (Cambridge, 
1988), p. 202, cited in Janice Love and Peter C. Sederberg ‘Black Education and the Dialectics of 
Transformation in South Africa, 1982-8’ (1990) 28 Journal of Modern African Studies 2 at 309. 
1151  By way of illustration, secondary school enrollment climbed from 45,598 in 1960 to 122,489 in 1970, to 
577,584 in 1980, and to 1,000,249 in 1984: see Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash - The Soweto Revolt: 
roots of a revolution (London, 1979), pp. 94-99. 
1152 Ministry of Education, Statistics about Palestinian General Education, 2007/08; PCBS, Education Statistics; 
PCBS Press Release on International Literacy Day, 8 September 2006. 
1153 UNDP Human Development Reports, ‘Net Secondary Enrolment rate,’ Human Development Index. 
2007/2008.  
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international tests and scored above the average for MENA countries is another major 
accomplishment. To the PA’s credit, access to basic and secondary education is highly 
equitable with respect to gender, location, refugee status, and household income. 1154 
Nevertheless, this study finds that racial discrimination is present in the imposition of conditions 
which impede Palestinian access to schools and education. Though the education system serving the 
Palestinians is, since 1994 and the creation of the Palestinian Authority, not under Israel’s direct 
control, the Israeli occupying authorities often engage in acts that actively interfere with the exercise 
of Palestinians’ right to education. Three categories of measures are addressed here: attacks on 
students and closures of schools; the restriction of movement of students and teachers; and student 
arrests. These measures have the combined result of preventing Palestinian economic and intellectual 
development, in turn facilitating the continuation of Israel’s system of domination and control over 
the population of the OPT. 
 
(i) School Closures and Attacks  
Between 1988 and 1992, the Israeli military closed Birzeit University in the West Bank along with all 
other Palestinian educational institutions, including schools and kindergartens. The Palestinian 
community continued to pursue its education by holding classes in homes, offices, churches, mosques 
and community centres, but the Israeli army often raided these classes and arrested students and 
teachers attending.1155  
Since the second Intifada began in September 2000, Palestinian schools and universities have come 
under military attack. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 
around 300 schools and eight universities have been shelled, shot at or raided by the Israeli Army 
between 2000 and 2005.1156 In the Gaza Strip, 73 educational institutions were partially or totally 
destroyed between 2000 and 2004.1157  
These attacks have cost the lives of students as well as permanent disability. There is no shortage of 
examples, even if taking short sample periods. In March 2003, a twelve-year old girl was hit in the 
head by a bullet outside Khan Yunis while sitting at her desk, which left her blind.1158 On 1 June 
2004, two ten-year old boys in UNRWA’s Al-Umariye Elementary Boys’ School in Rafah were hit by 
a bullet and ricochets from a Israeli tank. 1159 On 7 September 2004, a ten-year old girl sitting at her 
desk in UNRWA’s Elementary C Girl’s School in Khan Yunis camp was struck in the head by an 
Israeli bullet and died.1160 On 3 October 2004 the Israeli army broke down the walls of three schools 
in the Gaza Strip in the Jabaliyah refugee camp, while children were still in class, and took over to use 
them as firing positions for tanks.1161 On 15 October 2004, the army shot and killed a child sitting in 
                                               
1154 ‘West Bank and Gaza Public Expenditure Review. Vol. 1: From Crisis to Greater Fiscal Independence’ 
(February 2007). 
1155 Riham Barghouti and Helen Murray, ‘The Struggle for Academic Freedom in Palestine,’ Birzeit University 
Right to Education Campaign (September 2005). 
1156 Helen Murray, ‘Education is Freedom’ Adalah Newsletter, Volume 18 (September 2005). 
1157 Palestinian Centre for Human Rights-Gaza (PCHR) ‘Press Release 44/2004,’PCHR-Gaza Report, (16 March 
2004).  
1158 UNRWA, ‘UNRWA Condemns Rafah School Shooting,’ Press Release (June 2004). 
1159 Ibid. 
1160 UNRWA, ‘10-Year Old Girl Hit in UNRWA Classroom by Israeli Gunfire.’ Press Release (7 September 
2004). 
1161 ‘UN Slams Israeli Raids On Palestinian Schools,’ News Report, Geneva (October 2004) [incomplete 
footnote] 
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the classroom of a UN-flagged school.1162 On 12 December 2004 the Israeli army opened fire on a 
school, wounding seven children under the age of nine.1163 A month later, on 31 January 2005 the 
army again opened fire on attacked an elementary school in Rafah, this time killing an eleven-year old 
and injuring another child in the schoolyard.1164 
In 2006, the Israeli army disrupted classes in 18 schools in Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus and Jericho 
through raids, attacks, and arrests. It also raided the Polytechnic University in Hebron and a girls’ 
school in the village of Anata in the district of Jerusalem.1165 In June 2006, an F-16 fighter plane 
bombed the Islamic University in Gaza.1166 According to the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education 
the cost of damages to university properties due to Israeli military attacks amounts to US $7,888,133 
from 2000 to 2008.1167 
For most of 2003, Hebron University and the Palestine Polytechnic University were closed down by 
Israeli military order, suspending the education of more than 6,000 students for over six months. The 
practice of closures continues and in April 2008 alone, 14 Hebron-area schools and orphanages, 
which serve approximately 7,000 Palestinian children and orphans, were threatened with closure by 
the Israeli army after multiple raids. In July 2008, the Islamic School for Girls in Nablus was shut 
down after being raided and ransacked based on accusations of an affiliation with Hamas.1168  
Since September 2000, Israel has arrested and detained almost 6,000 children. In 2007 alone, 700 
children were arrested without being provided with any form of education while in prison.1169 The 
alleged offenses for which they are imprisoned span from throwing stones at protests over the 
Separation Wall, to being affiliated with Hamas and inciting protests.  
As a result of Israeli Military Order No. 132 which designates Palestinians as adults at the age of 16, 
Palestinian prisoners incarcerated in Israeli prisons are only required to be provided with education 
until the age of 15. By contrast, Israeli juvenile prisoners until the age of 18 are given the opportunity 
to continue their education in Hebrew following the Israeli curriculum in prison, while only a few 
Palestinian juvenile prisoners under 16 are given this opportunity (though they are often forced to 
learn in Hebrew, a foreign language of which they have little knowledge). The majority of Palestinian 
children incarcerated in Israeli prisons and detention centres, however, have no access to classes or 
educational materials.1170  
Between 2003 and May 2008, 349 Birzeit University students and around 80 students from An-Najah 
National University in Nablus were arrested on political grounds, often without been given access to 
their lawyers or any visitors.1171 In November 2004, four students from Gaza who were studying at 
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Birzeit University were arrested and, although no charges were brought against them, they were 
nevertheless prevented from returning to university to continue their studies.1172 
All of these measures are claimed to be justified by the Israeli authorities on the pretext of security, 
yet in practice are indicative of policies of racial oppression. The often violent interference with the 
right of Palestinian to attend educational institutions has created conditions detrimental to all 
Palestinians pursuing education in the OPT and effectively constitutes a collective measure impeding 
access of Palestinians as a group to education. A discriminatory policy of favouring Jewish students in 
the same territory is evidenced by Israel’s establishment and maintenance of separate schools in 
Jewish settlements that serve Jews exclusively and that are not subjected to military violence, and are 
supported by government subsidies. 
 
(ii) Restrictions on Movement 
The restriction of mobility of Palestinian students is the main obstacle to their exercising their right of 
education. In 2002, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) highlighted this problem: 
52. The Committee is concerned about the serious deterioration of access to education of 
children in the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of the measures imposed by the 
Israeli Defence Forces, including road closures, curfews and mobility restrictions, and the 
destruction of school infrastructure. 
53. The Committee recommends that the State party guarantee that every Palestinian child has 
access to education, in accordance with the Convention. As a first step, the State party should 
ensure that restrictions on mobility are lifted throughout the occupied Palestinian territories 
during school hours.1173 
This recommendation did not lead to improvements, however, and since 2002 the situation has 
worsened dramatically. An increase in checkpoints presents major obstacles for students attending 
school. The Qalandiya checkpoint, for example, delays students by about one-to-two hours daily and 
at most universities around 60 percent of the students have to cross at least one checkpoint to reach 
university.1174 A survey at Birzeit University showed that 91 percent of students have missed classes 
because of delays at checkpoints.1175 Since the beginning of 2006, thousands of Palestinians with 
foreign passports, have been denied entry to study and teach in the OPT and as a result 50 percent of 
these staff members at Birzeit university can no longer teach there.1176 Since 2004, Palestinians from 
Gaza have been banned from studying in the West Bank: consequently, the number of students from 
Gaza studying at Birzeit University fell from 350 in 2000 to thirty-five in 2005 to zero in 2008.1177 In 
2003, 120 students from Jenin were registered: in 2005, none were registered.1178 
Al-Quds University in Abu Dis was also issued with a military order in 2003 commanding an eight 
meter-high concrete wall to be built through the campus, confiscating one third of the campus. 
Although an international campaign was launched and the position of the wall was moved, it still cuts 
                                               
1172 Right to Education Campaign, ‘Demand the Return of Gaza Students to Birzeit University,’ Birzeit 
University (24 February 2005). 
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1175 Ibid. 
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through the path of 36 percent of the university’s students and prevents about 15,740 students from 
reaching other schools.1179 
The Wall has also resulted in a shortage of teachers in East Jerusalem, as many live in the West Bank 
and are unable to obtain permits to enter the city. In July 2007, the English department of the Arab 
American University of Jenin was nearly closed due to the difficulties in attracting native English-
speaking teachers after having existing lost staff members to severe Israeli restrictions on the entry of 
Palestinians holding foreign passports to the OPT.1180 
Israeli curfews have created yet another obstacle to education by preventing students from attending 
classes. In 2006, for example, the Israeli army imposed a curfew in Hebron, thereby preventing 
students from accessing two schools.1181 In March 2008, curfews also prevented students in the West 
Bank towns of Azzun, Al-Funduq and Haja from attending their classes.1182  
 
(iii) Prevention of Palestinian students from studying abroad 
In June 2007 a further clampdown on the mobility of Palestinians by Israel led to the denial of exit 
permits to approximately 2,000 primary and secondary school pupils and 722 university students from 
Gaza, preventing the continuation of their studies abroad. Of the 1,100 students wishing to attend 
universities abroad, only 480 were granted permission by Israel. In May 2008, the visas of seven 
winners of US Fulbright scholarships were revoked and they were consequently not allowed to leave 
Gaza, even after a major international campaign was launched on their behalf.1183  
The severe under-investment in schools and universities in Gaza and the prevention of students from 
Gaza from travelling to the West Bank or abroad to pursue their studies severely restricts their 
educational opportunities and significantly limits their ability to reach their academic potential. This 
near-complete travel ban constitutes a form of collective punishment imposed by Israel on all 
residents of Gaza and amounts to a systematic form of oppression. 
 
(iv) Discrimination in East Jerusalem 
Discrimination against Palestinian students is most visible in East Jerusalem, where public education 
is provided by Israel. New barriers to education have been created by the Separation Wall, which cuts 
through the city. As a result, many children and teachers who live on its eastern side and attend 
schools in East Jerusalem have to walk long distances to reach checkpoints through which they must 
pass in order to cross to the other side. Hundreds of teachers have faced difficulties in obtaining 
permits to cross the checkpoints. The same difficulty applies to students and teachers travelling in the 
opposite direction: the majority of the students who attend schools and universities elsewhere in the 
West Bank have trouble attending and many have been forced to drop out as a result.  
The Jerusalem Education Authority (JEA) in the Jerusalem Municipality, together with the Ministry 
of Education, is responsible for providing free education to the 79,000 eligible Palestinian Arab 
school students in East Jerusalem. However, only half of them, around 39,400 students, are actually 
attending public schools.1184 The other half are in fact denied access to public schooling because of 
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severe under-funding, a severe lack of classrooms, and other difficulties, and must either pay for 
expensive private education or attend officially unrecognized schools run by community groups. 
Around 10 percent of school age Arab children in East Jerusalem do not attend any schools 
whatever.1185 The percentage of students that enter high school but drop out stands at around 50 
percent, compared to a figure of 7.4 percent of Jewish students in Jerusalem.1186 
In 2006, for example, only NIS 113 million or 29 percent of the annual JEA budget was allocated to 
education in East Jerusalem, though 35 percent of school-aged children in Jerusalem are living in East 
Jerusalem.1187 This unequal funding can be seen in every aspect of the public school education; in 
West Jerusalem for example, there is one computer for every ten students, while in East Jerusalem 
there is one computer for every 26 students.1188 Thus, in this one area, almost three times as many 
resources are being spent on Jewish Israeli children in Jerusalem as compared with Palestinian 
children. 
There is currently a shortage of more than 1,500 classrooms in East Jerusalem with the result that 
Palestinian students are being taught in overcrowded, ill-suited and makeshift rooms, including 
bathrooms and kitchens that have been converted into classrooms.1189 The already high shortfall in the 
number of classrooms is expected to rise as far as 1,883 by 2010. However, despite existing and 
projected shortages only 50 new classrooms were built in Arab schools in East Jerusalem during 
2006. The Ministry of Education argues that one cause of the shortage in classrooms is the refusal of 
Arab residents of East Jerusalem to sell their land. However, to date approximately 35 percent of the 
land in East Jerusalem has been confiscated by Israel for the purpose of constructing settlements.1190 
This severe lack of educational infrastructure and facilities constitutes a violation of the Israeli 
Compulsory Education Law, which requires the state to provide all children between three and 18 
years with a place in a public school classroom.  
The issue of severe classroom shortages in East Jerusalem was brought before the Supreme Court in 
2000.1191 On 15 February 2001, the Ministry of Education and the Jerusalem Municipality committed 
before the court to build 245 classrooms in Arab schools in East Jerusalem over a four-year period. 
The petitioners are still trying to obtain implementation of this decision.  
The Compulsory Education Law covers all three- and four-year olds in Israel. However, the law was 
initially not enforced with regard to children under the age of five because of budgetary shortages. In 
1999 an amendment was passed requiring that Israel implement free pre-school education in stages 
over a period of ten years. In West Jerusalem the law was implemented in numerous neighbourhoods, 
whereas in East Jerusalem it was only implemented in one neighbourhood, Beit Safafa. As a result, 90 
percent of three and four year-old Palestinian children in East Jerusalem are not receiving any 
preschool education.1192 
                                               
1185 Ibid. 
1186 The annual yearbooks of the Jerusalem Education Administration, population data of the Jerusalem Institute 
for Israel Studies; Yuval Wargen, ‘Education in East Jerusalem,’ The Knesset Research and Information Centre,  
Jerusalem (16 October 2006). 
1187 Ibid. 
1188 Jonathan Lis, ‘Discrimination in Jerusalem: The municipality allocated three times the number of computers 
to educational institutions in West Jerusalem than it did in East Jerusalem,’ Ha’aretz (4 April 2005). 
1189 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘East Jerusalem – Facts and Figures’ (June 2008). 
1190 Yuval Wargen, ‘Education in East Jerusalem’; Ir Amim, ‘Inadequacies in the Public Education 
Infrastructure for Palestinians in East Jerusalem: Overview—September 2006’ (September 2006). 
1191 H.C. 5125/00, Shirine Eweida et al. v. The Jerusalem Municipality (unpublished). 
1192 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘East Jerusalem – Facts and Figures’ (June 2008). 
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The end result of all of these discriminatory policies is manifested in the fact that in Jerusalem, 41 
times more Jewish students qualify for a matriculation certificate than their Palestinian 
counterparts.1193  
This study finds the following on the implementation of the right to education: education is formally 
segregated in the OPT as part of a larger system of segregation imposed through the division of the 
territory; Israel does not run schools for Palestinians and does not establish any special curriculum on 
the basis of their identity; and Israel denies Palestinians the right to education through indirect 
measures, such as through obstacles to movement, closures of schools, and military attacks on schools 
and student. Palestinian students are thus denied full enjoyment of their right to education on the basis 
of membership of a racial group. 
 
(II) F.8. Denial of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
(II) F.8(a) Interpretation  
The right to freedom of opinion and expression is recognised under Article 19 of both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
The protection from racial discrimination in the exercise of one’s right to freedom of opinion and 
expression that is ensured by Article 5(d)(viii) of ICERD is cemented by the Apartheid Convention's 
condemnation of measures calculated to deny members of a racial group the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. 
The right to freedom of expression straddles numerous aspects of a functioning liberal democracy, 
enveloping the rights to freedom of speech, of the press and of academic inquiry. Although distinct 
from the fulfilment of other fundamental rights, the enjoyment of freedom of expression is pivotal to 
freedoms of choice, religion, conscience, association, protest and political identification. This exercise 
of freedom of expression is most often conceptualised around, but not solely limited to, the freedom 
of the media, as freedom of expression encompasses ‘the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information of ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers’.1194  
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute. Article 19(3)(b) of the ICCPR facilitates the 
restriction of freedom of information “[f]or the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre publique), or of public health or morals.’ In both apartheid South Africa, and Israel, in relation 
to the OPT, this restriction has been used liberally.  
Propaganda for war, as prohibited by Article 20(1) of the ICCPR, and the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations 1970,1195 obliges states to refrain from and prohibit all forms of propaganda for wars of 
aggression.1196 Article 20(2) of ICCPR further prohibits ‘Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’. 
In General Comment 29 on Article 4 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee highlighted the 
importance of these provisions by asserting that: 
  
No declaration of a state of emergency made pursuant to article 4, paragraph 1, may be 
invoked as justification for a State party to engage itself, contrary to article 20, in propaganda 
for war, or in advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence.1197 
                                               
1193 Shlomo Swirski and Itai Schurtz, ‘Success Rates in the Matriculation Exam, by Locality: 2004-2005,’ Adva 
Centre (August 2006). 
1194 Article 19(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   
1195 UNGA Res 2615 (XXV), 24 October 1970, para 3. 
1196 See further Michael Kearney, The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law (OUP, 2007). 
1197 General Comment No. 29 States of Emergency, (Article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) para 13(e). 
See also International Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights (Geneva, 
1983) 440. 
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These provisions are set in defence of the right to freedom of expression, and are aimed at ensuring 
not only that expression is not abused to violate other rights, but also at ensuring an environment 
conducive to the ability of all to engage in a market place of ideas.1198 The ad hoc tribunals have given 
significant attention to the impact of propaganda and incitement in the commission of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the Nahimana 
decision the ICTR focused in particular on how the media linked to the Rwandan government acted in 
violation of the right to freedom of expression, noting that ‘the expression charged as incitement to 
violence was situated, in fact and at the time by its speakers, not as a threat to national security but 
rather in defence of national security, aligning itself with state power rather than in opposition to 
it’,1199 while the ICTY is currently hearing a case against the former Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav 
Seselj who is accused in the indictment of participation in ‘war propaganda’ through incitement to 
hatred to violence including aiding and abetting killing of civilians.1200  
 
(II) F.8(b) Practices in Apartheid South Africa 
Under the South African apartheid regime, the banning of films, books or other ‘controversial’ 
materials was used to systemise the wider process of eradicating from public consciousness any 
dissenting political, social and economic opinions. The first legislative measure introduced to 
institutionalise censorship was the Publications and Entertainments Act of 1963, which granted the 
Ministry of the Interior the power to ban ‘undesirable’ material for a multitude of reasons, including 
obscenity, moral harmfulness, blasphemy and causing harm to relations among sections of the 
population. Under this statute, approximately 8,768 publications were prohibited.1201 This law was 
repealed and replaced by the Publications Act of 1974, under which 8,898 publications were banned 
between 1975 and 1982.1202  
The apartheid regime, by controlling and restricting the right to exercise freedom of expression, was 
capable of permeating a climate of fear and anxiety into every aspect of social, political, cultural and 
intellectual life in South African civil society. The list of banned items included any object that 
carried an ANC symbol, including lighters, buttons and t-shirts. These legislative restrictions created a 
mechanism for social control designed to suppress creation of a ‘black consciousness’, thus sustaining 
the entire apartheid regime. 
 
(II) F.8(c) Israeli practices in the OPT 
Israel limits freedom of expression in the OPT through several measures: direct censorship; 
restrictions on freedom of movement by journalists; wilful intimidation and harassment of journalists; 
and closure and destruction of Palestinian media outlets. 
 
(i) Suppression of Freedom of Expression: Censorship 
Israel limits the exercise of the right to freedom of expression primarily through direct censorship in 
the OPT and censorship of news published inside Israel about the OPT. Israeli censorship laws remain 
based upon the 1945 mandatory British Defence (Emergency) Regulations. These regulations are used 
                                               
1198 General Comment 11 (Article 20) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994). 
1199 The Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case no ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (3 
December 2003), para 1008. 
1200 Prosecutor v Vojislav Seselj, Modified Amended Indictment, Case no IT-03-67, 15 July 2005. 
1201 Gilbert Marcus, ‘Borders for Books. South Africa under Apartheid’ (AIDA Nederland, April 2008); see also 
‘Jacobsen’s Index of Objectionable Material’ (2006) housed at Beacon for Freedom of Expression, 
http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/about_database/south%20africa.html.  
1202 Ibid. 
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by the Israeli authorities in both Israel and the OPT, despite the fact that (as noted in Section II.D.3, 
above) they were repealed by the British authorities prior to the termination of the British Mandate by 
the Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council, 1948, and overturned in the West Bank in May 1948 by 
the Jordanian Constitution.  
Part 8 of the Regulations (Articles 86-101) serves as the legal basis for the institution of censorship. 
Article 88 (1) allows ‘[t]he censor [to] prohibit the importation or exportation or the printing of any 
publication which the importation, exportation, printing or publishing of which, in his opinion, would 
be or likely to become prejudicial for the defence of Palestine or to the public safety or to public 
order.’  
In 1948, the Press Ordinance, a signed censorship agreement between the Israeli government, the 
army and newspaper editors and press owners, determined a codified practice of self-censorship to 
ensure that there would be no breaches of ‘state security’. This created a system for the submission of 
any materials that could involve ‘national security’ to the military censor for pre-approval prior to 
publication. 1203 The Editors Committee, an informal forum comprised by the editors and owners of 
the main Israeli media, met regularly with the prime minister, cabinet members and senior officials, 
taking a central role in the self-censorship practiced by the Israeli media outlets.1204 In addition to 
providing for the existence and function of the Editors Committee, the agreement vested the primary 
authority for censorship within Israel with the military censor. After Israel's de facto annexation of 
occupied East Jerusalem in 1967 and the extension of Israeli law over the annexed territory, East 
Jerusalem became subject to the same censorship system as Israel.  
Although the role of the military censor for the Hebrew and English speaking media has diminished 
since the 1948 agreement, restrictions on freedom of expression for the Palestinian media in Israel and 
occupied East Jerusalem remains. Article 97 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations grants the 
censor the power to review materials before publication. Arabic newspapers in Israel and East 
Jerusalem have historically had this power more readily enforced against them. These outlets must 
submit two copies of every news article, regardless of the nature of the article, which they intend to 
print the following day, to the Israeli Government Press Building in Beit Argon. Hebrew and English 
language newspapers do not face such stringent restrictions, and are only required to submit articles 
about ‘military security’ matters. 
In terms of the OPT excluding East Jerusalem, the authority of the military censor was further 
reinforced through an extensive complex of military orders introduced upon Israel’s assumption of the 
status of Occupying Power. Many restrictive provisions of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 
were invoked to underpin the formulation of military orders instituting censorship in the OPT. 
Articles 86-101 of the Regulations were effectively applied to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Military 
Order No. 501205 forbids the import and distribution of newspapers into the West Bank without 
obtaining an Israeli military-approved permit, while publishing in the West Bank is restricted by 
Military Order No. 101,1206 according to which it is "forbidden … to distribute or publish a political 
article and pictures with political connotations." Thus, the limitations occur at the point of imparting 
information, and taken together, "the orders cover most methods of expressing or communicating 
ideas, giving Israeli military censors restrictive control over all publications which they consider to 
have any political meaning."1207  
                                               
1203 See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts%20About%20Israel/Culture/The%20Printed%20Media-
%20Israels%20Newspapers 
1204  Lahav, “The Press and National Security,” pp. 177-178. 
1205 Military Order No. 50, Order Concerning Distribution of Newspapers (11 July 1967). 
1206 Military Order No. 101, Order Concerning Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda (27 August 
1967). 
1207 Virgil Falloon, Excesssive Secrecy, Lack of Guidelines. A report on Military Censorship in the West Bank 
(Ramallah: Al-Haq, Law in the Service of Man, 1985).  
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In 1989, the Israeli High Court of Justice imposed limitations on the military censor, stating that 
censorship can only be exercised when it is certain that the publication of the item in question would 
harm public safety.1208 With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, however, the court system 
became actively involved in, rather than acting as a control mechanism on, the military censor. The 
Israeli courts began issuing media bans with increasing frequency, granting restrictions of coverage of 
certain cases upon the petition of the prosecutors or security forces.1209 
The Israeli press itself has been complicit in the practice of minimal criticism of Israeli policy through 
self-censoring. An official set of guidelines concerning controversial terminology in relation to the 
OPT was found in the Nakdi Report.1210 This included the prohibition of terms such as East Jerusalem 
from the Israeli media vocabulary. Also direct references to Palestine or the Palestinian territory were 
removed, with the Israeli media instead preferring to refer to the occupied territory of the West Bank 
as 'Judea and Samaria'.  
 
(ii) Suppression of Freedom of Expression: Restrictions on Freedom of movement  
Israel limits the rights of media personnel to seek information and ideas in the OPT. This right is 
particularly undermined by certain Israeli measures to restrict freedom of movement.  
 
Journalists operating in the OPT face two major obstacles to freedom of movement: administrative 
controls regarding the dissemination of press cards, and the pervasive system of checkpoints operated 
by the Israeli military within the OPT. 
The different treatment afforded by Israel to journalists working in Israel versus in the OPT is evident 
in the annual Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Sans Frontières.1211  
 
Year No. of Countries Ranked 
Rank for Israel 
within Israeli territory 
Rank for Israel 
in the OPT 
2003 166 44 146 
2004 167 36 115 
2005 167 47 Not Specified 
2006 168 50 135 
2007 169 44 103 
 
The Israeli Government Press Office (GPO) controls and regulates the process of obtaining official 
journalist accreditation to work both in Israel and the OPT. To be eligible for a GPO card, applicants 
must have accreditation with a recognised media organisation. This is equally applicable to 
                                               
1208  Ben-Zvi, Abraham, ‘The Limits of Israel’s Democracy in the Shadow of Security’ (2005) 1 Taiwan Journal 
of Democracy 2 at 8-9. 
1209  See Kurniel, Yuval, 'Balancing the protection of civil liberties during wartime: How the Supreme Court 
shaped Palestinian freedom of expression during the Second Intifada' (2002) 22 Government Information 
Quarterly at 626-643. 
1210 A paper drafted by the Israeli broadcasting authority, first set down in 1972. The aim was to ‘clarify some of 
the professional rules that govern the work of a newsperson’. 
1211 Reporters Sans Frontières - Reporters Without Borders, Annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index: statistics 
for 2003-2008 are available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4116.  
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international and Palestinian media. The GPO has used the issuing of press cards as a bureaucratic 
measure to restrict the ability of journalists to travel into the OPT to seek information and ideas, with 
the apparent political intent to reduce coverage of Israeli activities in the OPT. 
Since 2001, the Israeli government has revoked the press cards of many Palestinian journalists, thus 
diminishing their capacity to seek information and ideas.  In 2001 the Israeli Government Press Office 
(GPO) refused to renew press accreditation to Palestinian journalists, on the basis that they posed a 
‘security threat’ to the state of Israel. Following a court case, pursued by the Reuters news agency and 
Al-Jazeera satellite television network, the High Court ruled in 2004 that the 2001 GPO decision was 
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.1212 Despite this, the High Court did cede to the 
government request following this decision to allow the suspension of the issuing of press cards for 
selected individuals at the request of the General Security Service. GPO press cards must be renewed 
annually, leaving journalists mindful of the fact that Israel controls both the issuance of the press 
cards, and the checkpoints.  
The denial of press cards to Palestinian journalists, an obstacle generally not faced by Israeli 
journalists, restricts their ability to move not solely between Israel and the OPT but also to cross the 
complex intra-territory checkpoints and ad hoc roadblocks in the OPT. In addition to the media, the 
right to freedom of expression and opinion of Palestinian political activists and human rights 
defenders is also severely curtailed by Israel's imposition of travel bans on such individuals to prevent 
them from leaving the OPT to carry out their work and express their opinions at conferences, lectures 
and meetings abroad. Such restrictions are routinely implemented in spite of the weight afforded by 
the Israeli legal system to the right to freedom of expression, and, especially, to the right to freedom 
of political expression.1213 They are clearly designed to suppress dissenting voices from speaking out 
against Israel's policies in the OPT. 
 
(iv)Intimidation, Harassment, and Targeting of Media Installations and Journalists 
Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that radio and TV 
installations may be regarded as legitimate targets only if they are used for military purposes and 
directly contribute to the war effort. Determining the ‘military purpose’ of media installations may be 
politicised, however, where criticism of occupation itself is considered a military threat.  
Israeli policy allows targeting of media installations. On 19 January 2002 Israeli troops blew up the 
Voice of Palestine Radio and Television station offices and studios in Ramallah, accusing it of 
transmitting provocative material. On 12 December 2007, three media outlets, including the Nablus 
based TV station Al-Afaq, were forced to stop broadcasting after Israeli troops seized transmission 
equipment. Closure orders, destruction and damage of property and confiscation of materials result in 
not only the closing down or obstruction of the media outlet in question but in the intimidation of 
other outlets and organisations that are critical of Israel, fostering greater self-censorship. 
Violent attacks, harassment, and arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists obstruct the pursuit of 
information and ideas, as they intimidate and deter future reporting. Documented harassment of media 
personnel in the OPT ranges from confiscation of journalistic material to arbitrary arrest and detention 
of Palestinian journalists. The case of Mohammed Omer is illustrative. Mr. Omer, a journalist from 
the Gaza Strip, was stopped by Israeli border authorities when crossing back into the OPT from 
Jordan on 26 June 2009, after receiving the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism at a ceremony in 
London. He was detained without being given a reason and subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment by Israeli security authorities, beaten to the point of unconsciousness and hospitalised with 
several broken ribs.1214 The UN Special Rapporteur on the OPT notes that this incident, which he 
                                               
1212 Saif v. Government Press Office, [HCJ] 5627/02, 25 April 2004. 
1213 See Entrepreneurship and Publishing Promotion Inc. v. The Broadcasting Authority [HCJ 606/93] v.48 
1(2). 
1214 See, for example, Reuters, 'Gaza reporter: Israeli security officials broke my ribs', Ha'aretz (30 June 2008); 
Mel Frykberg, 'Israelis Assault Award Winning IPS Journalist', Inter Press Service (28 June 2008).  
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finds to be a violation of the right to freedom of expression, "cannot be discounted as an accident or 
an anomaly involving undisciplined Israeli security personnel", but is rather "part of a broader pattern 
of Israeli punitive interference with independent journalistic reporting on the occupation".1215   
In Israeli military operations in the OPT, where Palestinian journalists have been injured or killed 
where hostilities result in indiscriminate casualties among civilian, specific targeting of journalists 
constitutes a more serious violation of the law. Some press organisations have interpreted the Israeli 
military’s targeting of press personnel as deliberate where journalists are killed in isolated settings 
while wearing clothing and helmets clearly identified as ‘Press’ or ‘TV’. In one recent case, Fadel 
Shana, a Palestinian cameraman working for Reuters was killed by Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip 
while wearing a blue flak jacket marked with the word ‘PRESS’, as commonly worn by journalists 
and standing by his car, which also carried large ‘PRESS’ and ‘TV’ markings, in a large exposed 
area.1216 Such incidents have led Reporters Sans Frontières to list the Israeli military among its 
‘Predators of Press Freedom’.1217   
The net impact of Israeli measures curtailing Palestinian freedom of expression and opinion is to 
foster a culture of intimidation and to curtail the ability of Palestinians to express themselves and their 
opinions freely. In apartheid South Africa, such restrictions were understood as a necessary corollary 
of apartheid, as any system that attempts to engineer comprehensive social control must limit freedom 
of expression and opinion. Israel’s practices show a marked consistency with this pattern. 
  
 
(II) F.9.Denial of the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association. 
(II) F.9(a) Interpretation 
The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association are enshrined in Article 20 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. These rights are qualified only where restrictions are necessary for public safety, the 
protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.1218 Such 
restrictions must not be disproportionate, and must entail the least feasible impediment to the exercise 
of the rights. Otherwise, the right to peaceful assembly and to associate are regarded as the foundation 
of a democratic society. De Tocqueville states the proposition: 
‘The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of 
combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with 
them.  The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as 
the right of personal liberty.  No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of 
society’.1219 
For those under the jurisdiction of a state party to ICERD, protection from racial discrimination in the 
exercise of one’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association is required by Article 5(d)(ix) 
of the Convention. This provision informs the reference to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association in Article 2(c) of the Apartheid Convention. 
                                               
1215 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by 
Israel since 1967, Professor Richard Falk, UN Doc. A/63/326, 25 September 2008, at paras. 19-20. 
1216 See Al-Haq, Israeli Military Investigation Sanctions Wilful Killing of Civilians, including Reuters 
Cameraman, and Demonstrates Complete Disregard for Principle of Precautions in Attack (20 August 2008), 
available at: http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=388.  
1217 See Reporters Sans Frontières, available at: http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=26822.  
1218 See Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 11(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights; Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.   
1219 See A. De Tocqueville ‘Democracy in America’, cited in G. A. Beaudoin and E. Ratushny (eds.), The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (2nd Ed) (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), p. 235. 
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(II) F.9(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa 
Many of the South African apartheid government’s initial laws targeted free association. The most 
notable was the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act,1220 which empowered the Minister of Justice 
to prohibit a particular assembly or any specified person from being present in a particular area for a 
specified period.1221 Those who violated the Minister of Justice’s prohibitions were subject to harsh 
penalties. No warrant was required for the authorities to enter premises suspected of harbouring illegal 
gatherings. To generalise this Act, the apartheid government then passed the 1960 Unlawful 
Organization Act,1222 which allowed the Governor-General to declare any organization as illegal and 
thus granted the apartheid government authority to silence it. The 1956 Riotous Assembly Act1223 also 
empowered the ruling regime to prohibit gatherings in a public space or specific individuals from 
attending public gatherings. 
 
(II) F.9(c) Israeli practices in the OPT 
Whereas Israel’s policies to suppress free assembly and association of Palestinians in the OPT are 
comparably extensive, Jewish Israelis in the OPT and Israel are allowed full enjoyment of their right 
to freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Although most Israeli laws concerning these matters 
do not specifically target Palestinians in their text, they are rarely applied to settlers or Israeli Jews 
present in the OPT. When they are applied against Israelis they usually target ‘pro-Palestinian’ 
demonstrators and peace activists, or those whom the Occupying Power considers may threaten the 
'security' of Israel or its existence as a demographically Jewish state. 
Israel’s military legislation does not allow public gatherings of more than ten people unless the 
government receives notice of the gathering and is given the names of the attendees, thus making it 
even more restrictive in nature than the legislation in apartheid South Africa. Under Military Order 
No. 101,1224 "[i]t is forbidden to conduct a protest march or meeting (grouping of ten or more where 
the subject concerns or is related to politics) without permission from the Military Commander." Even 
Palestinian schools and universities have not been immune to this ban. Thousands of Palestinians 
were detained for organising and participating in public gatherings during the second intifada. Live 
ammunition, tear gas, sound bombs, steel coated rubber bullets, and physical violence continue to be 
used against gatherings of Palestinian civilians, particularly at demonstrations against Israel's illegal 
construction of the Wall in the West Bank. 
Further, the Israeli military authorities have adopted a policy of closing down Palestinian 
organisations that they deem to be security threats. Israel has also declared most Palestinian political 
parties to be 'terrorist' organisations, and thus, illegal. Hence any organisation connected directly or 
indirectly to a political party may be subject to closure, destruction, or even military attack. For 
example, a recent Israeli military order has targeted a residential area, a school, two medical clinics, 
and two orphanages in the West Bank city of Hebron for destruction because some of the donors to 
the charity that built them are allegedly affiliated to Hamas.1225 In 2007, Israeli authorities shut down 
dozens of charities and organisations participating in educational, social, cultural and humanitarian 
activities because of their alleged connections to Hamas. Direct membership of a Palestinian political 
                                               
1220 Act No. 44 of 1950, as amended.  
1221 Ibid. 
1222 Act No. 34 of 1960. 
1223 Act No. 17 of 1956. 
1224 Military Order No. 101, Order Concerning Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda, 27 August 
1967. 
1225 Badil, ‘Palestinian Civil Society Organizations express grave concern about Israeli closure of Islamic 
Charitable Society in Hebron’ April 24, 2008: available at: 
http://www.badil.org/Publications/Press/2008/press460-08.htm.  
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party designated in Israeli law as a 'terrorist' organisation, is a crime that can be punished by 
detention, house arrest, exile, or a travel ban. 
Palestinian organisations and entities in East Jerusalem have been subject to particular repression by 
the Israeli authorities. In its 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the US State 
Department highlighted the closure by Israel of "[p]rominent Palestinian centers in East Jerusalem, 
such as the Chamber of Commerce and Orient House" as a violation of the Palestinian right to 
freedom of association.1226 Such closures are based on affiliation of the organisations concerned with 
the Palestinian Authority, which Israel prohibits from organising events in East Jerusalem. Events and 
gatherings in March 2009 to mark the celebration of Jerusalem as the "Capital of Arab Culture 2009" 
were banned and forcefully dispersed by the Israeli authorities on this basis.1227 
Discriminatory treatment is suggested by disparities in Israeli responses to Jewish demonstrations and 
violence in the OPT. For example, Israeli forces regularly open fire on peaceful Palestinian 
demonstrations against the Wall, 1228 but do not do so in cases of demonstrations by settlers in the 
West Bank when removing settlement outposts. nor did they do so against Jewish Israeli rioters 
during the evacuation of settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005.  
Together, Israel's military legislation in the OPT operates to repress the Palestinian right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association, not least in East Jerusalem, is indicative of a widespread policy 
aimed at suppressing both political opposition against the policies of the Israeli occupation, and the 
expression of Palestinian cultural identity, in order to preserve Israeli domination in both spheres. 
 
(II) F.10 Case Study: Impact of Combined Practices in the Gaza Strip 
Article 2(c) of the Apartheid Convention is concerned with measures that exclude members of a racial 
group from participation in the ‘political, social, economic and cultural life of the country’. The 
paragraph then extends the meaning of this concern by further prohibiting ‘the deliberate creation of 
conditions preventing the full development of such a group’, citing measures discussed in sections 1-9 
above. If ‘full development’ is construed to include political, social, economic and cultural 
development, as the first part of the article suggests, then the concern of Article 2(c) could be 
interpreted as the holistic impact of such measures on a group including economic and other social 
effects.  A portrait or snapshot of economic and social conditions in the Gaza Strip, where these 
measures are deliberately practiced by Israel with particular rigour, can therefore indicate that such an 
impact has emerged. 
 
(a) Overview 
Since the victory of the Hamas movement in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, and 
particularly since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the Israeli government has 
imposed severe restrictions on the access of goods and services and the movement of people to and 
                                               
1226 See: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100597.htm.  
1227 See Al-Haq, A Culture of Repression: Israeli authorities ban Palestinian Cultural Festival in East 
Jerusalem (21 March 2009), available at: http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=436.  
1228 The West Bank village of Ni'lin is a case in point. On 29 July 2008, fifty children and fifty elderly citizens 
from Ni’lin planned to march from the village to the Wall in protest of the annexation of their land. Confronted 
by an Israeli Border Police vehicle, the crowd dispersed and the organisers led the children and elderly to safety. 
Ahmad Husam Musa, a ten-year-old child, hid in an olive grove. Field reports indicated that a "member of the 
Israeli Border Police saw Ahmad Musa, left the Border Police vehicle, aimed his rifle and fired a live bullet. 
Shot from a distance of 50 metres, the bullet entered Ahmad Musa’s forehead and exited through the back of his 
skull." See Al-Haq, Right To Life of Palestinian Children Disregarded in Ni’lin as Israel’s Policy of Wilful 
Killing of Civilians Continues, 7 August 2008, available at: http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=387.  
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from the Gaza Strip.1229 In September 2007, Israel claimed that it was exempted from its legal 
obligations towards the Palestinians in Gaza as a consequence of ‘disengagement’ (see discussion in 
Chapter 2.C (4)).1230 Israel subsequently declared the Gaza Strip to be a ‘hostile entity’ and imposed 
punitive measures on the Palestinian civilian population in order to bring a change in the political 
regime there.1231  
On 27 December 2008, the Israeli military launched a far-reaching military offensive against the Gaza 
Strip which continued for over three weeks until 18 January 2009. In ‘Operation Cast Lead’, least 
1380 Palestinians were killed, of whom 431 were children and 112 women. At least 5,380 people 
were injured, including 1,872 children and 800 women.1232  The offensive ended with Israel’s 
announcement of a unilateral ceasefire, and the Israeli forces withdrew three days later. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, 
Professor Richard Falk, described Operation Cast Lead as ‘a massive assault on a densely populated 
urbanized setting where the defining reality could not but subject the entire civilian population to an 
inhumane form of warfare that kills, maims, and inflicts mental harm that is likely to have long-term 
effects, especially on children that make up more than 50 percent of the Gaza population.’1233 Further, 
during these attacks, Israel prohibited Palestinian civilians from leaving Gaza, preventing them from 
becoming refugees and fleeing out of harms way. According to Professor Falk, “Refugee denial under 
these circumstances of confined occupation is an instance of ‘inhumane acts’ during which the entire 
civilian population of Gaza was subjected to the extreme physical and psychological hazards of 
modern warfare within a very small overall territory.’1234 
The closure policy combined with military attacks has had an extremely detrimental impact on the 
lives and living conditions of Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Although there has been a long-term 
pattern of de-development1235 in Gaza due to decades of occupation and intensive Israeli military 
attacks resulting in massive home demolitions,1236 killings and injuries,1237 the recent economic 
sanctions regime imposed by Israel from mid-June 2007 to March 2008 had been assessed as an 
unprecedented humanitarian crisis.1238 It has been argued that the "siege" imposed by Israel on the 
                                               
1229 The access to and from Gaza of people, goods, fuel and electricity is almost completely dependent on Israel, 
even after the completion of Israel’s ‘disengagement’.  
1230 See Gisha Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement, ‘Disengaged Occupiers – the Legal Status of Gaza,’ 
January 2007, 21-18; available at: http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/Report%20for%20the%20website.pdf.   
1231 See Israel’s Security Cabinet’s decisions from 5 September 2007 and 19 September 2007. 
1232 See UN Human Rights Council’s Combined Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Situation in Palestine and 
Other Occupied Arab Territories, A/HRC/10/22, 20 March 2009, p. 5, and Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Richard Falk, Human Rights 
Situation in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories, 11 February 2009, A/HRC/10/20, p. 7.  
1233  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied 
since 1967, Richard Falk, Human Rights Situation in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories, 11 
February 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/20, p. 8. 
1234 Ibid, p. 16. 
1235  Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development, Institute for Palestine Studies (April 
2005). 
1236 HRW, ‘Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the Gaza Strip,’ October 2004, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/gaza/. See also statistics gathered by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights 
(PCHR- Gaza), available at http://www.pchrgaza.org/alaqsaintifada.html.  
1237 See statistics gathered by PCHR-Gaza, available at http://www.pchrgaza.org/alaqsaintifada.html. See also 
statistics gathered by B’Tselem, available at: http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp; and UN 
OCHA’s Humanitarian Monitor Reports, issued periodically and available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/.    
1238 ‘The Gaza Strip: A Humanitarian Implosion,’ March 2008. The coalition responsible for the report is 
comprised of Amnesty International UK, CARE International UK, Christian Aid, CAFOD, Medecins du Monde 
UK, Oxfam, Save the Children UK and Trocaire (hereinafter UK Coalition, 2008). The report also gathers many 
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Gaza Strip since 2007 and the conditions that it has created, as discussed below, amounts to ‘cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment’ and is a violation of the UN Convention Against Torture 
(CAT).1239  
This section is divided into two parts. The first part provides figures concerning a first phase of the 
siege, predominantly covering the period of June 2007 through 2008. The second part provides 
information on the siege continuing in 2009 and in particular concerning conditions in Gaza 
immediately following "Operation Cast Lead".  
 
 
(b) Initial Phase of the Siege, June 2007–2008 
While the Palestinian economy has been in decline since the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000, 
economic restrictions imposed since the 2006 elections caused a severe collapse. Karni is the vital 
crossing for the movement of foods and goods to and from the Gaza Strip. Israel closed this crossing 
in mid-June 2007. Soon thereafter Palestinian human rights organizations petitioned the Israeli 
Supreme Court demanding the immediate reopening of the crossing, arguing that the denial of 
essential provisions to residents of Gaza violates their rights to life, health and to an adequate standard 
of living and amounts to collective punishment. The court stated that it was unconvinced that there 
was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and advised the petitioners in October 2007 to withdraw the 
petition.1240 
Closure of the Karni crossing heavily impacted the Palestinian economy: 
• In September 2000, some 24,000 Palestinians crossed out of Gaza everyday to work in 
Israel.1241 In 2008, that figure was zero. 
• Unemployment was close to 40 percent in the Gaza Strip in 2007 and was set to rise to 50 
percent in 2008. 
• More than 75,000 workers out of approximately 110,000 employed by the private sector were 
laid off because of the impact of the closures, and the majority of private businesses closed 
down  
• Nearly 90 percent of all industrial establishments shut down since mid-June 2007 including the 
most significant factories at the Karni Industrial Zone.  
• Pre-disengagement in June 2005, there were 3,900 factories in Gaza employing 35,000 people; 
by the end of 2007, there were 195 factories, employing only 1,750 workers.1242 
• Nearly all public infrastructure and maintenance projects, private construction and ministerial 
and municipal projects were halted due to the closure of factories and the lack of building 
materials.1243 
• In the months before the blockade began in June 2007, around 250 trucks a day entered Gaza 
through Karni with supplies.1244 In 2008, other crossings like Kerem Shalom only 
                                                                                                                                                  
of the recent statistics cited here. It is available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/gaza_implosion.pdf.  
1239 The Committee Against Torture will consider this issue in its review of Israel's compliance with CAT in 
May 2009.   
1240  H.C. 5523/07, Adalah v. The Prime Minister, et al. (petition withdrawn October 2007). 
1241  World Bank, ‘West Bank and Gaza Update,’ September 2006. 
1242 World Bank, ‘West Bank and Gaza: Economic Developments and Prospects,’ March 2008.  
1243 Ibid. 
1244 UK Coalition (2008), p. 8. 
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accommodate a maximum of 45 trucks a day. In most cases, this number was barely 
reached.1245 
• 95 percent of Gaza’s industrial operations are suspended due to the ban on imported raw 
materials and the block on exports.1246 
As a consequence of these conditions, poverty in Gaza reached unprecedented levels. In 2007, around 
eight out of ten households, approximately 1.1 million people, were living below the poverty line of 
NIS 2,300 (US $594) per month, a sharp rise from 63.1 percent in 2005. Of these, 66.7 percent of 
households were living in deep poverty on less than NIS 1,837 (US $474) per month.1247 Eighty 
percent of families in Gaza in 2007 relied on food aid, compared to 63 percent in 2006.  
 
Poverty was being aggravated by sharp price increases of many items resulting from shortages. In 
2007, households were spending approximately 62 percent of their total income on food compared 
with 37 percent in 2004.1248 During the period of May-June 2007 alone, prices for wheat flour, baby 
milk, and rice rose 34%, 30 percent and 20.5 percent respectively.1249 During the period June-
September 2007, the number of households in Gaza earning less than $1.2 per person per day soared 
from 55 percent to 70 percent.1250 
In October 2007 the Israeli government began limiting the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza.1251 In 
November 2007, responding to a petition filed by Adalah and Gisha on behalf of 10 Palestinian and 
Israeli human rights organizations, the Israeli Supreme Court approved the cuts to fuel supplies; by 
the end of January 2008, the court also sanctioned reductions in the supply of electricity.1252 The court 
accepted the state’s claim that it is only bound to safeguard ‘a minimal humanitarian standard’ in 
Gaza, a term that does not exist in international humanitarian law. 
As a result of fuel and electricity restrictions, hospitals were experiencing power cuts lasting for 8-12 
hours a day, due to a 60-70 percent shortage reported in the diesel required for hospital power 
generators.1253 All of the Gaza Strip, except the Rafah district, was facing a daily electricity outage for 
an average of eight hours.1254 As of April 2008, no fuel was available in Gaza on the open market and 
power cuts of three hours per day were experienced in almost all of the Gaza Strip.1255 UNRWA 
stopped its food delivery to 650,000 refugees in Gaza for five days in April 2008 due to a lack of fuel 
                                               
1245 Ibid, p.8. 
1246 World Bank, 'Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development' (17 December 2007). 
1247 UN OCHA Special Focus. ‘The closure of the Gaza Strip: The economic and humanitarian consequences’ 
(December 2007), p.2. Hereinafter OCHA, 2007.  Statistics in this section are from this source unless noted 
otherwise.  Available at: www.ochaopt.org/documents/Gaza_Special_Focus_December_2007.pdf 
1248 UK Coalition, 2008, p. 4. 
1249 World Food Program Food Security and Market Monitoring Report (9 June 2007). 
1250 UK Coalition (2008), p. 7. 
1251 63 percent of Gaza’s power supply is provided directly by Israel paid for by deductions from Palestinian tax 
revenues, and 28 percent is produced in Gaza powered by fuel paid for by the European Commission through 
the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM). All of Gaza’s fuel is imported through Israel (OCHA, 2007). 
Recall that Israel destroyed all six transformers in Gaza’s only power plant in June 2006. See B’Tselem, ‘Act of 
Vengeance: Israel’s Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and its Effects’, (September 2006), available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200609_Act_of_Vengeance_Eng.pdf.   
1252 H.C. 9132/07, Jaber al-Basyouni Ahmed v. The Prime Minister. Case documents and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions are available on Adalah’s website at:  http://www.adalah.org/eng/gaza%20report.html. 
1253 UK Coalition, 2008, p. 8. 
1254 World Health Organization, West Bank and Gaza, ‘Health Situation in Gaza,’ (3 March 2008). 
1255 UN OCHA, ‘Gaza Strip Fuel Situation Report as of 23 April 2008,’ available at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/Gaza_Strip_Fuel_Situation_Report_as_of_23_April_2008.pdf.  
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for its trucks.1256 The Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) provides drinking water and 
removes and treats sewage for the Gaza Strip. Without fuel, electricity and proper maintenance, the 
network cannot function and thirty-to-forty million litres of sewage goes into the sea everyday 
because of a lack of fuel to pump or treat human waste.1257 The CMWU estimates that between 25-30 
percent of the population of Gaza did not receive running water in their homes; before the blockade 
the CMWU was able to distribute water to 100 percent of its beneficiaries.1258  
Health care has been heavily impacted by the siege. Many specialized and life-saving medical 
treatments are not available in hospitals in Gaza. Current measures imposed by Israel have prevented 
a large number of patients with treatment referrals from leaving Gaza for specialized medical care. 
Excessive delays in obtaining permission to leave the Gaza Strip reduce the patients’ possibility of 
survival. 
Rulings delivered by the Israeli Supreme Court in January 2008 involved patients in life-threatening 
conditions requesting to exit Gaza for medical care. In these cases, the Supreme Court refused to 
intervene in the state’s decision to deny access to healthcare to nine patients on security grounds.1259 
In a previous ruling, delivered on 28 June 2007, the Supreme Court refused to discuss the issue of 
Israel’s legal responsibility towards the Gaza Strip, or the state’s position that entry into Israel should 
be permitted only as a humanitarian gesture. The court limited the discussion to the ‘operative 
common denominator, i.e., to humanitarian aspects’.1260 The court did question the ‘life/limb’ 
distinction (according to which the state argued that a danger to limb constitutes a danger to the 
‘quality of life’ and does not necessitate access to health care outside of Gaza). However, it did not 
intervene in this issue, deciding that intervention in such cases could ‘by the stroke of a pen, expose 
IDF soldiers and civilians at the Crossing to danger’.1261 Following this comment, the court refused to 
intervene in the security prohibition of two patients to whom denial of care would entail the loss of a 
limb.1262  
Medical conditions in the Gaza Strip are changing rapidly, but it is relevant here that Israel’s closures 
had brought the medical system to the brink of collapse even before 27 December 2008 and that 
Israeli authorities were unresponsive to warnings of a growing humanitarian crisis. Physicians for 
Human Rights-Israel (PHR-I) reported that, since June 2007, it had collected testimonies from least 
30 patients seeking urgent medical help who were denied passage by the General Security Service 
(GSS).1263 According to GSS policy, patients were being detained at the Erez Crossing and requested 
to provide information or to act as regular collaborators as a condition for permission to leave the 
Gaza Strip for medical treatment.1264 The deliberate withholding of medical care for non-medical 
                                               
1256 UN OCHA, ‘ISRAEL-OPT: Food distribution halted, cooking gas running out in Gaza,’ IRIN Humanitarian 
News and Analysis, (28 April 2008), available at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77959. 
1257 Ibid, p. 10. 
1258 UK Coalition, 2008, p. 10. 
1259 H.C. 11105/07, PHR-Israel and 15 Patients v. The Commander of the Israeli Military in Gaza, Chief 
Commander of the Southern District, et al. (unpublished decision), and H.C. 559/08, PHR-Israel and 1 Patient 
v. The Commander of the Israeli Military in Gaza, Chief Commander of the Southern District, et al 
(unpublished decision). See also Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, ‘Gaza: No Justice, No Hope for Patients’ 
(2 January 2008), available at: 
http://www.phr.org.il/phr/article.asp?articleid=538&catid=55&pcat=45&lang=ENG. 
1260 See H.C. 5429/07, PHR-Israel, et al. v. The Minister of Defence. 
1261 Ibid. 
1262 Ibid. 
1263 See Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, ‘Holding Health to Ransom: GSS Interrogation and Extortion of 
Palestinian Patients at Erez Crossing’ (August 2008), p. 6, available online at: 
http://www.phr.org.il/phr/files/articlefile_1217866249125.pdf. 
1264 Ibid. 
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reasons constitutes a form of torture, PHR-I argues.1265 The Israeli authorities denied carrying out 
such practices at Erez and dismiss them as Palestinian propaganda.1266 Of patients seeking emergency 
treatment in hospitals outside Gaza in 2007, 18.5 percent were refused permits to leave.1267 The 
proportion of patients given permits to exit Gaza for medical care decreased from 89.3 percent in 
January 2007 to 64.3 percent in December 2007, an unprecedented low.1268 While the overall number 
of patients requesting a permit to pass through Erez crossing increased after June 2007 due to the 
Rafah crossing (border with Egypt) closure, the percentage of permits that were denied increased from 
7 percent in January 2006 to 36 percent in December 2007.1269 During the period October–December 
2007, WHO confirmed the deaths of twenty patients, including 5 children, among people awaiting 
visas.1270 The MoH hospitals were working within a declared state of emergency. Palestinian Health 
Ministry reported that urgently needed drugs (85 items), medical supplies (52 items) and lab reagents 
(24 items) were out of stock at MoH facilities.1271 
 
(c) Aftermath of "Operation Cast Lead" 
 
After Operation Cast Lead, the population in the Gaza Strip was experiencing the following 
conditions:1272 
 
According to OCHA, during the week 4-10 of March 2009, 50,000 people continued to have no 
running water, and an additional 100,000 received water only every 5-6 days, primarily in the North 
Gaza district, eastern areas of Khan Younis and Az Zeitoun area of Gaza City. 1273 Access to water for 
the affected population will remain difficult until spare parts and repair materials are allowed entry 
into Gaza.1274 During the week of 11-17 March 2009, nine truckloads carrying supplies for water 
projects were allowed into Gaza. However, due to restrictions on the entry of other essential materials, 
including water pipes, the benefit of these supplies is limited.1275 
 
                                               
1265 ‘PHR-Israel believes that the fact that refusal to collaborate leads to prevention of treatment, may constitute 
a breach of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, as it contributes to physical suffering and may even lead to death, where a person’s life could have 
been saved or his suffering alleviated by receiving treatment’. See Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, ‘Holding 
Health to Ransom,’ p. 30. 
1266  Tim McGirk, ‘Israelis Blocking Medical Care in Gaza,’ Time Magazine (25 March 2008), available online 
at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725422,00.html.  
1267 WHO West Bank and Gaza, ‘Access to Healthcare for the Palestinian People’ (April 2008), pp. 36-37, 
available online at: 
http://www.emro.who.int/palestine/reports/monitoring/WHO_special_monitoring/access/access%20to%20healt
h%20services%20(April%202008).pdf. 
1268 Ibid. 
1269 Ibid. 
1270 UK Coalition, 2008, p. 11. 
1271 WHO West Bank and Gaza, ‘Health Situation in Gaza’, (3 March 2008). 
1272 For regular updates on this information see UN OCHA at www.ochaopt.org, and, for example Al Mezan 
Centre for Human Rights at www.mezan.org, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights at www.pchrgaza.org 
1273 Ibid. 
1274 Ibid. 
1275 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 
11-17 March 2009. Available online at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_2009_03_13_english.pdf. 
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According to OCHA, during the week of 4-10 March 2009, 90% of the Gaza population was 
experiencing intermittent power cuts as a result of scheduled power cuts.1276 The remaining 10% of 
Gaza’s population has remained without electricity, due to damages sustained by the electricity 
network, since the 27 December 2008 onset of Israeli military operation “Cast Lead’.1277During 
February 2009, the Gaza Power Plant (GPP) was only able to operate at about 80% of its full capacity 
(65MW out of 80MW), creating an almost 20% electricity deficit throughout the Gaza Strip.1278 
During February 2009, approximately 8.3 million litres of industrial fuel were imported from Israel 
and used exclusively for the operation of the GPP, an amount that is significantly below the 14 
million needed to operate the plant at full capacity.1279  
 
OCHA reported that during the week of 11-17 March 2009, nearly 50,000 litres of diesel and 30,000 
litres of petrol entered Gaza daily via the Gaza-Egypt tunnels.1280 Though these supplies have eased 
the fuel shortage, the amount of fuel reaching Gaza still remains far below the needs of the 
population. 
 
According to OCHA, the overall levels of humanitarian aid allowed into Gaza remain below what is 
urgently required.1281 During the week of 11-17 March 2009, Israeli clearance procedures for access 
into Gaza by international humanitarian agency personnel continued to be very lengthy, greatly 
hindering their capacity to provide humanitarian aid and services.1282 
 
During February 2009, 324 permit applications were submitted by patients who required medical 
treatment abroad, of whom only 183 (56.5%) had their permits granted in a timely manner by the 
Israeli District Coordination Liaison (DCL) office; 109 (33.6%) had their applications delayed; 9 
(2.8%) had their application denied and another 23 (7.1%) were interviewed by the ISA and are still 
awaiting an exit permit.1283 According to the Palestinian Liaison Officer at Erez, only 258 patients 
exited during February 2009.1284  
 
Many critically needed items (spare parts, construction materials, etc.) remain restricted for entry, 
preventing reconstruction and recovery efforts, including spare parts for water and wastewater 
infrastructures.1285 More than 100 procurement orders of spare parts and consumables needed to repair 
the Gaza Power Plant have been waiting for clearance to enter Gaza for months, preventing some 
repair works from taking place and keeping the functioning of the plant at a fragile level.1286 
 
During February 2009, a daily average of 127 truckloads of goods entered the Gaza Strip, a figure that 
is well below the level of imports in May 2007 (475 truckloads), and the level of imports was 
                                               
1276 Ibid. 
1277 Ibid. 
1278 The UN Humanitarian Monitor: Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 34, February 2009. Available online at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_humanitarian_monitor_2009_02_01_english.pdf. 
1279 Ibid. 
1280 Ibid. 
1281 OCHA, Field Update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator, 10-16 March 2009. Available at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_gaza_humanitarian_situation_report_2009_03_16_english.pdf.  
1282 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Protection of Civilians Weekly Report 
(11-17 March 2009). 
1283 The UN Humanitarian Monitor: Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 34 (February 2009).  
1284 Ibid. 
1285 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Protection of Civilians Weekly Report (4-
10 March 2009). 
1286 The UN Humanitarian Monitor: Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 34 (February 2009). 
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insufficient to meet market needs: over 80% of the truckloads carried food stuffs, to the exclusion of 
other major essential supplies.1287 In the same month, Israeli approval was arbitrarily denied for the 
import of other goods, including some food items (chickpeas and macaroni), recreational kits, 
stationery, and veterinary drugs.1288 According to OCHA, the import of goods from Israel, particularly 
by humanitarian agencies, remains subject to unclear and often inconsistent criteria at the Israeli-
controlled crossings.1289 
 
Access by farmers to their land in the north and east of the Gaza Strip and east along the border with 
Israel remains limited. Fishermen remain limited to a territory of three nautical miles from the Gaza 
shoreline,1290 despite an agreement reached under the Oslo Accord for fishing grounds extending to 20 
nautical miles west of Gaza that was adhered to until June 2007 with Hamas’ takeover of Gaza. In 
June 2007 the fishing ground was cut to six nautical miles, which was halved to three nautical miles 
after Cast Lead, severely damaging the livelihood of Gaza’s 3,000 fishermen and their families.1291 
Israel enforces the three nautical mile-limit by opening fire on Palestinian fishing vessels found in 
water beyond it.1292 
 
Erez Crossing was opened on 23 days during February 2009, allowing only 1,978 people to exit Gaza, 
the majority of whom were diplomats and international humanitarian staff (730) and Palestinian 
patients and their accompaniers (505) with valid permits to cross Erez for medical treatment in Israel 
and the West Bank.1293 370 Palestinians carrying permits were allowed to cross Erez to visit their 
families in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan.1294 The Rafah Crossing was exceptionally opened on 15 
days during February 2009 to allow mainly urgent medical cases to enter Egypt and cross back into 
Gaza. 2,662 Palestinians, including 590 patients, were allowed to enter Egypt and 1,855 others to 
return back to Gaza during February 2009. The daily average of people who crossed into Egypt (95) 
and who entered Gaza (66) constitutes just 31% and 23% of the parallel figures for May 2007, at 310 
and 292 respectively. 
 
(II) G. Article 2(d) – Measures designed to divide the population along racial lines by the 
creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the 
prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the expropriation 
of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof 
(II) G.1 Creation of separate reserves and ghettos 
(II) G.1(a) Interpretation 
Reference to ‘reserves’ or to ‘ghettos’ is not found elsewhere in international law and there is little 
national or international jurisprudence clarifying the meaning of these phrases. In general use, the 
term reserves, when speaking of separate treatment of racial groups or peoples, applies generally to 
areas of land set aside for their exclusive use. Reserves may be used to confine people or provide 
                                               
1287 Ibid. 
1288 Ibid. 
1289 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 
18-24 March 2009. Available online at: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_2009_03_24_english.pdf. 
1290 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 
11-17 March 2009 
1291 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 
18-24 March 2009.  
1292 Ibid. 
1293 The UN Humanitarian Monitor: Occupied Palestinian Territory, No. 34, February 2009. 
1294 Ibid. 
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them with specific rights such as the reservation system for Native Americans in the US  enabled by 
legislation such as the Indian Appropriations Act of 1851, which became a system to provide 
autonomy for tribal governance. Reserves may also be established to preserve a particular ecological 
zone essential to the cultural practices that allow cultural survival of groups.  
The special relevance of the term here is specific to South Africa: the 1913 Land Act established that 
black land ownership would be confined to certain areas of the country that were called black 
‘Reserves’ and the term remained in use when the Apartheid Convention was drafted. Although the 
term Homelands was then current, the text of the Apartheid Convention as adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1973 omitted any explicit reference to the Homelands (most likely with the intention of 
denying them any semblance of recognition or legitimacy), referring instead in Article 2(d) to the 
‘creation of separate reserves and ghettos’.  
The term ghetto is associated with urban districts characterised by geographic isolation and 
discrimination1295 and is in use with regards, for example, Roma communities in Europe.1296 The most 
notorious ghetto in modern history was the Warsaw Ghetto, a historically Jewish ghetto where Jews 
were imprisoned during the Second World War in order to facilitate the execution of the Holocaust. 
Although urban ghettoes may be formed through voluntary choices, reflecting the propensity of 
language and ethnic groups and especially immigrant groups to cluster as social networks, the term is 
commonly associated with vulnerability, poverty, discrimination and marginality relative to a 
dominant society. 
For the purposes of the Apartheid Convention, reference to ‘reserves and ghettos’ can be taken as 
referring respectively to rural and urban enclaves to which residence by a racial group is restricted. 
Article 2 confirms that it is an inhuman act constituent of apartheid to confine a racial group to 
reserves and ghettoes in order to exclude it from the life of the country.  
 
(II) G.2(a) Practices in Apartheid South Africa 
Division of the population in South Africa was orchestrated through legislation that categorised the 
entire population by racial type and allowed each group the right to live only in its assigned 
geographic zones. In rural areas, this system became the Homelands policy; in urban areas, it 
generated black townships, such as Soweto, that functioned as labour reservoirs for white cities. 
The use of reserves to exclude blacks from the life of South Africa traces to the Glen Grey Act of 
1874 and the Bantu Land Act of 1913,1297 which established the principle of geographic segregation 
on the basis of race, and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 which further legislated this 
principle.1298 Under the National Party, these earlier laws provided the basis for the first major step 
toward Grand Apartheid, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. This Act divided South Africa into 
                                               
1295 See for example: Report of the independent expert on minority issues, Addendum, Mission to France, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/7/23/Add.2 (2008). 
1296 See for example: Consideration of Reports, Comments and Information Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 9 of the Convention (Slovakia), CERD/C/SR.1655 (2004). 
1297 See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
p. 338. 
1298 For example, the Bantu Land Act of 1913 restricted African land ownership to the ‘native reserves’ and the 
Native Affairs Act of 1920 established separate administrative structures for Africans with the result that 80 per 
cent of the country (i.e. the black African population) was confined to 13 per cent of the land. The Native 
(Urban Areas) Act of 1913 provided for urban segregation and African influx control and the Native Trust and 
Land Act of 1936 consolidated the reserves, and forbade the transfer to, or lease of land by, other races within 
these reserves. Meanwhile, Africans were prohibited from acquiring land elsewhere. See John Dugard, Human 
Rights and the South African Legal Order (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 78-79. See also, 
DL Carey Miller and Anne Pope, Land Title in South Africa (Cape Town: Juta, 2000), pp. 19-20 and Crawford 
supra note ** at pp. 338-339. The term ‘Bantu’ was the way in which Africans were described by South African 
law. See Dugard, ibid, p. 61. 
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separate areas, each reserved exclusively for the use of a particular racial group, while ensuring that 
the white group maintained control over the most economically productive areas of the country.1299 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1952 ensured that the separation policy would succeed by 
empowering the Minister of Native Affairs to remove blacks from public or privately owned land and 
establish resettlement camps to house these displaced people. The Natives Laws Amendment Act of 
1952 also narrowed the category of blacks who had the right of permanent residence in towns to those 
who had been born in a town and had lived there continuously for not less than 15 years, or who had 
been employed there continuously for the same period of time, or who had worked continuously for 
the same employer for at least 10 years. 
Implemented from 1954, these Acts authorised the State to uproot black citizens from their homes of 
generations. Millions of black people were eventually forcibly ejected from ‘white’ land in terms of 
these measures, often dumped unceremoniously to ‘adapt or die’ in remote and primitive ‘resettlement 
areas’.  The generally appalling conditions in these ‘dumping grounds’ regularly produced terrible 
poverty, disease and crippling infant mortality.  The intense human suffering in places such as 
Dimbaza, Limehill, Soetwater and hundreds of others provoked international outrage and led to 
charges of genocide against the National Party government.1300 The policy also resulted in the 
wholesale destruction of urban communities like Sophiatown (Johannesburg), District Six (Cape 
Town), Cato Manor and South End in Port Elizabeth, with consequences of immense suffering and 
huge losses of property and income.   With the enactment of the Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) 
Act, Act No 64 of 1956, those forcefully removed could not appeal to the courts against their 
removals. 
The notion of self-governing black Homelands did not come to fruition until the 1960s and 1970s1301 
when they were seen as an escape route for a government whose policies of forced removal — and 
other overt practices of racial segregation and discrimination —had attracted widespread international 
criticism and condemnation, particularly from the United Nations.1302 This problem concerned South 
Africa’s Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoed1303 who, in a 1961 Parliamentary debate, admitted that the 
Homelands were:  
‘… a form of fragmentation which we would not have liked if we were able to avoid it. In 
light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa there is, however, no doubt that eventually 
this will have to be done, thereby buying for the white man his freedom and the right to retain 
domination in what is his country … If the Whites could have continued to rule over 
everybody, with no danger to themselves, they would certainly have chosen to do so. 
However, we have to bear in mind the new views in regard to human rights, … the power of 
the world and world opinion and our desire to preserve ourselves’.1304 
The ideology underpinning the creation of the Bantu Homelands in South Africa—as well as those 
which would be subsequently established in Namibia—was most clearly expressed in a 1954 
                                               
1299 In 1985, the apartheid government itself estimated that a total of 126,176 families had been forced out of 
their homes in terms of the Act: Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook, p.  37. 
1300 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years – The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party 1948-1994 
(Randburg: Ravan Press, 1996), p. 69. 
1301 See Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 81-88 and Miller and Pope, Land Title, ibid at p. 23. 
1302 See generally, John Dugard, ‘The Legal Effect of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid’, 83 South 
African Law Journal (1963), p. 44. 
1303 See Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa’s Bantustans (London: International and Defence Aid 
Fund, 1976), p. 8 (observing that Dr. Verwoerd was very concerned about South Africa’s image in the world, 
and the threat of decolonization in the rest of Africa.) 
1304 107 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 4191-93, 10 April, 1961, cited in John Dugard, International Law: A 
South African Perspective (Cape Town: Juta, 2000), p. 447. 
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government report written by an eleven-man commission chaired by Professor F.R. Tomlinson.1305 
The Tomlinson Report, which took almost five years to complete, concluded that:  
‘…separate development of the European and Bantu communities should be striven for, as the 
only direction in which racial conflict may possibly be eliminated, and racial harmony 
possibly be maintained. The only obvious way out of the dilemma lies in the sustained 
development of the Bantu Areas on a large scale.’1306 
‘Grand Apartheid’ thus reflected, most fundamentally, a strategy by the National Party to escape the 
political conundrums for white people resulting from South Africa’s majority-black demography. It 
was evident to the Tomlinson Commission that, were they to give into international pressure and form 
a multiracial society with equal rights for all in a single state, whites would lose control of national 
politics and ultimately, it was feared, their European cultural life-styles: 
At whatever speed, and in whatever manner the evolutionary process of integration and 
equalisation between European and Bantu might take place, there can be no doubt as to the 
ultimate outcome in the political sphere, namely that the control of political power will pass 
into the hands of the Bantu. 
It is possible that European paramountcy might be maintained for some time, by manipulation 
of the franchise qualifications; but without a doubt the government of the country will 
eventually be exercised by those elected by the majority of voters. Theoretically, it is possible 
that the non-Europeans who then constitute the majority of voters, might prefer to have the 
country ruled by Europeans. Such a supposition appears highly doubtful, and certainly 
improbable. But, even if such were to be the case, the rulers of a democratic country would 
have to carry out the will of the majority of the people, which means to say, that the European 
orientation of our legislation and government will eventually disappear.1307 
Hence the Tomlinson Commission warned that, if all South Africans were represented in a unified 
parliamentary democracy, power would pass into the hands of the blacks. Because blacks were not 
considered capable of maintaining a ‘European’ democracy, to sustain South Africa as a democracy 
required excluding blacks from political rights and representation. Yet excluding blacks from equal 
rights as citizens would undermine and ultimately destroy the ‘European’ democracy (which only 
whites could maintain) because it would require measures that were profoundly undemocratic and 
illiberal. Thus to preserve democracy for white people, some solution had to be found. 
The Homelands were the National Party’s answer to this dilemma, as well as a way to stave off 
criticism of its racial policies by the outside world. Apartheid architects like Henrik Vervoerd (first as 
Education Minister and later as Prime Minister) argued that South Africa was a state with many 
nationalities, instead of one nation, and that separate development of each nation was mandated, as 
only disaster could result from multiracialism, multinationalism and multiculturalism.1308 In 1959, the 
South African Parliament passed the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act which introduced 
‘national’ divisions in the country for particular ethnic groups, which would form the basis for the 
Homeland system.1309  The preamble provided: 
                                               
1305 See Summary of the Report on the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas 
within the Union of South Africa (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1955), hereinafter the ‘Tomlinson 
Commission.’ 
1306 Ibid, p. 194. 
1307 See Tomlinson Commission, p. 103. 
1308 See Merle Lipton, ‘Independent Bantustans? (1972) 48 International Affairs at 1-19. 
1309 Apparently, the name of this Act was changed so as to sound more appealing. There were protests within the 
National Party that so negative a bill, without some positive compensation, would alienate some domestic 
opinion and provide foreign critics with ammunition against South Africa: see Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas 
Karis and Newell Stultz, South Africa’s Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism (London: Heinemann, 
1967), pp. 12-13. 
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Whereas the Bantu peoples of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a homogenous 
people, but form separate national units on the basis of language and culture; and whereas it is 
desirable for the welfare and progress of said peoples to afford recognition to the various 
national units and to provide for their gradual development within their own areas to self-
governing units on the basis of Bantu systems of government …1310 
The Act established a number of white Commissioners-General to act as agents of the Central 
Government in the homelands, and set up eight Bantu authorities.1311 It also completed the process of 
removing African’s civil rights in South Africa with the elimination of the (white) native 
representatives from the National Assembly.1312 
Thus the Homelands were designed to remove the demographic threat to racial democracy by tapping 
into the United Nations principle that every people has the right to self-determination. Grand 
Apartheid prescribed that whites would exercise this right in the great majority of the country’s 
territory, including in all major towns and cities and 90 percent of its arable land. Black South 
Africans would do so in ten ‘independent’ homelands invented and demarcated by the South African 
government: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane, 
KwaNdebele, and KwaZulu.1313 In 1963, Transkei became the first Homeland to be granted ‘self-
government’ status, although this was primarily a publicity exercise to show to the ICJ that South 
Africa was sincere about granting the blacks self-determination.1314 The other Homelands would not 
be granted ‘self-governing’ status until the mid 1970s. In 1976, Transkei was granted ‘independence’ 
although the UN General Assembly had already called upon its members to refuse recognition to 
Transkei or to any other homeland.1315 Three other Homelands were declared independent: 
Bophutatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981). 
The reality of Grand Apartheid was that black South Africans (80 per cent of the country’s 
population) were to be confined to a mere 12-13 per cent of the area of South Africa, whilst the whites 
(20 percent) would rule over the remaining 88 percent of the land.1316 Moreover, the fact that the 
Homelands were spread around South Africa in a fragmented horseshoe comprising eighty-one large 
and 200 smaller blocks of land (see map) led many to argue that they could never form independent 
and viable sovereign states.  
International rejection of the Bantustan system was categorical, on several grounds: that black South 
Africans’ right to self-determination included a right to territorial integrity over the entirety of South 
Africa; that black South Africans lacked ‘the legal capacity to give the consent necessary to any 
divestiture envisaged by the Bantustan policy’;1317 and because the implementation of the Bantustan 
policy was reliant on dividing the population along racial lines to be forcibly transferred from their 
homes into the Bantustans. In 1971, the UN General Assembly denounced the policy ‘artificially to 
divide the African people into ‘nations’ according to their tribal origins’ and justify ‘the establishment 
of non-contiguous Bantu homelands (Bantustans) on that basis’ and condemned ‘the establishment of 
Bantu homelands (Bantustans) and the forcible removal of the African people of South Africa and 
                                               
1310 Quoted from Crawford, p. 339. 
1311 See Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa’s Bantustans (London: International Defence and Aid 
Fund, 1976), p. 21. 
1312 Ibid. 
1313 There were also two other smaller Bantustans called KwaNdebele and KaNgwane.  
1314  See Carter, Karis and Stultz, supra note *** at pp. 12-13. 
1315 See GA Res. 3151G, 14 December 1973 and GA Res. 3411D, 28 November 1975. 
1316 Ibid, p. 3. 
1317 Henry J Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African Bantustan Policy (1978) 
17 Colum J Transnat’l L 185 at 217. 
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Namibia to those areas as a violation of their inalienable rights, contrary to the principle of self-
determination and prejudicial to territorial integrity of the countries and the unity of their peoples’.1318  
Two days after the granting of ‘independence’ to Transkei, the UN General Assembly adopted 
resolution 31/6A (1976) by 130 votes to none. This resolution condemned ‘the establishment of 
Bantustans as designed to consolidate the inhuman policies of apartheid, to destroy the territorial 
integrity of the country, to perpetuate white minority domination and to dispossess the African people 
of South Africa of their inalienable rights.’ It further rejected Transkei’s independence as ‘invalid’, 
and called upon all governments ‘to deny any form of recognition to the so-called independent 
Transkei.’ This call for non-recognition of the Transkei would be endorsed by the UN Security 
Council in resolutions 402 (1976) and 407 (1977).1319 Similar resolutions and denunciations were 
passed by the UN calling on all 
states not to recognise the 
‘independence’ of Bophuthatswana 
in 1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei 
in 1981.1320  
South Africa also attempted to 
establish Bantustans in Namibia 
(formerly South West Africa), 
which it had administered under 
League of Nations mandate after 
World War I and refused to 
relinquish after World War II. In 
1964, the Odendaal Commission1321 
recommended that 40.07 per cent of 
the territory be allocated for non-
white homelands, 1322 while 
allocating to the whites control of 
43.22 per cent of the land where 
nevertheless the majority of the 
population was black.1323 In 1968, 
the South African Government 
passed the Development of the Self-
Government for Native Nations in 
South-West Africa Act. Black 
territories were divided into ten 
blocks: Basterland, Bushmanland, 
Damaraland, East Caprivi, 
                                               
1318 General Assembly Resolution 2775 of 29 November 1971. 
1319 For further reading, see Geoffrey E. Norman, ‘The Transkei: South Africa’s Illegitimate Child’ (1976–77) 
12 New England Law Review at 585-646; Donald E. deKieffer and David A. Hartquist, ‘Transkei: A Legitimate 
Birth’ (1977–78) 13 New England Law Review at 428-452; and Geoffrey E. Norman, ‘The Transkei Revisited’ 
(1977–78) 13 New England Law Review at 792-801. See also, Merrie Faye Watkin, ‘Transkei: An Analysis of 
the Practice of Recognition – Political or Legal?’ (1977) 18 Harvard International Law Journal at 605-627. 
1320 See John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987), pp. 98-108. 
1321 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-63, RP 12 / 1964. For a very 
useful map of the envisaged ten black ‘homelands’ for Namibia by the Odendaal Commission, see Kaela, The 
Question of Namibia, p. 80. 
1322 See Dugard, The Southwest Africa/Namibia Dispute, p. 238 (citing UN Monthly Chronicle, June 1964, pp. 
33 ff.) 
1323 Ibid, see also, Sagay, Legal Aspects of the Namibia Dispute, p. 359. In 1965, the UN General Assembly 
added its protests to that of the Special Committee of 24. GA Res. 2074 (XX), 17 December 1965. 
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Hereroland, Kaokoland, Kavangoland, Namaland, Ovamboland and Tswanaland. (Only East Caprivi, 
Hereroland and Kavangoland were granted self-rule.1324) The policy was opposed by the South West 
Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the Democratic Development Co-operative Party 
(DEMCOP), which demanded independence for the whole of Namibia.1325 
International rejection of the Bantustan strategy in Namibia was equally strong. The United Nations 
General Assembly terminated the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia in 1966.1326 In 1968, the UN 
General Assembly denounced the black ‘self-government’ plans as designed to ‘destroy the national 
unity and territorial integrity of Namibia.’1327 The UN Security Council described the establishment of 
Bantustans in Namibia as ‘contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter’ and condemned 
the Native Nations Act as ‘a violation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.’1328 In 
1976, the UN Security Council declared that, ‘in order that the people of Namibia may be enabled 
freely to determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and 
control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity.’1329 In 
paragraph 11 (c) of that resolution, the Security Council called on the South African Government to 
abolish the application in Namibia of ‘all racially discriminatory Bantustans and homelands.’1330 Due 
to international opposition, no Bantustan in Namibia became an ‘independent’ state. In 1990, Namibia 
was admitted to the UN as an independent state, its territorial integrity intact.1331 
 
II) G.2(b) Practices by Israel in the OPT  
Division of the population in the OPT is orchestrated through legislation that categorises the entire 
population by its identity and allows each group the right to live only in its assigned geographic 
zones.  
Formal plans to divide the West Bank into Jewish and Palestinian zones trace to at least1978, when 
the parastatal Jewish Agency, responsible for developing and managing Jewish-national assets in 
Israel,1332 formally declared that the West Bank was a permanent part of ‘Eretz Israel’ (the Land of 
Israel) and presented a ‘master plan’ for inserting Jewish settlements into the region in order to secure 
permanent Jewish-Israeli control over its geography.1333 Known as the ‘Drobles Plan’, it proposed as a 
                                               
1324 See Sagay, Legal Aspects of the Namibia Dispute, pp. 363-369 (describing the homelands of Ovamboland, 
Kavangoland, Damaraland, Hereroland, the Caprivi Strip, Bushmanland, Rehoboth Gebiet and Namaland).  
1325 Ibid, p. 370. SWAPO and DEMCOP  called for a boycott of the elections to the Legislative Council of the 
Ovambo ‘homeland’ held on 1 and 2 August 1973.  As a result only 823 out of 50,000 eligible voters cast their 
ballots. 
1326 Ibid. See also, GA Res. 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 (where the General Assembly terminated the 
Mandate of South West Africa and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory until its independence). 
1327 GA Res. 2403 (XXIII) of 16 December 1968. 
1328 SC Res. 264 of 20 March 1969. 
1329 SC Res. 385 of 30 January 1976, para. 7. 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 SC Res. 652, 17 April 1990. See further, Cedric Thornberry, A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of 
Namibia’s Independence (Winhoek: MacMillan, 2004), in which the author details the negotiations which led to 
Nambia’s transition to independence. 
1332 The role and authority of the Jewish Agency was confirmed in 1952 by the World Zionist Organisation–
Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 5713-1952 and by a 1954 ‘covenant’ that was reaffirmed at the 34th World Zionist 
Organisation Congress:  see ‘Covenant Between the Government of Israel and The Zionist Executive called also 
the Executive of the Jewish Agency’, cited in W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, The Palestine 
Problem in International Law and World Order (Longman, 1986), 433. 
1333 ‘Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983’ (October 1978), available 
as United Nations Document S./13582 (22 October 1979), emphasis in original. 
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premise that ‘a strip of settlements at strategic sites enhances both internal and external security alike, 
as well as making concrete and realizing our right to Eretz-Israel’. The Plan then detailed how these 
settlements should be placed ‘not only around the settlements of the minorities [Palestinians], but also 
in between them’ and developed to encourage ‘dispersion of the [Jewish] population from the densely 
populated urban strip of the coastal plain eastward to the presently empty areas of J&S’.1334 
Subsequently, the Jewish Agency developed other master plans for particular settlement blocs, like 
Rehan, Ariel, and Gush Etzion, in which smaller settlements were established around larger ones to 
consolidate blocs of land. The language of these plans was explicitly to ‘Judaise’ the land: that is, 
increase the Jewish proportion of its population and ensure a strategic geographic dispersal of Jewish 
settlement. 
By the late 1990s, the grid of Jewish settlement had reached its present geographic configuration and 
had consolidated an integrated system of territory for exclusively Jewish use. Settlement blocs are 
connected to each other and to Israel through contiguous belts of land, closed zones, and highways 
that have the cumulative effect of carving Palestinian zones into a series of disarticulated enclaves 
connected by smaller separate roads, from which passage is controlled by checkpoints staffed by the 
Israeli military and private Israeli security forces, as dealt with in detail in Section 2F of this chapter. 
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs published an exhaustive study of the 
settlement grid in 2007.1335 Through GIS mapping, the study determined that almost 40 percent of the 
West Bank is now taken up by Israeli infrastructure, in which settlements, linked by a major highway 
system to Israel, have geographically fragmented Palestinian communities. Palestinian access to the 
West Bank road network is restricted by a closure regime consisting of approximately 85 checkpoints, 
460 roadblocks and a permit system for Palestinian vehicles noting that: 
Each Palestinian enclave is geographically separated from the other by some form of Israeli 
infrastructure including settlements, outposts, military areas, nature reserves and the Barrier. 
However, the Israeli road network is the key delineator in marking the boundaries of the 
enclaves. The road network functions to provide corridors for travel from Israel, and between 
settlements in the West Bank, and barriers for Palestinian movement.1336 
The operation of this system to divide territory into enclaves, which can accurately be understood as 
being ‘reserves and ghettos’, is illustrated by the case of Nablus.1337 A city with a population of 
130,000 and the regional hub for some 350,000 Palestinians, Nablus is encircled by 14 Israeli 
settlements and 26 outposts connected to each other by roads used primarily by settlers that stretch 
around the city and across Nablus governorate. These roads are in turn linked to ten checkpoints, 
including seven that encircle the city and through which all Palestinians going in and out of Nablus 
must cross. According to OCHA, in April 2007, only 10 percent of Nablus buses (22 out of 220) and 
7 percent of Nablus taxis (150 out of 2,250) had permits to access and use the checkpoints around 
Nablus city. Only fifty private Palestinian cars were permitted to use the checkpoints while more than 
seventy obstacles installed by the Israeli army block the road junctions and physically prevent 
Palestinian traffic from reaching the roads used primarily by settlers.1338 The city of Nablus thus 
constitutes a Palestinian reserve, in the sense noted above insofar as it is a physical area enclosed with 
the purpose of dividing the population along racial lines.  Conversely, Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank are also physical areas enclosed with the purpose of dividing the population along racial lines.  
For the purposes of this report, the settlements, if we understand them to be akin to ‘reserves and 
ghettos,’ are for the benefit of the dominant racial group, that is, Israeli Jews to the detriment of the 
Palestinian population.  Whereas the ‘reserves and ghettos’ of the Convention is clearly suggestive of 
                                               
1334 Ibid., emphases and acronym in original. 
1335 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The Humanitarian Impact on 
Palestinians of Israeli Settlements And Other Infrastructure in the West Bank (July 2007). 
1336 Ibid., p. 70. 
1337 See OCHA, 'Nablus: A City Encircled', ibid., at p. 89-93. 
1338 Ibid., p. 90. 
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the Bantustan policy of the illegitimate ‘Homelands’ promoted by the Apartheid government in South 
Africa, no such formal practice can be said to exist in the OPT. 
Nevertheless, international law prohibits the dismembering of a self-determination unit where this is 
unilaterally imposed. Indeed, several provisions of the Oslo Accords provide that the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip form ‘a single territorial unit’ whose integrity is to be preserved pending the conclusion of 
permanent status negotiations.1339  Moreover, Israeli settlement activity is clearly contrary to 
international law.  On 18 September 1967, Theodor Meron, the then Legal Adviser to Israel’s Foreign 
Ministry came to the conclusion that:  ‘…civilian settlement in the administered territories 
contravenes explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention’.1340  Likewise, on 21 April 1978, 
the State Department’s Legal Advisor Herbert J. Hansell concluded that ‘…the establishment of the 
civilian settlements in [the occupied] territories is inconsistent with international law’.1341  This 
position was most recently affirmed on 9 July 2004, when the International Court of Justice came to 
the same conclusion in its Wall advisory opinion: ‘Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (including in East Jerusalem) have been established in breach of international law’.1342 
The United Nations rejection of Israel’s settlement policy has been equally as categorical as its 
condemnation of the Bantustans established in Namibia and South Africa. For instance, in resolution 
465, the UN Security Council stated that ‘Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its 
population and new immigrants in [the occupied] territories constitute a flagrant violation of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention’.1343  In the same resolution it deplored the ‘continuation and persistence 
of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel 
to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an 
urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories 
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem’.1344 It further called upon ‘all States not to provide Israel 
with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied 
territories’.1345   
 
The EU has also consistently opposed Israel’s settlement policy and its member states have voted in 
favour of several UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israeli settlements.1346 In 1980, The 
European Nine (as it was then called) issued its Venice Declaration in which it considered that 
‘settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are 
illegal under international law’.1347   
 
                                               
1339 See the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Article IV; and the 1995 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Article XI.1. 5. 
1340 A scan of  the original Hebrew text of this opinion is available at: http://southjerusalem.com/settlement-and-
occupation-historical-documents/, and a complete English translation on the website of the Sir Joseph Hotung 
Programme in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle East (School of Oriental and African 
Studies, London) at: http://www.soas.ac.uk/lawpeacemideast/resources/48485.pdf.     
1341 See United States: Letter of the State Department Legal Adviser Concerning the Legality of Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 21 April 1978, in 17 International Legal Materials (1978), p. 777 at p. 
779. 
1342 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 at p. 184, para. 120. 
1343 SC Res. 465, 1 March 1980, operative paragraph 5. 
1344 Ibid, operative paragraph 6. 
1345 Ibid, operative paragraph 7. 
1346 See e.g. SC Res. 446, 22 March 1979; SC Res. 452, 20 July 1979; and SC Res. 471, 5 June 1980.  
1347 See operative paragraph 9 of the Venice European Council Declaration, 13 June, 1980, available at: 
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf (last retrieved 17 May 2009). 
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(II) G.3 Prohibition of mixed marriages 
(II) G.3(a)Practices in apartheid South Africa 
In apartheid South Africa, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 prohibited marriages 
between white people and people of other races. The Immorality Amendment Act, Act No 21 of 1950; 
amended in 1957 (Act 23) further prohibited adultery, attempted adultery or related ‘immoral acts’ 
(extra-marital sex) between white and black people and strictly forbade ‘unlawful carnal intercourse’ 
as well as ‘any immoral or indecent act’ between a white person and a member of any other racial 
group.1348 Those found guilty of ‘unlawful carnal intercourse’ or ‘any immoral or indecent act’ could 
be sentenced to imprisonment for up to seven years with hard labour and up to ten lashes where the 
male was under fifty years of age.1349 In some cases, even a kiss between people of different races 
could lead to a conviction in terms of the Act.1350  In order to apprehend persons ostensibly engaged in 
unlawful carnal intercourse across the racial divide, the South African Police were driven to extreme 
measures:  
Special Force Order O25A/69 detailed the use of binoculars, tape recorders, cameras and two-
way radios to trap offenders.  It also spelled out how bed sheets should be felt for warmth and 
examined for stains.  Police were also reported to have examined the private parts of couples 
and taken people to district surgeons for examination.1351 
Writing in 1981, David Harrison estimated that since 1950, there had been over ten thousand 
convictions under the Immorality Act1352 and commented that ‘prosecution has trailed in its wake 
social disgrace, family break-up and many cases of suicide’.1353  
 
(II) G.3(b) Israeli practices in the OPT 
Israel does not formally prohibit mixed marriages among members of various racial groups either 
within Israel or in the OPT. Mixed marriages are discouraged in practice only by the absence of civil 
marriage in Israeli law, which provides under the Family Courts Law of 1995 that religious courts—
Rabbinical courts for Jews and Muslim, Christian and Druze courts for Arabs.1354— have exclusive 
jurisdiction in the matters of marriage and divorce.1355 This arrangement creates hardships for couples 
from different religious groups or those without religious affiliation who wish to get married, leaving 
them only with the option of getting married abroad.  While these marriages are legally recognised in 
Israel and can be registered with the Ministry of the Interior, the Rabbinate does not recognise 
marriages when one of the partners is not Jewish.1356 
                                               
1348 Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook, p. 30. 
1349 Ibid., at p. 32. 
1350 Ibid., at p. 33. 
1351 Ibid. 
1352 According to Roger Omond, more than 11,500 people were convicted of contravening the Immorality Act 
between 1950 and 1980, and more than twice that number were charged.  See Roger Omond, The Apartheid 
Handbook, p. 33. 
1353 David Harrison (1981) ‘The White Tribe of Africa’ Macmillan South Africa (Publishers) (Pty) Ltd: 
Johannesburg at 172.  Roger Omond notes that over the twenty year period prior to the publication of his book 
in 1986, at least sixteen white men had committed suicide by gassing, hanging, shooting, drowning or taking 
insecticide after being charged under the Immorality Act: Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook, pp. 33-34.   
1354 Palestinian Order in Council (POC)-1922, Article 15(a). 
1355 Family Courts Law of 1995, section 3(B1). 
1356 Rabbi and Attorney Kariv, G. (2006, March). ‘Religion and State and the Israel Elections,’ Israel Religious 
Action Centre (IRAC), available at: http://rac.org/advocacy/irac/; Rabbi and Attorney Kariv, G. (2006, 
November). ‘Civil Marriage Abroad, IRAC; and Meranda, A. (2008, Feb. 13). ‘Knesset votes against civil 
marriage,’ Jewish World, Ynet, available at: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3506428,00.html. 
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As outlined in Chapter III, Israeli law applies to Israeli settlers in the OPT, and thus entails 
consequences for any ‘mixed’ marriage between an Israeli and a Palestinian in the OPT. First, on 
account of the authority of religious institutions, such a marriage can only take place outside of Israeli 
jurisdiction. Second, even if allowed to register the marriage with the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, 
the couple is not allowed by law to live together in Israel or East Jerusalem, as the Citizenship and 
Entry into Israel Law of 2003 precludes the Palestinian spouse from having any status that would 
allow them to live in Israel or East Jerusalem for the purposes of family unification. Third, the couple 
will similarly face both practical and legal obstacles preventing them from living together in the OPT. 
The Jewish-Israeli spouse is de jure barred from entering or living in Area A of the West Bank or the 
Gaza Strip. The Palestinian spouse is de facto barred from living in a Jewish-Israeli settlement due to 
the restrictions on access and residence by virtue of the permit system in the West Bank and the 
procedures of the various settlement councils, Jewish agencies and religious institutions that operate 
the settlements. 
The effect of these obstacles is that mixed marriages between Jews and other religious sects in the 
OPT, while not directly and formally prohibited, are rendered almost impossible in practice, thereby 
entrenching the division of the population along racial lines.  
 
(II) G.4 Expropriation of landed property  
(II) G.4(a) Interpretation  
Under Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, the occupying power is forbidden from destroying or 
seizing enemy property unless imperative for the ‘necessities of war’. Article 55 closely mirrors this 
near total prohibition on the destruction of ‘enemy’ property, placing an additional duty on the 
occupying power to administer public buildings and lands ‘in accordance with the rules of usufruct’. 
To show a breach of the prohibition against land expropriation in Article 2(d) of the Apartheid 
Convention, however, it is not enough to establish a practice of land expropriation per se: the practice 
must be established as designed to ‘divide the population along racial lines’ and to serve ‘purposes of 
establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of 
persons’.  
 
(II) G.4(b) Practices in apartheid South Africa 
In South Africa, deprivation of property ultimately disenfranchised the black population and ensured 
servitude and was further designed to divide the population along racial lines. The 1913 Land Act 
disenfranchised in perpetuity those blacks who were able to own property by limiting, and in some 
instances obliterating, their rights of land ownership except in designated ‘black’ areas (about 8 
percent of the country). Re-designation of urban areas along racial lines was effected through forced 
removal of blacks from their properties by state expropriation and their relocation to black townships. 
The effect of expropriation was to leave certain urban areas either derelict or as sites for white 
buildings.1357 Black people were allowed the right to acquire land only in designated areas, separate 
from the settled white areas, and ultimately only in the Bantustans. The comment by Stanford in 1892 
rang true during the apartheid regime: ‘…the labour question is bound up with the land question. The 
man who has no land and no trade must work for some one else who has.’1358  
 
 
 
                                               
1357  AJ Christopher The Atlas of Apartheid (Routledge, 1994), p. 140. 
1358 Cape Native Blue Book, p. 43; cited in H. Corder, Law and Social Practice in South Africa (Cape Town: 
Juta, 1988), p. 285. 
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 (II) G.4(b) Israeli practices in the OPT 
Israeli land practices in the OPT rest on a complex system. Under Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations,1359 Israel must respect ‘unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’ 
Israel has done so, but selectively, retaining vestiges of Jordanian and Ottoman laws where these 
contribute to restricting Palestinian property development and expanding Jewish settlements. Israel 
has also relied on the argument of ‘military necessity’ regarding ‘enemy property’ as well as ‘state 
lands’ and even private property.  
Upon assuming authority over the OPT, Israel upheld the Jordanian system of land law (except in East 
Jerusalem),1360 although it had rejected Jordan’s claim to be the rightful sovereign of the territory 
between 1948 and 1967.1361 Jordanian law was infused with earlier Ottoman law regarding land: 
ultimate title rested in the Sultan (or state), but private and collective land rights were derived through 
usufruct, as codified partly by tax laws.1362 Formal land registration was indeed avoided by many 
smaller cultivators because it incurred additional Ottoman taxes, and was seen as advantageous only 
with the advent of British and then Jordanian rule. By the time the OPT was occupied in 1967, only 
around one-third of land was registered. Israel then re-interpreted these untitled lands as ‘state lands’ 
in a different sense: as land to which individual users had no registered title and therefore no legal 
claim.  
Yet through reforms to extant land law, combined with military orders,1363 Israel has ensured de facto 
and de jure possession of the majority of Palestinian lands. Such actions do not constitute 
‘requisition’1364 or ‘expropriation’ as allowed in the Hague Regulations but rather appropriation, or 
unlawful expropriation, of Palestinian lands resulting in the annexation-by-proxy of the OPT through 
Israeli settlers.1365 The Israeli government's reliance on the argument of ‘military necessity’, coupled 
with its active support of settlements, highlights a blurring between public and private interests in 
                                               
1359 The ‘Beit-El-Toubas Case’ (1979), Ayyub et al. vs. The Minister of Defence (HCJ 606/78, 610/78), 
discsused in I. Lustick, ‘Israel and the West Bank after Elon Moreh: The Mechanics of De Facto Annexation’ 35 
Middle East Journal 557. 
1360 As discussed in Chapter Three, Israel claims to annex East Jerusalem on 28 June 1967 through the Law and 
Administration Order (No. 1), which states that ‘the territory of the Land of Israel described in the appendix is 
hereby proclaimed territory in which the law, jurisdiction and administration of the state apply.’ Quoted in 
COHRE & BADIL, at 71. By applying Israeli law, the Ministry of Finance seized sizeable portions of East 
Jerusalem for ‘public’ purposes before handing these over to private Jewish-Israeli developers.  
1361 Ibid., p. 67. 
1362 Raja Shehadeh, The Law of the Land: Settlements and Land Issues under Israeli Military Occupation 
(Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1993), pp. 20-24. 
1363 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and BADIL estimate in their 2005 report that 1500 
military orders had been issued by 2002 in relation to regulation of the West Bank and none of these have been 
revoked. Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) & BADIL Resource Centre for Palestinian 
Residency and Refugee Rights, Ruling Palestine: A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of 
Land and Housing in Palestine, May 2005, available online at 
http://www.badil.org/Publications/Monographs/BADIL-COHRE-Israel%20Land%20Regime.pdf, p. 80-81. 
1364 See, for example, Article 52 of the Hague Regulations. 
1365 ‘Requisition’ in international humanitarian law implies the lawful taking of private property, which strict 
limitations and limited temporal scope, for the needs of the occupying army. ‘Expropriation’, as referred to in 
the Apartheid Convention, is not generally used in the instruments of international humanitarian law, and is 
primarily examined in international law through the lens of procedural and substantive protections that 
international investment treaties provide to foreign investors (primarily against nationalisation). Expropriation 
entails the taking of private property by a state (or its agent) or the transfer of the power of management or 
control of a company to the state. It can be either lawful or unlawful. Generally, an expropriation is unlawful 
when it is discriminatory, not for a public purpose, or not accompanied by just compensation: see Donna Arzt, 
The Right to Compensation: Basic Principles Under International Law: Compensation as Part of a 
Comprehensive Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Syracuse University, 1999). 
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land. Use of land, whether termed ‘expropriation’ or ‘appropriation’ is only permitted in international 
humanitarian law when overriding military needs dictate. These needs are inherently public in nature 
and reflect the transfer of administration from enemy hands to those of the occupiers; private actors 
are not part of the equation. Yet Israel has consistently drawn on such public sphere arguments to 
facilitate the discriminatory transfer of land to private individuals, namely Israeli settlers.  
At the commencement of the occupation in 1967, the Israeli government immediately froze all 
pending cases1366 and implemented new requirements for land registration.1367 Public inspection of 
land registers was forbidden and any land transaction required permission from the newly endowed 
registrar of lands.1368 Jewish purchase of Palestinian lands was later facilitated through Military Order 
Nos. 811 and 847, which extended the Jordanian laws’ irrevocable power of attorney from five to 
fifteen years.1369 Only Israelis were empowered to validate signatures through this process, which 
avoided informing the land registry and thus public knowledge about the sale of land.1370 Local 
Palestinian courts had no jurisdiction over unregistered West Bank lands.1371 
Since 2002, large areas of ‘state land’ and Palestinian private land have been seized and/or destroyed 
for Israel’s construction of the Wall.1372 Although these measures were termed ‘temporary’,1373 the ICJ 
has recognised that the substantial alteration of landed property produces facts on the ground 
possessing long-term legal significance.1374 Seizures of private property are illegal and this illegality is 
increased when such lands are handed over to Israeli settlers, whose presence in the OPT is in breach 
of Article 49, as discussed earlier.1375  
The discriminatory purpose of Israel’s land and settlement policies in the West Bank was clarified in 
1978 by Mattityahu Drobles, then Head of the World Zionist Organisation Department for Rural 
Settlement, in his ‘Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983’. 
Drobles emphasised that the purpose of the Master Plan was demographic engineering in the interest 
of annexing the West Bank permanently to Israel:  
The civilian presence of Jewish communities is vital for the security of the state…There must 
not be the slightest doubt regarding our intention to hold the areas of Judea and Samaria for 
                                               
1366 ‘The land settlement operations were begun by the British in the early 1920s, and were continued by the 
Jordanian government. In 1967 they were discontinued by Military Order No. 192, and requests by West 
Bankers to complete these operations, especially in areas where all the stages except the final registration were 
completed…were denied.’ Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
1367 Military Order No. 291, Order Concerning Settlement of Disputes over Land and Water, 19 December 1968. 
1368 Under Military Order No. 25, Order Concerning Transactions in Property, 18 June 1967, Shehadeh, p. 59. 
1369 Military Order No. 811, Order Concerning Amendment to Law of Immovable Property, 23 November 1979. 
This Order was then amended by Military Order No. 847, Order Concerning Amendment to Law of Immovable 
Property, 1 June 1980. 
1370 See B’Tselem, Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, (May 2002), at 63. In the context of 
occupation, secret land dealings facilitate land alienation from Palestinians to Jews, as such transactions are seen 
by other Palestinians as a form of collaboration. 
1371 COHRE and BADIL, p. 100. 
1372 Article 46, Hague Regulations. 
1373 Elin B. Hilwig, The Barrier in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Protection of Private Property under 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005), pp. 41-42. 
1374 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136 at para. 121. 
1375 Where it can be shown that ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property…[is] not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and unwantonly’ then individuals may be held criminally 
responsible for such grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention under Article 147. 
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ever…The best and most effective way to remove any shred of doubt regarding our intention 
to hold Judea and Samaria forever is a rapid settlement drive in these areas.1376 
The Drobles Plan laid out a pragmatic programme of land appropriation:  
State and uncultivated land should be seized immediately for the purpose of settlement in the 
areas located among and around the population centres with the aim of preventing as much as 
possible the establishment of another Arab state in these territories. It will be difficult for the 
[Arab] minority to form a regional connection and political unity when split by Jewish 
colonies … in light of the current negotiations on the future of the West Bank, we are entitled 
to compete with time, as in this period everything will be decided on the basis of the facts that 
we create in these Territories.1377  
Aside from requirements for proving and maintaining title under Jordanian law, a number of different 
‘legal’ mechanisms were also introduced with the occupation to seize Palestinian lands in support of 
this settlement drive. One was the 1950 Absentee Property Law which, in conjunction with Military 
Order No. 58,1378 characterises an absentee as anyone outside of the territory during the 1967 conflict. 
Such lands could be seized by the Custodian (acting as part of the Lands Administration in West 
Jerusalem), who is then permitted to transfer such properties to the Development Authority, which 
included members of the Jewish National Fund.1379 This mechanism is essentially immune from 
review thanks to Article 5 of the Order, which states that: 
Any transaction carried out in good faith between the custodian of absentee property and any 
other person concerning property which the custodian believed when he entered into the 
transaction to be absentee property, will not void and will continue to be valid even if it is 
subsequently proved that the property was not at the time absentee property.1380 
This provision effectively allows an Israeli acting in ‘good faith’ to override all existing Palestinian 
claims to land. 430,000 dunums, along with 11,000 buildings, were seized under this provision in the 
first few years of the occupation, facilitating their later categorisation as ‘state’ land.1381 Thus, the 
declaration of ‘absentee’ lands was an important first step in establishing settlements across the West 
Bank.  
In the first decade or so of the occupation, settlements were also built extensively on Palestinian 
private lands sealed for ‘security’ reasons or expropriated for ‘military purposes’.1382 In this early 
stage, settlements were often erected on military bases. Until 1979, the Israeli High Court accepted 
military arguments for this practice on grounds of ‘security’, although a clear pattern was emerging 
between military lands and their later use by (Jewish) civilians. A petition brought by Palestinian 
landowners in 1979 sought to challenge such definitions and was ultimately successful in its object of 
distinguishing settlement ownership from ‘military necessity’. In the case, Elon Moreh, the High 
Court held that: 
                                               
1376 Extract of the Drobles Plan, from Matitiyahu Drobless, The Settlement in Judea and Samaria – Strategy, 
Policy and Program (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, September 1980), p. 3; quoted in 
B’Tselem, Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank (May 2002), p. 14.  
1377 Quoted in Al-Haq, Discrimination is Real: Discriminatory Israeli Policies in Israel, The Occupied 
Territories and Occupied East Jerusalem, Draft Paper presented to the World Conference Against Racism, 
Durban, South Africa, 28 August – 7 September 2001, p. 21. The Drobles plan went through several versions 
after its composition in 1978. 
1378 Order Concerning Absentee Property (Private Property), 23 July 1967. 
1379 Shehadeh, pp. 61-63 
1380 Quoted in Al-Haq, Discrimination is Real, p. 22.  
1381 B’Tselem, Land Grab, p. 59. 
1382 Military Order No. 259, Order Concerning Security Provisions (Closure of Military Training Zones), 13 
June 1968, lands seized from Palestinians have often been handed over to settlers. COHRE & BADIL, p. 128. 
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The army could not offer post facto justifications for land seizures when they were in fact 
initiated by a pro-settler political group (Gush Emunim, or, Bloc of the Faithful); 
Security grounds offered by the army needed to be specific and consistent with national 
security objectives; 
Ideological and/or political motivations for the establishment of settlements was distinct from 
security reasons; 
Permanent settlements could not be established on lands temporarily ‘requisitioned’ for 
military purposes as per the Hague Regulations.1383 
In this judgment, the High Court affirmed the application of the Hague Regulations along with its ban 
on the appropriation of private lands. Effectively, this ruling prevented future military seizures of 
private land for settler use unless an overriding security need could be proved.1384 
The Israeli government at the time responded to the High Court by respecting its ruling, but 
simultaneously sought new methods of land acquisition. An exhaustive land survey was accelerated 
immediately after the decision, to provide the occupying power with specific data about land 
holdings, to determine which lands were privately or publicly owned.1385 Public lands would be the 
source for most future settlements.1386 As mentioned above, Israel retained the Jordanian system of 
tenure yet altered this significantly through military orders. One example was Military Order No. 59, 
which authorises a designated authority to seize ‘enemy’ property for state land.1387 This Order 
enabled the Israeli government to declare 13 percent of the West Bank as ‘state’ land, parts of which 
were used for settlement construction.1388  Ambiguities and complexities over the definition of ‘state’ 
lands—lands that were unregistered or collectively owned—enabled Israel to declare a further 26 
percent of the West Bank as ‘state’ land.1389 Although this interpretation of ‘state lands’ eliminated the 
usufruct ensured by Ottoman law and custom, the appeal mechanisms devised for West Bank lands 
ensured that such decisions vis-à-vis ‘public’ lands were usually impossible to review. 1390 Palestinians 
had no standing to sue in Israeli municipal courts over ‘public’ lands.1391  
Furthermore, although the High Court had accepted to review private land requisitions, it has refused 
to hear matters over ownership status.1392 Thus, for Palestinians whose private land holdings has been 
                                               
1383 Lustick, p. 561. 
1384 It is important to note that although this case radically reduced the expropriation of private lands for 
settlements, the practice has continued to a lesser extent not via ‘military necessity’ arguments, but based on the 
Jordanian Law for the Expropriation of Land for Public Purposes. Lustick cites examples whereby such private 
Palestinian lands ‘were used solely for the benefit of Jewish settlements’. In a later HCJ challenge to this 
method of appropriation, the Court ruled that such land could not be seized when it was intended for the sole 
benefit of settlers (Zoo Haderech, May 20 1981). Ibid., p. 572 and 576. 
1385 Ibid., p. 568. 
1386 However, it is important to note that bypass road construction since 1994 has often occurred on privately 
held land through the declaration of ‘military necessity’. See B’Tselem, Land Grab, p. 50. As in the case of pre-
1979 civilian building projects, these roads have largely been created for the benefit of Israeli settlers and their 
state-sponsored guards, the Israeli occupying forces. The HCJ has upheld the government’s justifications of 
these roads being essential for security in the Wafa case, Wafa et al. v. Minister of Defence et al., HCJ 2717/96. 
1387 Order Regarding Government Property (Judea and Samaria), 31 July, 1967. 
1388 B’Tselem, Land Grab, p. 53.   
1389 Ibid. 
1390 See generally, Shehadeh, Part 1, pp. 11-30. 
1391 Lustick, pp. 568. 
1392 Ibid. 
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categorised as ‘public’,1393 the only recourse is to military-appointed administrative tribunals tasked to 
advise the military commander. The burden of proof in such cases rested on Palestinian owners, who 
were required to show indisputable title through formal Jordanian title deeds1394 in costly and 
complicated proceedings conducted mostly in Hebrew. Given the military tribunals’ strict 
requirements about modes of land use, these formalities proved too onerous for many land owners, 
who then saw their ‘state’ lands turned over to settlement construction. 
In contrast to rapid growth in Jewish settlements, development in Palestinian zones has been stifled. 
Zoning and municipality laws for Palestinians are a combination of Jordanian laws and military 
orders1395 and municipal boundaries in the OPT were frozen in 1967 despite rapid natural population 
growth.1396 Lands outside such zones are typically classified as agricultural lands or nature reserves 
and any construction on such lands is severely restricted.1397 Under the Oslo Accords, Palestinian 
construction was only possible in Areas A and B, about 40 percent of the West Bank.1398  
The picture in Jerusalem is much the same: it is estimated that between 1967 and 1995, 64,867 new 
housing units were built in the Municipality, only 8,890 of which for Palestinians.1399 In addition, 
despite the pressures of an expanding population, no new Palestinian communities have been 
established since 1967 in the area.1400 Where buildings have been constructed without the required 
permits, thousands of them have been destroyed in a concerted policy to stem development and 
punish Palestinian land owners through legal, administrative mechanisms. Particularly during periods 
of heightened unrest, house demolitions are common on ‘security’ grounds or as collective 
punishment where a link, often tenuous, is made between the building and an attack. Since 2002, the 
Israeli authorities have also used the absence of valid permits to destroy many properties during the 
construction of the Annexation Wall.  
This systematic transfer of land from Palestinians to settlers is racially discriminatory in intent and 
effect because all settlers in the OPT, although usually referenced as ‘Israeli’, are Jewish. An 
exclusively Jewish demography in the settlements is secured partly through internal rules developed 
by the settlement movements and partly through their planning by Jewish-national institutions, whose 
bylaws and ‘Covenant’ require that their funds and services benefit only Jews yet which operate as 
‘authorised agencies’ of the State (as discussed in section C.4, above).1401 The body that approves 
settlement construction, the Joint Settlement Committee—jointly composed by the Jewish Agency 
and World Zionist Organisation (WZO)—is comprised of an equal number of relevant Israeli 
ministers and executive members of the WZO. The Ministry of Agriculture funds the WZO’s 
Settlement Division and, until 1993, it was assisted by staff members from the Jewish Agency’s 
                                               
1393 For example, according to a report published in 1950 by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question 
to the United Nations General Assembly, only eight per cent of West Bank lands could be considered to be 
‘public lands’. Ibid., pp. 569. 
1394 Under the Jordanian Land Settlement Law of 1953. 
1395 For a general overview about town planning and development, see Coon, Chapter 5. 
1396 Military Order No. 194. COHRE and BADIL estimate that permits issued only satisfy 10 percent of the 
needs of an increasing population. See COHRE & BADIL, p. 120. 
1397 See generally Shehadeh, pp. 84-88. Another way of restricting land use is the classification of land as 
‘archaeological’ through a revision of the Jordanian Antiquities Law. Shehadeh cites examples of lands deemed 
to have archaeological significance (and hence prohibitions on their development attached) being used later by 
settlers. Ibid., p. 87. 
1398 COHRE & BADIL, p.121. 
1399 Ibid., p.125. 
1400 Ibid., p. 127. 
1401 See also Anthony Coon, Town Planning under Military Occupation (Aldershot: Dartmoth, 1992) pp. 172-
173. 
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Settlement Department.1402 A discrete legal sphere for Jewish settlers in the OPT is then secured 
through the dual legal system, as described in Chapter Three.  
 
(II) H. Article 2(e) - Exploitation of the Labour of the Members of a Racial Group 
(II) H.1 Interpretation 
Almost all international human rights instruments prohibit slavery, servitude and forced labour.1403  
Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour of the International Labour Organisation 1930 
defines ‘forced or compulsory labour’ as ‘all work or service which is extracted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily’.1404 Exploitation is a broader term that can embrace conditions of extreme worker 
vulnerability, in which people are under-compensated for their work yet have no effective means of 
redressing poor wages or conditions. 
 
(II) H.2 Practices in apartheid South Africa  
The apartheid economy relied on the exploitation of black labour and many apartheid laws, 
particularly the Pass Laws and Group Areas Act, were designed to serve major industries, in particular 
the mining industry. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1970 gave effect to the job reservation 
system, which reserved white collar work for non-blacks and confined employment opportunities of 
blacks at the lowest wage sectors.1405 
The aim of the pass laws was largely to control labour, by confining black people’s residence to 
segregated townships (or Bantustans) while securing their availability as low-wage workers to White-
owned industries.1406 All black labourers working outside the black areas (Bantustans) were 
designated as migrants. The effect of this was  
to use the pass system to balance white needs for security and labour, and additional 
legislation has been interwoven with it to form a 'daunting legal complex' establishing far 
reaching controls over African employment, housing, access to land and citizenship 
rights. Pass laws remain at the very centre of the legal complex, which has undergone 
continual adjustments as efforts are made to 'reform' the system without altering the 
existing distribution of power.1407 
Migrant labourers were not in a position to bargain within the workplace and lacked any trade union 
representation. The Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 and later the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 (which 
limited the rights to freedom of association and movement) effectively prohibited gatherings among 
workers that could foment dissent or the formation of trade unions. It was not until workers mobilised 
                                               
1402 Although the Jewish Agency had been authorised to develop Jewish-only settlements beyond the Green 
Line, this role was handed over to the WZO in 1971 once the tax-free status of its US donations faced some 
obstacles. B’Tselem, Land Gra, p. 21. 
1403 P. Sieghart The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford Clarendon Press 1983), pp. 226-229. 
1404 Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced Labour, adopted on 28 June 1930 by the General Conference of the 
International Labour Organisation at its fourteenth session, entry into force 1 May 1932, Article 2, paragraph 1.  
1405   M. Legassick and D. Innes, ‘Capital Restructuring and Apartheid: A Critique of Constructive Engagement’ 
(1977) 76 African Affairs at  448-449; Wolpe ‘South Africa: Class, Race and Occupational Structure’ Collected 
Seminar Paper No.12 The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Vol.2 (Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1971), p. 103.  
1406 Owen Crankshaw ‘Changes in the Racial Division of Labour during the Apartheid Era’ (1996) 22 Journal of 
Southern African Studies 4 at 634. 
1407  Michael Savage ‘The Imposition of Pass Laws on the African Population in South Africa 1916-1984’ 
African Affairs (1986) Vol. 85, No. 339, 182. 
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effectively through underground associations that workers’ representation was somewhat enabled 
through enactment of the Labour Relations Act 51 of 1982. This Act offered workers some rights 
regarding disputes over dismissals but did not relieve the fundamental inequalities that structured the 
labour sector.  
Former nationalist MP and Deputy Minister of Justice, Mines and Planning G. F. Froneman referred 
to the migrant labour system as integral to the economic structure of apartheid. 'This is, in fact, the 
entire basis of our policy as far as the white economy is concerned.’1408  This is echoed by an 
unequivocal statement by then Prime Minister B. J. Vorster who, in 1968, said 'We need them to work 
for us, but the fact that they work for us can never entitle them to claim political rights. Not now, nor 
in the future . . . under any circumstances.’1409 The effect of segregated residential and work areas 
forced family members to live apart. Men were forced to live far away from their families in the 
Bantustans or the townships.1410 Women remained with their children, though many living in 
townships were relied on domestic servant work in the White areas.1411   
 
(II) H.3 Israeli practices in the OPT 
Israel has no legal system of allotting particular jobs to different racial group. As discussed earlier, 
however, in regard to the right to work and pass laws, Israeli policies have restructured the Palestinian 
work force through the suppression of Palestinian industry, export restrictions, and other measures 
that have increased Palestinian dependency on jobs inside Israel.  
Before the first intifada, Israel made extensive use of low-wage Palestinian labour, particularly for 
agriculture, construction, and other manual labour. Through the mid-1980s, over 100,000 Palestinian 
workers from the OPT crossed daily into Israel. This ‘migrant’ system mirrored some of the labour 
dynamics associated with South Africa’s Group Areas Act and the Palestinian work force experienced 
much of the vulnerability and restrictions that black South African workers experienced under 
apartheid: low and insecure wages, lack of union representation, often substandard working 
conditions, employment confined to the lowest-wage jobs, prohibitions on living in the areas of their 
employment inside Israel, and forced by pass laws to return nightly to the OPT (or stay over illegally 
inside Israel). Since Palestinian workers were subjected to these conditions because they are not 
Jewish, the system of migrant Palestinian labour from the OPT constituted a form of labour 
exploitation on the basis of race (recalling the meaning of ‘race’ under international law, as discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter).  
After the first intifada, however, Israel raised barriers to Palestinian employment inside Israel and 
since 1993 the number of Palestinians from the OPT (excluding East Jerusalem) working in Israel has 
dropped to a few thousand. During closures, this number becomes negligible or nil. For some years 
after 1993, during closures workers could still evade checkpoints and get over or around barriers to 
pass illegally into Israel. With the construction of the Wall as a continuous barrier around the West 
Bank, the number of workers able to enter Israel during closures has dropped to nearly nothing. Since 
the election of Hamas in January 2006, access by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to work inside Israel 
has also dropped to insignificant numbers and now is effectively zero.  
                                               
1408  Cited in Godfrey Mwakikagile Africa and the West (Nova Publishers, 2000), p. 134. 
1409  Cited by Christopher Heywood in ‘Transformation’ A History of South African Literature (2004) 
Cambridge University Press, p. 156. [Emphasis added.] 
1410  Ellison Kahn, 'The Pass Laws', in Ellen Hellmann, (ed) Handbook of Race Relations in South Africa (Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 1949) pp. 279-91. 
1411  C. Simkins, 'The distribution of the African population of South Africa by age, sex and region-type: 1960-
1980', SALDRU Working Paper No. 32, South African Labour Development Research Unit, Cape Town 
(January 1981). 
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As this loss of income has had severe effects on the Palestinian economy in both territories, it is a 
source of great concern to Palestinians and to the Palestinian Authority. Thus the continuing 
availability of Palestinian labour to be exploited remains a factor in the conflict. Rather than 
exploiting Palestinian labour for its low wages and vulnerability, Israel has appeared to exploit that 
very dependency by using access to jobs in Israel as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the 
Palestinian Authority.1412 
 
(II) I. Article 2(f) – Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, because they oppose apartheid 
(II) I.1 Interpretation 
Article 2(f) provides that repression of opposition to apartheid—that is, to a system of institutionalised 
racial domination—is one hallmark of an apartheid regime. In reviewing Israeli or any other state’s 
practices in light of this section, however, a dilemma arises. Where a state has institutionalised racial 
domination as a comprehensive system of laws and practices implemented by state institutions—the 
defining quality of apartheid—opposition to those laws and practices could easily be equated with a 
threat to state security. Arguing that resistance to apartheid is illegitimate on grounds of sedition was a 
ploy of the apartheid government in South Africa (which often equated the anti-apartheid struggle 
with the global communist menace) and might be expected of any apartheid government. 
Nevertheless, distinguishing impartially between state actions to protect the state from sedition 
(legitimate) and actions to protect an apartheid regime (illegitimate) may still be difficult.  
 
(II) I.2 Practices in apartheid South Africa 
On 2 February 1990, South African President FW de Klerk announced at the annual opening of 
Parliament a commitment to a negotiated political settlement and the unbanning of the African 
National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party 
and other organisations and the release of political prisoners, most notably Nelson Mandela.  This 
event recalled years of political persecution and suppression by the apartheid Government.   
 
The TRC found that ‘in the period 1960–94, virtually all opposition was labelled “Communist” in its 
overwhelmingly negative ‘Cold War’ sense. Extra-parliamentary, and particularly black, opposition 
was considered illegitimate, and those associated with such opposition were effectively 
criminalised.’1413 The apartheid government’s efforts to suppress resistance to apartheid extended to a 
broad counter-insurgency strategy, sometimes called the ‘total strategy’, to repel the so-called ‘total 
onslaught’ of Soviet communism whose goal was believed to be the overthrow of the South African 
government.1414 The TRC found that this approach reshaped the regime’s entire approach to the 
resistance movement:  
 
The growing influence of counter-insurgency thinking – associated with South Africa’s 
involvement in the wars in the former South West Africa and Rhodesia – had a substantial 
impact on the patterns and modes of abuse reported. In the first place, it introduced a regional 
dimension to gross violations of human rights. Victims were increasingly non-South Africans. 
Secondly, as the political temperature rose within South Africa, models of crowd control 
employed by both the SAP and the SADF were informed by a counter-insurgency 
perspective. Thus counter-insurgency thinking was turned not only on a foreign but on a 
domestic civilian population. Increasingly, gross violations were attributed to those 
                                               
1412 See B’tselem, ‘Restrictions on Movement: The Paris Protocol’, available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Paris_Protocol.asp.  
1413 Final Report of the TRC, Vol. 2, Ch. 1, p. 6. 
1414 Final Report of the TRC, Vol. 2, Ch. 1, paras. 108–124. 
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responsible for public order policing, among them the riot police and later the SADF. Thirdly, 
counter-insurgency thinking legitimated and facilitated the emergence of covert units such as 
Vlakplaas, and resulted in an increase in the number of reported abductions and killings of 
political activists. This trend intensified from the mid-1980s, as the rationale of counter-
revolutionary warfare took hold within dominant quarters of the security establishment.1415 
State repression of opposition to apartheid included the practices cited earlier, such as arrests and 
torture, as well as more sweeping measures. In the early 1960s, the government banned the ANC and 
Pan-African Congress, which were forced underground in the early 1960s. In later decades, the 
apartheid government targeted both armed and nonviolent opposition to apartheid. The armed struggle 
was suppressed through broad definitions of outlawed conduct, including ‘communism,’ which was 
defined widely enough to include any doctrine or ideology considered undesirable by the state. ‘Listed 
persons’ could not be quoted, including those who had been defined as such under the Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950, later to become the Internal Security Act in 1976. The Government Gazette 
detailed weekly inventories of publications (national and international) that were banned under the 
Publications Control Act, for their political content. National leaders and activists of the ANC were 
also targeted for extra-judicial persecution by the state police, through harassment, beatings, and 
killings. Such measures eliminated or terrorised many prominent anti-apartheid activists: for example, 
by beating some leaders to death (such as Black Consciousness leader Steven Biko), maiming others 
in letter bombs (such as lawyer Albie Sachs) or eliminating prominent activists by assassination (such 
as Communist Party and Umkhonto wa Sizwe leader Chris Hani).  
 
(II) I.3 Israeli practices in the OPT 
Security for the state of Israel is conflated with the security of state institutions that fund, enforce and 
implement the system of domination over Palestinians. Consequently, Palestinian resistance to the 
policies, practices, and institutions that enforce this system is treated as threats to state security.  
Israeli practices falling under Article 2(a) of the Apartheid Convention, in particular, indicate an 
intention to persecute those opposed to Israel’s system of domination over Palestinians in the OPT. As 
noted, Palestinian political leaders and activists have been subject to targeted extrajudicial killings, as 
well as torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in prisons. They are subject to arrest 
and detention because of their political views and membership of political parties, as noted in the 
analysis of both Article 2(a) relating to arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment, and Article 2(c) 
relating to freedom of expression, and freedom of association. By the end of March 2009, 45 members 
of the Palestinian Legislative Council – over one third of the democratically elected parliament – were 
imprisoned in Israeli jails, the majority of whom were convicted of membership of political parties 
designated as illegal by Israel, and eight of whom were administratively detained without charge or 
trial. The intent to repress political opposition to Israeli domination is clear. 
Also relevant to Article 2(f) of the Apartheid Convention is the targeting and closure of charitable, 
educational and cultural organisations suspected of affiliation with Hamas or other banned political 
parties; restrictions imposed on human rights defenders who speak out against the actions of the 
Israeli armed forces and other instruments of occupation; and the widespread arrest campaigns and 
excessive use of force against Palestinian individuals and civil society organisations demonstrating 
against the Wall and the discriminatory administration of land, water and infrastructure in the OPT. 
Israel’s practices in these regards are reviewed under the framework of Article 2(c) – in Part II.F) of 
this chapter – relating to the denial of the rights to freedom of expression and opinion, and to peaceful 
assembly and association. From these practices, it can surmised that Israel is engaged in persecuting 
Palestinians who express certain political views, criticise Israel’s human rights practices or 
demonstrate against the occupation’s measures of domination. 
 
                                               
1415 Ibid, p.8, para. 29. 
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(II) J. Conclusion 
The analysis of apartheid in this report aimed to establish three things: (i) the definition of apartheid; 
(ii) the status of the prohibition of apartheid in international law; and (iii) whether Israel’s practices in 
the OPT amount to a breach of that prohibition. 
Though not defining the practice with precision, Article 3 of ICERD prohibits the practice of 
apartheid, as a particularly egregious form of discrimination. Subsequent legal instruments, primarily 
in the forms of the Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute, have developed the norm against the 
practice of apartheid in two ways: first, they criminalise certain apartheid-related acts, thereby 
reflecting the evolution of the international community’s views about the wrongfulness of the 
practice; and, second, they provide further elaboration of the definition of apartheid.     
The substantive core of the definition of the practice of apartheid is reflected in the striking similarity 
in the terms used in the Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute: the former criminalises 
“inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial 
group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’ while the 
latter criminalises inhumane acts committed in the context of and to maintain “an institutionalized 
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group.’ 
Both focus on the systematic, institutionalised, and oppressive character of the discrimination 
involved, and the purpose of domination that it entails. Indeed, the reason apartheid was singled out 
for mention in ICERD was because of its institutionalised character, and it is that character that is at 
the core of the definition.  
It has been established in this study that the prohibition of apartheid, which addresses a particularly 
severe form of racial discrimination and amounts to a denial of the right to self-determination of the 
subordinate racial group, has assumed the status of customary international law, and, further, is 
established as a rule of jus cogens entailing obligations erga omnes. 
Having clarified the definition of apartheid and the status of the norm prohibiting it, the principal 
function of this chapter was to briefly review apartheid practices in South Africa and appraise Israel's 
practices in the OPT in relation to the prohibition of apartheid. On the basis of the evidence presented, 
this study concludes that Israel has introduced a system of apartheid in the OPT, 1416 in violation of a 
peremptory norm of international law.  
The language of the Apartheid Convention indicates that the list of ‘inhuman acts’ described in 
Article 2 as comprising the ‘crime of apartheid’ are intended as illustrative and inclusive, not as 
exhaustive or exclusive. That a narrower range of policies could constitute a case of apartheid is 
suggested by the history of apartheid South Africa, where, for example, Article 2(b) regarding the 
intended “physical destruction” of a group was not applicable. A broader potential range of policies is 
implied by the qualifier of “similar policies and practices … as practiced in southern Africa”. The 
‘shall include…’ wording of the Apartheid Convention also suggests that a positive finding of 
apartheid need not establish that all practices cited in Article 2 are present, or that precisely those 
practices are present, but rather  that ‘policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination’ 
form a comprehensive system that has not only the effect but the purpose of maintaining racial 
domination by one racial group over the other.  
The construction of a ‘racial group’ is fundamental to the question of apartheid. The cumulative effect 
of the discussions in Part I.C) of this chapter—on the definition of ‘racial’ in international law, on the 
broad construction given to that term in ICERD, on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals on the interpretation of ‘racial group’, and on the perceptions (including self-
perceptions) of Jewish identity and Palestinian identity—is to illustrate that Israeli Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs should be defined as distinct racial groups for the purposes of the definition of 
apartheid.  
                                               
1416 The conclusions of this report draw on the evidence of practice over the course of Israel's occupation of the 
OPT through April 2009. 
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Israel’s status as a ‘Jewish state’ is inscribed in its Basic Laws, and it has developed legal and 
institutional mechanisms by which the state seeks to ensure an enduring Jewish character. These laws 
and institutions are channelled into the OPT to convey privileges to Jewish settlers and disadvantage 
Palestinians on the basis of their respective group identities. This domination is associated principally 
with transferring control over land in the OPT to exclusively Jewish use, thus also altering the 
demographic status of the territory. This discriminatory treatment cannot be explained or excused on 
grounds of citizenship, both because it goes beyond what is permitted by ICERD and because certain 
provisions in Israeli civil and military law provide that Jews present in the OPT who are not citizens 
of Israel also enjoy privileges conferred on Jewish-Israeli citizens in the OPT. In sum, the state of 
Israel exercises control in the OPT with the purpose of maintaining domination by Israeli Jews over 
Palestinian non-Jews. This system resembles that of apartheid. 
Consequently, Israeli policies and practices that correspond to practices cited in Article 2 of the 
Apartheid Convention, Article 5 of ICERD, and Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute can be interpreted as 
serving the purpose of maintaining racial domination by one group over another. Summarising this 
report’s discussion of the relevant practices with Article 2 of the Apartheid Convention as the guiding 
framework, the report has found the following: 
o Article 2(a) regarding denial of the right to life and liberty of person is satisfied by Israeli 
measures serving to repress Palestinian dissent against the occupation and its system of 
domination. Israel's policies and practices include murder, in the form of targeted 
extrajudicial killings; torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
of detainees; a military court system that falls far short of international standards for fair trial; 
and arbitrary arrest and detention of Palestinians, including administrative detention imposed 
without charge or trial and lacking adequate judicial review. All of these practices are 
discriminatory in that Palestinians are subject to different legal systems and different courts, 
which apply different standards of evidence and procedure that result in harsher penalties than 
those applied to Jewish Israelis.  
o Article 2(b) regarding ‘the deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living 
conditions calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part’ is not 
satisfied, as the Israel’s policies and practices in the OPT are not found to have the intent of 
causing the physical destruction of the Palestinian people. Policies of collective punishment 
that entail grave consequences for life and health, such as closures imposed on the Gaza Strip 
that limit or eliminate Palestinian access to essential health care and medicine, fuel, and 
adequate nutrition, and Israeli military attacks that inflict high civilian casualties, are serious 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law but do not meet the threshold 
required by this provision regarding the OPT as a whole. 
o Article 2(c) regarding measures calculated to prevent a racial group from participation in the 
political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and to prevent the full development 
of a group through the denial of basic human rights and freedoms is satisfied on a number of 
counts:  
(i) Restrictions on the Palestinian right to freedom of movement are endemic, stemming 
from Israel's control of the OPT's border crossings, from the Wall in the West Bank, 
from a matrix of checkpoints and separate roads, and from obstructive and all-
encompassing permit and ID systems. 
(ii)    The right of Palestinians to choose their own place of residence within their territory is 
severely curtailed by systematic administrative restrictions on both residency and 
building in East Jerusalem, by discriminatory legislation that operates to prevent 
Palestinian spouses from living together on the basis of which part of the OPT they 
originate from, and by the strictures of the permit and ID systems.   
(iii) Palestinians are denied enjoyment of their right to leave and return to their country. 
Palestinian refugees now living in the OPT (approximately 1.8 million people) are not 
allowed to return to their homes, while Palestinian refugees outside Israel and the 
CHAPTER IV  PROHIBITION OF APARTHEID | 273 
 
 
OPT (approximately 4.5 million) are not allowed to return to either territory. 
Similarly, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians displaced from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in 1967 have been prevented from returning to the OPT. Many Palestinian 
residents of the OPT must obtain Israeli permission to leave the territory (which is 
often denied), political activists and human rights defenders are often subject to 
arbitrary and undefined 'travel bans', while many Palestinians who travelled abroad 
for business or personal reasons have had their residence IDs revoked and been 
prohibited from returning. 
(iv) Israel denies Palestinians their right to a nationality by denying Palestinian refugees 
from inside the Green Line their right of return, residence, and citizenship in the state 
(Israel) governing the land of their birth. Israel’s policies in the OPT also effectively 
deny Palestinians their right to a nationality by obstructing the exercise of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination and preventing the formation of a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  
(v) Palestinians are restricted in their right to work, through Israeli policies that severely 
curtail Palestinian agriculture and industry in the OPT, restrict exports and imports, 
and impose pervasive obstacles to internal movement that impair access to 
agricultural land and travel for employment and business. Although formerly 
significant, Palestinian access to work inside Israel has been curtailed in recent years 
by prevailing closure policies and is now negligible. Palestinian unemployment in the 
OPT as a whole has reached almost 50 percent. 
(vi)    Palestinian trade unions exist but are not recognised by the Israeli government or by the 
Histadrut (the largest Israeli trade union) and cannot effectively represent Palestinians 
working for Israeli employers and businesses. Palestinian unions are also prohibited 
from functioning in Israeli settlements. Although they are required to pay dues, the 
interests and concerns of Palestinian workers are not represented by the Histadrut, 
and Palestinians have no voice in Histadrut policies. 
(vii) The right of Palestinians to education is not impacted directly by Israeli policy, as 
Israel does not operate the school system in the OPT, but is severely impeded by 
military rule. Israeli military actions have included extensive school closures, direct 
attacks on schools, severe restrictions on movement, and arrests and detention of 
teachers and students. Israel’s denial of exit permits, particularly for Palestinians from 
the Gaza Strip, has prevented thousands of students from continuing their education 
abroad. Discrimination in relation to education is striking in East Jerusalem, and is 
further indicated by a parallel Jewish-Israeli school system in illegal settlements 
throughout the West Bank, supported by the Israeli government.  
(viii) Palestinians are denied the right to freedom of opinion and expression through 
censorship laws enforced by the military authorities and endorsed by the High Court 
of Justice. Palestinian newspapers must have a military permit and publications must 
be pre-approved by the military censor. Since 2001, the Israeli Government Press 
Office has drastically limited Palestinian press accreditation. Journalists are regularly 
restricted from entering the Gaza Strip and Palestinian journalists suffer from patterns 
of harassment, detention, confiscation of materials, and even killing.  
(ix) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association is impeded through 
military orders. Military legislation bans public gatherings of ten or more persons 
without a permit from the Israeli military commander. Non-violent demonstrations 
are regularly suppressed by the Israeli army with live ammunition, tear gas, and 
arrests. Most Palestinian political parties have been declared illegal and institutions 
associated with those parties, such as charities and cultural organisations, are 
regularly subjected to closure and attack. 
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(x) The prevention of full development in the OPT and participation of 
Palestinians in political, economic, social and cultural life is most starkly 
demonstrated by the effects of Israel's ongoing siege and regular large-scale 
military attacks on the Gaza Strip.  
o Article 2(d) relating to division of the population along racial lines, is satisfied in the 
following ways: 
(iii) Israeli policies have divided the OPT into a series of non-contiguous enclaves or 
‘reserves’ into which Palestinians are effectively confined. Israel has further 
fragmented the West Bank by creating zones of land for exclusively Jewish use, to 
which Palestinian entry is prohibited without a permit, as well as by banning Israeli 
travel into Palestinian zones. The Wall and its infrastructure of gates and permanent 
checkpoints suggest Israel’s intention to impose a system of permanent cantons in 
which residence and passage will be determined by racial identities. A deliberate state 
policy of racial discrimination is indicated further by the role of Israeli government 
ministries, as well as the World Zionist Organisation and other Jewish-national 
institutions operating in partnership as authorised agencies of the State, in planning, 
funding and implementing construction of the West Bank settlements and their 
infrastructure for exclusively Jewish use. 
(iv) Israeli law does not formally prohibit mixed marriages between Jews and 
Palestinians, but the proscription of civil marriage in Israeli law and the authority of 
religious courts in matters of marriage and divorce, coupled with restrictions on 
where Jews and Palestinians can live in the OPT, present major practical obstacles to 
any potential mixed marriage. 
(v) Israel has extensively appropriated Palestinian land in the OPT for exclusively Jewish 
use. Private Palestinian land comprises about 30 percent of the land unlawfully 
appropriated for Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Presently, approximately 40 
percent of the West Bank is completely closed to Palestinian use, with significant 
restrictions on access to much of the rest of it.  
o Article 2(e) relating to exploitation of labour is today not significantly satisfied, as Israel has 
raised barriers to Palestinian employment inside Israel since the 1990s and Palestinian labour 
is now used extensively only in the construction and services sectors of Jewish-Israeli 
settlements in the OPT. Otherwise, exploitation of labour has been replaced by practices that 
fall under Article 2(c) regarding the denial of the right to work. 
o Arrest, imprisonment, travel bans and the targeting of Palestinian parliamentarians, national 
political leaders and human rights defenders, as well as the closing down of related 
organisations by Israel, represent persecution for opposition to the system of Israeli 
domination in the OPT, within the meaning of Article 2(f). 
In sum, Israel appears clearly to be implementing and sustaining policies intended to maintain its 
domination over Palestinians in the OPT and to suppress opposition of any form to those policies. 
While the comparative analyses of South African apartheid practices threaded throughout this chapter 
are there to illuminate, rather than define, the meaning of apartheid, and while there are certainly 
differences between apartheid as it was applied in South Africa and Israel’s policies and practices in 
the OPT, the two systems can be defined by similar dominant features.  
Part I.D of this chapter spoke to the key legislative foundations underpinning the South African 
apartheid regime: especially, the troika of laws—the Population Registration Act 1950, the Group 
Areas Act 1950, and the Pass Laws1417—which laid the foundations for an institutionalised apartheid 
                                               
1417 Inter alia, the Native Laws Amendment Act 1952, the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of 
Documents) 1952, the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 1955, the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation 
Act.  
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policy. These laws, respectively, allowed the apartheid regime to categorise the population along 
racial lines, segregate the population on the basis of those categorisations into different geographic 
areas allocated to different racial groups, and restrict passage by members of any group into the area 
allocated to other groups and thus any contact between groups that might ultimately compromise 
white supremacy. This strategy, called ‘grand apartheid’ by its South African architects, was then 
buttressed by two further pillars of apartheid: a pervasive system of institutionalised racial 
discrimination, which prevented the enjoyment of basic human rights by non-white South Africans 
based on their racial identity under the Population Registration Act, and a matrix of draconian 
‘security’ laws and policies that were employed to suppress any opposition to the regime and to 
reinforce the system of racial domination, including administrative detention, torture, censorship, 
banning, and extra-judicial killing. 
 
The analysis in Part II of this chapter demonstrates that Israel’s practices in the OPT can be defined 
by the same three ‘pillars’ of apartheid: 
The first pillar derives from how Jewish identity is codified in Israeli law and how Israeli law then 
extends preferential legal status and material privileges to Jewish  settlers in the OPT on the basis of 
their Jewish identity and discriminate against Palestinians on the basis of the inferior status afforded 
to them. The review of Israel’s practices under Article 2(c) of the Apartheid Convention provides 
abundant evidence of such discrimination in realms such as freedom of movement and residence and 
the right to leave and return to one’s country. The 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law banning 
family unification, the application of Israeli civil law to Jewish settlers in the OPT who are not Israeli 
citizens on grounds of their Jewish identity, and the denial of the Palestinian right to nationality 
through the 1950 Law of Return and 1952 Citizenship Law are particularly egregious examples of 
legislation that confers benefits to Jews over non-Jews and illustrate the adverse impact of having the 
status of Palestinian Arab. That inferior status is further highlighted through the application of a 
harsher set of laws and different courts for Palestinians in the OPT than for Jewish-Israeli settlers. 
The ‘Grand Apartheid’ policy to segregate the population into different geographic areas is evidenced 
by Israel’s extensive control of Palestinian land, which continues to shrink the territorial space 
available to Palestinians; by the hermetic closure and isolation of the Gaza Strip from the rest of the 
OPT; by the deliberate severing of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank; and by the 
appropriation and construction policies serving to carve up the West Bank into an intricate and well-
serviced network of connected settlements for Jewish-Israelis, and an archipelago of besieged and 
non-contiguous enclaves for Palestinians. That these measures are intended to segregate the 
population along racial lines in violation of Article 2(d) of the Apartheid Convention is clear from the 
visible web of walls, separate roads, and checkpoints and from the invisible web of permit and ID 
systems, comparable to South Africa’s Pass Laws, that combine to ensure that Palestinians remain 
confined to the reserves designated for them while Israeli Jews are prohibited from entering those 
reserves but enjoy freedom of movement throughout the rest of the Palestinian territory. Much as the 
same restrictions functioned in apartheid South Africa, this policy has the effect of crushing 
Palestinian socio-economic life, securing Palestinian vulnerability to Israeli economic dominance, and 
of enforcing a rigid segregation of Palestinian and Jewish populations 
The third pillar upon which Israel’s system of apartheid in the OPT rests is its ‘security’ laws and 
policies. The extrajudicial killing, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment of Palestinians, as described under the rubric of Article 2(a) of the Apartheid 
Convention, are all justified by Israel on the pretext of security. These policies are state-sanctioned, 
often approved by the Israeli judicial system, and supported by an oppressive code of military laws 
and a system of improperly constituted military courts. This report finds that Israel's invocation of 
'security' to validate sweeping restrictions on Palestinian freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, 
association and movement also often purport to mask a true underlying intent to suppress dissent and 
maintain control over Palestinians as a group.  
Thus, while the individual practices listed in the Apartheid Convention do not in themselves define 
apartheid, they have been shown in this chapter not to occur in the OPT in a vacuum, but to be 
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integrated and complimentary elements of an institutionalised and oppressive system of Israeli 
domination and oppression over Palestinians as a group; that is, a system of apartheid.   
The legal consequences of such a conclusion—for Israel, for the Palestinians, for third states, and for 
international organisations—will be addressed more fully in Chapter VI. In particular, that chapter 
will set forth the basis and contours of the legal obligations incumbent on the international community 
of states as a whole in respect of commission by Israel of an internationally wrongful act which, as 
both an especially heinous form of racial discrimination and an infringement of the right to self-
determination, entails obligations erga omnes.   
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Chapter V 
Conclusion: Findings and Legal Implications 
 
A. Summary Findings 
Both colonialism and apartheid are prohibited by international law. This Report has found 
strong evidence to indicate that Israel has violated, and continues to violate, both prohibitions 
in the occupied Palestinian territories.  
Israel’s denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination is comprehensive. It has shown an 
intention to violate the territorial integrity of the occupied Palestinian territories through its 
claim to annex East Jerusalem and through its settlement policy. Both are illegal in 
themselves, demonstrating an intention to acquire territory through the use of force. In 
addition, the settlement policy violates Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel 
has overreached the authority that it possesses under the law of occupation to govern the 
territories. It has exceeded its lawful authority to legislate for the OPT and has prevented the 
protected population from exercising political authority. It has deliberately adopted measures 
that have obliterated the separation between its economy and infrastructure and that of the 
occupied Palestinian territories: this separation is required by international law in order to 
prevent the unlawful annexation of occupied territory. Israel has also violated the 
Palestinians’ right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources through its discriminatory 
appropriation of land and water resources. In short, Israel has adopted and implemented 
colonial practices that have denied the population of the occupied Palestinian territories the 
opportunity freely to determine its political status and freely pursue its economic, social and 
cultural development. 
Israel has also introduced a system of apartheid in the occupied Palestinian territories. As the 
precedent of Namibia demonstrates, a State may breach the prohibition of apartheid in 
territory that lies beyond its borders but which is under its jurisdiction. International law 
defines apartheid not as isolated acts of unlawful racial discrimination but rather as a system 
of acts designed to establish and maintain the domination of one racial group over another. In 
the OPT, Jewish and Palestinian identities function as racial identities in the sense provided 
by ICERD, the Apartheid Convention, and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. Israel’s domestic laws and institutions are 
channelled into the OPT to convey special rights and privileges to Jewish settlers while 
denying fundamental rights and freedoms to Palestinians. Domination by the Jewish group is 
associated principally with transferring control over land in the OPT to exclusively Jewish 
use, dividing the population of the territory into Jewish and Palestinian enclaves, and 
restricting movement on discriminatory grounds and disadvantaging Palestinians in all areas 
of economic, social and political life. This discriminatory treatment cannot be justified or 
excused on grounds of citizenship.  Consequently, this study finds that the State of Israel 
exercises control in the OPT with the purpose of maintaining a system of domination by Jews 
over Palestinians and that this system constitutes a breach of the prohibition of apartheid.  
This study’s findings of colonialism and apartheid do not supersede, negate or affect other 
grounds for assessing Israel’s occupation as unlawful. The precedent of Namibia confirms 
that a State may breach the prohibition on apartheid in territory that it controls beyond its own 
borders. Mindful of the right of the Namibian people to self-determination;1418 of the fact that 
South Africa's presence in Namibia had outlived its legitimate Mandate;1419 of South Africa's 
                                               
1418 See, inter alia, General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966. 
1419 General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966; Security Council Resolution 264 
(1969) of 20 March 1969; Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970. 
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"policy of colonial exploitation" in Namibia;1420 and of "the evil and abhorrent policies of 
apartheid and the measures being taken by the Government of South Africa to enforce and 
extend those policies beyond its borders";1421 the UN General Assembly, Security Council 
and the International Court of Justice all found that South Africa's continued occupation of 
Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was "under obligation to withdraw its 
administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the 
Territory."1422 This study’s conclusion that Israel is breaching the international legal 
prohibition on apartheid, when considered in light of its prolonged occupation and colonial 
practices in the OPT in violation of the Palestinian right to self-determination, suggests that 
similar legal consequences may result. 
It must be nevertheless be stressed that the occupied Palestinian territories remain occupied 
and Israel’s duty to conform to the body of international law that regulates occupation is 
undiminished, along with its duty to remedy the illegal situation it has created through its 
colonial and apartheid practices. Israel’s observance of the law of occupation is primarily an 
issue of concern for it and the occupied population. Israel’s duty to fulfil its obligations under 
international humanitarian law is held in parallel with its duty to comply with the 
international legal norms that prohibit colonialism and apartheid.  Further, States parties to the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, in accordance with Article 1, are under the obligation to ensure 
that Israel complies with its requirements.1423 Accordingly, not only is Israel bound to desist 
from its unlawful practices under the internationally accepted rules on State responsibility, but 
members of the international community are equally bound to take appropriate action to 
ensure that Israel complies with its duties as a member of the United Nations and as a party to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
 
B. Legal Implications of the Findings 
This study concludes that Israel—through actions in the OPT that are attributable to the 
State—is delictually responsible under the rules of State responsibility for wrongful acts of 
apartheid and colonialism, as detailed in Chapters Three and Four. Colonialism amounts to a 
denial of self-determination, whereas apartheid is an egregious form of racial discrimination 
that itself constitutes a denial of self-determination.  
International law is inherently biased towards the protection of State interests. Although the 
Palestinian people has some international status because of its entitlement to self-
determination, the remedies available to it on the international sphere are limited, and 
principally lie in recourse to human rights bodies in attempts to ensure that Palestinian rights 
are respected. There exists some support for the claim that when an occupied population also 
finds itself under colonial domination, it has a right to resist this foreign occupation and 
colonial domination in pursuit of the exercise of its right to self-determination.1424 
                                               
1420 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 
1971, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun, para. 19. 
1421 Security Council Resolution 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970. 
1422 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Advisory Opinion of 21 June 
1971, para. 133. 
1423.See Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 200, para.159: it may be recalled that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross claims that all States are now parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
1424 UN Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 
of 24 October 1970. 
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The relative absence of remedies available to the right-bearer does not, however, have the 
consequence that Israel’s obligations are lessened or extinguished. The conclusion that Israel 
has breached the international legal prohibitions of apartheid and colonialism in the OPT 
suggests that the occupation itself is illegal on these grounds.  The legal consequences of 
these findings are grave and entail obligations not merely for Israel but also for the 
international community as a whole. Both are contrary to public international law and both 
involve breaches of peremptory (jus cogens) norms that have inescapable consequences for 
all States. States cannot purport to justify or excuse a violation of these peremptory 
prohibitions and all States have a legitimate interest in ensuring that such violations do not 
occur. What legal consequences of this finding then arise for other States and competent 
intergovernmental organisations? 
 
1. Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and States 
As was stated at the outset, this Report does not address the question of whether individuals 
might bear criminal responsibility under international law for the activities it has scrutinised. 
Nor has it considered possible criminal penalties or civil liabilities that private non-State 
actors—such as corporations—might bear as a consequence of their involvement in the 
activities examined. Essentially, these would arise under domestic law, although international 
law may be relevant in determining how that law should be applied.  
Rather, this study has focused on the question of State responsibility. In that respect, it serves 
no legal purpose to note that Israel’s responsibility may be perceived by its victims to arise 
from the ‘criminal’ nature of the apartheid and colonial practices as confirmed, inter alia, by 
treaties dealing with serious international crimes, such as the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Such treaties speak only to individual criminal responsibility.  
In its study of the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) initially provided for State criminal responsibility by adopting a draft 
Article which stated: 
An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an 
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the 
international community that its breach is recognised as a crime by that community as 
a whole, constitutes an international crime.1425 
Examples of State crimes given by the ILC at that time included ‘colonial domination’ and 
‘apartheid’. However, the ILC ultimately dropped the notion of State criminal responsibility 
from its 2001 Articles, due to opposition to the inclusion of this concept by some States.1426 It 
opted instead for a special regime regulating serious violations of peremptory norms that did 
not involve State criminal responsibility.1427   
                                               
1425 Reproduced, with commentary, at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/ILCSR/Arts.htm#A19.  The 
notion of State crime was first proposed in 1976 and was retained by the International Law 
Commission in Article 19 in its first reading of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility of 1996 (see 
Report of the ILC (1996) GAOR 51st Session (1998) 37 ILM 440. See also John Dugard, International 
Law – A South African Perspective, 3rd Edition, 2007 at 269 to 270. 
1426 See James Crawford , The International Law Commission’s Articles on State responsibility: 
introduction, text and commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), pp. 16 -20: the status of draft 
Article 19.2, regulating crimes of State, had been placed in abeyance in 1998 by the Commission, ibid, 
27. 
1427 See further discussion below on the special regime (represented by articles 40 and 41 of the 2001 
Articles on State Responsibility) for the violation of peremptory norms not involving State criminal 
responsibility. 
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Nevertheless, although States viewed the concept of State responsibility as controversial, its 
excision from the ILC Articles was not intended to indicate, as a matter of law, that this 
category of crimes does not exist.1428 After this substitution had been made, Japan commented 
that ‘the text... is still haunted by the ghost of “international crime”’. It has been argued that 
the notion of serious breaches of peremptory norms defined in Article 40 and the discarded 
notion of State crimes in fact refer to the same thing. Wyler, for example, has termed them 
‘the twin brothers of horror’.1429  
 
2. Responsibility of States 
The Charter of the United Nations obliges member States to promote ‘universal respect for, 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion’. The content of the human rights to be protected was 
subsequently spelt out in a variety of instruments and the right to bring a claim for a violation 
of internationally recognised human rights is well established in various human rights 
declarations and treaties.  
For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1430 states that, 
‘[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law’. Similarly, Article 
2(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1431 states that, ‘[e]ach State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity…’.1432  Article 
6 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination1433 
provides that, ‘States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective 
protection and remedies… against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human 
rights… as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or 
                                               
1428 See International Law Commission, Report on the work of its Fifty-Second session, UN 
Doc.A/55/10 (2000), 59, paras. 360-362, available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2000/repfra.htm; 
(also II(2) YbILC 59, paras. 360-362 (2000)). There is an extensive literature on crimes of States: see, 
for instance, Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The uses of Article 19’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International 
Law 339; Ian Brownlie, International law and the use of force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963), pp. 150-166, and System of the law of nations. State responsibility (Part One) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 32-33; Giorgio Gaja, ‘Should all references to international crimes 
disappear from the ILC draft articles on State responsibility?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 365; Andre de Hoogh, Obligations erga omnes and international crimes (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1996); Alain Pellet, ‘Can a State commit a crime? Definitely, yes!’ (1999) 10 
European Journal of International Law 425; Shabtai Rosenne, ‘State responsibility and international 
crimes: further reflections on Article 19 of the draft articles on State responsibility’ (1997-98) 30 New 
York University JILP 145; Christian Tomuschat, ‘International crimes by States: an endangered 
species?’, in Karel Wellens (ed.), International law: theory and practice. Essays in honour of Eric Suy 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1998), p. 253; and Joseph Weiler et al (eds.), International crimes of State 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989), Part Two. 
1429 Eric Wyler, ‘From “State crime” to responsibility for serious breaches of obligations under 
peremptory norms of general international law’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 1147 
at 1159. 
1430 General Assembly Resolution 217A (III). 
1431 General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex. 
1432 For a review of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR on the question of 
reparations, see Catherine Jenkins ‘After the Dry White Season: The Dilemmas of Reparation and 
Reconstruction in South Africa’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on Human Rights 421 at 423-9.  
1433 ILM (1966) 5 352. 
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satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination’. Article 14 of the UN 
Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment1434 
requires each State party to, ‘ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture 
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensations, including the 
means for as full rehabilitation as possible’.1435 
Further, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in its advisory opinion on the Legal 
consequences of the construction of a wall, Israel is required to observe not only human rights 
law but also the strictures of international humanitarian law. 
 
a. Responsibility of Israel 
The legal consequences arising from an internationally wrongful act are not uniform. Under 
the international law of State responsibility, Israel bears the greatest responsibility for 
remedying the illegal situation it has created, for instance by making reparations to victims of 
the human rights violations inflicted by Israel’s apartheid and colonial practices.  
The rules of international law regarding State responsibility were codified in the 2001 Articles 
on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC).1436 In Chapter II 
of the Articles,1437 the ILC stipulates that one of the essential conditions for the international 
responsibility of a State is that the conduct in question is attributable to the State under 
international law. The general rule is that the only conduct attributable to the State on the 
international level is that of its official organs or of others who acted under the direction, 
instigation or control of those organs. This general rule embraces the conduct of all States 
who through their agencies involve themselves in acts prohibited by international law, 
including apartheid and colonialism.  
                                               
1434 24 International Legal Materials 535 (1985). 
1435 For a review of the jurisprudence of the UN Committee against Torture on reparations, see Jenkins 
op cit 429-430. 
1436 The 2001 Articles were approved, without vote, by the General Assembly in resolution 56/83 (12 
December 2001), UN Doc.A/RES/56/83, operative paragraph 3 of which provided: ‘Takes note of the 
articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, presented by the International 
Law Commission, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution, and commends them to the 
attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate 
action.’ 
This approval followed the recommendation of the International Law Commission that the General 
Assembly take note of the Articles and subsequently decide whether to convene a diplomatic 
conference with a view to conclude a convention on State responsibility. See International Law 
Commission, Report on the work of its Fifty-Third session, UN Doc.A/56/10 (2001), 38-41 and 42, 
paras.61-67 and 72-73; and also Crawford J, Articles on State responsibility, pp. 58-60. In 2004, the 
General Assembly reconsidered this matter, and decided to defer its decision. See James Crawford and 
Simon Olleson, ‘The continuing debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility’ (2005) 54 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 959. The General Assembly has since adopted 
resolution 62/61 (8 January 2008), UN Doc.A/RES/62/61, in which it, once again, commended the 
Articles to the attention of States, ‘without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other 
appropriate action’ (operative paragraph 1), and included on the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth 
session consideration of whether a convention should be adopted, or other appropriate action be taken, 
on the basis of the Articles (operative paragraph 4). See also David Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State 
responsibility: the paradoxical relationship between form and authority’ (2002) 96 American JIL 857. 
1437 The Articles deal with responsibility in a logical sequence, starting with a definition in Chapter I of 
the basic principles of responsibility, and moving on in Chapter II to define the conditions under which 
conduct is attributable to the State. Chapter III spells out in general terms the conditions under which 
such conduct amounts to a breach of an international obligation of the State concerned. 
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The United Nations has paid particular attention to the issue of reparations, through the work 
of a series of Special Rapporteurs.1438 Their work subsequently developed into the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 2005.1439 
According to the Basic Principles, States are obliged to respect, ensure respect for, and 
enforce the norms of both international human rights law and humanitarian law that are 
contained in customary international law, as well as in the treaties to which a particular State 
is party. States must prevent violations; investigate any violations which do occur and, where 
appropriate, take action against the violator in accordance with domestic and international 
law; provide victims with equal and effective access to justice; provide appropriate remedies 
to victims; and provide for or facilitate reparations to victims.1440 
Reparation to victims is thus recognised as an integral part of the obligations of States under 
international human rights law and humanitarian law. As stated above, in terms of the Basic 
Principles, a State has the obligation to ensure respect for human rights, which includes the 
duty to prevent violations, to investigate violations, to take appropriate action against the 
violators and to afford remedies to victims. Where there has been a violation of 
internationally recognised human rights, a State has responsibility to make just and adequate 
reparation to all persons within the jurisdiction of the offending State. Reparation should 
respond to the needs and wishes of the victims and be proportionate to the gravity of the 
violation and the resulting harm. It should include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. In addition to providing reparation to 
individuals, States should make adequate provision for collective reparations to groups of 
victims and special measures should be taken to afford opportunities for self-development and 
advancement to groups which, as a result of human rights violations, have been denied such 
opportunities.1441 These are the more obvious responsibilities that Israel bears as the violating 
State.  
 
b. Responsibility of Other States 
The prohibitions concerning colonialism and apartheid are peremptory norms; all States have 
a legitimate interest that they be observed and have obligations consequent upon their breach  
While the ILC ultimately dropped the notion of State criminal responsibility from its 2001 
Articles for acts such as apartheid and colonial domination, as stated above, it nonetheless 
accepted that violations of peremptory norms were of particular concern to the international 
community as a whole, and opted instead for a special regime for the violation of peremptory 
norms.1442  This is contained in Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC’s 2001 Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Article 40 provides: 
                                               
1438 Theo Van Boven was appointed Special Rapporteur in 1989 by the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  The Sub-Commission suggested that 
international standards needed to be developed and remaining gaps filled to ensure that victims of gross 
violations in particular would have an enforceable right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
See T van Boven, Final Report on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, UN Doc No E/CN 4/Sub 
2/1993/8 (2 July 1993). Van Boven’s study was taken forward by the UN through the appointment of 
M Cherif Bassiouni, an expert on reparations.  
1439 General Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/147.  
1440 See Articles 1-3 of the Basic Principles.  
1441 Basic Principles, articles 15 to 23. 
1442 See International Law Commission, Report of the work of its 53rd session, UN Doc.A/56/10, 
Commentary to Chapter III of its 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
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1. This Chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a 
serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law. 
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure 
by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation. 
The consequences of a serious breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of 
general international law are set out in Article 41, which provides: 
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach 
within the meaning of Article 40. 
2. No State shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the 
meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 
3. This Article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part 
and to such further consequences that a breach to which this Chapter applies may 
entail under international law. 
The significance of these consequences is that they are multilateral and imposed on all States, 
as opposed to the remedies which may arise for a State directly injured by the internationally 
wrongful act of another.   
As yet, relatively little judicial attention has been paid to Articles 40 and 41, and their precise 
contours are yet to be developed. In the ICJ’s Wall advisory opinion, Judge Kooijmans was 
mystified over the substantive content of the duty not to recognise an illegal act imposed on 
States by Article 41.1443 In the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judge Cançado 
Trindade deemed these Articles under-developed: 
The relatively succinct treatment of grave violations—and their consequences—of 
obligations under mandatory norms of general International Law (Articles 40-41) in 
the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of the States (2001) reveals the insufficient 
conceptual development of the matter up to our days, in an international community 
that is still seeking a greater degree of cohesion and solidarity.1444  
Nevertheless, the ICJ’s ruling in the Wall advisory opinion echoes the terms of these two 
Articles1445 and both have been affirmed by domestic supreme courts.1446  For example, the 
                                                                                                                                      
Acts (henceforth ILC Report), p. 110, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm; II(2) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (henceforth Yearbook) (2001) UN Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), Commentary 
to Chapter III, 110; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Chapter III, p. 242. 
1443 Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 136, separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 219 at 231-232, 
paras.40-45, especially at 232, para.44. 
1444 Myrna Mack Chang v Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (25 November 2003), 
Ser.C, No.101, [2003] IACHR 4, Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 8, note omitted, available 
at: www.worldlii.org/int/cases/IACHR/2003/4.html#fn1. 
1445 Paragraph 159 provides that, ‘Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations 
involved, the Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal 
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in 
and around East Jerusalem.  They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in 
maintaining the situation created by such construction’: Simon Olleson, The impact of the ILC’s 
Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, (London: BIICL, 2007), pp. 237-
241: available at 
www.biicl.org/files/3107_impactofthearticlesonstate_responsibilitypreliminarydraftfinal.pdf.  
1446 Article 40 was affirmed by the German Federal Constitutional Court in case No.2 BvR 955/00 (26 
October 2004), see Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts: comments and 
information received from Governments, UN Doc.A/62/63 (9 March 2007), statement of Germany, 7 at 
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German Federal Constitutional Court referred implicitly to Article 41 in a 2004 decision1447, 
stating: 
The concept of peremptory rules of public international law has recently been 
affirmed and further developed in the articles of the International Law Commission 
on the law of State responsibility...This field of law is a core area of general 
international law that governs the (secondary) legal consequences of a State’s 
violation of its (primary) obligations under international law.  Article 40 (2) of the 
International Law Commission articles on the responsibility of States contains the 
definition of a serious violation of ius cogens and obliges the community of States to 
cooperate in order to terminate the violation using the means of international law. In 
addition, a duty is imposed on States not to recognize a situation created in violation 
of ius cogens.1448 
Furthermore, academic research has supported its customary status. For example, Gattini1449 
convincingly argues that Article 41 is declaratory of existing customary international law. 
By its nature and definition in the Apartheid Convention, apartheid is a ‘systematic failure’ to 
observe an international obligation within the terms of Article 40.2. It does not lie in isolated 
acts of racial discrimination, but is constituted by a systematic programme undertaken by one 
racial group to oppress any other. In its commentary to Article 40, the ILC observed that: 
To be regarded as systematic, a violation would have to be carried out in an organised 
and deliberate way. In contrast, the term ‘gross’ refers to the intensity of the violation 
or its effects; it denotes violations of a flagrant nature, amounting to a direct and 
outright assault on the values protected by the rule. The terms are not of course 
mutually exclusive; serious breaches will usually be both systematic and gross. 
Factors which may establish the seriousness of a violation would include the intent to 
violate the norm; the scope and number of individual violations, and the gravity of 
their consequences for the victims.1450 
As this Report has demonstrated, Israel’s violation of the prohibition of colonialism may 
readily be described as a ‘direct and outright assault’ on the exercise of the Palestinian 
people’s right to self-determination. The ICJ declared in the East Timor case that self-
determination is ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’.1451 In the 
Wall advisory opinion, it ruled that self-determination was a right erga omnes, that is, an 
obligation owed to the international community as a whole, and whose realisation all United 
                                                                                                                                      
15-17, paras.33-38. It was also affirmed by the United Kingdom House of Lords in A and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department No.2, [2005] UKHL 71 (8 December 2005), opinion of 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill, para.34. Further, in R (on the application of Al Rawi and others) v Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2006] EWHC 972 (Admin) (4 May 2006), the English Divisional Court noted and affirmed a 
ministerial reliance on Articles 40 and 41, see opinion of Lord Justice Latham, paras.69-70. 
1447 The case concerned the expropriation of land without compensation in the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation between 1945 and 1949.   
1448 See Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts: 
comments and information received from Governments, UN Doc.A/62/63 (9 March 2007), comments 
by Germany, 15-16, para.36: for an account of this case, see 15-17, paras.33-38.   
1449 Andrea Gattini, ‘A return ticket to ‘communitarianism’, please’ (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 1181 at 1185-1195. 
1450 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 40, 113, para. 8; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 40, 
UN Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), 113, para. 8; and also Crawford, State responsibility, 
Commentary to Article 40, p. 247, para. 8. 
1451 East Timor case (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Rep, 1995, 90 at 102, para.29. 
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Nations member States,1452 as well as all States parties to the UN Covenants on Human 
Rights, have the duty to promote.1453 The ILC’s exegesis of the Court’s jurisprudence 
concludes that self-determination has ius cogens status.1454  
Israel’s colonial practices in breach of Palestinian self-determination are equally as systematic 
as its practices of apartheid. Its settlements policy is not a series of isolated acts but a 
concerted enterprise, buttressed by the construction of roads and the wall. This policy is 
designed to fragment the territorial sphere in which the Palestinians seeks to exercise their 
right to self-determination through the establishment of an independent, sovereign, and viable 
State. Israel’s discriminatory appropriation of natural resources, principally land and water, 
violates the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which is the principal 
expression of the economic aspect of self-determination. This principle has also been violated 
by the intentional integration of the Palestinian economy and infrastructure into that of Israel. 
Accordingly, different components of the principle of self-determination have been targeted 
in ‘an organised and deliberate way,’ thereby meeting the threshold set by the ILC for the 
application of Article 40. The consequences for third States that arise from these breaches are 
clear: they must cooperate to bring these violations to an end, and must not recognise as 
lawful the situation created by these violations, or render aid or assistance in maintaining that 
situation. This last consequence is also dictated by Article 16 of the ILC’s Articles, which 
provides that: 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
Faced with a serious breach of peremptory norms—in the case at hand, Israel’s introduction 
of an apartheid system within the occupied Palestinian territories and its colonial practices, 
which amount to a comprehensive denial of self-determination—Article 41 imposes two 
broad and distinct obligations on all States, ‘whether or not they are individually affected by 
the serious breach’:1455 namely the duty to cooperate and the duty of abstention.  Further, 
should a State fail to fulfil its duty of abstention then, under certain circumstances, it might 
also become complicit in the commission of the initial internationally wrongful act under the 
terms of Article 16 of the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts.1456 
 
 
 
                                               
1452 By virtue of General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)(24 October 1970). In the Nicaragua case, 
the International Court ruled that resolution 2625 expressed rules of customary international law – see 
Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua case: merits judgment (Nicaragua v 
United States), ICJ Rep, 1986, 14 at 99-100, para.188: see also Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 
171, para. 87. 
1453 Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 171-172, para. 88: see also 199, paras. 155-156. 
1454 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 40, p. 112, para.5; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 40, 
p. 112, para. 5; and also Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 40, pp. 246-247, para. 
5.  
1455 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, p. 114, para. 3; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 
41, p. 114, para. 3; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 41, p. 249, para. 3. 
1456 The question of complicity is addressed below in section C. 
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i. The Duty of Cooperation to End Violations 
The first obligation, which the ILC emphasises is a ‘positive duty’, is the duty to cooperate to 
bring to an end the serious breaches of the peremptory norms in question: 
Because of the diversity of circumstances which could possibly be involved, the 
provision does not prescribe in detail what form this cooperation should take. 
Cooperation could be organised in the framework of a competent international 
organization, in particular the United Nations. However, paragraph 1 also envisages 
the possibility of non-institutionalised cooperation.1457 
The Commission noted that cooperation was generally taken within the framework of 
international organisations but did not specify the measures which might be required, as the 
choice of appropriate measures would depend on the circumstances of the particular situation. 
It simply stated that these must be lawful and constitute ‘a joint and coordinated effort by all 
States to counteract the effects of these breaches’.1458 This non-specific approach appears to 
follow that adopted by the ICJ in the Namibia advisory opinion.1459 
The law of State responsibility functions on the international plane where, characteristically, 
remedies for the breach of an international obligation will be sought by one or more States 
from another. The 2001 Articles identify two categories of States which may invoke the 
responsibility of another. In broad terms, Article 42 provides that a State is entitled as ‘an 
injured State’ to invoke the responsibility of another if the obligation breached was owed to 
the claimant State individually, or to a group of States and the breach of the obligation 
especially affects the claimant State. 1460  
This right of this category of States (‘injured’ States) to challenge the delinquent behaviour of 
another State is clearly established in international law. In contrast, the second category of 
States identified in Article 48 of the 2001 Articles (‘interested’ States), was seen by some to 
involve a degree of innovation. Article 48.1 provides that: 
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: 
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is 
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or 
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 
Article 48 continues that an interested claimant State may seek the cessation of the delict and 
guarantees of non-repetition, as well as reparation in favour of the injured State or the 
beneficiaries of the obligation breached. ‘Interested’ States are conceptually distinct from 
‘injured’ States, a matter which has attracted criticism from States themselves, some of which 
                                               
1457 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, p. 114, para. 2; Yearbook (2001), p. 114, para. 2; and 
Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 41, p. 249, para. 2. 
1458 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, para. 3; Yearbook (2001), p. 114, para. 3; and Crawford, 
State responsibility, Commentary to Article 41, p. 249, para. 3. 
1459 See Namibia advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 55, para.120. 
1460 If the Road Map is considered to be a legally binding international instrument, members of the 
Quartet fall into this category: see ‘A performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ annexed to a letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2003/529, 7 May 2003.  For Israel’s 
fourteen reservations see ‘Israel’s Response to the Road Map, 25 May, 2003, available at: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm.  
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have objected to the formulation of the distinction between injured and interested States, and 
the recognition of the latter category’s entitlement to invoke responsibility.1461   
In drafting Articles 42 and 48, the ILC elaborated upon the ICJ’s dictum in the Barcelona 
Traction case, which distinguished between obligations whose breach particularly affects one 
State and those obligations owed to the international community as a whole, and which all 
States have a legal interest in their protection: 
33. ...an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another 
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the 
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can 
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. 
34.  Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from 
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have 
entered into the body of general international law...; others are conferred by 
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. 
35.  Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are 
not of the same category. It cannot be held, when one such obligation in particular is 
in question, in a specific case, that all States have a legal interest in its observance. In 
order to bring a claim in respect of the breach of such an obligation, a State must first 
establish its right to do so...1462 
Articles 42 and 48 are not mutually exclusive: a State may be injured within the meaning of 
Article 42 by another’s breach of an obligation owed to the international community as a 
whole, which thus simultaneously gives rise to the possibility of interested States invoking the 
delinquent’s responsibility under Article 48.1463 While Article 42 expresses an established 
principle, Article 48 is generally seen as an example of progressive development of the law 
by the ILC. It received a mixed reaction from States1464 and, as yet, has apparently not 
received judicial scrutiny.1465 
                                               
1461 See, for instance, the comments of France, India and the Nordic States recorded in Bodeau P, 
Comments and observations by governments in the 6th Committee, 54th Session - 1999: summary of 
main points (1999), p. 11, available at: 
www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/projects/state_responsibility_document_collection.php, and State responsibility: 
comments and observations received from governments, A/CN.4/515 (19 March 2001), the Netherlands 
(61-62), China (69-70) and Japan (70). By 2001, however, the Nordic States had decided to support the 
distinction (70). 
1462 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd case, second phase, final judgment, ICJ Rep, 1970, 3 
at 32, paras. 33 and 35: compare 47, para.91: reaffirmed Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 199, 
para.155. On Article 48 and Barcelona Traction, see ILC Report, Commentary to Article 48, 126, para. 
2 and 127, paras.8 and 9; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 48, 126, para.2 and 127, paras.8 and 
9; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 48, 276-277, para.2, and 278, paras.8 and 
9. The germ of this development may be traced back to Roberto Ago’s Second report on State 
responsibility (1970), UN Doc.A/CN.4/233, [1970] II YBILC 184, para.23. 
1463 See ILC Report, Commentary to Part Three, Chapter I, 116, para. 3; Yearbook (2001), 
Commentary to Part Three, Chapter I, 116, para. 3; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to 
Part Three, Chapter I, p. 255, para. 3. 
1464 See State responsibility: comments and observations received from governments, A/CN.4/515 (19 
March 2001), 69-74 (and compare 60-66); and also Bodeau, Comments and observations, pp. 10-11. 
1465 In his separate opinion in the Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda) case, Judge Simma endorsed Article 48 in his separate opinion, but it is clear 
that this opinion was expressed on a point which had not been argued by the parties. See ICJ Rep, 
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Further, the scope of Article 48 bears a relationship to that of Article 40. Article 48.1.b 
permits States other than the injured State to invoke the responsibility of another where ‘the 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole’. The ILC’s view is 
that peremptory norms and those owed to the international community as a whole are 
essentially the two sides of the same coin: 
From the Court’s reference [in the Barcelona Traction case] to the international 
community as a whole, and from the character of the examples it gave, one can infer 
that the core cases of obligations erga omnes are those non-derogable obligations of a 
general character which arise either directly under general international law or under 
generally accepted multilateral treaties (e.g. in the field of human rights). They are 
thus virtually coextensive with peremptory obligations (arising under norms of jus 
cogens). For if a particular obligation can be set aside or displaced as between two 
States, it is hard to see how that obligation is owed to the international community as 
a whole.1466 
Nevertheless, the ILC views peremptory norms and core obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole as having different emphasis. Peremptory norms focus on the scope 
and priority of the obligations they embody. The focus of obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole is on the interest all States have in compliance, through 
their entitlement to invoke the responsibility of any State in breach.1467 Article 48, however, 
encompasses a wider class of delicts than Article 40 because it is not restricted to serious 
breaches of peremptory norms.  
In summary, the ILC Articles on State Responsibility recognise the traditional rule that a State 
may invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation is owed to the injured State 
itself, or to a group of States including that State and that State is specially affected. 
Moreover, Article 48, in Dugard’s words, ‘repudiates the 1966 decision of the International 
Court of Justice in the South West Africa Cases which held that Ethiopia and Liberia had no 
legal standing to bring proceedings against South Africa in respect of its treatment of the 
people of Namibia because they were not directly affected themselves and international law 
did not recognize an ‘actio popularis’, or right resident in any member of a community to take 
legal action in vindication of a public interest’.1468  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
2005, 168, separate opinion of Judge Simma, 334 at 346, para.32 and 347, para.35. Elements of an 
earlier draft Article which do not entirely correspond to Article 48 in its final form were considered by 
a 1997 WTO Panel Report on European Communities–Regime for the importation, sale and 
distribution of bananas, and by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber 
in the Blaskic case (1997). See Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts: compilation of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other 
bodies, UN Doc.A/62/62 (1 February 2007) 74 and 77-79. 
1466 Crawford J, Third report on State responsibility, UN Doc.A/CN.4/507 (10 March 2000), 46-47, 
para. 106(a), available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/345/10/PDF/N0034510.pdf?OpenElement. See also 
ILC Report, Commentary to Part Two, Chapter III, 111-112, para.7; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to 
Part Two, Chapter III, pp. 111-112, para.7; Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Part Two, 
Chapter III, pp. 244-245, para.7; and Andre de Hoogh, ‘The relationship between jus cogens, 
obligations erga omnes, and international crimes: peremptory norms in perspective’ (1991) 42 Austrian 
Journal of Public and International Law 183. 
1467 ILC Report, Commentary to Part Two, Chapter III, pp. 111-112, para.7; Yearbook (2001), 
Commentary to Part Two, Chapter III, 111-112, para.7; and Crawford, State responsibility, 
Commentary to Part Two, Chapter III, pp. 244-245, para.7. 
1468 John Dugard,  International Law – A South African Perspective (3rd Edition, 2007), 279. 
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ii. The Duty of Abstention 
The second duty, imposed by Article 41.2, is the duty of abstention, which has two elements: 
States must not (1) recognise as lawful situations created by serious breaches of peremptory 
norms, or (2) render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.  
Regarding the first element, the ILC expressly referred to an ‘attempted acquisition of 
sovereignty over territory through the denial of the right of self-determination’ as an example 
of a situation that States must not recognise.1469 Indeed, collective non-recognition of this 
situation is a prerequisite for any collective community response and is the minimum 
necessary response expected from States.1470 In relation to Israel’s colonial practices in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, at the very least this clearly mandates that all States must 
maintain their refusal to recognise Israel’s purported annexation of East Jerusalem and of any 
areas of the West Bank on which settlements have been constructed, including ‘seam’ areas 
between the green (Armistice) line and the Wall. Following the Namibia advisory opinion, 
States should also refrain from locating their embassies in Jerusalem, lest this be interpreted 
as recognition of Israel’s claim to have annexed East Jerusalem,1471 and ensure that the 
application of treaty relationships with Israel are not extended to the OPT.1472 Implementation 
of the duty of abstention in relation to economic aspects of self-determination is perhaps more 
fluid and straddles the duty of non-recognition and the second aspect which prohibits the 
granting of aid or assistance to the commission of the serious breach of peremptory norms.  
Nevertheless, the duty of non-recognition as such clearly requires that States deny Israel title 
to the natural resources of the OPT. 
Regarding the second element, the ILC observes that the duty not to render aid or assistance is 
a logical extension of the duty of non-recognition, but states that: 
[I]t has a separate scope of application insofar as actions are concerned which would 
not imply recognition of the situation created by serious breaches... This separate 
existence is confirmed, for example, in the Security Council’s resolutions prohibiting 
any aid or assistance in maintaining the illegal apartheid regime in South Africa.1473 
In relation to South Africa’s illegal presence in Namibia, the International Court of Justice 
ruled that States had a duty ‘to abstain from entering into economic and other forms of 
relationship or dealings with South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may 
entrench its authority over the territory’.1474 In his separate opinion, Judge Ammoun gave a 
more elaborate account of this duty, arguing that it prohibited: 
[A]ll economic, industrial or financial assistance, in the form of gifts, loans, credit, 
advances or guarantees, or in any other form. This prohibition is not confined to 
States. It naturally extends to institutions in which States have voting rights, such as 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Development Association and the International Finance Corporation.1475 
                                               
1469 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, 114, para.5; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 41, 
114, para.5; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 41, p. 250, para. 5. 
1470 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, 115, para.8; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 41, p. 
115, para.8; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 41, 251, para.8. 
1471 See Namibia advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 55, para.123. 
1472 See Namibia advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 55, para.122. 
1473 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, p. 115, para.12; Yearbook (2001), Commentary to Article 
41, 115, para.12; and Crawford, State responsibility, Commentary to Article 41, p. 252, para.12. 
1474 See Namibia advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 1971, 55-56, para.124. 
1475 Namibia advisory opinion, ICJ Rep 1971, 16, separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, 67 at 94-95, 
para.14.7: note omitted. 
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In short, in the economic realm, the duty of abstention imposed by Article 41 requires all 
States to ensure that they do not bolster the economic viability of Israel’s colonial and 
apartheid projects in the OPT. For example, the obligation not to recognise Israel’s title over 
natural resources has implications for trade in these resources, whether in primary or 
processed form. This is a general duty, not one confined to economic issues, and, as Judge 
Ammoun notes, it extends to international organisations whose activities are determined or 
controlled by their member States. 
 
c. The question of complicity 
Should a State fail to fulfil its duty of abstention (when faced with a situation arising from the 
serious breach of an obligation arising from the breach of a peremptory norm of international 
law) then, in certain circumstances, it can become complicit in the delinquent State’s 
internationally wrongful act, and thus independently engage its own responsibility by helping 
to maintain that situation.  Article 16 of the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that: 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
a. that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and  
b. the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
Article 16 has been affirmed as expressing a rule of customary international law by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court and by the ICJ. 
In ruling on the legality of the extradition to the United States of Yemeni nationals who had 
been arrested in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court cited Article 16 to illustrate that 
States may be held responsible for aiding or assisting the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act.  The Court held that: 
[T]he administrative authorities and courts of the Federal Republic of Germany are as 
a matter of principle barred by article 25 of the Basic Law from interpreting and 
applying national law in a way that violates such general rules of international law.  
They are also obliged to refrain form doing anything that lends effectiveness to acts 
performed in violation of general rules of international law by non-German sovereign 
entities within the territorial area of application of the Basic Law and are prohibited 
from playing any decisive role in such acts by non-German sovereign entities... 
... 
That State responsibility can under specific conditions be established by acting in 
support of third party actions that are contrary to international law is shown by article 
16 of the International Law Commission’s draft convention on State responsibility, 
which codifies customary international law in this field.1476 
Article 16 was also examined by the ICJ in 2007 in Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.1477 In considering the construction of 
                                               
1476 See Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts: 
comments and information received from Governments, UN Doc.A/62/63 (9 March 2007), comments 
by Germany, 12-13, paras.23-25.  Article 16 was also referred to in a decision of the German Federal 
Administrative Court in its 2005 decision on the legality of the war in Iraq: see N. Schultz, ‘Was the 
War on Iraq Illegal? – The German Federal Administrative Court’s Judgment of 21st June 2005’ 
(2005) 7/1 German Law Journal 25 at 33-34, available at: 
www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol07No01/PDF_Vol_07_No_1_25-44_Developments_Schultz.pdf.  
1477 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro: judgment of 26 February 2007. 
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complicity to commit genocide under Article 3(e) of the Genocide Convention, the Court 
ruled that it: 
419. ...includes the provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of the 
crime...although “complicity”, as such, is not a notion which exists in the current 
terminology of the law of international responsibility, it is similar to a category found 
among the customary rules constituting the law of State responsibility, that of the “aid 
or assistance” furnished by one State for the commission of a wrongful act by another 
State. 
420. ...The Court sees no reason to make any distinction of substance between 
“complicity in genocide”, within the meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), of the 
Convention, and the “aid or assistance” of a State in the commission of a wrongful 
act by another State within the meaning of...Article 16...In other words, to ascertain 
whether the Respondent is responsible for “complicity in genocide” within the 
meaning of Article III, paragraph (e)...the Court...must examine whether organs of the 
respondent State, or persons acting on its instructions or under its direction or 
effective control, furnished “aid or assistance” in the commission of the genocide in 
Srebrenica, in a sense not significantly different from that of those concepts in the 
general law of international responsibility. 
... 
432. ...complicity always requires that some positive action has been taken to furnish 
aid or assistance to the perpetrators of the genocide, while a violation of the 
obligation to prevent [genocide] results from mere failure to adopt and implement 
suitable measures to prevent genocide from being committed.  In other words, while 
complicity results from commission, violation of the failure to prevent results from 
omission...there cannot be a finding of complicity against a State unless at the least its 
organs were aware that genocide was about to be committed or was under way, and if 
the aid and assistance supplied, from the moment they became so aware onwards, to 
the perpetrators of the criminal acts or to those who were on the point of committing 
them, enabled or facilitated the commission of the acts.  In other words, an 
accomplice must have given support in perpetrating the genocide with full knowledge 
of the facts.1478 
Thus, the ICJ not only affirmed the customary status of Article 16, but also held that 
complicity under international law requires knowledge of the unlawful situation and the 
provision of positive support.   
The law is clear.  When faced with a serious breach of an obligation arising under a 
peremptory norm, all States have the duty not to recognise this situation as lawful and the 
duty not to aid or assist the maintenance of this situation.  Further, all States must co-operate 
to bring this situation to an end.  If a State fails to fulfil these duties, axiomatically it commits 
an internationally wrongful act.  If a State aids or assists another State in maintaining that 
unlawful situation, knowing it to be unlawful, then it becomes complicit in its commission 
and itself commits an internationally wrongful act. 
  
3. Responsibility of International Organisations  
The peremptory prohibitions on apartheid and colonialism which denies the right of self-
determination do not merely bind all States, but also, by extension, intergovernmental 
organisations to which they belong. There is authority for the proposition that States cannot 
evade their international obligations by hiding behind the independent personality of an 
                                               
1478 Genocide in Bosnia case: judgment of 26 February 2007, paras.419-420 and para.432. For further 
discussion of this aspect of the case, see Olleson, Impact of the ILC’s Articles, pp. 136-138. 
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international organisation of which they are members. This question was examined, albeit 
obliquely, in a case heard by the European Court of Justice, namely SAT Fluggesellschaft 
mbH v European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).1479 In his 
opinion to the Court, Advocate General Tesauro expressed the view that the fact that 
Eurocontrol was an international organisation did not insulate it from the Community’s 
competition laws. In justifying his conclusion, Advocate General Tesauro argued:  
Just as it is not permissible for a Member State to have recourse to its own domestic 
law in order to limit the scope of Community law, since that would undermine the 
unity and effectiveness of Community law, so it would not be possible to arrive at a 
similar result by relying on the obligations arising from an international agreement... 
In other words, if national public bodies and Member States themselves, in so far as 
they carry on an economic activity, are under an obligation to respect the provisions 
of Article 85 et seq. of the Treaty, they may not escape that obligation by entrusting 
the activity to an international organization.1480 
This consideration is capable of a more general application beyond the confines of the 
European legal order. It seems illogical to allow States to evade responsibility simply through 
the fact of combination. 
Moreover, in his Fifth report on responsibility of international organizations, the rapporteur 
of the ILC, Professor Gaja, stated that, like States, international organisations are capable of 
committing internationally wrongful acts which constitute serious breaches of peremptory 
norms of international law.1481 This conclusion had been foreshadowed in his Third report on 
the responsibility of international organizations, where Gaja stated that, under certain 
circumstances, the United Nations may be under a duty to prevent genocide. Using the failure 
to prevent genocide in Rwanda as an example, he commented: 
Assuming that general international law requires States and other entities to prevent 
genocide in the same way as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, and that the United Nations had been in a position to prevent 
genocide, failure to act would have represented a breach of an international 
obligation. Difficulties relating to the decision-making process could not exonerate 
the United Nations.1482 
Gaja’s conclusion reflects established international doctrine. For example, in an early phase 
of the Genocide in Bosnia case, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht ruled that the Security Council 
could not lawfully adopt a resolution which breached a peremptory norm and, if it did so, that 
act would be ‘void and legally ineffective’.1483 
In the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall advisory opinion, the International 
Court of Justice specifically recalled that under General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)(24 
October 1970), the Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly 
                                               
1479 101 International Law Reports 9 (1994). Eurocontrol, an inter-governmental organisation, was 
established in 1960 to provide common air navigation services in the airspace of European member 
States.  
1480 101 International Law Reports (1994) 17, para.7. 
1481 See Giorgio Gaja, Fifth report on responsibility of international organizations, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/583 (2 May 2007), 17, para.55, and also draft Articles 43 and 44, 19-20: essentially 
international organisations were assimilated to States in this matter. 
1482 See Giorgio Gaja, Third report on the responsibility of international organisations, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/553 (13 May 2005) 4, para.10, note omitted. 
1483 Case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide: further requests for the indication of provisional measures, Order of 13 September 1993 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Rep, 1993, 325, separate 
opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, 407 at 440-441, paras. 100-104. 
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relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations: 
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying 
out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of 
the principle.1484 
The Court also underlined that the General Assembly should encourage efforts aimed at 
reaching a negotiated solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict which would lead to the creation 
of a Palestinian State,1485 and that both it and the Security Council should consider what 
further action was required to bring an end to the illegal situation resulting from the 
construction of the wall.1486  
Failure by the United Nations to foster self-determination and combat apartheid when it is in a 
position to do so is no different from failure to prevent genocide. In both cases, the United 
Nations would be failing to act to discharge peremptory obligations which are incumbent on 
all its member States, as well as on itself. While the duty of States to co-operate to bring an 
end to serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law does not necessarily imply 
that such co-operation should take place within the United Nations,1487 this is a duty which the 
principal political organs of the United Nations should also discharge, as the ICJ indicated. At 
the very least, the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly and Security 
Council, is under a duty to act in good faith to foster co-operation to ensure the eradication of 
apartheid in the occupied Palestinian territories, and achieve the exercise of self-
determination by the Palestinians. As both norms prohibiting apartheid and colonialism have 
peremptory status, a failure to do so amounts to a serious breach of international law by the 
United Nations, one which engages its international responsibility.  
Similarly, Quartet members may have responsibilities over and above those arising for other 
States. It is significant in this regard that the United Nations is the principal global political 
organisation and is also a member of the Quartet.1488 It is also important to recall that the 
European Union is a member of the Quartet. Other regional organisations, even if not part of 
the Quartet, would in any event have to consider their response to Israel’s apartheid and 
colonial practices within the rubric of their own competence and responsibility to promote 
human rights.1489 The consequences attaching to States and intergovernmental organisations 
                                               
1484 Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 199, para. 156. 
1485 Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004, 201, para.162. 
1486 Ibid., p. 200, para.160. 
1487 ILC Report, Commentary to Article 41, p. 114, para. 2; Yearbook (2001), UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 114, para. 2; and also Crawford, State responsibility, 
Commentary to Article 41, p. 249, para. 2. 
1488 See, for example, Wall advisory opinion, ICJ Rep, 2004 200, paras. 160 and 161 in which the ICJ 
drew specific attention to ‘the urgent necessity for the United Nations as a whole to redouble its efforts 
to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to pose a threat to international peace and 
security, to a speedy conclusion, thereby establishing a just and lasting peace in the region’. 
1489 For example, the Constitutive Act of the African Union contains no reference to apartheid, but 
Article 3.h provides that one of the objectives of the Union is to ‘Promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other 
relevant human rights instruments’. The preamble to the African Charter contains a passing reference 
to apartheid—‘Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are 
still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all forms of 
discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion or 
political opinions’.  
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overlap. It is possible that States might best discharge some of their obligations through an 
organisation to which they belong. However, as demonstrated above, the failure of an 
organisation to act does not exonerate each member State of its responsibility to do so. 
 
C. Recommendations:  
1. That States Take Urgent Action to Uphold Their Legal Obligations in Respect of 
Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law 
 
The prohibitions of colonialism (as a denial of self-determination and violation of the 
prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force) and apartheid (as an egregious form of 
racial discrimination) are both established as jus cogens and their breach gives rise to 
obligations erga omnes. The findings of this report thus imply legal obligations on all States 
in relation to the internationally wrongful acts committed by Israel in the OPT. Accordingly, 
States are legally bound to pursue the following policies: 
 
o Not to recognise as lawful the illegal situation created by Israel’s practices of 
colonialism and apartheid in the OPT; 
o Not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that illegal situation; 
o To cooperate with a view to bringing the illegal situation to an end; 
o Not to render themselves complicit in the internationally wrongful acts in question 
by failing to fulfil the above obligations. 
 
2. That States Urgently Request an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of 
Justice 
The conclusions reached in this report provide a basis for urgent consideration by concerned 
States to call upon the UN General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice regarding Israel’s practices of apartheid and colonialism. 
Accordingly, in this Report it is respectfully recommended that States, in accordance with 
Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations and pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the 
ICJ, request the ICJ urgently to render an advisory opinion on the following question: 
Do the policies and practices of Israel within the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
violate the norms prohibiting apartheid and colonialism; and, if so, what are the legal 
consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices, considering the rules and 
principles of international law, including the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (1960), the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and other relevant 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions? 
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APPENDIX I: 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid 
[Full Text] 
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification by General Assembly resolution 3068 
(XXVIII) of 30 November 1973, entry into force 18 July 1976, in accordance with article XV 
The States Parties to the present Convention, 
 Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in which all Members pledged 
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the 
achievement of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,  
 
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour or 
national origin,  
 
Considering the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, in which the General Assembly stated that the process of liberation is irresistible and 
irreversible and that, in the interests of human dignity, progress and justice, an end must be 
put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,  
 
Observing that, in accordance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, States particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid 
and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under 
their jurisdiction,  
 
Observing that, in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, certain acts which may also be qualified as acts of apartheid constitute a crime 
under international law,  
Observing that, in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, "inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid" 
are qualified as crimes against humanity, Observing that the General Assembly of the United 
Nations has adopted a number of resolutions in which the policies and practices of apartheid 
are condemned as a crime against humanity,  
Observing that the Security Council has emphasized that apartheid and its continued 
intensification and expansion seriously disturb and threaten international peace and security, 
Convinced that an International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid would make it possible to take more effective measures at the international and 
national levels with a view to the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid, Have 
agreed as follows:  
Article I  
1. The States Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime against 
humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and 
similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II 
of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the 
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purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat 
to international peace and security.  
2. The States Parties to the present Convention declare criminal those organizations, 
institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid.  
Article II  
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term "the crime of apartheid", which shall 
include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in 
southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial 
group of persons and systematically oppressing them:  
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty 
of person:  
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;  
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily 
or mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting 
them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;  
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or 
groups;  
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause 
its or their physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or 
groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and 
the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or 
groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights 
and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right 
to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right to a nationality, the 
right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;  
d) Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along 
racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group 
or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the 
expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof;  
 (e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by 
submitting them to forced labour;  
(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, because they oppose apartheid.  
Article III  
International criminal responsibility shall apply, irrespective of the motive involved, to 
individuals, members of organizations and institutions and representatives of the State, 
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whether residing in the territory of the State in which the acts are perpetrated or in some other 
State, whenever they:  
(a) Commit, participate in, directly incite or conspire in the commission of the acts mentioned 
in article II of the present Convention;  
(b) Directly abet, encourage or co-operate in the commission of the crime of apartheid.  
Article IV  
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake:  
(a) To adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to prevent any 
encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their 
manifestations and to punish persons guilty of that crime;  
(b) To adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to prosecute, bring to trial and 
punish in accordance with their jurisdiction persons responsible for, or accused of, the acts 
defined in article II of the present Convention, whether or not such persons reside in the 
territory of the State in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that State or of some 
other State or are stateless persons.  
Article V  
Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of the present Convention may be tried 
by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which may acquire jurisdiction 
over the person of the accused or by an international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with 
respect to those States Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.  
Article VI  
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to accept and carry out in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations the decisions taken by the Security Council aimed at 
the prevention, suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid, and to co-operate in the 
implementation of decisions adopted by other competent organs of the United Nations with a 
view to achieving the purposes of the Convention.  
Article VII  
1. The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to submit periodic reports to the 
group established under article IX on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
measures that they have adopted and that give effect to the provisions of the Convention.  
2. Copies of the reports shall be transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to the Special Committee on Apartheid.  
Article VIII  
Any State Party to the present Convention may call upon any competent organ of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as it considers appropriate 
for the prevention and suppression of the crime of apartheid. 
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Article IX  
1. The Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights shall appoint a group consisting of 
three members of the Commission on Human Rights, who are also representatives of States 
Parties to the present Convention, to consider reports submitted by States Parties in 
accordance with article VII.  
2. If, among the members of the Commission on Human Rights, there are no representatives 
of States Parties to the present Convention or if there are fewer than three such 
representatives, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consulting all States 
Parties to the Convention, designate a representative of the State Party or representatives of 
the States Parties which are not members of the Commission on Human Rights to take part in 
the work of the group established in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, until such 
time as representatives of the States Parties to the Convention are elected to the Commission 
on Human Rights.  
3. The group may meet for a period of not more than five days, either before the opening or 
after the closing of the session of the Commission on Human Rights, to consider the reports 
submitted in accordance with article VII.  
Article X  
1 . The States Parties to the present Convention empower the Commission on Human Rights:  
(a) To request United Nations organs, when transmitting copies of petitions under article 15 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to 
draw its attention to complaints concerning acts which are enumerated in article II of the 
present Convention;  
(b) To prepare, on the basis of reports from competent organs of the United Nations and 
periodic reports from States Parties to the present Convention, a list of individuals, 
organizations, institutions and representatives of States which are alleged to be responsible for 
the crimes enumerated in article II of the Convention, as well as those against whom legal 
proceedings have been undertaken by States Parties to the Convention;  
(c) To request information from the competent United Nations organs concerning measures 
taken by the authorities responsible for the administration of Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories, and all other Territories to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 
December 1960 applies, with regard to such individuals alleged to be responsible for crimes 
under article II of the Convention who are believed to be under their territorial and 
administrative jurisdiction.  
 
2. Pending the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 
1514 (XV), the provisions of the present Convention shall in no way limit the right of petition 
granted to those peoples by other international instruments or by the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies. 
Article XI  
1. Acts enumerated in article II of the present Convention shall not be considered political 
crimes for the purpose of extradition.  
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2. The States Parties to the present Convention undertake in such cases to grant extradition in 
accordance with their legislation and with the treaties in force.  
Article XII  
Disputes between States Parties arising out of the interpretation, application or 
implementation of the present Convention which have not been settled by negotiation shall, at 
the request of the States parties to the dispute, be brought before the International Court of 
Justice, save where the parties to the dispute have agreed on some other form of settlement.  
Article XIII  
The present Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the 
Convention before its entry into force may accede to it.  
Article XIV  
1. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.  
Article XV  
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the 
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of 
ratification or accession.  
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the 
twentieth instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the Convention shall enter into 
force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or 
instrument of accession.  
Article XVI  
A State Party may denounce the present Convention by written notification to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt 
of the notification by the Secretary-General.  
   
Article XVII  
1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any State 
Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.  
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be 
taken in respect of such request.  
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Article XVIII  
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States of the following 
particulars:  
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles XIII and XIV;  
(b) The date of entry into force of the present Convention under article XV;  
(c) Denunciations under article XVI;  
(d) Notifications under article XVII.  
Article XIX  
1. The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts 
are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.  
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of the present 
Convention to all States. 
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Appendix II 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
[Full Text] 
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 
 
The General Assembly,  
 
Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United 
Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, 
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom,  
Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and 
friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all 
peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,  
Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of 
such peoples in the attainment of their independence,  
A ware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the 
freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,  
Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in 
Trust and Non- Self- Governing Territories,  
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its 
manifestations,  
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international 
economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples 
and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,  
Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon 
the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,  
Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious 
crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination 
associated therewith,  
Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and 
independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories 
which have not yet attained independence,  
Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their 
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,  
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its 
forms and manifestations;  
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And to this end Declares that:  
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to 
the promotion of world peace and co-operation.  
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.  
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence.  
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease 
in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the 
integrity of their national territory shall be respected.  
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories 
which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, 
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, 
without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete 
independence and freedom.  
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity 
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-
interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and 
their territorial integrity. 
 
 
